

UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DO PARANÁ

LUCCAS DANNIEL MAIER CECHETTO

MERITOCRACIA: AVALIAÇÃO SISTEMÁTICA DE PROCESSOS
COMPORTAMENTAIS PRESENTES NOS CONTEXTOS DE OCORRÊNCIA DO
CONCEITO EM AMOSTRA DA LITERATURA ESPECIALIZADA

CURITIBA/PR

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obtenção do título de Mestre em Psicologia, pertencente
à Linha de Pesquisa em Análise do Comportamento do
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Ciências Humanas, da Universidade Federal do Paraná.

Orientador: Prof. Dr. Alexandre Dittrich

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Os membros da Banca Examinadora designada pelo Colegiado do Programa de Pós-Graduação em PSICOLOGIA da Universidade Federal do Paraná foram convocados para realizar a arguição da Dissertação de Mestrado de **LUCCAS DANNIEL MAIER CECETTO** intitulada: **MERITOCRACIA: AVALIAÇÃO CRÍTICA DE PROCESSOS COMPORTAMENTAIS QUE CONTROLAM O USO DO CONCEITO EM AMOSTRA DA LITERATURA ESPECIALIZADA**, sob orientação do Prof. Dr. ALEXANDRE DITTRICH,

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Atenciosamente,



Prof. Dr. Alexandre Dittrich

Orientador

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RESUMO

O primeiro registro do termo meritocracia se deu em 1956, mas seus princípios podem ser encontrados desde Confúcio, a partir do século V AC, no contexto da alocação de cargos na burocracia governamental chinesa. No ocidente, os princípios protestantes, apontados como os principais pilares filosóficos do que veio a constituir o ideal meritocrático ocidental, foram levados por seus pregadores, que fugiam da perseguição da coroa inglesa, para as colônias inglesas nos EUA. A fim de aumentar a visibilidade sobre a relevância dos debates sobre meritocracia para a comunidade analítico-comportamental e oferecendo subsídios a partir do behaviorismo radical para possíveis discussões, buscou-se avaliar criticamente o uso do termo ‘meritocracia’ em amostra da literatura acadêmica especializada. A partir da organização dos resultados, buscou-se: (a) definir o problema: identificar as condições de estímulo que controlam o uso do termo meritocracia (ou *meritocracy*) em literatura selecionada e avaliar criticamente tais usos, buscando subsidiar uma possível interpretação do conceito, a partir de conceitos do behaviorismo radical e da análise do comportamento; (b) especificar as informações: identificar os controles mais recorrentes no uso do termo na literatura em geral; (c) selecionar as fontes: adoção do Portal de Periódicos CAPES como base de dados com amostra representativa da literatura acadêmica de alta qualidade sobre o tema, selecionando artigos revisados por pares em inglês, português e espanhol que apresentassem o termo ‘meritocracia’ ou ‘*meritocracy*’ no título e no corpo do texto; além de uso do critério *SCImago Journal & Country Rank* ($SJR \geq 1$ para os periódicos); (d) levantar as informações: sistematização das ocorrências de palavras com o radical *merit-* nos textos; classificação nas áreas do saber, segundo classificação do SJR e; divisão dos estudos em teóricos e empíricos, e, por fim; (e) tratar as informações: além da própria seleção da literatura; identificação dos controles mais recorrentes em termos (1) das áreas do saber, (2) do tipo de estudo, (3) dos disparadores de debate mais frequentes, (4) das metodologias e (5) das conclusões. Esse tratamento das informações também envolveu uma avaliação crítica, a partir dos princípios do behaviorismo radical, dos usos mais frequentes de ‘meritocracia’. As áreas que mais tiveram publicações sobre o tema foram: Ciências Sociais, Psicologia e Educação. Nas discussões contemporâneas nessas áreas, a distinção entre a proposta oriental e ocidental atravessa boa parte dos artigos aqui analisados. Quando a discussão orbita em torno de métodos de seleção (ou admissão, promoção etc.), a meritocracia é tratada como sistema de justiça distributiva, segundo o qual os bens sociais (i.e.: acesso à saúde) seriam distribuídos da maneira mais justa. Quando é discutida à luz do “Sonho Americano”, costuma ser tratada como ideologia hierarquizante, ou que justifica o sistema como está (desigual e estratificado). Além disso, outros temas recorrentes nos trabalhos aqui expostos são as relações entre crença na meritocracia e percepção de desigualdades e de discriminação; os critérios utilizados para aferir mérito; a ênfase nas credenciais acadêmicas como demonstradoras de mérito; e os efeitos do discurso meritocrático no sistema educacional. Algumas possibilidades de debates são apontadas para os analistas do comportamento, envolvendo agências de controle, a discussão skinneriana sobre liberdade e dignidade e a teoria das molduras relacionais.

Palavras-chave: mérito, meritocracia, análise do comportamento, ideologia, sistema de distribuição.

ABSTRACT

The first register of the term 'meritocracy' is found in 1956, but its principles date back to Confucius, from the 5th century BC and onwards, in the context of professional assignment in the Chinese government bureaucracy. In the West, Protestant principles, pointed out as the main philosophical pillars of what came to constitute the Western meritocratic ideal, were taken by their preachers, who fled from the persecution of the Crown of England, to the English colonies in the U.S.A. In order to increase visibility on the relevance of the debates on meritocracy for the analytic-behavioral community and, also, to offer insights from radical behaviorism for possible discussions, the use of the term 'meritocracy' was critically evaluated in a sample of specialized academic literature. After organizing the results, we sought to: (a) define the problem: identifying the stimulus conditions that control the use of the term meritocracy in selected literature and critically evaluating such uses, seeking to provide a possible interpretation of the concept, based on concepts of radical behaviorism; (b) specify the information: identifying the most recurrent controls in the use of the term in literature overall; (c) select the sources: adoption of the *Portal de Periódicos da CAPES* as a database with a representative sample of high-quality academic literature on the subject, selecting peer-reviewed articles in English, Portuguese and Spanish that present the term 'meritocracia' or 'meritocracy' in the title and body of the text; in addition to using the SCImago Journal & Country Rank (SJR) ≥ 1 criterion for journals; (d) gather the information: systematization of the occurrences of words with the radical merit- in the articles; categorization in the fields of scientific knowledge, according to the SJR classification and; division into theoretical and empirical researches, and, finally; (e) treat the information: besides the literature selection itself; identification of the most recurrent controls regarding the (1) fields of knowledge, (2) type of study, (3) most frequent debate triggers, (4) methodologies and (5) conclusions. This treatment of information also involved a critical evaluation, based on the principles of radical behaviorism, of the most frequent uses of 'meritocracy'. The areas that had most publications on the subject were: Social Sciences, Psychology and Education. In contemporary discussions in these areas, the distinction between the Eastern and Western proposal populates most of the articles analyzed here. When the discussion revolves around methods of selection (or admission, promotion, etc.), meritocracy is treated as a system of distributive justice, according to which social goods (i.e.: works) would be distributed in the most equitable manner. When discussed in the light of the "American Dream", it is usually treated as a hierarchical ideology, or one that justifies the system as it is (unequal and stratified). In addition, the relationships between belief in meritocracy and the perception of inequalities and discrimination; the criteria used to assess merit; the emphasis on academic credentials as demonstrators of merit; and the effects of meritocratic discourse on the educational system are other recurrent themes in the articles presented here. Some possibilities of debates are pointed out for behavior analysts, including control agencies, the Skinnerian discussion about freedom and dignity, and the relational frame theory.

Keywords: merit, meritocracy, behavior analysis, ideology, distribution system

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LISTA DE ABREVIATURAS OU SIGLAS

AC – Análise do Comportamento (quando não precedida por números)
AC – Antes de Cristo (após números)
CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
DC – Depois de Cristo
EUA – Estados Unidos da América
ENEM - Exame Nacional do Ensino Médio
LSAT - *Law School Admission Test*
PAP – Partido Ação Popular
PDFO - Percepção de Discriminação Focada no Outro
PPB - Percepção de Privilégio Branco
PPM - Preferência pelo Princípio do Mérito
PSDB – Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira
PSL – Partido Social Liberal
PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores
QI – Quociente de Inteligência
RFT - Relational Frame Theory (Teoria das Molduras Relacionais)
SAT - *Scholastic Assessment Test*
SJR - *SCImago Journal & Country Rank*

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1 INTRODUÇÃO

2 Os termos mérito e meritocracia permeiam textos das mais diversas áreas do saber, em
3 especial das Ciências Sociais, da Educação e da Psicologia. Rápidas pesquisas em qualquer
4 base de dados ou buscador apresentarão as mais diferentes visões sobre o que é a meritocracia
5 e sobre seus efeitos. De defesas enfáticas a ataques contundentes, passando por
6 posicionamentos ambíguos, a discussão sobre meritocracia costuma girar em torno da
7 coerência de uma sociedade ou organização meritocrática, de sua viabilidade ou da
8 necessidade de se implementar ou eliminar a meritocracia em alguma instituição. Conceito
9 polissêmico – evocado amplamente em discursos políticos, utilizado como justificativa no
10 desenho de políticas públicas, como pressuposto em processos de seleção, entendido como
11 ideologia, sistema etc. – a meritocracia vem recebendo atenção crescente e divide opiniões.

12 A primeira ocorrência do termo da qual se tem conhecimento é de 1956, em um texto
13 do sociólogo britânico Alan Fox (1956). Ao escrever para o periódico britânico da ala mais à
14 esquerda do Partido dos Trabalhadores, o *Socialist Commentary*, Fox foi enfático em suas
15 críticas à meritocracia, descrevendo como a renda, a propriedade, a educação e a ocupação
16 são variáveis determinantes para compreender a desigualdade e a estratificação social (Littler,
17 2018). A disseminação do termo (uma junção do latim *mereo* – ser digno – e do grego *krátos*
18 – força ou poder), no entanto, é atribuída a uma sátira de Michael Young, também sociólogo e
19 britânico, originalmente publicada em 1958. Ele buscou ridicularizar, através de uma ficção
20 distópica publicada em livro oriundo de sua tese de doutorado, a proposta de uma sociedade
21 que se orientasse pela lógica de que o status social reflete de maneira justa as diferenças
22 intelectuais e educacionais de qualquer grupo social (Kuppens, et al., 2018). O mérito de cada
23 indivíduo, na crítica apresentada por Young, seria a combinação de suas habilidades (medidas
24 pelo QI, por exemplo) com seu esforço – o que, segundo o autor, invariavelmente levaria a
25 um favorecimento exagerado de qualificações relacionadas à educação formal sobre outros

aspectos relacionados ao desempenho (Themelis, 2012). Entretanto a obra foi mal compreendida, como afirmou Young em 1994: os leitores entenderam que ele via a meritocracia como algo desejável, quando na verdade ele pretendia realizar uma crítica contundente a essa proposta (Young, 1994).

Contudo, a meritocracia como proposta, ainda que não recebesse esse nome, tem raízes mais antigas. Segundo Sienkewicz (2003), Confúcio [551-479 AC] defendia que os cargos governamentais deviam ser preenchidos segundo o mérito, e não a hereditariedade. Isso influenciou a criação dos exames educacionais imperiais na China, que eram, na época, a única via de acesso para cargos burocráticos no governo. De acordo com Cheng (2018), o confucionismo é uma tradição que tem mais de dois mil anos. De seus vários momentos, o autor aponta o período clássico, a partir da dinastia Han (202 AC – 220 DC), como sendo o que melhor ilustra a meritocracia confuciana. Esta se daria a partir da satisfação das necessidades materiais da população ao mesmo tempo em que o Estado ofereceria condições para acesso à educação de alta qualidade, mas apenas a uma parcela de seus cidadãos. Os dignos deveriam ser benevolentes, virtuosos e conhecedores do mundo – os *Junzi*¹. Além disso, deveriam estar em posições capazes de assegurar o bem-estar de seus compatriotas. Ainda que tal sistema aponte para uma estratificação, segundo a interpretação confuciana, qualquer cidadão bem-educado que desenvolva suas virtudes inatas e oriente suas ações no seu bem-estar e no do próximo tem potencial de se tornar *Junzi*.

O confucionismo imperial (influenciado pela proposta meritocrática de Confúcio) entra em declínio, na China, em meados do século XVI, o que acaba coincidindo com o surgimento de modelos meritocráticos em outros locais. Entre 1640 e 1933, a Alemanha, por exemplo, passa por profundas mudanças em sua configuração política, sendo dividida em estados autônomos no século XVI (com a Prússia sendo o mais proeminente), para virar um

¹ Segundo Cheng (2018), *Junzi* vem dos termos *Jun* (líder, governante) e *Zi* (filho). Devido às ameaças constantes à nobreza, o termo *Zi* passou a ganhar o significado de virtuoso, para que se desvinculasse da lógica hereditária.

Império unificado a partir de 1871, sob a liderança de Bismarck e, na sequência, no pós-1ª Guerra Mundial, torna-se a República de Weimar. Andersen (2018) investiga o surgimento e desenvolvimento da meritocracia nesses três períodos na Alemanha. Ele defende que a meritocracia por si só não basta para garantir a qualidade burocrática de uma administração, sendo necessário também o que chama de responsividade², definida pela disposição dos burocratas em trabalhar para governos divergentes de suas concepções e de desenvolver as políticas de tais governos com o mesmo cuidado que teriam caso fossem alinhados a seus próprios ideais. O autor buscou descrever como o que ele considera meritocracia se desenvolveu nesses regimes. Com a chegada de Frederico Guilherme (1640-1688)³ ao poder na Prússia, práticas meritocráticas teriam começado a ser lentamente implementadas na contratação dos servidores públicos, ganhando força nos períodos subsequentes. A partir do reinado de Frederico II, O Grande (1740-1786), acirra-se o conflito entre os monarcas e a crescente classe dos burocratas, oposta a nomeações exclusivamente feitas pela coroa. Segundo Andersen (2018), essa falta de responsividade dos burocratas em relação aos reis teve como consequência uma redução na qualidade da burocracia na administração pública alemã, e implicou em embates frequentes entre os dois grupos, que atravessam o Império (1871-1918) e a República de Weimar (1919-1933), prejudicando a prestação de serviços públicos e impedindo a implementação do que seria uma meritocracia de fato.

Tanto no resgate chinês como no alemão, a discussão sobre meritocracia focava no preenchimento de cargos da burocracia governamental e as dificuldades relacionadas a esse processo – o que se verifica também nas tentativas iniciais (século XIX) de implementação de um sistema meritocrático de nomeação de cargos nos Estados Unidos, Inglaterra e França – sendo apontada como a preocupação mais frequente por parte dos governantes desses países na época (Andersen, 2018).

² Traduzido do termo “responsiveness”: “. . . the bureaucrats’ propensity to serve diverging governments and their policies with equal care”. (Andersen, 2018, p. 3).

³ Os períodos após o nome dos reis neste parágrafo referem-se à duração de seus reinados.

74 Os casos alemão e chinês, assim como o inglês, que será relatado na sequência, e o
75 surgimento do protestantismo são de fundamental importância para entender as raízes da
76 meritocracia, especialmente o percurso que se seguiu para que um tipo de meritocracia se
77 tornasse o paradigma fundante dos Estados Unidos, após a colonização inglesa. Apesar de já
78 ter relações comerciais com a China desde o século XVII – através da Companhia Britânica
79 das Índias Orientais –, os ingleses viam como ameaça a hegemonia econômica chinesa e seu
80 império. Embora não se possa descartar alguma influência do confucionismo no que veio a se
81 tornar a concepção de meritocracia inglesa, é comum que se atribua a outra matriz uma das
82 bases do pensamento meritocrático ocidental: a ética protestante de trabalho, que seria uma
83 decorrência do surgimento do protestantismo, descrito a seguir.

84 A partir do século XVI, segundo a *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (2019d), na Alemanha,
85 um grupo de pessoas insatisfeitas com a Igreja Católica Romana, que viriam a ser conhecidas
86 como protestantes, começa a ganhar força, especialmente na crítica do que consideravam uma
87 degeneração da Igreja que, segundo eles, envolvia-se cada vez mais na política e distanciava-
88 se dos valores cristãos, como o voto de pobreza, por exemplo. A figura mais conhecida desse
89 período é Martinho Lutero, que apresentou suas teses questionando a Igreja Católica Romana
90 e a autoridade do papado não só em suas práticas, mas também em sua doutrina. Um exemplo
91 é a compreensão dos protestantes de que havia relaxamento da concepção de indulgências,
92 estas que se tornaram fonte de renda lucrativa para a Igreja, a partir do momento em que se
93 podiam pagar taxas para ter os pecados perdoados ou escapar do purgatório. Isso foi
94 considerado uma ofensa grave por Lutero, que propôs reformar a Igreja para que voltasse a se
95 aproximar dos princípios de pobreza apostólica e simplicidade, bem como das Escrituras
96 Sagradas. Por conta disso, segundo a *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (2019d), Lutero foi
97 excomungado e perseguido, contando com a proteção de um príncipe para escapar da Igreja.
98 A partir de sua condenação, crescem os protestos contra a Igreja Católica Romana, o que dá

origem ao nome de “protestantes” – nomenclatura que viria a ser utilizada também para grupos dissidentes na Suíça (seguidores de Ulrico Zuínglio) e, no mesmo país, após Ulrico, para um grupo que tinha maior expressão em Genebra, que em outras partes da Suíça, além de outros contingentes em outras regiões da Europa.

Ainda de acordo com a *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (2019d), para Lutero, a simples confissão ou arrependimento pelos pecados não seria o suficiente para que alguém fosse merecedor do perdão divino. Convicto disto, adotou um modelo de vida ascético, que implicava na negação dos desejos mundanos e na fé como caminho para se tornar mais digno da justiça divina. Segundo sua crença, a transformação de um pecador em merecedor – em justo – se dá por meio da justificação pela fé. Esse princípio defende que quem pode afirmar se um humano é justo ou merecedor é Deus, e somente ele. Pela fé e pelo seguimento estrito da palavra de Deus, expressas nas Escrituras Sagradas, é que o homem se torna mais digno da piedade divina. Além disso, de modo aparentemente contraditório a uma concepção meritocrática, Lutero defendia que todas as ações humanas são determinadas por Deus (*Britannica*, 2019d) e, de acordo com Sanchez-Burks (2005), apresenta a noção de que somente através de muito trabalho em todas as atividades humanas seria possível atingir alguma elevação espiritual. Essa concepção de trabalho contrasta fortemente com a noção de que trabalhar era um mal necessário ao homem, vigente até então. O tema do trabalho e sua relação com a ética protestante é recorrente nos artigos analisados neste estudo (Fiske, 2018; *Harvard Law Review*, 2008; Knowles & Lowery, 2012; Kuppens et al., 2018; Poocharoen, Brillantes, 2013) e será discutido posteriormente.

Embora o calvinismo tenha ganhado força em Genebra, um de seus “fundadores”⁴, João Calvino, era francês, mas teve que fugir da França para poder disseminar suas ideias. Concordando com a verdade absoluta das Escrituras e com a justificação pela fé, Calvino

⁴ O calvinismo ganha esse nome por parte dos luteranos que se opunham a Lutero. Sua origem não remonta apenas a Calvino, sendo os princípios calvinistas estabelecidos e disseminados por diversos protestantes (Pederson, 2016).

123 divergia de Lutero no tema do merecimento da piedade divina. Para Lutero, ninguém era
124 merecedor, mas a fé aproximava da redenção. Para Calvino, os que professassem sua fé,
125 seguissem as Escrituras com rigor e agissem com amor pelos sacramentos podiam se
126 considerar dignos. Outro ponto também aparentemente contraditório a uma concepção de
127 meritocracia é a defesa, por parte de Calvino, da predestinação, segundo a qual antes da
128 criação do Universo, Deus teria elegido alguns homens para reatarem a aliança divina –
129 rompida pela pecaminosidade humana. Além disso, seus seguidores deveriam ser muito
130 disciplinados e viver sem excessos (Britannica, 2019d).

131 Uma decorrência mais rígida do protestantismo, influenciada pelo calvinismo
132 (especialmente no que diz respeito à predestinação e ao ascetismo), é o puritanismo, originado
133 na Inglaterra, que visava a purificar a Igreja desse país. O termo foi utilizado inicialmente de
134 maneira irônica para se referir a um grupo que se opunha a uma determinação da coroa
135 inglesa de uso de vestimentas clericais. Esse embate demonstrava bem a insatisfação
136 crescente desse grupo com o que consideravam uma reforma incompleta feita pela coroa
137 inglesa, pois desejavam uma purificação das influências católicas no calvinismo, algo que
138 avaliavam como não realizado integralmente nos governos pós-Reforma da Inglaterra
139 (Britannica, 2019d). Igualmente defensores da justificação pela fé, pregavam um seguimento
140 rigoroso das escrituras como verdade universal e que Deus revelava sua salvação através da
141 pregação da palavra divina. Mais rigorosos que os calvinistas, os puritanistas sustentavam sua
142 conduta em uma moral rígida, especialmente no que diz respeito ao comportamento sexual e
143 ao trabalho (Uhlmann et al., 2011).

144 Na metade do século XVII eclode a Revolução Inglesa (também conhecida como
145 Guerra Civil Inglesa) que tem como um de seus principais protagonistas Oliver Cromwell.
146 Um calvinista puritanista convicto, Cromwell é eleito parlamentar em 1640 e ganha fama pela
147 sua destreza militar na condução do *New Model Army*, nome pelo qual ficou conhecido o

exército inglês vitorioso na Guerra Civil (Britannica, 2019c). Ele idealiza esse modelo de exército a partir de dois principais ideais: (1) a vertente puritanista do protestantismo, segundo a qual toda ação humana advém da Providência, cabendo ao ser humano trabalhar muito em busca da pureza espiritual e da divulgação da palavra divina; (2) a rejeição à nomeação de aristocratas ou membros da família real para cargos militares, que deveria ser substituída pelo preenchimento de cargos independentemente do status social. Esse modelo organizativo militar é considerado por alguns autores como a primeira demonstração de um tipo de meritocracia no território britânico (Barraqui, 2013; Swaim, 2016).

No mesmo período, as primeiras colônias britânicas bem-sucedidas são estabelecidas em solo estadunidense, a partir do início do século XVI, por, dentre outros grupos, protestantes puritanistas que fugiam da perseguição religiosa na Inglaterra. A partir de então, foram fundadas as Treze Colônias, que se distinguiram entre colônias de povoamento, ao norte, e de exploração, ao sul (Pinto, 2019). Esses colonizadores viam nas terras do continente vizinho a possibilidade de fundar uma nação pura espiritualmente, com indivíduos que sustentassem sua ação no mundo a partir da fé protestante (Uhlmann et al., 2011). Após um longo período de disputas políticas e conflitos violentos com a coroa inglesa, favorecidos pelas disputas que a Inglaterra enfrentava em seu próprio território, as Treze Colônias, com apoio de França e Espanha, conseguiram sua independência em 1776.

A formação do novo país e de sua Constituição foi fortemente influenciada pelos ideais iluministas, adotando inclusive a divisão de poder proposta por Montesquieu (os três poderes, a saber: executivo, legislativo e judiciário) – célebre autor do Iluminismo. Nesse período se estabelecem os princípios para o que viria a ser conhecido como o “Sonho Americano”. Segundo Kazin, Edwards e Rothman (2011), a Revolução Americana também foi influenciada pelo modelo chinês de administração pública. A fim de se proteger da ingerência britânica nas colônias, foram propostos mecanismos de preenchimento de cargos a

173 partir de um modelo meritocrático. Aliados à influência puritanista na ética do trabalho, esses
 174 pilares se tornariam basilares para a defesa da consolidação de uma aristocracia natural, como
 175 defendida alguns anos depois por Thomas Jefferson⁵, em 1813, em uma carta dirigida a John
 176 Adams, advogado e segundo presidente dos Estados Unidos:

177 Concordo convosco em que há uma aristocracia natural entre os homens. Os
 178 fundamentos destas são virtude e talento. . . . Há, também, uma aristocracia
 179 artificial, fundada na riqueza e no nascimento, sem virtude ou talento; essa
 180 pertenceria à primeira classe. Considero a aristocracia natural como o mais precioso
 181 dom da natureza para a instrução, a confiança e o governo da sociedade. . . . A
 182 aristocracia artificial é ingrediente malévolos no governo, e devia-se fazer provisão
 183 para impedir-lhe a ascendência. (p. 86)

184 Apontada como um dos pressupostos fundamentais do “Sonho Americano”, a
 185 meritocracia é até hoje amplamente defendida nos EUA (Meroe, 2014; McNamee & Miller,
 186 Jr., 2004), e tem como um de seus princípios, segundo Alvarado (2010, p. 1), “a
 187 disponibilidade de oportunidades iguais para prosperar”. Lembrando a lógica confuciana,
 188 Alvarado (2010) aponta que são dignos do “Sonho Americano” somente aqueles com
 189 inteligência, habilidade e esforço – ainda que todos possam atingir isso, desde que o Estado
 190 forneça iguais oportunidades.

191 Os embates entre nobreza (com ou sem o clero ao seu lado) e grupos não pertencentes
 192 a esses núcleos políticos, influenciados pelos princípios iluministas, além do confucionismo e
 193 do puritanismo protestante, encontram seu auge na Revolução Francesa. A monarquia
 194 absolutista exercida por Luis XVI, o empobrecimento crescente da população em contraste ao
 195 enriquecimento da nobreza e do clero franceses (que ocupava todos os cargos da
 196 administração pública, independentemente de possuírem credenciais para a função exercida) e
 197 a influência de pensadores como Voltaire, Rousseau e Montesquieu mobilizaram a burguesia

⁵ Thomas Jefferson foi o principal redator da Declaração de Independência dos EUA e terceiro presidente dos EUA. A carta mencionada por Kazin, Edwards e Rothman (2011) consta originalmente nos “Escritos Políticos” de Jefferson.

francesa a assumir a direção da população insatisfeita em uma série de revoltas que iria culminar com a Queda da Bastilha, em 1789, demarcando o fim do regime do monarquismo absolutista na França (Yair, 2008). Pouco tempo depois, com a burguesia pretendendo espalhar os ideais revolucionários, por um lado, e, por outro, a nobreza buscando fortalecer sua autoridade, a França entrou em um período de guerras que destituíram a monarquia, estabeleceram uma República em 1792 e, devido a uma série de importantes conquistas militares, alçou um jovem militar de 24 anos ao posto de General: Napoleão Bonaparte (Britannica, 2019^a).

Devido ao temor dos ideais da Revolução Francesa, muitos nobres que ocupavam os cargos de chefia nas Forças Armadas francesas abriram mão de seus cargos, o que permitiu que Napoleão pudesse implementar uma carreira militar para seus comandados sustentada naquilo que representava bem a rejeição à nobreza e ao clero na França revolucionária: a ocupação de cargos baseada no talento individual, e não no sangue. Aos 30, torna-se primeiro-cônsul da França (1799-1804), cargo que centrava todas as decisões políticas do país. Nesse período, funda a Academia de Saint-Cyr, em 1803, responsável pela formação de soldados de infantaria e que facilitou o acesso à burguesia da época à carreira militar (Britannica, 2019b). O sucesso de Napoleão na maioria das guerras em que tomou parte ajudou a consolidar a imagem de estadista meritocrático, a despeito das contradições encontradas quando se torna imperador, resgatando uma lógica hereditária de sucessão, bem como nomeando diversos familiares para cargos de poder em seu governo (Britannica, 2019b).

Já no século XX, um país desponta como exemplo de meritocracia, segundo a literatura investigada: Singapura (Bellows, 2009; Lee, 2000; Mauzy & Milne, 2002; Tan, 2008; Poon, 2018). O país era um ponto importante de passagem comercial entre a Inglaterra e a China⁶, o que atraiu a ocupação colonial da Grã-Bretanha desde o início do século XIX até

⁶ Singapura é situada entre o Sul e o Leste asiático, o que é apontado como um dos fatores para seu sucesso econômico, uma vez que é o único local nesse trecho que possui águas profundas perto da costa – o que permitiu

o período pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial, com consequências muito negativas para o desenvolvimento do país. No período da 2ª Guerra, especificamente entre 1942 e 1945, Singapura foi ocupada pelos japoneses, o que fragilizou ainda mais a qualidade de vida na ilha asiática. O país só se tornou independente em 1959, e uma república em 1965, quando começou seu rápido processo de industrialização e desenvolvimento tecnológico. Além disso, na segunda metade do século XIX, Singapura recebeu intensa migração de cultivadores chineses, que correspondem atualmente a 76% da população do país (Singapore, 2018). Essas duas principais influências, da colonização inglesa e da migração chinesa, ajudam a entender como os pilares para a evocação da meritocracia na administração pública do país se estabeleceram, dada a influência política desses dois grupos na história do país.

Tal mudança no desenvolvimento do país se atribui a políticas consideradas meritocráticas de seleção de funcionalismo público, bem como de progressão de carreira dentro do governo, algo favorecido pela manutenção do mesmo partido no poder por 50 anos, segundo Bellows (2009). Para Lee (2011), Tan (2008) e Poon (2018), a meritocracia é um dos paradigmas fundantes dessa nova Singapura. Ela se expressa de maneira similar à norte-americana, com foco na igualdade de oportunidades oferecidas pelo Estado, em uma perspectiva utilitária, em que os que devem assumir posições de liderança são selecionados pelos seus méritos e são, portanto, mais aptos a tomar decisões focando o bem-estar da sociedade (Lim, 2013). Outro ponto importante para a consolidação desse modelo em Singapura foi a avaliação do partido que governa a ilha desde 1959 (PAP – Partido da Ação Popular) de que o país precisava de uma identidade nacional após obter sua independência. Segundo Moore (2000), a solução para tanto foi a ênfase no multirracismo e na meritocracia. De acordo com esse autor, a meritocracia em Singapura se ancora em três pilares: a) a possibilidade de que as diversas etnias no país se estabeleçam em comunidades

a construção do principal porto do sudeste asiático. (Bellows, 2009). O porto foi construído durante o início do século XIX, à época da colonização britânica, para rivalizar com o porto de Jacarta, na Indonésia (Moore, 2000).

auto-organizadas para avaliar suas deficiências e propor soluções; b) subsídio habitacional com foco em promover condições de moradia similares para todos e; c) o uso de testes padronizados no sistema educacional.

Considerado por Poon (2018) um dos pilares de sustentação da meritocracia em Singapura, o sistema de financiamento de bolsas para estudantes que se destacam no desempenho acadêmico tem suas origens na época da colonização britânica (1824-1965). Segundo a autora, já em 1885 a coroa inglesa financiava os estudos dos estudantes com melhor desempenho da ilha, na esperança de ter uma elite aliada no país. Após a independência, em 1966, o sistema de financiamento é incorporado na administração pública, mantendo a mesma lógica de bolsas para alunos com o melhor desempenho acadêmico – que viriam a compor o funcionalismo público de Singapura. Os chineses também influenciaram o sistema educacional de Singapura, por meio de um Plano de Assistência Especial, que garante, desde 1979, que estudantes de alta performance façam o ensino primário ou secundário em escolas selecionadas com imersão na cultura e valores chineses. A influência também se mostra no fato de que, em 2010, 86% dos universitários eram chineses – um percentual maior que o correspondente à presença chinesa na ilha (Lim, 2013).

Como é possível observar nesse resgate histórico, as origens da meritocracia possuem forte relação com o militarismo e com os embates entre nobreza, clero e classes comerciais não diretamente relacionadas aos dois primeiros grupos. Posteriormente, esse conceito é extrapolado para outros contextos, como a educação e criação de políticas públicas. A relação próxima com a educação, algo a ser debatido mais detalhadamente adiante, pode ser observada na criação dos exames imperiais, no período do confucionismo na China, para seleção da burocracia governamental, bem como na criação da Academia de Saint-Cyr para formação e seleção de militares, com Napoleão Bonaparte, e no apontamento da educação como basilar para o caso de Singapura. Portanto o conceito de meritocracia, originalmente

relacionado a contextos militares e relativos a governança, passa a ser usado em outros contextos. As convergências e divergências entre o que se entende como meritocracia em tais contextos será explorada mais à frente.

No Portal de Periódicos da CAPES, que utilizaremos como fonte de dados para este estudo, as discussões sobre meritocracia têm um de seus primeiros registros em 1961, em artigo que explora o que o autor chama de a diferença entre uma educação baseada em talento (meritocracia) e em igualdade de acesso aos estudos (isocracia). Um ponto que merece destaque é que o autor do artigo (Kazamias, 1961) empresta de Young o termo meritocracia, mas o apresenta sem destacar o aspecto satírico da obra⁷, o que vai ao encontro das observações feitas posteriormente por Young acerca da incompreensão de sua distopia (Young, 1994).

A produção acerca do tema investigado neste estudo, nas décadas de 60 e 70, concentra-se na relação entre meritocracia e educação, influenciadas pela teoria da educação baseada na meritocracia, proposta pelo sociólogo americano Daniel Bell (Goldthorpe, 2003). A teoria discorre sobre a relação entre a classe de onde provém uma pessoa, seus sucessos educacionais individuais e eventuais destinos de classe que o indivíduo pode atingir. Segundo Goldthorpe (2003), essa relação muda ao longo do tempo por conta das exigências funcionais das sociedades modernas, de três maneiras diferentes: (1) o elo entre a classe originária e o nível educacional enfraquece, devido à expansão da igualdade de oportunidades educacionais; (2) a ligação entre o sucesso educacional individual e as possíveis classes destinatárias se fortalece, uma vez que o sucesso é mediado pelo esforço individual, especialmente na obtenção de qualificações formais e; (3) a relação entre classe de origem e possíveis destinos tende a se enfraquecer com a igualdade de oportunidades, sendo mediada pela educação. A

⁷ The term “meritocracy” has been borrowed from Michael Young, a British sociologist, who defined it as the rule of the cleverest people. See Michael Young, *The Rise of Meritocracy, 1870-2033* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1958), 18-19. Young’s entire essay is devoted to an examination of the developments that might result in a society where merit or talent is carefully identified and recognized, and where the educational system provides for the maximum development of individual talents. (Kazamias, 1961, p. 345)

teoria ganhou ampla aceitação entre políticos, e segue influenciando administradores e educadores hoje, além de produzir ampla literatura discutindo sua validade.

Na Psicologia, o debate ganha especial atenção na década de 70, quando o chefe do Departamento de Psicologia de Harvard na época, Richard Herrnstein, apresenta sua tese de que o QI apontava para a existência de uma meritocracia independentemente da remoção de barreiras sociais, baseada em diferenças biológicas inatas (Deutsch & Esdall, 1972). Herrnstein, junto a Charles Murray (um cientista político), continua seguindo essa linha de raciocínio em suas investigações, e lança, em 1994, sua obra mais famosa: *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life*. Nela os autores discorrem sobre a influência hereditária e ambiental sobre a inteligência, e como isso determina acesso a oportunidades, posição social e recompensas. O livro ganhou destaque, dentre outros, por um capítulo controverso em que defende a atribuição de menores índices de QI aos afroamericanos por origens genéticas (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1997).

O tema continuou gerando discussões para além da polêmica de Herrnstein e Murray, e segue sendo debatido cada vez mais. No levantamento aqui feito, entre artigos revisados por pares com fator de impacto Scimago Journal Rank (SJR) ≥ 1 , em inglês, português ou espanhol no Portal de Periódicos da CAPES, entre 1978 e dezembro de 2019, existem 67 trabalhos com a palavra *meritocracy* ou meritocracia no título e no corpo do texto. Conforme é possível observar na Figura 1, a maioria desse volume se concentra a partir de 2001 e vem mantendo uma tendência de crescimento desde então.

Nº de artigos revisados por pares com as palavras 'meritocracy' ou 'meritocracia' no título e no corpo do texto, em inglês, espanhol ou português, no portal da CAPES, em revistas com SJR ≥ 1




Figura 1. Nº de artigos revisados por pares com as palavras ‘meritocracy’ ou ‘meritocracia’ no título e no corpo do texto, em inglês, espanhol ou português, no portal da CAPES⁸.

O indicador de tendências de pesquisa da Google, o Google Trends, indica também um crescimento continuado do interesse no tema. A disponibilização desses dados iniciou em 2004, o que justifica o recorte temporal na Figura 2 (interesse pelo termo ‘meritocracy’ em todo o mundo) e na Figura 3 (interesse pelo termo ‘meritocracia’ no Brasil). Segundo o Google Trends,

Os números representam o interesse de pesquisa relativo ao ponto mais alto no gráfico de uma determinada região em um dado período. Um valor de 100 representa o pico de popularidade de um termo. Um valor de 50 significa que o termo teve metade da popularidade. Uma pontuação de 0 significa que não havia dados suficientes sobre o termo. (Trends, 2019).

⁸ As figuras 2 e 3 demonstram interesse de pesquisa no termo meritocracia ou ‘meritocracy’ e apontam uma tendência de crescimento, o que pode estar relacionado também com maior facilidade de acesso a internet, como o que ocorreu após os *smartphones*. Também não é possível dizer, com critérios precisos, se o mesmo crescimento não é observado quanto a muitos outros termos.

Busca por 'meritocracia' no Brasil (Google Trends)




Figura 2. Buscas com o termo 'meritocracia' no Google, no Brasil, desde 2004.

Busca por 'meritocracy' no mundo (Google Trends)




Figura 3. Buscas com o termo 'meritocracy' no Google, em todo o mundo, desde 2004.

Observa-se a ocorrência de um pico de interesse no Brasil em outubro de 2014, que corresponde ao período eleitoral. No ano em questão, o segundo turno foi decidido entre o PSDB e o PT, em uma disputa bastante acirrada, com diferença de menos de 10 milhões de votos entre a eleita, Dilma Rousseff (PT) e Aécio Neves (PSDB). Frequentemente evocada pelo PSDB como marca de suas gestões (Agência Estado, 2010), a meritocracia já havia sido debatida nas eleições presidenciais anteriores, de 2010, em que a candidata pela primeira vez, Dilma Rousseff (PT), defendeu uma reforma administrativa “com meritocracia e profissionalismo” (Agência Estado, 2010). Além disso, o termo também foi frequentemente evocado pelo PSDB, o que se reproduziu em 2014, em que era uma das bandeiras principais

do candidato Aécio Neves. Nas últimas eleições, em 2018, a palavra também esteve muito presente no discurso do candidato Jair Bolsonaro (PSL), que tornou a repeti-la em seu discurso de posse (G1, 2019).

Essa forte presença da meritocracia em discursos eleitorais não se restringe aos candidatos brasileiros. Nos EUA, em seu discurso de posse em 2013, Barack Obama evocou os princípios meritocráticos ao afirmar que: “Permanecemos fiéis ao nosso credo quando uma menininha nascida na pobreza mais desesperançosa sabe que tem a mesma chance de ter sucesso que qualquer outra pessoa”⁹. Do outro lado do espectro político, em 2017, em seu primeiro discurso para o Congresso Americano, Donald Trump afirmou que os controles de imigração se dariam a partir de um sistema baseado no mérito (Trump, 2017).

Na Inglaterra, o discurso de Theresa May (Partido Conservador), em 2016, tornou-se notório pelo seu forte apelo à meritocracia, finalizando com a promessa de que tornaria a Inglaterra a maior meritocracia do mundo (May, 2016). Nas proximidades das eleições de 2010, o então primeiro-ministro, Gordon Brown, no outro polo do espectro político (Partido Trabalhista), afirmou a necessidade de uma “meritocracia genuína para todo o povo britânico”¹⁰ (Brown, 2010), o que permite diversas interpretações, como a de que havia uma meritocracia antes, mas que não era genuína, ou que só a meritocracia aplicada por ele seria genuína. O vencedor naquele ano foi David Cameron, do Partido Conservador, que em discurso na Conferência do Partido Conservador, em 2012, declarou que a regra número um de ser um Conservador é “que não importa de onde você vem, mas para onde você vai”¹¹.

Na França, o atual presidente, Emmanuel Macron, também defendeu – em entrevista ao canal francês TF1 que os objetivos do seu governo são a meritocracia e o trabalho (Financial Times, 2018). Nicolas Sarkozy, presidente entre 2007 e 2012, defendia

⁹ “We are true to our creed when a little girl born into the bleakest poverty knows that she has the same chance to succeed as anybody else” (Obama, 2013).

¹⁰ “Our values demand a genuine meritocracy for all British people” (Brown, 2010).

¹¹ “It’s not where you’ve come from that counts, it’s where you’re going” (Cameron, 2012).

frequentemente a meritocracia, como na alusão à meritocracia estadunidense (Blinder, 2007) e como o pilar de combate ao que chama de “igualitarismo¹²” nas universidades (Cabral, 2007), embora sem definir a que se referia com a palavra.

O exercício poderia ser continuado com tantos outros líderes políticos nos mais variados cantos do planeta e em diversos períodos de tempo nos últimos séculos. A evocação constante parece sugerir que ainda não há uma meritocracia, qualquer que seja a proposta defendida, implementada em nenhum ou quase nenhum país. Os motivos para tanto são um dos balizadores de boa parte da discussão da literatura aqui investigada, e serão analisados mais adiante. É importante destacar, no entanto, que a despeito de tais líderes sugerirem que ainda não há meritocracia implementada, o conceito afeta decisões em nível governamental, orientando políticas públicas e construindo discursos acerca do que impede ou facilita a mobilidade social.

Os debates acadêmicos sobre meritocracia se dividem em diversas frentes – dentre outras: a apreciação da coerência entre as práticas em instituições ou países que se reivindicam meritocráticos; a exigência (bem como seu grau e coerência) de características consideradas meritocráticas nos processos de seleção; a relação com temáticas de raça e gênero e diversas outras categorias, que serão apresentadas posteriormente. Os temas se inter-relacionam em diversos dos textos aqui citados, indicando o desafio de uma pesquisa conceitual acerca da meritocracia, considerando também que aparentemente há diversas perguntas que são pouco exploradas nos trabalhos sobre o tema, a despeito de sua amplitude e diversidade e, mesmo dentro de uma área de conhecimento, a polissemia persiste. Não são raras as discussões feitas a partir de compreensões mentalistas ou internalistas do que é mérito (ou como aparecem em alguns artigos como sinônimos: esforço, habilidade, capacidade), o

¹² O igualitarismo é um termo recorrente em textos de pensadores do espectro ideológico alinhado com a direita. É o nome dado ao que se chama de “doutrina da igualdade” (Diatkine, 2017, p.88), ou seja, o pressuposto de que todos podem ser tratados de maneira igualitária o que, segundo seus críticos, é impossível e ofusca a diversidade (Constantino, 2015; Rothbard, 2012)

386 que já é um alerta para uma discussão analítico-comportamental, uma vez que não é comum
387 que se busque operacionalizar o que é mérito (ou seus sinônimos) ou meritocracia (ou termos
388 correlatos) – seja na defesa ou na crítica.

389 Alguns exemplos que sugerem essa diversidade semântica podem ser observados em
390 Pettit (2018), que aponta a meritocracia como produtora de “falsas esperanças” e de um
391 “otimismo cruel” ou em Viana e Silva (2018), que a aponta como dispositivo de
392 individualização relacionado a um aumento de um determinado tipo de perfeccionismo. Da
393 mesma maneira, a concepção de uma meritocracia baseada no QI, ou de que o sucesso ou a
394 posição social são reflexos do mérito, reforçam a tendência internalista que circunda esse
395 debate. Discussões como essas tendem a ser pouco elucidativas, uma vez que, como já dito,
396 podem se tornar amplas demais (referem-se a uma gama numerosa de comportamentos, mas
397 sem descrevê-los, o que prejudica, por exemplo, a avaliação da eficácia – ou ausência dela –
398 de propostas meritocráticas) ou mesmo circulares, ou seja, que não avançam na compreensão
399 do fenômeno, descrevendo a mesma coisa, mas em termos diferentes.

400 Na Análise do Comportamento, a discussão sobre o tema ocorre com pouca
401 frequência, pelo menos de modo explícito. Contudo, Skinner (1971), ao discutir o tema da
402 liberdade e da determinação do comportamento, apresenta alguns aspectos essenciais para a
403 investigação dos processos envolvidos, a começar pela discussão sobre a tendência ainda
404 predominante de atribuir causas internas aos comportamentos – o que para os behavioristas é
405 um problema, pois reitera o mentalismo, que tende a desviar o foco dos determinantes
406 ambientais do comportamento e dificulta maior nitidez sobre o conceito. Esse ponto é um dos
407 pilares do debate que será aprofundado adiante. Outro ponto importante destacado pelo autor
408 diz respeito a como explicações que não sejam sustentadas em causas internas podem agredir
409 o senso de “dignidade” de um indivíduo. Além desses assuntos, o autor também discute a
410 relação entre quão explícito é o controle sobre nosso comportamento e o grau de crédito (ou

culpa) proporcionalmente conferido à emissão de uma resposta, bem como os critérios que costumam ser utilizados para avaliar o “merecimento” de uma consequência.

Outro behaviorista que abordou mais diretamente o tema foi J. G. Holland, conhecido por suas pesquisas e debates a respeito de fenômenos sociais. Para ele (1972), a noção de mobilidade social ascendente tem como função exercer controle das elites sobre a população, que determina os critérios para “subir na vida”. Além disso, o autor atribui ao mito das causas internas a defesa do sucesso pelo esforço ou “mérito pessoal” (Holland, 1978, p. 170).

A defesa da necessidade de uma meritocracia influencia diretamente, portanto, diversos aspectos da nossa vida como, por exemplo, a administração pública – seja orientando políticas, estabelecendo critérios para seleção de pessoal na burocracia governamental, oferecendo explicações para a desigualdade etc. Além disso, enquanto uma visão de mundo, está envolvida na nossa relação com o sofrimento decorrente das dificuldades envolvidas na mobilidade social e nas explicações que damos para nosso sucesso ou fracasso. Outra influência importante está no quão explícitos são os critérios para ser merecedor de uma recompensa, sucesso, reconhecimento etc. O excesso de mentalismo que permeia os contextos de ocorrência mais recorrentes (embora não todos) do termo meritocracia dificultam a compreensão nítida do que um indivíduo ou organização deve fazer para obter as recompensas, afetando, por exemplo, a prestação de serviços ou os relacionamentos dentro das organizações. Não é objetivo deste estudo apresentar um conceito de meritocracia ou buscar defini-la e sim, demonstrar a amplitude de significados atribuída a esta palavra, não raramente em termos mentalistas, e buscar identificar quais processos comportamentais são comumente citados quando se fala em meritocracia e em quais contextos– quando possível identificar – os autores utilizavam o termo.

A relevância do fenômeno para os analistas do comportamento, portanto, evidencia-se (1) pelo aumento significativo de publicações acadêmicas sobre o mesmo em anos recentes,

436 apresentando-se como fenômeno social de larga escala, cuja análise poderia ser beneficiada
437 pelo acréscimo das discussões behavioristas; (2) pela recorrência de referências ao conceito
438 em discursos de políticos e gestores, em diversos campos e níveis, sugerindo impacto em
439 ações que influenciam o comportamento humano de maneira mais generalizada (políticas
440 públicas, leis etc) com efeitos diretos sobre o comportamento e o bem estar das pessoas e
441 grupos afetados; (4) pela virtual ausência de tratamento sistemático sobre o tema na literatura
442 analítico-comportamental; (5) pela possível tensão, na Análise do Comportamento, entre o
443 potencial de crítica à meritocracia (evidenciado, por exemplo, nas obras de Skinner e Holland,
444 que serão debatidas posteriormente) e o uso sistemático de consequências reforçadoras e
445 punitivas como fundamento para a seleção de repertórios comportamentais, sugerindo, em
446 alguns casos, uma distinção de comportamentos que poderiam ser interpretados como sendo
447 merecedores de reforços do tipo recompensa – em contraste com outros que são punidos.

448 A discussão sobre meritocracia tem perpassado, como demonstrado até aqui e
449 conforme tornaremos a tratar mais adiante, as mais variadas áreas do saber, bem como
450 diferentes áreas de atuação – especialmente no que diz respeito à administração pública ou
451 privada –, além de ter sido alvo de crescente interesse no mundo todo, principalmente na
452 última década. É de especial interesse para a Análise do Comportamento compreender quais
453 são os comportamentos envolvidos no que é considerado meritocracia nessas discussões, a
454 fim de contribuir para uma melhor elucidação do conceito utilizado e suas implicações na
455 própria comunidade analítico-comportamental. As possibilidades de debate são numerosas,
456 considerando como isso pode afetar o planejamento administrativo de diversas organizações
457 (empresas, governos, escolas etc.), seus possíveis efeitos sobre a qualidade de vida das
458 pessoas afetadas e, ainda, os possíveis reflexos nas discussões analítico-comportamentais,
459 envolvendo desde as tensões já apontadas por Skinner e Holland, como as discussões sobre
460 agências de controle e a partir da Teoria das Molduras Relacionais (RFT).

O objetivo geral deste estudo é propiciar à comunidade de analistas do comportamento um aumento na visibilidade das discussões sobre meritocracia, além de buscar demonstrar possíveis implicações da(s) meritocracia(s) na sociedade e na própria comunidade behaviorista radical. Esta proposta será efetuada, nesta dissertação, em duas etapas: (1) identificar os fenômenos comportamentais que controlam o uso do conceito de “meritocracia” em amostra da literatura especializada sobre o tema, em diferentes áreas do saber; (2) avaliar sistematicamente o uso do conceito em tal literatura, oferecendo subsídios para uma compreensão behaviorista radical e analítico-comportamental do(s) fenômeno(s) que designa(m). Para atingir esses objetivos, pretendeu-se realizar um levantamento do termo meritocracia nos diversos contextos em que é utilizado, buscando identificar processos comportamentais e descrevendo possíveis consequências relatadas ou inferidas do que é chamado meritocracia – ampliando, em última análise, a visibilidade e a clareza sobre o conceito.

474 MÉTODO

475 Estudos conceituais podem ser definidos como aqueles que pretendem elucidar o que
476 compõe o conjunto de explicações utilizado por uma ciência (Tourinho, 1999), ou como a
477 investigação da linguagem científica (Machado & Silva, 2007), ou ainda, como “o estudo da
478 gramática dos conceitos de uma teoria, o exame diligente de seus compromissos filosóficos e
479 a análise de seu contexto histórico” (Laurenti, Lopes & Araujo, 2016, p. 8). Andery (2010)
480 acrescenta que pesquisas conceituais podem ser também caracterizadas como documentais,
481 visando a identificar de quais comportamentos verbais acumulados a produção de dados é
482 produto. Tais iniciativas, segundo Tourinho (1999), têm recebido mais destaque na Análise do
483 Comportamento e na Psicologia, ainda que em grau menor¹³ que outros tipos de estudo
484 (Machado & Silva, 2007).

485 Segundo Tourinho (1999), esses estudos podem se apresentar na forma de resgates
486 conceituais (com maior ou menor ênfase no aspecto histórico) ou debates epistemológicos.
487 Esse autor ainda acrescenta – com o que Machado e Silva (2007) e Laurenti, Lopes, e Araújo
488 (2016) concordam – que trabalhos conceituais/filosóficos sempre estarão articulados e
489 interdependentes, em algum grau, com pesquisas empíricas e trabalhos de intervenção (bem
490 como as pesquisas empíricas, articuladas com trabalhos conceituais/filosóficos e de
491 intervenção e, os de intervenção, com os demais).

492 Para Machado e Silva (2007), algumas das principais preocupações de pesquisas
493 conceituais envolvem a identificação e esclarecimento de problemas conceituais; indicação de
494 explicações excessivamente vagas ou ad hoc; apontamento da extensão injustificada de um
495 conceito familiar para um domínio não familiar ou; realce de ambiguidade semântica. Para
496 atingir esse fim, alguns dos passos a serem seguidos pelo pesquisador envolvem a
497 identificação do propósito e estrutura do argumento para apresentação de uma crítica, cujos

¹³ No Brasil, no entanto, trabalhos teóricos tem sido a maioria das produções. Entre 1999 e 2011, de um total de 265 publicações analítico-comportamentais em três revistas (RBTCC, REBAC e PAC), 132 são teóricas, contra 90 aplicadas e 43 básicas (Strapasson, Magalhães & Custódio, 2013).

efeitos no texto investigado devem ser avaliados, seguidos de uma ou mais explicação alternativa (Machado & Silva, 2007).

Não existe um método consolidado descrito em manuais para se fazer pesquisas conceituais na Análise do Comportamento (AC) ou na Psicologia (Machado & Silva, 2007), mas alguns autores já investigaram o tema (sobre como isso é feito na AC e na Psicologia, como um todo) e buscaram apontar pressupostos que consideram essenciais para se realizar trabalhos desse tipo com qualidade. A obra organizada por Laurenti, Lopes, e Araujo (2016) dialoga amplamente com as colocações feitas pelos demais autores citados nesta seção. Preocupados com a pouca credibilidade dos estudos conceituais na Psicologia, cientes das contribuições que tais pesquisas podem fornecer e não se esquecendo da importância da interdependência entre os tipos de pesquisa para o avanço de uma ciência, os organizadores discutem (e convidam outros autores para discutir) aspectos filosóficos e metodológicos da pesquisa teórica em Psicologia.

Essa interdependência já é tratada logo no primeiro capítulo da obra (Lopes, 2016), no conflito entre pesquisa empírica e pesquisa teórica, passando pelo embate entre filosofia e ciência (e, mais especificamente, entre filosofia humanista e psicologia científicista), cuja separação se apresentou de maneira mais consolidada a partir do século XX. Através de alguns exemplos, o autor do capítulo destaca outro aspecto que é colocado como central por Abib (1996), que é a importância do pesquisador atuar tanto como filósofo, quanto como cientista na investigação teórica. O capítulo conclui, dessa forma, que essa relação conflituosa é mais benéfica do que perniciosa à pesquisa teórica, sendo preciso reconhecer o conflito para que seja possível entender que um empirismo sem filosofia é inócuo, e que filosofia sem empirismo pouco dialoga com a realidade. Para o autor:

. . . é preciso não apenas reconhecer o conflito entre pesquisas empírica e teórica, mas promovê-lo. Isso pode ser feito por políticas científicas que estejam esclarecidas

523 em relação a esse ponto, recusando a tradição que defende uma harmonia inócua, em
524 favor de um diálogo conflituoso, porém produtivo. (Lopes, 2016, p. 36)

525 Os trabalhos conceituais podem aparecer em diferentes níveis, como o debate sobre
526 conceitos nucleares, sobre categorias filosóficas, ou ainda, análises históricas dos conceitos
527 (Laurenti & Lopes, 2016). Além disso, os autores complementam, mais uma vez em afinidade
528 com Abib (1996), que o pesquisador que se propõe a investigar conceitos e teorias deve levar
529 em conta o momento histórico e cultural em que seu objeto de estudo se situa, bem como o
530 em que o próprio cientista se encontra e, também, destacam a importância de se dominar tanto
531 a filosofia como a área de interesse para um bom trabalho conceitual. Para Laurenti e Lopes
532 (2016), a definição mais satisfatória para os fins de sua empreitada é o de que interpretar é
533 construir significados – ao invés de desvendar ou atingir verdades.

534 Skinner (1945/1988) acrescenta que a investigação do “significado” de um conceito
535 consiste em identificar as circunstâncias em que ele é emitido – ou, segundo Brunkow (2014),
536 na busca pelas propriedades que controlam a emissão de certa resposta verbal, e por que essa
537 resposta é controlada por tais propriedades. Para Brunkow (2014), o emissor de uma resposta
538 verbal é quem melhor pode fornecer dados sobre o que controlou seu comportamento verbal.
539 Dessa forma, mesmo sem poder perguntar diretamente ao falante – acessando um texto que
540 discorre sobre meritocracia, por exemplo – é possível inferir as condições de estimulação que
541 controlam o comportamento de um autor através de suas produções textuais.

542 Considerando a necessidade de analisar as condições que controlam o uso de um
543 conceito e a escassez de métodos para pesquisas conceituais, Tourinho (2010) apresentou uma
544 proposta metodológica em cinco etapas para trabalhos reflexivos, ou conceituais, que norteará
545 a investigação realizada neste estudo. São elas: (a) a definição do problema; (b) a
546 especificação das informações; (c) a seleção das fontes; (d) o levantamento de informações e;
547 (e) o tratamento das informações.

(a) definição do problema

O tema da meritocracia, conforme já apresentado anteriormente, vem recebendo atenção crescente nas produções científicas e na comunidade não-científica, sendo frequentemente estudado no âmbito acadêmico, evocado em discursos de gestores públicos ou privados, e defendido ou criticado nas mais diversas áreas do saber. A literatura analisada neste estudo aponta para uma amplitude de significados possíveis para o conceito. Em outras palavras, os contextos de ocorrência do termo são dos mais variados e parte da dificuldade em debater esse tópico reside nessa diversidade semântica. Não obstante, existem similaridades importantes nos contextos – mesmo quando apresentam posições distintas sobre a meritocracia – que pretendemos explorar neste estudo.

Além disso, dentro da comunidade analítico-comportamental o tema atravessa nossas práticas (implícita ou explicitamente) de modo constante. Seja nas discussões de Skinner em *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (1971) ou nos textos de Holland (1972; 1978) que abordam mais diretamente o tema, seja nas considerações acerca do que um debate sobre meritocracia pode nos oferecer de reflexão sobre o planejamento de contingências nas práticas fundamentadas pelo behaviorismo radical, o conceito mostra sua relevância para uma discussão da Análise do Comportamento, o que motivou a proposta de não só investigar o uso do conceito na literatura selecionada, bem como propor uma avaliação sistemática, também a partir do behaviorismo radical, de tais usos.

Este estudo teve como objetivos, portanto, identificar processos comportamentais presentes nos contextos de ocorrência do termo meritocracia (ou *meritocracy*), bem como os próprios contextos, quando possível, em literatura selecionada e avaliar sistematicamente tais usos, buscando ilustrar os processos comportamentais mais recorrentes.

(b) a especificação das informações

A fim de atingir os objetivos aqui propostos foi preciso buscar fontes de informação que contemplassem as diferentes áreas acadêmicas que produzem trabalhos a respeito do tema, para que fosse possível identificar sob controle de quais variáveis comportamentais o conceito de meritocracia é utilizado. Essa investigação dependeu da identificação, nas publicações, dos processos comportamentais e contextos mais frequentes presentes no uso do termo. Há um grupo de produções, por exemplo, que se concentra mais em descrever as consequências previstas ou já ocorridas da aplicação ou não aplicação de uma proposta meritocrática (i.e.: avaliações de políticas públicas e de processos de seleção). Para além dos usos meramente descritivos do conceito, mostrou-se importante também identificar a postura prescritiva dos diferentes autores em relação à meritocracia, expressa em termos de posicionamento acerca da utilização de um modelo meritocrático dentro de e entre diversas áreas do saber, como na Sociologia (i.e.: propostas de meritocracia mesclada com ações afirmativas) ou na Educação (i.e.: propondo que o conceito de meritocracia deve ser construído com as minorias).

(c) a seleção das fontes

O critério utilizado para seleção dos textos foi o da obtenção de amostra representativa de literatura acadêmica de alta qualidade sobre o tema. Para tanto, foi escolhido o Portal de Periódicos da CAPES, biblioteca virtual coordenada e financiada integralmente pelo Governo Federal, via Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES). Parte de políticas públicas federais de acesso à informação científica, a ferramenta “conta com um acervo de mais de 45 mil títulos com texto completo, 130 bases referenciais, 12 bases dedicadas exclusivamente a patentes, além de livros, enciclopédias e obras de referência, normas técnicas, estatísticas e conteúdo audiovisual” (Portal de Periódicos CAPES, 2019b).

No acervo, estão as mais respeitadas e conceituadas bases de pesquisa, periódicos e publicações nacionais e estrangeiras, cuja lista pode ser consultada no próprio portal (Portal de Periódicos CAPES, 2019a).

Dado o alto número de resultados apresentados em uma busca preliminar pelo termo meritocracia (625 produções) ou *meritocracy* (18.607 produções), sem outros filtros, novos critérios foram aplicados, buscando uma amostra que pudesse atender aos objetivos deste estudo em termos de relevância e qualidade. Limitou-se a busca a artigos em periódicos revisados por pares, nos idiomas inglês, português e espanhol e que apresentassem o termo meritocracia, ou *meritocracy*, no título e no corpo do texto. Além disso, a fim de abordar as discussões que têm tido mais relevância para a comunidade científica, foi adotado o critério de corte do fator de impacto $SJR \geq 1$. O SJR (*SCImago Journal & Country Rank*) extrai seus índices do banco de dados Scopus®, com base em informações sobre citações de mais de 34 mil títulos de mais de 5 mil publicadores internacionais. Os dados coletados são baseados no algoritmo do Google PageRankTM e avaliam a visibilidade dos periódicos do Scopus® desde 1996 (SCImago, 2019^a). O fator SJR expressa a média ponderada de citações em um determinado ano em relação aos três anos anteriores naquele periódico (SCImago, 2019b).¹⁴ Por fim, foi descartado um artigo que não apresentou temática considerada relevante para este estudo (investigou se a formação da classe bancária mercantil na Inglaterra poderia ser considerada nepotista). Ao final, chegou-se ao total de 67 artigos.

(d) o levantamento de informações

A partir da leitura do material selecionado, destacaram-se todos os trechos em que era mencionado o termo meritocracia (ou *meritocracy*). Os trechos foram analisados buscando identificar relatos ou indicações das circunstâncias em que foi usado. Os textos também foram

¹⁴ Para mais detalhes: https://www.scimagojr.com/help.php#understand_journals

620 classificados de acordo com sua área do saber e tipo de estudo. As áreas foram extraídas da
621 classificação das revistas apresentada pelo SJR, uma vez que foi a partir desse índice que se
622 delimitou o número de artigos a ser investigado. Para os tipos de estudo, adotou-se a divisão
623 entre pesquisa básica e aplicada proposta por Zanella (2013). Segundo essa autora, a pesquisa
624 básica (também chamada de pura ou teórica) tem como principal objetivo a melhor
625 compreensão de um fenômeno a partir da articulação e sistematização de conceitos e
626 conhecimentos que se relacionam ao fenômeno investigado. Já a pesquisa aplicada (ou
627 empírica) tem como principal objetivo a resolução de problemas humanos ou a melhor
628 compreensão sobre maneiras de como lidar com um problema, o que não exclui a
629 contribuição teórica que tais pesquisas podem oferecer.

630 Por fim, a última categorização levou em conta todas as ocorrências dos termos com
631 radical *merit-* (além de ‘mérito’, em português) na literatura investigada para identificação de
632 definições e operacionalizações apresentadas, visando identificar processos e/ou operações
633 comportamentais. As ocorrências foram registradas por página, coluna e linha e classificadas
634 em termos derivados de (ou relacionados) à palavra mérito (ou *merit*) (e.g., meritoso). O
635 mesmo foi feito com meritocracia (ou *meritocracy*) – termos como ‘meritocrático’ foram
636 registrados aqui. Um exemplo pode ser visto na Figura 4.

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito / merit e advérbios/adjetivos derivados	Meritocracia / meritocracy e advérbios/adjetivos derivados
345	2	9		Here education according to talent will be called “meritocracy,” and the notion of equality in education “isocracy.”
345	2	12		Meritocracy and Jefferson The concept of meritocracy can be traced back to Thomas Jefferson. Instead of the European notion of aristocracy and hereditary classes, Jefferson called for a new kind of aristocracy, an “aristocracy of talent.”
351	2	15	Judging by what the nature of the criticism has been and by what plans have been set afoot, the idea of recognition of merit seems to have been reborn.	
351	2	20		Can the concept of “meritocracy” coexist with the concept of “isocracy” as imbedded in the American tradition?
353	1	24	Overemphasis on merit is potentially as inequalitarian and fraught with dangers as is underemphasis.	
353	1	27		There is no necessary correlation between meritocracy and a good society.
353	1	29	Yet, recognition of merit is indispensable.	
353	1	33		In facing the new challenge, American education must seek constantly to strike a reasonable balance between the Jeffersonian concept of meritocracy and the prevalent notion of isocracy.

Figura 4. Exemplo de organização das ocorrências de termos com o radical *merit-* em artigo da literatura

investigada, visando identificar variáveis que controlaram o uso de tais palavras.

(e) o tratamento das informações

O processo de seleção de literatura a ser investigada já é, por si só, uma etapa do trabalho conceitual mediada pelas possibilidades de cursos de análise a respeito do problema de pesquisa (Tourinho, 2010). O passo seguinte consiste em organizar essa investigação de maneira a tornar mais nítido para o leitor que fenômenos estão sendo discutidos e quais relações se pretendem destacar, a fim de contribuir para uma melhor elucidação dos controles envolvidos no uso de dado conceito.

647 Para responder ao problema deste estudo, buscou-se, a partir da listagem das
648 ocorrências do uso do termo meritocracia (ou *meritocracy*), identificar quais destas
649 apresentam descrições ou alusões a fenômenos comportamentais. Isso envolve tanto respostas
650 de indivíduos ou grupos quanto condições antecedentes e consequentes que possam ter
651 alguma relação funcional com tais respostas, explicando-as ou sendo explicadas por elas.

652 Também buscamos agrupar os trechos em classes temáticas comuns, por serem as
653 mais recorrentes (i.e.: meritocracia nos processos de seleção ou bonificação; meritocracia e
654 educação; meritocracia como ideologia etc.), a fim de investigar as convergências e
655 divergências do debate dentro de cada uma dessas classes. Por fim, pretendeu-se avaliar
656 sistematicamente o uso do conceito na literatura investigada, a partir dos subsídios conceituais
657 e empíricos do behaviorismo radical e da análise do comportamento. Tratou-se aqui de avaliar
658 em que medida a literatura apresenta com clareza os comportamentos emitidos pelos diversos
659 indivíduos ou grupos envolvidos nas práticas ditas “meritocráticas”, incluindo as variáveis
660 que potencialmente os controlam.

RESULTADOS

Um total de 67 artigos foi analisado neste estudo. A lista deles pode ser consultada no Anexo I. Para chegar a este resultado, como já exposto no método, o termo meritocracia (ou *meritocracy*) foi buscado no Portal de Periódicos da CAPES, selecionando apenas os resultados que continham o termo no título e no corpo do assunto e identificados como artigos revisados por pares, nos idiomas português, inglês e espanhol, em periódicos com fator de impacto $SJR \geq 1$. As publicações avaliadas estão indicadas com um asterisco (*) ao seu lado no corpo do texto e no início de cada referência bibliográfica na lista ao final desta pesquisa.

A literatura investigada foi categorizada a partir da identificação de processos comportamentais e contextos de ocorrência do termo meritocracia (ou *meritocracy*). A primeira variável considerada foi a área de conhecimento em que o estudo se insere, uma vez que isso interfere na construção da pesquisa, bem como nas escolhas teóricas para o debate. A Tabela 1 mostra os resultados por área, conforme categorização do *SCImago Journal & Country Rank* (SJR).

Tabela 1. Número de artigos por área do conhecimento, conforme classificação do SJR.

Área do Conhecimento	Quantia
Educação	12
Sociologia e Ciência Política	11
Psicologia Social	11
Artes e Humanidades (miscelânea)	4
Antropologia	3
Desenvolvimento	3
Economia e Econometria	3
Ciência Política e Relações Internacionais	3
Psicologia Aplicada	1
Administração de Empresas, Gestão e Contabilidade (miscelânea)	2
Estudos Culturais	2
Direito	2
Ciências Sociais (miscelânea)	2
Neurociência Cognitiva	1
Comunicação	1
História e Filosofia da Ciência	1
Medicina (miscelânea)	1
Multidisciplinar	1
Comportamento Organizacional e Gestão de Recursos Humanos	1
Psicologia (miscelânea)	1
Saúde Pública, Ambiental e Ocupacional	1
Total	67

676 As áreas do conhecimento que apresentaram o maior volume de publicações
677 atendendo aos critérios deste estudo foram: Educação (12), Sociologia e Ciência Política (11)
678 e Psicologia Social (11). Agrupando Sociologia e Ciência Política (11) com Antropologia (3),
679 Ciência Política e Relações Internacionais (3) e Ciências Sociais (miscelânea) (2) – todos
680 ramos das Ciências Sociais (Silva et al., 2016) – obteve-se o total de 19 artigos. Já na
681 Psicologia, as categorias Psicologia Social, Psicologia Aplicada e Psicologia (miscelânea)
682 totalizam 13 publicações.

683 Além disso, o SJR classifica as revistas em subáreas do conhecimento, chegando até
684 cinco classificações (área principal e mais quatro subáreas) no escopo investigado neste
685 estudo. Dos 67 artigos, 35 apresentaram uma segunda classificação; 17, uma terceira; 5, uma
686 quarta e; 2, uma quinta. As subáreas serão consideradas no intuito de agrupar trabalhos com
687 interface explícita com as três áreas principais já citadas (Ciências Sociais, Psicologia e
688 Educação) para a apresentação dos resultados. Estudos que já tinham sido classificados em
689 alguma das três áreas principais com maior volume de publicações não foram considerados
690 novamente nessa etapa, e os que foram incluídos na subárea anterior não foram contados na
691 classificação seguinte.

692 Deste modo, além dos 19 estudos já identificados nas Ciências Sociais, mais 3
693 classificados na primeira subárea como Ciência Política e Relações Internacionais (1) e
694 Sociologia e Ciência Política (2), além de outros 2 da segunda subárea, categorizados em
695 Sociologia e Ciência Política (1) e Ciência Política e Relações Internacionais (1) comporão o
696 grupo Ciências Sociais, totalizando 24 artigos nessa área do conhecimento. A classificação
697 Psicologia da Educação e do Desenvolvimento, na primeira subárea, com 1 artigo, e
698 Psicologia (miscelânea – 1 artigo), na quarta subárea, foram incorporadas ao volume de
699 publicações na Psicologia, totalizando 15 publicações. Já na Educação, não ocorreram
700 interfaces explícitas nas subáreas que já não tivessem sido consideradas nas divisões

anteriores, mantendo-se o número de 12 publicações nessa área. Os artigos remanescentes foram incorporados nas três grandes áreas quando discutiam um fenômeno similar aos que já haviam sido localizados nas Ciências Sociais, Psicologia ou Educação. Dessa maneira, a área Ciências Sociais foi expandida para Ciências Sociais e relacionados e passou a ter 35 trabalhos, enquanto Psicologia e relacionados totalizou 18 e, por sua vez, Educação e relacionados somou 14 artigos. A compilação final pode ser observada na Tabela 2.

Tabela 2. Número de artigos por área do conhecimento, conforme classificação do SJR, agrupados de acordo com a subárea, além da área principal.

Área do Conhecimento	Quantidade
Ciências Sociais e relacionados	35
Psicologia e relacionados	18
Educação e relacionados	14
Total	67

Outra variável de controle considerada relevante foi o tipo de cada estudo analisado. A maioria da literatura aqui investigada se enquadrou na pesquisa aplicada, se valendo de levantamentos nacionais, questionários, entrevistas e experimentos para verificar a consistência de um dado sistema meritocrático, discutir se dado sistema é, de fato, meritocrático, bem como as crenças das pessoas na meritocracia e possíveis correlações dessas crenças com outros fenômenos (i.e.: discriminação). A Tabela 3 apresenta os resultados dessa classificação.

Tabela 3. Volume de publicações segundo o tipo de cada pesquisa

Tipo	Pesquisas básicas	Pesquisas aplicadas	Total
Total	15	52	67

Por fim, dos estudos em que foi possível identificar o país em que a pesquisa foi realizada (54 dos 67), 51 foram realizados no Norte global, sendo 28 na América do Norte (25 nos EUA e 3 no Canadá), 17 na Europa (6 nos países do Reino Unido) e 5 na Ásia (2 na China e 3 em Singapura). Há, portanto, um evidente viés nos resultados e discussão que se seguirão, tendo em vista a ausência de pesquisas sobre meritocracia no Sul global que atendessem aos critérios deste estudo.

Artigos por área do conhecimento

Na sequência, serão apresentados os artigos selecionados, divididos pelas áreas de estudos e agrupados em torno de temáticas comuns, com descrições sucintas das principais características metodológicas, objetivos e conclusões – além das definições implícitas ou explícitas de mérito e meritocracia, quando possível. Como o leitor notará, mesmo após a aplicação dos critérios de corte evidencia-se uma diversidade temática e de perspectivas nas discussões sobre o tema presentes na literatura. Tal diversidade sugere caminhos férteis de diálogo entre as áreas que estudam a temática e a Análise do Comportamento.

i) Ciências Sociais e relacionados

A área que abrangeu o maior volume de publicações investigadas neste estudo – 35 ao todo – foi a das Ciências Sociais. Destes, 6 são teóricos e os demais, empíricos (29). As discussões mais frequentes trataram dos impactos do status socioeconômico, gênero, grupo étnico e background educacional no acesso a oportunidades educacionais e profissionais. Outro tema recorrente foi o impacto que a crença na meritocracia pode ou não ter na aceitação de desigualdades, seja em relação a terceiros ou a si próprios – ou seja, a relação entre meritocracia e justiça social.

No que diz respeito ao acesso a oportunidades, os trabalhos desta área se dividem entre investigar o quão meritocrática é uma instituição de ensino ou sistema educacional, uma organização profissional e, até mesmo, uma sociedade, a partir da relação entre critérios meritocráticos e status socioeconômico de destino ou outros tipos de recompensas ou privilégios sociais (i.e.: ocupação profissional ou acesso ao ensino). Os critérios utilizados para observar o grau de mérito nos vários ambientes investigados são amplos e diversos, mas com frequência envolvem termos como habilidade, esforço, credenciais educacionais

(medidas em termos de nível escolar e/ou pontuações em testes como o de QI ou o SAT¹⁵) e desempenho (observado a partir de avaliações de desempenho). Esses critérios são evocados conjuntamente ou isoladamente pelos autores para sustentar os argumentos que desenvolvem em seus trabalhos.

i.i) Contexto Educacional

No âmbito educacional, o uso de pontuações em testes costuma ser o principal critério que demonstraria mérito no processo de admissão nas instituições de ensino. Alon e Tienda (2007)* discutem o que constitui o mérito nos processos de admissão no ensino superior no Texas (EUA). Eles buscaram verificar – a partir do cruzamento dos dados da pontuação no SAT e da colocação no ranking escolar oficial do governo estadunidense – se os testes padronizados, como o SAT, garantem maior competitividade e igualdade de oportunidades. Os autores discordam do uso da pontuação no SAT como critério meritocrático e defendem que a melhor maneira de avaliar o talento e o esforço individual é pelo ranking escolar ao longo da vida.

Driessen, Sleegers e Smit (2008)*, a partir da discussão dos dados de uma pesquisa nacional na Holanda, com mais de oito mil estudantes (que continha dados sobre gênero, status socioeconômico, etnia, desempenho escolar e atitude em relação aos estudos), investigaram o que determinaria as sugestões dos professores aos alunos de qual ensino secundário seguir. O mérito, nesse estudo, é definido pelos talentos, capacidades e esforços do indivíduo, que, em um sentido estrito, seriam medidos pelas pontuações em testes cognitivos, mas que, em um sentido mais amplo, deveria considerar as competências não-cognitivas (i.e.: desempenho escolar, atitude em relação aos estudos).

¹⁵ O SAT, ou *Scholastic Assessment Test*, é o principal teste padronizado dos EUA, que serve como critério de seleção para entrada em diversas universidades estadunidenses – de modo similar ao ENEM, o Exame Nacional do Ensino Médio, no Brasil.

770 Marks (2010)* considera mérito como sendo a soma da habilidade e do esforço, mas
771 ressalta que esforço é um conceito impreciso e que apenas a habilidade, medida pela
772 pontuação em testes educacionais, é considerada quando se fala em mérito. Afirma que a
773 habilidade – a partir de um levantamento multinacional com aproximadamente 170 mil
774 estudantes de 15 anos –, mais do que o contexto socioeconômico, influencia em qual trabalho
775 os estudantes esperam estar aos 30 anos de idade.

776 Investigando o mérito nos testes padronizados das faculdades de Direito nos EUA
777 (LSAT), Henderson (2004)* destaca o prejuízo de colocar indiretamente na conta do mérito a
778 velocidade de resposta dos testes. Segundo esse autor, a velocidade de resposta de testes e a
779 capacidade de raciocínio são habilidades distintas e sem correlação. Para ele, discutir de
780 maneira aprofundada e crítica quais critérios acabam sendo relacionados com o mérito nos
781 LSAT, como a velocidade de resposta, pode contribuir tanto para o fortalecimento da
782 meritocracia como da justiça social.

783 Para Mitchell (2013)*, ao pesquisar as narrativas presentes na educação de alunos
784 multilíngues do ensino secundário nos EUA, ignorar a proficiência desses alunos no inglês e
785 usar notas de testes como principal parâmetro de mérito direciona políticas públicas
786 educacionais que acabam por mascarar o racismo institucional.

787 Oller Jr. (1997)* não chega a discutir a meritocracia em si, mas sim como tomar os
788 resultados de testes de QI como parâmetro para alocações meritocráticas representa um
789 problema, por não levar em consideração, em se tratando de pessoas surdas, por exemplo, o
790 papel da proficiência na língua primária exigida no teste. Para eles, indivíduos surdos podem
791 acabar sendo classificados como “retardados” por apresentar baixo desempenho em testes de
792 QI, sem considerar que a apresentação das questões é feita em uma linguagem secundária para
793 esse grupo.

i.ii) Contexto organizacional

No contexto organizacional, as variáveis que costumam ser utilizadas para avaliar quanto meritocráticos são processos de seleção, promoção ou remuneração são: as avaliações de desempenho, isoladamente ou somadas a provas escritas, à idade ou ao background educacional, além dos métodos de seleção e critérios padronizados de candidatura.

Castilla (2008)* pesquisou a relação entre sistemas de recompensas baseados no mérito (i.e.: avaliações de desempenho) e as disparidades salariais e de promoção, segundo o gênero e a raça em uma grande organização nos EUA. Utilizando dados das avaliações de desempenho, do crescimento salarial e das promoções, o autor sugere que o que impede a igualdade de oportunidades de promoção e remuneração e a meritocracia de acontecer no ambiente de trabalho são os diversos estágios das avaliações de desempenho, bem como os vieses que existem ao, por exemplo, acoplar o aumento salarial às avaliações de performance.

Em outro estudo, Castilla e Benard (2010)* abordam o tema de se as desigualdades raciais e de gênero no ambiente de trabalho ocorrem *a despeito* dos esforços de implementar sistemas meritocráticos ou *por causa* desses esforços. Os autores elaboram três estudos para verificar se acreditar que a organização é meritocrática aumenta o nível de viés de gênero e raça nas decisões gerenciais. Participaram, aproximadamente, 450 pessoas com experiência em cargos de gerência em que estas precisavam assumir o papel de gerente em situações hipotéticas e selecionar candidatos baseado nas avaliações de desempenho. O que observaram é que os vieses de gênero e raça persistiram nos três estudos, com candidatos homens brancos recebendo bônus maiores, a despeito de avaliações iguais de desempenho de mulheres e negros. Segundo os autores, uma cultura organizacional meritocrática pode convencer gerentes que eles não são enviesados em suas decisões. Além disso, concluem que os vieses persistiriam por causa dos esforços meritocráticos e não a despeito deles.

818 Considerando meritocracia como um sistema de distribuição de recompensas no
819 ambiente de trabalho, que seria operacionalizada em termos dos resultados das avaliações de
820 desempenho, de provas escritas e da observação do potencial de trabalho (sem apresentar uma
821 definição do que consideraram como potencial), Bacharach e Aiken (1979)* investigaram a
822 relação entre satisfação no trabalho e: alienação; falta de sentido no trabalho e; meritocracia.
823 A partir de dados de entrevistas com trabalhadores de 44 burocracias administrativas públicas
824 na Bélgica, os autores defendem que há maior satisfação entre chefes de departamento quando
825 a percepção de alienação e falta de sentido são reduzidas, enquanto que os subordinados
826 tendem a expressar maior satisfação quando percebem maior meritocracia em seus locais de
827 trabalho.

828 Uma variável que aparece pouco quando se discute meritocracia é a idade, que junto
829 do background educacional seriam os fatores para avaliar se o processo de seleção em uma
830 grande empresa de tecnologia nos EUA era meritocrático (Petersen, Saporta & Seidel, 2000)*.
831 A partir de dados do processo de seleção nessa organização ao longo de 10 anos e com mais
832 de três mil respondentes, os autores concluem que os processos de seleção são meritocráticos
833 no que diz respeito ao gênero e parcialmente, no que concerne a raça, em que as redes sociais
834 desempenham papel importante na contratação.

835 Os métodos de seleção (por exemplo, um único portal online onde todos os candidatos
836 se inscrevem e obtêm informações sobre o cargo) e critérios padronizados de candidatura são
837 defendidos por He e Markachev (2018)* como garantidores de que um processo de seleção
838 seja meritocrático. Ao investigarem, a partir de 40 entrevistas, as contratações em uma estatal
839 petrolífera chinesa, os autores propõem que o excesso de medidas de avaliação de
840 desempenho insuficientes, o mal uso de medidas que seriam adequadas e a ênfase nas
841 credenciais acadêmicas prejudicam a meritocracia na seleção de profissionais.

842 i.iii) Sociedades

843 Já no que se refere às sociedades, a relação entre nível educacional e status
844 socioeconômico de destino, bem como a alocação profissional de acordo com o nível
845 educacional, são os principais indicadores, segundo a literatura, de quão meritocrática é uma
846 sociedade.

847 Para Bukodi e Goldthorpe (2010)*, a Hungria socialista (1949-1989) pode ser
848 considerada um dos modelos mais bem acabados de meritocracia baseada na educação,
849 considerando a forte conexão entre nível escolar e status socioeconômico de destino
850 observada nesse período, a partir dos dados de cinco pesquisas realizadas pelo governo da
851 época.

852 Já para Griffin e Kalleberg (1981)*, com base em duas pesquisas nacionais sobre
853 educação, nos EUA, com mais de 700 homens brancos adultos, apenas a forte correlação entre
854 nível escolar e alocação profissional pode não ser suficiente para caracterizar uma sociedade
855 como meritocrática (no caso, a estadunidense). Para eles, essa investigação deve passar
856 também pela observância da divisão técnica do trabalho em classes (i.e.: cargos gerenciais,
857 técnicos, manuais, etc.).

858 Krauze e Slomczynski (1985)*, a partir de um modelo matemático de alocação
859 meritocrática, também consideram que a sociedade estadunidense não é meritocrática, por não
860 ser possível demonstrar forte correlação entre as credenciais educacionais e a alocação
861 profissional em trabalhos recompensados diferentemente (a divisão técnica do trabalho).

862 Poocharoen e Brillantes (2013)* discutem as diferenças (a partir de pesquisas
863 nacionais com servidores públicos) entre a meritocracia no pacífico asiático (China, Coreia do
864 Sul, Índia, Taiwan, Malásia e Filipinas) e nos EUA Para tanto, propõem cinco dimensões de
865 análise: critérios de recrutamento; corrupção no recrutamento e seleção; filiação política e
866 influência política; nível de centralização do processo de recrutamento e seleção e; a

867 quantidade de dispositivos protetores do mérito (i.e. políticas de delação que protejam os
868 delatores). Uma das diferenças estaria no fato de que o modelo asiático se preocupa com a
869 alocação profissional dos membros mais talentosos na burocracia governamental, enquanto o
870 modelo estadunidense se concentraria na igualdade de oportunidades para toda a sociedade.
871 Os autores consideram a possibilidade de a meritocracia contribuir para legitimar hierarquias,
872 bem como o impacto de fatores como a herança, os capitais social (“contatos”) e cultural (i.e.:
873 educação, exposição às artes etc.) e o acesso desigual à educação no impedimento para que
874 uma sociedade seja meritocrática. Enfatizam, também, a contradição entre sistemas de seleção
875 supostamente meritocráticos, mas nos quais a lealdade política acaba pesando mais, como no
876 caso asiático. No caso estadunidense, o paradoxo estaria em como garantir que servidores
877 públicos selecionados meritocraticamente sejam sensíveis aos líderes políticos eleitos.

878 Goux e Maurin (1997)*, por sua vez, consideram que a sociedade francesa não é
879 meritocrática, pois o sucesso acadêmico, que determinaria a mobilidade social na França,
880 deveria se basear apenas na habilidade pessoal, mas seria, na realidade, mesclado com
881 mecanismos hereditários e intergeracionais. Chegam a essa conclusão com base em dados de
882 quatro pesquisas nacionais sobre educação e qualificações profissionais, realizadas entre 1970
883 e 1993.

884 Saunders (2002)* defende que a Inglaterra é mais meritocrática do que não-
885 meritocrática, uma vez que as classes sociais de destino nesse país seriam mais determinadas
886 pela habilidade cognitiva e pela motivação do que por outros fatores. As habilidades são
887 mensuradas baseadas em dados coletados em três idades diferentes, que incluem: respostas de
888 um questionário, desempenho em testes de matemática e interpretação de texto, avaliação dos
889 professores e desempenho em um teste de conhecimento geral. Já a motivação é considerada a
890 partir da média ponderada das avaliações dos professores, da assiduidade de alunos ao longo

891 da vida escolar e da pontuação em uma escala de motivação acadêmica respondida com 16
892 anos de idade.

893 Gillies (2005)* discute políticas públicas de educação do Partido Trabalhista (*New*
894 *Labour*) na Inglaterra, especialmente entre 2002 e 2005, com foco nas que se direcionam às
895 práticas parentais e em discursos do governo orientados para os pais, a partir de dados de uma
896 pesquisa nacional sobre acesso a recursos durante a criação dos filhos (como remunerações
897 justas, acesso à educação formal, ao entretenimento e atenção à saúde, por exemplo) . O autor
898 conclui que a narrativa do governo inglês tende a reforçar uma noção de exclusão social, em
899 que famílias da classe trabalhadora são vistas como não possuindo habilidades ou
900 responsabilidade moral e estariam fadadas a transmitir isso para seus filhos, caso não sejam
901 orientadas pelo discurso pró-meritocracia promovido no período investigado pelo estudo.

902 Breen (2003)*, ao questionar se a Irlanda do Norte é uma meritocracia educacional,
903 considera o mérito enquanto a recompensa pela posse e utilização de qualidades, habilidades e
904 atributos relevantes para um trabalho, que costumam ser identificadas pelas credenciais
905 educacionais. Segundo ele, a partir dos resultados de uma pesquisa nacional sobre mobilidade,
906 uma vez que fatores como o gênero e o grupo étnico de origem influenciam na alocação
907 profissional, o país não pode ser considerado meritocrático.

908 Em Singapura, segundo Tan (2008)*, mérito poderia ser entendido como uma mistura
909 entre esforço e talento, ambos inatos e cultivados, que permitiriam a qualquer indivíduo que
910 apresente essas características conquistar recompensas sociais. Investigando as práticas do
911 PAP (Ação Partido Popular), que está no poder desde 1959, o autor defende que o governo de
912 Singapura cria tensões na dita meritocracia no país, ao, por meio de um sistema educacional
913 altamente competitivo, formar uma elite técnica para ocupar a burocracia governamental, que
914 irá, por sua vez, definir o que é mérito. Isso ofuscaria os aspectos igualitários da defesa de
915 uma meritocracia, transformando-a em uma “ideologia da desigualdade”.

916 Chua (2011)* enfatiza também o tema do sistema educacional altamente competitivo e
917 da tecnocracia elitista em Singapura, ao investigar a relação entre redes sociais e a alocação
918 profissional. Apesar de observar que a burocracia estatal é, de fato, preenchida sobretudo
919 com base em credenciais educacionais, mais do que nas redes sociais, o autor destaca o
920 prejuízo de se basear apenas em resultados de exames nacionais para definir mérito, uma vez
921 que isso tenderia a favorecer os que já estão nos melhores cargos profissionais, especialmente
922 na burocracia governamental (majoritariamente chinesa), e que influenciariam no desenho das
923 políticas públicas educacionais.

924 Domanski (2011)* aponta que na Polônia pós-comunista (a partir de 1980), a transição
925 para uma economia de mercado implicou em maior ênfase na educação universitária e maior
926 distribuição de benefícios aos profissionais baseado em sua produtividade (refletida na
927 posição educacional e profissional), o que caracterizaria, segundo o autor, o país como
928 meritocrático.

929 Uitermark e Pruijt (2004)* discutem a relação da administração municipal de
930 Amsterdã, na Holanda, com grupos que ocupam imóveis abandonados. A partir de um resgate
931 histórico sobre a conformação desse movimento de ocupação e sobre suas relações com o
932 poder público, os autores argumentam que a noção de meritocracia aplicada nesse contexto
933 sugere que os únicos cidadãos que merecem ser alvos de políticas públicas de assistência são
934 aqueles que não oferecem resistência à gestão municipal – não sendo este o caso dos
935 ocupantes, que foram despejados após décadas habitando uma região que teria sido
936 desocupada para favorecer a especulação imobiliária.

937
938 i.iv) Crença na meritocracia e relação com a percepção de desigualdades

939 Outros estudos se preocuparam em verificar a percepção ou crença de grupos a
940 respeito de quão meritocrática é a sociedade ou instituição em que se inserem e como isso

afeta a percepção e o enfrentamento de desigualdades. Os estudos abordam diferenças nas formas de lidar com a discriminação entre homens, mulheres, negros(as) e grupos étnicos, além de investigar a defesa de ações afirmativas (ou rejeição a elas), segundo o grau de crença na meritocracia.

Foster, Sloto e Ruby (2006)* concluem – a partir de experimentos em que o mérito era considerado a partir da indicação de concordância, por parte dos respondentes, em uma escala com afirmações que descreveriam princípios meritocráticos (i.e.: “Todo mundo neste país tem oportunidades iguais”) – que indivíduos que endossavam a meritocracia mais fortemente tendiam a ter percepção reduzida de um episódio de discriminação que eles mesmos sofreram, além de relatarem menor autoestima e menor engajamento em ações coletivas.

O periódico Harvard Law Review (2008)* discute a relação entre a crença de que um ambiente de trabalho, especificamente firmas de Direito, é meritocrático – ou seja, de quanto a mobilidade é determinada pelo mérito, e não por status herdado – e o enfrentamento à discriminação nesses contextos organizacionais. Considera a meritocracia uma das ideologias fundantes dos EUA (expressa no “Sonho Americano”) e legitimadoras de hierarquias nesse país, assim como outras crenças: de que a sociedade é justa; no sucesso como causado pelo indivíduo; no controle pessoal e individual dos rumos da vida e; na ética protestante de trabalho, conforme sugerido por Major e Schmader (2001). Segundo esse artigo, os ambientes em que a crença na meritocracia é muito enfatizada desencorajam o reconhecimento de vieses que favorecem aqueles que estão no topo. O autorrelato de histórias de sucesso por parte das minorias pode acabar reforçando a discriminação e a complacência das firmas, que não precisariam abordar o tema do preconceito se ele não é reconhecido como tendo ocorrido ou se é minimizado pelos grupos atingidos. Isso se daria porque admitir que existe uma estrutura discriminatória no ambiente de trabalho poderia conflitar com a crença dos bem-sucedidos na meritocracia. Defendem que as instituições devem continuar comprometidas com o mérito,

966 desde que considerando que as estruturas sociais tendem a privilegiar alguns grupos em
967 detrimento de outros, e agindo para mudar essas estruturas.

968 Reynolds e Xian (2014)* investigam a percepção de estadunidenses sobre a
969 meritocracia em seu país a partir de dois levantamentos nacionais (em 1987 e 2010), em que
970 os respondentes precisavam indicar quais fatores consideravam mais determinantes para
971 serem bem-sucedidos em uma escala de não importante a muito importante. Os mais
972 preponderantes, nos dois momentos, foram: trabalhar duro, ambição e educação formal de
973 qualidade, enquanto a sorte, o gênero e a raça foram considerados os menos importantes. Os
974 autores relatam, a partir desses dados, que, para a população dos EUA, não só o país seria
975 meritocrático, como seguia sendo em 2010, tanto quanto em 1987.

976 Ronsini (2014)* entrevistou jovens da classe trabalhadora e da classe média a respeito
977 de como percebiam mensagens promotoras da meritocracia (i.e.: mensagens que relacionam o
978 sucesso ao trabalho duro e ao próprio esforço) em telenovelas. Os achados descrevem um
979 padrão em que telespectadores da classe média não oferecem resistência a essas mensagens,
980 enquanto que os da classe trabalhadora, sim, ainda que não consigam imaginar uma narrativa
981 alternativa.

982 Para Newman, Johnston e Lown (2015)*, a ideia de que os resultados materiais e
983 recompensas são determinados pela iniciativa individual, pelo trabalho duro e pela habilidade
984 é percebida de maneira diferente de acordo com a desigualdade regional em uma cidade.
985 Analisando as respostas de indivíduos brancos não-latinos a quatro pesquisas nacionais nos
986 EUA sobre o grau de concordância com afirmações que os autores consideraram como
987 relacionadas à meritocracia, o artigo conclui que habitantes que possuem baixa renda em
988 regiões mais desiguais das cidades estadunidenses tendem a resistir mais à ideia de
989 meritocracia, enquanto que os de alta renda, na mesma região, aderem mais a ela. Ainda
990 assim, isso não impede que indivíduos de baixa renda endossem ideais meritocráticos. Para

chegar a essa conclusão, dividem os dados das quatro pesquisas em três medidas: (1) a concordância (sim ou não), na primeira pesquisa, com as seguintes afirmações: “A maioria das pessoas que quer avançar na vida pode conseguir isso se trabalhar duro” ou “O trabalho duro e a determinação não são garantias de sucesso para a maioria das pessoas”; (2) a concordância (concordo ou discordo em uma escala de quatro pontos) com as proposições: “Trabalhar duro oferece pouca garantia de sucesso” e “O sucesso na vida é basicamente determinado por forças fora do nosso controle” e; (3) a classificação dos que concordaram parcialmente ou totalmente com a primeira proposição da métrica (2) no grupo dos que rejeitam a meritocracia, independentemente de como opinaram sobre a segunda proposição desta mesma métrica.

Na contramão do estudo de Newman et al. (2015)*, outros autores (Solt et al., 2016)* observam que em regiões mais desiguais de cidades nos EUA, indivíduos de baixa renda tendem a endossar mais a crença de que podem ascender socialmente se trabalharem duro. Os autores afirmam que os resultados de Newman et al. (2015)* são problemáticos por englobarem três medidas diferentes (ver estudo anterior) da variável dependente (rejeição à meritocracia) que não poderiam ser comparadas. Apresentam, então, uma proposta de análise de um levantamento mais amplo (utilizando todos os dados e não apenas de brancos não latinos) realizado em 2007, que investigou variações geográficas e demográficas nas crenças e atitudes por todo os Estados Unidos. Para tanto, defendem o uso apenas da medida (1) do estudo de Newman et al. (2015)*, que consideram única e consistente e que, segundo eles, sugere a conclusão contrária a que Newman chegou.

Pettit (2018)* acompanhou, em um trabalho de campo etnográfico de 11 meses, homens jovens universitários de regiões mais pobres na busca de emprego em uma Cairo globalizada, permeada por discursos de pertencimento global, desde que a partir do aproveitamento das oportunidades e de trabalho duro. Observando a rotina desses estudantes

1016 de universidades públicas na busca por melhores oportunidades de emprego, o autor afirma
1017 que os discursos meritocráticos oferecem uma falsa esperança aos jovens, que se percebem
1018 como únicos responsáveis pelo seu sucesso, ao mesmo tempo em que tais narrativas
1019 contribuiriam para precarizar suas vidas, ofuscando as desigualdades.

1020

1021 i.v) Modelos matemáticos

1022 Alguns autores propõem modelos experimentais matemáticos para discutir
1023 possibilidades de meritocracia ou escolha pela meritocracia em sistemas hipotéticos.
1024 Gradstein (2014)* trata a meritocracia como a distribuição de recursos segundo o esforço
1025 individual. Sugere, a partir de um cenário hipotético de votação em um método de
1026 distribuição de recursos entre membros de um grupo (igualitário, independentemente do
1027 esforço de cada membro, ou meritocrático), que, quanto maior o grau de meritocracia,
1028 maiores são as desigualdades na alocação dos recursos, e que em sistemas mais democráticos,
1029 em que o poder decisório não está concentrado na elite, a tendência é optar por distribuições
1030 mais igualitárias.

1031 Borondo et al. (2014)* avalia, por meio de outro modelo, o impacto da organização
1032 das redes sociais na meritocracia. Para os autores, um sistema pode ser considerado
1033 meritocrático se a compensação e o poder disponíveis para indivíduos forem determinados
1034 por suas habilidades e méritos. Sugerem que isso só seria possível em redes sociais totalmente
1035 conectadas, e não esparsas, como as que se observam em nossa sociedade.

1036 Por sua vez, Phillips (2014)* elabora um modelo em que a implementação, em
1037 processos de seleção, de uma regra quantitativa que incorpora tanto elementos subjetivos (i.e.:
1038 avaliação por pares), como objetivos (i.e.: medidas bibliométricas de citação em periódicos),
1039 comporia um índice de mérito que poderia reduzir vieses subjetivos na contratação.

Já Barberà, Bevia e Ponsati (2015)* apresentam um modelo para avaliar o quanto a opção por um princípio igualitarista ou meritocrático de distribuição de benefícios coletivos (oriundos de cooperação) é afetada pela necessidade de formar alianças para aumentar a produtividade e decidir a distribuição dos resultados. Através de um jogo em que os participantes conhecem a produtividade de todos os outros e, portanto, podem antecipar as recompensas que receberão de optar (através de voto) pela aliança meritocrática ou igualitária, os autores propõem que um sistema pode ser considerado meritocrático apenas quando os votos se orientam para uma produtividade mediana que está acima da produtividade média da aliança. Caso contrário, será considerado igualitário. Sugerem que quando os participantes não conseguem se comprometer com um princípio ou com outro, há grande instabilidade no sistema.

Por fim, apenas um autor da Sociologia neste levantamento se preocupou em investigar o conceito propriamente dito. Daniels (1978)* se apoia na noção de Young (1958) de mérito como sendo a soma da habilidade (medida em termos de QI) e esforço, para apresentar os modelos de meritocracia que emergiram na literatura que investigou. Para ele, o mérito, em um sentido mais estrito, poderia ser entendido como sendo definido em função da utilidade social das habilidades que seriam meritocráticas, em termos de eficiência e produtividade, ao invés de merecimento. A(s) meritocracia(s) representaria(m), portanto, sistema(s) de justiça distributiva com os seguintes princípios: a. alocação profissional segundo o merecimento; b. um princípio que especifica as condições nas quais a alocação profissional segundo o mérito ocorre e; c. um princípio que especifica os esquemas de recompensas para trabalhos. Para o autor, os meritocratas tendem a concordar no que determina os dois primeiros princípios, mas divergem nas interpretações sobre o esquema de recompensas. Com base nisso, e focando especificamente no que orientaria a alocação profissional em propostas

1065 meritocráticas, apresenta seis tipos de meritocracia, classificadas em função do esquema de
1066 recompensa oferecido aos indivíduos:

- 1067 1. desenfreada/descontrolada: o esquema de recompensa permite aos que conseguem
1068 posições de prestígio e poder qualquer recompensa que eles consigam obter;
- 1069 2. baseada em merecimento: o esquema de recompensa permite recompensas
1070 proporcionais à contribuição dada para um determinado trabalho, podendo ser em
1071 termos de produtividade ou merecimento moral;
- 1072 3. utilitarista: o sistema permite desigualdades que atuam na maximização da utilidade
1073 total ou média dos recursos;
- 1074 4. *maximin*: permitem-se desigualdades que atuam na maximização do índice de bens
1075 sociais primários daqueles em pior condição;
- 1076 5. estritamente igualitária: nenhuma desigualdade é permitida, e;
- 1077 6. socialista: não permite desigualdades na satisfação de necessidades básicas.

1078 De acordo com Daniels (1978)*, as três primeiras podem ser consideradas não-
1079 igualitárias, uma vez que permitem desigualdades na distribuição das recompensas sem
1080 restrições que protejam os mais vulneráveis. A denominada *maximin* permite desigualdades,
1081 mas promove mecanismos que visem beneficiar aqueles mais vulneráveis. As duas últimas
1082 seriam igualitárias, só permitindo desigualdades quando baseadas nas necessidades e não nas
1083 funções sociais do indivíduo. O autor conclui que os meritocratas, nesse contexto, estariam
1084 mais comprometidos, por conta da preocupação com a produtividade, em distribuir alguns
1085 bens sociais (i.e.: postos de trabalho) de acordo com distribuições morais e arbitrárias de
1086 habilidades e traços, uma vez que, de um modo geral, permitem desigualdades.

1087 ii) Psicologia e relacionados

1088 Dos 18 estudos neste grupo, dois são teóricos e 16 empíricos. O principal debate nessa
1089 área do conhecimento gira em torno da crença na meritocracia e de suas consequências para a
1090 saúde (efeitos na percepção de discriminação sofrida por si ou por outros e ações tomadas
1091 diante do episódio, por exemplo) e para a justiça social, como o posicionamento acerca de
1092 ações afirmativas.

1093 As temáticas de raça, gênero e relacionadas a grupos étnicos, assim como discussões
1094 sobre ações afirmativas voltadas para minimizar os efeitos do racismo, são muito frequentes
1095 nos trabalhos da Psicologia investigados nesta revisão. Boa parte dos trabalhos aborda esses
1096 temas a partir de estudos que investigam o efeito da preferência pelo princípio meritocrático
1097 ou da crença na meritocracia na percepção de discriminações, bem como nas medidas a serem
1098 tomadas diante de episódios de preconceito.

1099

1100 ii.i) Raça e gênero

1101 Knowles e Lowery (2012)* defendem que a meritocracia é entendida, nos EUA, como
1102 uma norma prescritiva, segundo a qual os indivíduos devem receber bens sociais de acordo
1103 com suas habilidades e esforços individuais. Conduzem quatro estudos com homens e
1104 mulheres que se autodeclararam brancos ou caucasianos para verificar a relação entre a defesa
1105 da meritocracia como norma distributiva e o como isso afetaria a percepção de brancos sobre
1106 a existência de desigualdade racial. O primeiro estudo (1) se utiliza de uma escala que é
1107 recorrentemente utilizada nas pesquisas em Psicologia Social sobre o tema: a de Preferência
1108 pelo Princípio do Mérito – PPM (Davey et al., 1999), além de outras duas escalas, a de
1109 percepção de privilégio branco – PPB (Swim & Miller's, 1999) e a de percepção de
1110 discriminação focada no outro – PDFO (Iyer, Leach & Crosby, 2003). A proposta foi
1111 observar a relação entre a preferência e o reconhecimento de privilégios por parte dos

1112 brancos. No segundo estudo (2), além das respostas das escalas PPM, PPB e a PDFO, foi
1113 solicitado que os participantes lessem um texto com a descrição de um ‘self’ ideal e depois
1114 classificassem características desse ‘self’ de acordo com a importância. Conceituando mérito
1115 enquanto habilidade e ética do trabalho, buscam averiguar se há correlação entre a preferência
1116 pelo princípio do mérito, a adoção desse conceito de mérito como um ideal pessoal e as
1117 percepções dos privilégios raciais por parte de brancos. O estudo seguinte (3) manipulou
1118 experimentalmente o que definiu como uma necessidade de reforçar o ‘self’ para verificar se
1119 isso funcionaria como um moderador da conexão entre a PPM e a percepção de privilégio por
1120 parte dos brancos. Aplicando as mesmas três escalas, os autores cruzaram esses dados do
1121 grupo desse estudo com as respostas de um falso teste de habilidades sociais e interpessoais,
1122 que tinha como objetivo distribuir aleatoriamente os respondentes em categorias que
1123 consideraram positivas, como resiliência e conscientização, ou negativas, como ansiedade ou
1124 indecisão, para verificar a correlação entre as percepções e o fato de estar em um grupo com
1125 características atribuídas que eram negativas. O último estudo (4) coletou as respostas de três
1126 itens específicos das escalas PPB e PDFO para investigar a percepção de desigualdade racial.
1127 Preocupou-se, também, em verificar o quanto salientar a norma meritocrática (solicitando que
1128 os participantes indicassem o grau de concordância com três itens específicos da escala PPM)
1129 para brancos afeta a percepção de privilégios e se a existência de uma ‘identidade branca’
1130 (verificada pelo grau de concordância com três afirmações sobre identificação com o próprio
1131 grupo racial) influencia esse efeito. Segundo os autores, foi possível verificar: (1) que quanto
1132 maior a PPM, maior negação de privilégios por parte dos brancos; (2) que o desejo de se ver
1133 como merecedor impacta negativamente a percepção de privilégios; (3) a necessidade dos
1134 brancos de reforçar seu ‘self’ e; (4) que salientar a norma meritocrática reduz a percepção de
1135 desigualdades raciais.

1136 Kwate e Meyer (2010)* revisam a literatura sobre acesso a saúde por parte de afro-
1137 americanos para discutir o efeito da crença na meritocracia na saúde desse grupo. Também
1138 compreendendo a meritocracia enquanto ideologia que informa o “Sonho Americano”, os
1139 autores discutem como esse ideal promove um senso de esperança, podendo contribuir para
1140 reduzir a percepção de vulnerabilidade ao preconceito. De acordo com eles, essa ideologia
1141 seria racista, por promover a ideia de que todos podem ser bem sucedidos, mas
1142 desconsideraria problemas estruturais, tais como as desigualdades na distribuição de renda e
1143 no nível escolar. Ao invés de serem reconhecidas como injustiças, acabam sendo utilizadas
1144 como prova de que os afro-americanos seriam incapazes de competir num sistema
1145 meritocrático e dificultariam o acesso à saúde por parte desse grupo.

1146 Hing, Bobocel e Zanna (2002)*, a partir de dois estudos com estudantes universitários
1147 homens e mulheres canadenses, propuseram-se a verificar se o endosso à meritocracia
1148 implicava em sempre ser contrário a ações afirmativas. Consideram que a meritocracia pode
1149 ser compreendida como uma regra de justiça distributiva que prescreve que os resultados
1150 relativos da vida de um indivíduo (por exemplo, o salário) deveriam ser proporcionais aos
1151 inputs relativos (como o esforço individual) e que episódios de discriminação num ambiente
1152 de trabalho poderiam ser compreendidos como uma violação ao princípio do mérito. O
1153 primeiro estudo buscou compreender a relação entre a PPM (Davey et al., 1999), a percepção
1154 de discriminação no ambiente de trabalho (a partir das respostas em uma escala de oito itens
1155 sobre essa percepção) e a oposição a programas de ação afirmativa (verificada pelo voto
1156 favorável ou desfavorável dos respondentes a uma política organizacional de ação afirmativa
1157 em uma empresa hipotética – mas que eles não sabiam que era). O segundo estudo se
1158 preocupou em verificar se os achados do primeiro eram replicáveis, a partir da manipulação
1159 experimental da percepção de discriminação no ambiente de trabalho, uma vez que
1160 consideraram que a maneira como são escritas as afirmações em escalas pode influenciar as

1161 respostas e o julgamento subsequente de alguma situação. O objetivo era observar se a
1162 alteração da escrita de alguns itens (ênfatizando ou minimizando a discriminação) da escala
1163 utilizada no primeiro estudo influenciaria na oposição a ações afirmativas. Sobre a pergunta
1164 de pesquisa, concluem que se as ações afirmativas forem percebidas como restauradoras em
1165 algum grau do princípio do mérito, elas recebem menos oposição, ainda que isso não implique
1166 em considerá-las como não violando o princípio do mérito, especialmente entre homens
1167 brancos.

1168 Em outro trabalho, Hing et al. (2011)*, afirmam que a definição corrente de mérito
1169 compreenderia habilidade, treino e experiência, enquanto a meritocracia costuma ser definida
1170 ou como um princípio de justiça ideal que cria mobilidade social, ou como uma ideologia que
1171 poderia legitimar a desigualdade na sociedade. Baseados nisso, propõem que as duas
1172 interpretações estariam corretas, sendo diferenciadas pelas crenças de que ela já existe
1173 (descritiva) ou de que deveria existir (prescritiva). Segundo os autores, a meritocracia,
1174 enquanto legitimadora de hierarquias seria alimentada por três ideologias: crenças que
1175 justificam o sistema atual, o preconceito (racismo e sexismo), e a inclinação para a dominação
1176 social de um grupo sobre outro. Seus estudos, então, se preocuparam em verificar, entre
1177 homens e mulheres estudantes de Psicologia no Canadá, se a defesa pela meritocracia sempre
1178 implica em legitimar alguma hierarquia. O primeiro (1) examinou se a preferência pelo
1179 princípio do mérito, medida pela PPM (Davey et al., 1999) se diferencia da percepção que a
1180 meritocracia existe, medida por uma escala que elaboram adaptando a PPM, que será
1181 identificada como PME. Também verificaram a correlação entre as crenças prescritiva e
1182 descritiva na meritocracia com ideologias hierarquizantes que justificam o sistema, a saber: a
1183 de que os resultados na sociedade são baseados no mérito; conservadorismo político; apoio a
1184 figuras autoritárias e autoritarismo de direita. Investigaram também a correlação com o
1185 preconceito e com a inclinação para maior dominação social (IDS) de um grupo sobre o outro.

1186 Para tanto, os participantes indicavam sua orientação política em uma escala de 1 a 7 (1 =
1187 extremamente liberal e 7 = extremamente conservador), seus sentimentos em relação a figuras
1188 autoritárias em outra escala (0 = muito frio a 7 = muito acolhedor) e seu grau de concordância
1189 sobre autoritarismo de direita em uma quarta escala de 30 itens. O preconceito foi medido a
1190 partir da resposta a itens selecionados de duas escalas (Altemeyer, 1996; Bobocel et al., 1998)
1191 e a orientação para a dominação social pela escala de Pratto et al., 1994. Por fim, uma escala
1192 adicional de autopercepção foi utilizada para avaliar o como os respondentes se observam
1193 (i.e.: “Sou uma pessoa completamente racional”). O segundo estudo (2), com outros
1194 universitários canadenses, teve como objetivo averiguar, a partir de uma situação hipotética –
1195 desigual e ambígua – de contratação em uma organização, se a PPM tem efeito na crença
1196 meritocrática descritiva. Na etapa piloto, os participantes liam uma descrição de vaga de
1197 emprego para locutor de rádio e currículos de dois candidatos. A formação em jornalismo
1198 seria um diferencial e apenas o candidato com as demais qualificações inferiores em relação
1199 ao primeiro possuía essa graduação. O objetivo dessa etapa era induzir um viés na escolha dos
1200 candidatos (apesar de um ter a formação diferencial, o outro possuía mais qualificações). No
1201 estudo principal, tinham que responder a escala PPM e, três a seis semanas depois, uma parte
1202 aleatoriamente selecionada era convidada para um estudo em que tinham que observar se
1203 estudantes “leigos” faziam julgamentos similares ao de departamentos de seleção profissional.
1204 Lendo as descrições da vaga e dos candidatos utilizadas na fase piloto, tomavam
1205 conhecimento de que o primeiro candidato (o com menos qualificações) foi selecionado e era
1206 um homem, enquanto que o segundo, uma mulher, não foi. O estudo seguinte (3) tratou do
1207 tema de como a preferência pelo princípio do mérito e por ideologias hierarquizantes prediria
1208 reações a ações afirmativas. Novamente, universitários de Psicologia do Canadá responderam
1209 a escala PPM, assim como as escalas sobre preconceito, IDS e sobre autoritarismo de direita.
1210 Uma parte dos respondentes foi aleatoriamente selecionada para responder, em pares, um

1211 teste de associações implícitas (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998) aplicado por uma
1212 mulher branca, que o descrevia como uma avaliação da velocidade de resposta a estímulos
1213 variados. A partir disso, foram classificados em grupos de homens, mulheres, competentes ou
1214 incompetentes (no sentido profissional). Na sequência, um assistente de pesquisa homem e
1215 branco aplicou um questionário de uma empresa hipotética que estaria buscando, na “força de
1216 trabalho do futuro”, as reações, por meio de voto, a políticas organizacionais afirmativas que
1217 teriam sido bem-sucedidas em duas outras empresas. O quarto e último estudo (4) teve como
1218 objetivo testar se, entre as pessoas que apresentam pouco endosso a ideologias legitimadoras
1219 de hierarquia, a preferência pelo princípio do mérito prediz maior apoio a programas que
1220 violariam o princípio do mérito, ou seja, às ações afirmativas. Outro grupo de estudantes
1221 canadenses de Psicologia respondeu a escala PPM, além de outra sobre crenças a respeito de
1222 vieses, elaborada pelos próprios autores. Desses respondentes, um grupo foi selecionado para
1223 participar da mesma pesquisa de opinião sobre o programa de ação afirmativa do grupo do
1224 estudo 3, com a diferença que o termo ação afirmativa foi trocado por iniciativas de
1225 diversidade. Os autores concluem que as crenças meritocráticas prescritivas não refletem
1226 crenças que justificam o sistema ou de endosso à dominação social de um grupo sobre o
1227 outro. Além disso, sugerem que a crença descritiva está mais fortemente correlacionada a
1228 ideologias como conservadorismo político, preconceito, orientação para a dominação social e
1229 autoritarismo de direita. Os que acreditam que a meritocracia deveria existir tendem a se opor
1230 menos a ações afirmativas, mas não deixam de percebê-las como violadoras do princípio de
1231 mérito. Os que acreditam que ela existe, tendem a minimizar a discriminação e a legitimar a
1232 hierarquia social vigente. O primeiro grupo estaria mais ligado a princípios de justiça social, e
1233 o segundo, à legitimação de ideologias hierarquizantes.

1234 Foster e Tsarfati (2005)* investigaram a relação entre crença na meritocracia e
1235 percepção de discriminação severa de gênero – especificamente, se essa relação promoveria

1236 mais ou menos bem-estar. Os autores defendem que o primeiro episódio de discriminação
1237 sofrida é o mais difícil de lidar; o que determinou o grupo participante do estudo que
1238 realizaram: mulheres estudantes de Psicologia no Canadá que relataram episódios leves ou
1239 nenhum episódio de discriminação sofrida, além de selecionarem – deste grupo – apenas as
1240 que relataram maior e menor crença na meritocracia (excluindo as que estavam entre os
1241 pólos). Homens também foram selecionados, mas apenas para aumentar a veracidade do
1242 episódio de discriminação simulado. Para avaliar o grau de crença na meritocracia, utilizam
1243 uma escala de 7 pontos de Lalonde et al. (2000), na qual os participantes indicam seu grau de
1244 concordância com quatro frases (i.e.: “Todos nesse país têm oportunidades iguais”). A(s)
1245 experiência(s) pessoal(is) de discriminação eram avaliadas em um questionário em que as
1246 respondentes precisavam indicar seu grau de concordância entre discordo totalmente a
1247 concordo totalmente com afirmações sobre discriminação (i.e.: “Homens têm mais
1248 oportunidades de emprego que eu”). O estudo consistiu, em um primeiro momento, para
1249 simular uma hierarquia intergrupo, na seleção de grupos de 6 (quatro mulheres e dois homens)
1250 que recebiam um resumo falso do experimento (seria uma avaliação de ansiedade na
1251 realização de testes) em que iriam participar. Apenas os participantes com maiores pontuações
1252 seriam selecionados para uma etapa seguinte, que envolveria a produção de um vídeo para
1253 ajudar a reduzir a ansiedade em outros estudantes, além de concorrerem em uma loteria de
1254 \$200, enquanto os demais receberiam uma nova bateria de testes para avaliar se o baixo
1255 desempenho no teste se reproduzia em outros conhecimentos, como a Matemática, além de
1256 concorrerem em uma loteria de \$100. Por fim, um segundo experimentador, que atuou como
1257 um assistente de pesquisa selecionado porque teria tido uma alta pontuação no mesmo teste
1258 inicial dos participantes, estaria observando a linguagem corporal de cada um durante a
1259 realização dos testes e registrando em categorias como ansioso, negligente, competente etc. A
1260 situação severa de discriminação era evocada por uma explicação do primeiro experimentador

1261 que relatava que mulheres, de um modo geral, tinham desempenho pobre no teste, e que
1262 homens mais frequentemente eram selecionados para a etapa do vídeo. Após ouvirem esse
1263 relato, tinham 5 minutos para realizar o teste e independentemente dos resultados, apenas os
1264 homens foram selecionado para o grupo de vídeo. Havia, também, um grupo controle que não
1265 recebeu o aviso da potencial discriminação na seleção para a etapa seguinte e que selecionou
1266 casais para a suposta produção do vídeo. Os participantes selecionados para a fase do vídeo
1267 eram levados para outra sala e recebiam um informe do objetivo verdadeiro do experimento e
1268 eram mandados embora. O outro grupo realizou mais um teste e depois receberam a descrição
1269 do experimento verdadeiro. O pós-teste envolveu avaliações de humor em uma escala (Foster
1270 & Dion, 2003); de satisfação com a vida (avaliando três afirmações entre “nada verdadeiro
1271 para mim” e “extremamente verdadeiro para mim”); de autoestima (em uma escala com
1272 afirmações em que precisavam indicar se era nada verdadeiro ou totalmente verdadeiro para
1273 elas); além de serem classificadas de acordo com a raiva e ansiedade inferida da correlação
1274 entre as pontuações anteriores. Seus achados sugerem que mulheres que não acreditam que a
1275 meritocracia existe relatam melhor bem-estar após a situação experimental, na qual sofreram
1276 discriminação severa. Isto seria coerente com as teorias de consciência grupal (Bartky, 1997)
1277 e de estudos com mulheres (Bowles & Klein, 1983), que propõem que quebrar crenças como
1278 na meritocracia (que seria um mito), pode fazer com que mulheres culpem o sistema pelo seu
1279 fracasso, melhorando seu bem-estar pessoal. Já no grupo controle, o padrão se inverteu:
1280 aqueles que relataram maior crença, relataram maior bem-estar no pós-teste, o que iria de
1281 acordo com a teoria da adaptação cognitiva, em que “pensar positivo” sobre o sistema pode
1282 aumentar o ajustamento psicológico a situações ameaçadoras.

1283 Pesquisando a relação entre crença meritocrática e percepção de discriminação de
1284 gênero sofrida, McCoy e Major (2007)* propõem, a partir de outros estudos sobre
1285 meritocracia e justificativas da desigualdade, três dimensões para a meritocracia: crença na

1286 mobilidade social individual (i.e.: meu status social depende só de mim); ética protestante do
1287 trabalho (i.e.: trabalho duro garante sucesso); e a crença que o mundo como está é justo. A
1288 partir dessas dimensões, buscam verificar se, ao serem estimulados por mensagens
1289 promotoras de meritocracia, os participantes de uma simulação experimental tenderiam a se
1290 engajar mais em justificativas do sistema meritocrático e a perceber menos situações de
1291 discriminação, mesmo quando eles mesmos são vítimas. Para tanto, realizaram um piloto
1292 (com 32 universitários homens e mulheres) e dois estudos: o primeiro, com 78 estudantes
1293 universitários estadunidenses de ascendência europeia (homens e mulheres), e o segundo, com
1294 41 universitárias. No piloto, o objetivo foi testar se dicas sutis de meritocracia em mensagens
1295 (cinco frases neutras e 15 promotoras de meritocracia) que precisavam desembaralhar
1296 influenciariam o uso de explicações que justificam o sistema. Após desembaralharem as
1297 frases, respondiam um questionário de distração e outro de verificação de endosso à
1298 meritocracia (com quatro afirmações sobre mobilidade social individual em que os
1299 participantes precisavam indicar seu grau de concordância). O primeiro estudo reproduziu a
1300 situação do piloto para verificar a mesma hipótese, além de investigarem se as justificativas
1301 do sistema são mais frequentes nos que endossam fortemente a meritocracia, bem como se
1302 membros de grupos discriminados justificam mais frequentemente o sistema quando diante de
1303 episódios de discriminação. Entre mulheres, a ativação das crenças foi mais fortemente
1304 correlacionada com a chance de se culpar em alguma situação de desvantagem que com
1305 culpar a discriminação. Já entre homens, mesmo após a ativação das crenças, a culpabilização
1306 das mulheres por alguma desvantagem foi em igual medida que culpar a discriminação (nunca
1307 se culpando). O segundo estudo buscou averiguar se a ativação de crenças na meritocracia
1308 (por meio do procedimento piloto) seguida pela exposição à discriminação (i.e.: relatos de
1309 mulheres que sofreram machismo) aumenta a frequência de justificações do sistema. Também
1310 procurou observar em que medida a estereotipia (i.e.: mulheres são mais acolhedoras e

1311 homens mais competentes tecnicamente) afeta o grau de percepção da discriminação, bem
1312 como o quão verdadeiro consideravam o relato que tinham lido e sua correlação com a
1313 percepção do machismo no caso relatado. As participantes que tiveram as crenças ativadas
1314 perceberam menos machismo no episódio relatado, além de terem utilizado mais respostas
1315 que justificam o sistema, como estereotipar o grupo, considerando desvantagens como
1316 produto de serem menos capazes tecnicamente, por exemplo.

1317 Segundo Tacconelli et al. (2012)*, a meritocracia seria um sistema de governança ou
1318 administração em que tarefas e responsabilidades são distribuídas de acordo com méritos
1319 individuais (i.e.: inteligência, credenciais e educação – determinadas por avaliações ou testes).
1320 Para esses autores, o sucesso na ciência deveria ser informado unicamente por esse sistema,
1321 mas observam, ao investigarem a distribuição de cargos nas áreas de microbiologia clínica e
1322 infectologia entre especialistas médicos europeus, que há uma diferença significativa entre
1323 gêneros nessa alocação, com o trabalho doméstico pesando desproporcionalmente entre as
1324 médicas, além de altos índices de relato de discriminação por conta do gênero ou do local de
1325 origem.

1326 Em uma proposta diferente, na qual investigaram crenças, Horberg, Kraus e Keltner
1327 (2013)* apresentam quatro experimentos, com estadunidenses, em que buscam verificar se
1328 perceber demonstrações de orgulho em outro estaria correlacionado com inferir que esse
1329 indivíduo endossa a meritocracia. A meritocracia é entendida pelos autores enquanto um
1330 sistema de justiça distributiva no qual os recursos são distribuídos com base no mérito (i.e.:
1331 desempenho, contribuição ou habilidade), e, portanto, oposto ao igualitarismo. Os autores
1332 apresentaram, a partir de fotos, demonstrações de orgulho por parte das pessoas retratadas, e
1333 as contrastaram com demonstrações de alegria, para verificar qual expressão de sentimento
1334 era mais correlacionada com a inferência de apoio à meritocracia. Os participantes indicavam
1335 uma estimativa de apoio à meritocracia e ao igualitarismo a partir de uma escala para cada

sistema e, em outra escala (de 1 = nada a 7 = totalmente) o quanto o sujeito na foto tenderia a demonstrar alegria ou orgulho. No estudo seguinte, verificaram a correlação entre interesse próprio percebido em fotos e o endosso inferido à meritocracia ou ao igualitarismo. O próximo experimento investigou se as pessoas que demonstram orgulho são percebidas como aparentando maior interesse próprio e se isso afeta as inferências sobre apoio a um dos dois sistemas distributivos. O estudo final utilizou trechos de falas de pessoas em contextos em que elas discorriam sobre seus pontos fortes. Os participantes não ouviam as falas, mas eram instruídos a observar as expressões dos entrevistados para que os autores pudessem avaliar se a percepção de demonstrações não-verbais de orgulho prediriam maior inferência de apoio à meritocracia em relação ao igualitarismo. Os quatro estudos correlacionam a percepção de que alguém está demonstrando orgulho com inferir que essas pessoas endossam a meritocracia.

A proposta de Walton, Spencer e Erman (2013)* se baseia em uma meta-análise de 39 experimentos com estudantes do nível fundamental ao superior de cinco países (negros e latinos que moram nos EUA, imigrantes da Turquia que moram na Alemanha e de mulheres da América do Norte e da Europa). Os experimentos avaliaram o desempenho acadêmico (conforme pontuação no SAT ou notas), criaram uma situação experimental de ameaça psicológica e depois pediram aos participantes que realizassem outro teste acadêmico. Os autores defendem, a partir da análise, uma tentativa de conciliação entre a meritocracia e as ações afirmativas: o que chamam de “meritocracia afirmativa”. Para os autores, a meritocracia deve ser entendida como a medição do potencial de cumprir tarefas, afirmando que isso não pode subestimar a habilidade intelectual e o potencial de membros de grupos negativamente estereotipados, como os negros. Segundo eles, a habilidade é algo parcialmente latente e subestimado por testes como o SAT, que não levam em consideração o que chama de

ameaças psicológicas a esses indivíduos. Portanto, a implementação de medidas afirmativas seria fundamental para promover mais meritocracia, e não o contrário.

Outra proposta de mediação é a de Gündemir et al. (2017)*, que defendem uma meritocracia multicultural no ambiente organizacional. Consideram que o princípio meritocrático deve se basear unicamente na competência dos indivíduos ao se realizar contratações e promoções. Nesse sentido, valorizar a multiculturalidade, segundo os estudos que apresentam, reduziria a ativação de estereótipos e a negação de discriminação por parte de brancos, ao mesmo tempo em que aumentaria o engajamento de não brancos, aumentando a sensação de inclusão.

1369

1370 ii.ii) Grupos étnicos

Outros autores buscaram entender os efeitos da crença na meritocracia nas desigualdades observadas em outros grupos étnicos (i.e.: imigrantes) ou na sociedade em geral. McCoy et al. (2013)* consideram a meritocracia como uma ideologia de justificação do sistema atual e dominante nos EUA, que seria mediada por crenças: que o mundo é justo como está; na ética protestante do trabalho; e que a mobilidade social é possível. Segundo seus estudos, a crença meritocrática beneficia a autoestima tanto de membros de grupos de status social elevado, como de status baixo, uma vez que isso aumentaria a percepção de controle pessoal sobre os rumos da vida, mas isso acabaria por desviar o foco das desigualdades e legitimar o mundo como está.

Wiley, Deaux e Hagelskamp (2012)* investigaram as relações entre crença na meritocracia, grau de identificação étnica e engajamento em ações coletivas diante de desigualdades entre imigrantes latinos de primeira e segunda geração nos EUA. Para esses autores, a meritocracia seria informada pelo “Sonho Americano”, ou seja, pela crença que é possível ascender socialmente por meio de trabalho duro. Por meio de um levantamento em

que os participantes precisavam preencher escalas (de discordo totalmente a concordo totalmente), verificaram como os respondentes consideravam que o público os enxergava, a crença dos imigrantes na meritocracia, a identificação étnica e o apoio a ações coletivas. Observam que os imigrantes de primeira geração tendem a acreditar mais na meritocracia, enquanto os de segunda se apresentam mais reticentes, ao mesmo tempo em que tendem a se identificar mais com seus grupos étnicos e a apoiar mais ações coletivas de enfrentamento às desigualdades.

Fiske (2018)* investigou, a partir de um levantamento bibliográfico, como cognições sobre políticos (impressões e estereótipos a respeito de características das figuras políticas; como acolhimento e competência, por exemplo) ajudam a explicar as impressões sobre candidatos políticos, sobre pessoas no geral e sobre estereótipos de grupo. Além disso, essas impressões afetariam as divisões de classe e o ressentimento de classe. A partir do relato de outros estudos, sugerem que há consistência no fato de que a elite (no geral ou dos políticos) seria vista como competente, mas fria, mas a frieza seria menos importante que a competência, esta que justificaria o merecimento do status desse grupo, ainda que os mais pobres se ressentam da maneira como são tratados pela elite. Já a elite tenderia a ver minorias, como os imigrantes e os destinatários de políticas públicas de assistência, como trapaceiros, ou seja, não merecedores de recompensas sociais.

Investigando outro grupo étnico, os australianos de ascendência asiática, Ho (2017)* discute como a visão que se tem desse grupo, como exemplo de meritocracia pelo seu alto desempenho acadêmico, contribui para um ambiente de competição com elevação de pressão social sobre esses estudantes e aumento de ansiedade, provocando um efeito de “automatização” de suas vidas. Comparados a esse grupo, outros estudantes não tão bem-sucedidos seriam vistos como preguiçosos ou incompetentes.

1409 ii.iii) Educação

1410 O contexto educacional também recebeu atenção dos pesquisadores em Psicologia.
1411 Para Darnon et al. (2018)*, a crença de que o resultado escolar de alguém é produto de sua
1412 habilidade e esforços individuais, na França, assim como a crença na autoeficácia, ajudariam
1413 a explicar a lacuna de desempenho entre diferentes grupos socioeconômicos, podendo criar
1414 barreiras para a implementação de métodos pedagógicos redutores de desigualdades.
1415 Estudantes de quinta série da França, pertencentes a diferentes níveis socioeconômicos, foram
1416 expostos a um texto que, ora defendia a meritocracia escolar, ora um assunto não relacionado
1417 à meritocracia (condição controle). Na sequência, relatavam sua autoeficácia nas matérias de
1418 Língua Francesa e Matemática, bem como seu grau de crença na meritocracia escolar. Por
1419 fim, realizavam testes em Língua Francesa e em Matemática. Os autores observaram que
1420 ativar a crença na meritocracia escolar favoreceria processos de atribuição do sucesso a
1421 características internas (i.e.: autoeficácia) e de responsabilização individual, permeando todos
1422 os estratos sociais com a percepção de que são os responsáveis pela condição social em que
1423 estão. Além disso, ativar a crença foi correlacionado com a variação nas notas nos testes,
1424 sendo que quanto mais se relatou crença na meritocracia escolar após a ativação, pior foi o
1425 desempenho nos testes entre estudantes de baixo status socioeconômico, enquanto que entre
1426 os de status elevado, o efeito não foi significativo.

1427 Em outro estudo com a mesma autora principal, Darnon, Smeding e Redersdorff
1428 (2018)* reforçam a hipótese da meritocracia como barreira para políticas pedagógicas
1429 redutoras de desigualdade, a partir de três estudos. O primeiro estudo (1) foi realizado com
1430 estudantes universitários franceses que respondiam uma escala subjetiva sobre status
1431 socioeconômico (Adler et al., 2000), eram expostos a imagens de humor para distração e, em
1432 seguida, respondiam duas pesquisas – uma escala de crença na meritocracia escolar de
1433 Wiederkehr et al. (2015) que foi dividida em dois momentos: a indicação em uma escala de

1434 concordância (de nem um pouco a muito) de quanto consideram que os itens correspondiam a
1435 realidade escolar francesa atual e, também, de quanto eles acreditavam que o sistema deveria
1436 ser daquele jeito. Após essa etapa, eram introduzidos a uma nova intervenção pedagógica
1437 hipotética que supostamente reduziria a desigualdade na universidade e tinham que relatar seu
1438 interesse (por meio da expressão de grau de concordância com seis afirmações) e
1439 possibilidade de engajamento nessa proposta (por meio da indicação, em quatro afirmações,
1440 do grau de interesse em se envolver no projeto). O estudo seguinte (2), realizado virtualmente,
1441 teve como participantes pais franceses de alunos da primeira série ao final do ensino médio.
1442 Os participantes respondiam às mesmas escalas de crença na meritocracia escolar e a
1443 subjetiva sobre status socioeconômico. Eram, então, expostos a uma de duas variações da
1444 intervenção pedagógica: ora como reduzindo desigualdades sociais, ora como melhorando a
1445 nota de todos os alunos, mas mantendo a lacuna de status socioeconômico. Na sequência,
1446 tinham que indicar seu interesse no método e a possibilidade de engajamento. O último estudo
1447 buscou averiguar entre pais de alunos do ensino primário ao médio, fora do contexto virtual,
1448 se a orientação política dos respondentes influenciava na crença na meritocracia escolar e na
1449 possibilidade de envolvimento com a intervenção equalizante. Em um primeiro momento,
1450 com a função de “ativar” a crença na meritocracia escolar, os pais precisaram ler uma
1451 entrevista com um suposto especialista que defendia a meritocracia escolar (“na escola, onde
1452 há vontade, há um caminho”) e que isso era suficientemente comprovado cientificamente. Na
1453 situação controle, a ideia defendida foi a de que a maneira como um ambiente de jardim de
1454 infância é organizada afeta os jogos que elas irão escolher. Em seguida, responderam a escala
1455 subjetiva sobre status socioeconômico, indicaram sua orientação política (por meio de uma
1456 escala de 1 – extrema esquerda a 10 – extrema direita) e, por fim, foram apresentados a um
1457 dos dois métodos hipotéticos de intervenção pedagógica, assim como tinham que indicar o
1458 interesse e a disponibilidade de envolvimento. Os resultados principais foram: (1) a crença na

1459 meritocracia escolar prediz negativamente o interesse e a disponibilidade de engajamento em
1460 práticas equalizantes no contexto universitário. A norma meritocrática descritiva (crença que
1461 a meritocracia existe), portanto, serviria como barreira potencial para medidas pedagógicas
1462 redutoras de desigualdade. (2) a crença na meritocracia escolar prediz mais fortemente a
1463 resistência a políticas pedagógicas que enfrentem a desigualdade do que medidas que
1464 melhorem as notas de um modo geral, mas mantendo a lacuna socioeconômica. O fato de o
1465 estudo ser online pode ter enviesado os resultados, por conta de o acesso a internet ser mais
1466 frequente entre membros de status socioeconômico elevado. Uma terceira variável poderia ser
1467 responsável pela relação entre crença na meritocracia escolar e a disponibilidade de
1468 engajamento com intervenções pedagógicas equalizantes, que é testada no último estudo (3): a
1469 ativação da crença na meritocracia não implicou em grau menor de engajamento em nenhum
1470 dos dois métodos – o que poderia ser devido a uma resistência em abrir mão do princípio do
1471 mérito –, ainda que a crença na meritocracia escolar, controlando a orientação política, tenha
1472 continuado sendo negativamente associada à disponibilidade de engajamento no método
1473 equalizante.

1474 Kuppens et al. (2018)* investigaram como grupos de maior escolaridade percebem os
1475 com menos, a partir de sete estudos. Primeiro (1), buscaram verificar, entre universitários do
1476 País de Gales, como se sentiam (i.e.: frio ou acolhedor) em relação a vários grupos (ex:
1477 britânicos, ingleses, galeses, franceses, idosos, graduados, evasores escolares). No próximo
1478 (2), trabalhadores mecânicos participaram de uma pesquisa online em que precisavam, dentre
1479 outras coisas, indicar o quanto consideravam que seguiam regras sociais, como (e se)
1480 percebiam racismo, xenofobia e sexismo, além de seus sentimentos em relação a diversos
1481 grupos. O terceiro estudo (3), online e com participantes britânicos não-muçulmanos, buscou
1482 investigar se informações mínimas sobre o background educacional afetavam a avaliação
1483 daquela pessoa. Os respondentes precisavam indicar se gostavam de indivíduos descritos em

1484 termos de seu nível escolar e etnia. Também tinham que avaliar o quanto se identificavam
1485 com o grupo em que estavam (i.e.: baixo ou alto nível escolar) e responder questões sobre seu
1486 próprio nível escolar e o dos pais. A quarta (4) proposta replicou a anterior, diferindo no
1487 público: trabalhadores mecânicos estadunidenses, ao invés de britânicos e se dividiu em duas
1488 investigações: 4a. utilizou os mesmos perfis muçulmanos e não-muçulmanos do estudo
1489 anterior e 4b. utilizou perfis de brancos e negros. O quinto (5) experimento buscou investigar
1490 em que medida diferenças nas características atribuídas a diferentes grupos afetam o viés
1491 educacional intergrupos observado nos casos anteriores. Em uma amostra representativa da
1492 população de Flanders, na Bélgica, foi solicitado que fosse indicado o grau de concordância
1493 com seis afirmações sobre talento, trabalho duro e sorte (i.e.: “Qualquer um consegue um
1494 diploma universitário se trabalhar duro o suficiente.”). O experimento seguinte (6) buscou
1495 aprofundar a compreensão sobre fatores que afetariam o viés intergrupos, aplicando em
1496 estudantes universitários holandeses escalas que indicariam suas preferências por ideologias
1497 hierarquizantes (i.e.: dominação social), o quanto consideravam membros de determinados
1498 grupos responsáveis pelas suas condições atuais, seus sentimentos em relação a esses
1499 membros e o quanto acreditavam que os grupos deveriam receber ajuda do governo. A última
1500 investigação (7) repetiu a proposta do estudo (6), com as diferenças de que foi realizado com
1501 trabalhadores mecânicos nos EUA, substituiu os grupos “pobres” e “turcos” por “classe
1502 trabalhadora” e “negros” e retirou o grupo “cegos”. Além disso, acrescentou uma escala de
1503 crença na meritocracia para verificar se os resultados do experimento anterior refletiam
1504 crenças ideológicas sobre a desigualdade, bem como o grau de identificação com o próprio
1505 grupo educacional, o grau de dificuldade que avaliaram que tiveram na sua educação, e o
1506 quanto de mérito consideram que tiveram ao longo de suas formações. Por fim, indicavam o
1507 grau de concordância com afirmações sobre viés educacional (i.e.: “Eu considero mais
1508 negativamente alguém quando eles não completaram sua educação.”).

1509 Nas três manipulações do estudo (1), os indivíduos com maior nível escolar foram
1510 avaliados de maneira mais acolhedora que os de menor nível por respondentes de todos os
1511 níveis socioeconômicos. O estudo (2) replicou os resultados dos primeiros e acrescentou o
1512 dado de que pessoas com alto nível escolar tendem a apresentar maior viés negativo em
1513 relação aos menos escolarizados. A manipulação seguinte (3) sugere que participantes com
1514 diploma universitário apresentam maior viés educacional intergrupos: relatavam gostar mais
1515 dos perfis com maior escolaridade. Os indivíduos com menor escolaridade não apresentaram
1516 esse viés, mesmo que se percebessem como mais semelhantes aos perfis de baixo nível
1517 escolar. Além disso, quanto maior a identificação com indivíduos de alto nível escolar, maior
1518 o viés. A quarta investigação (4) replicou os achados do anterior: participantes com maior
1519 escolaridade demonstraram maior viés intergrupo, gostando mais de outros indivíduos com a
1520 mesma escolaridade e os respondentes com menor nível escolar não apresentaram o viés. No
1521 que diz respeito à etnia, indivíduos com menor escolaridade avaliaram outras etnias mais
1522 positivamente que os mais escolarizados, ainda que avaliem os de mesma etnia mais
1523 positivamente do que os de outra – algo também observado no estudo (3). Para os autores,
1524 isso sugere que o preconceito escolar é mais aceitável, para pessoas com maior nível escolar,
1525 que o em relação a outros grupos, como etnias. O quinto (5) experimento indicou maior
1526 atribuição ao trabalho duro do que sorte ao sucesso acadêmico em relação ao sucesso
1527 profissional, tanto nos respondentes de maior como de menor escolaridade (ainda que em
1528 menor escala nesse segundo grupo), o que sugeriria que pessoas com menor escolaridade não
1529 parecem contestar a legitimidade de seu baixo status educacional, ou seja, consideram que
1530 merecem o status que possuem. O próximo experimento (6) observou que pessoas menos
1531 escolarizadas eram vistas como mais responsáveis e culpáveis por sua condição que pessoas
1532 pobres e como sendo menos injustamente tratadas. Caracterizar membros de níveis
1533 socioeconômicos inferiores como menos escolarizados (em contraste com pobres, por

exemplo) implicaria em maior avaliação negativa por parte dos mais escolarizados. O último estudo (7) sugere que os com menor nível escolar são considerados mais responsáveis e culpáveis, tanto pelos mais como menos escolarizados, eliciam mais raiva e são alvo de menor apreço que a classe trabalhadora. Os mais escolarizados apresentaram maior viés intergrupo, enquanto os menos, em relação ao próprio grupo, o que sugeriria que este segundo grupo tende a endossar as visões negativas que se têm a respeito deles. Por fim, quanto maior a crença na meritocracia, maior a tendência a atribuir a causas internas a situação de grupos em desvantagem.

Para Haney e Hurtado (1994)*, ao discutir o impacto do discurso meritocrático no Direito, o mérito é tomado como algo natural e raramente definido, e permite que desigualdades estruturais sejam ignoradas, sendo que quando há alguma crítica, isso é tomado como violação dos direitos individuais.

iii) Educação e relacionados

Na Educação, dos 14 trabalhos, 6 são teóricos e 8 empíricos. A meritocracia é discutida sob as mais diversas perspectivas, incluindo as políticas públicas de educação, em especial a adoção de políticas afirmativas, os processos de admissão escolar e universitário e o uso de testes padronizados para aferição de habilidades.

No âmbito das políticas afirmativas, Park e Liu (2014)* consideram que há uma cooptação, por parte de estadunidenses brancos, de estudantes estadunidenses de ascendência asiática contra ações afirmativas, baseadas em estereótipos (i.e.: asiáticos são mais inteligentes e esforçados) e conveniência (é útil para atacar as ações afirmativas). Os estadunidenses brancos que são contrários a ações afirmativas e se percebem prejudicados por elas ao não serem admitidos em instituições que possuem sistemas de cotas se beneficiariam de reforçar o discurso meritocrático para os estadunidense-asiáticos que tiram altas notas e

1559 também se consideram prejudicados por sistemas de cotas. Segundo os brancos, os asiáticos
1560 estariam sendo discriminados pelos sistemas de cotas. Conseguiriam, dessa forma, mais um
1561 argumento contra ações afirmativas, uma vez que ao enfatizar o como essa minoria étnica nos
1562 EUA possui alto desempenho acadêmico, não faria sentido considerar que a condição étnica
1563 influencia o desempenho acadêmico.

1564 Weakliem, Mcquillan e Schauer (1995)* definem a meritocracia como a mobilidade
1565 social devido ao desempenho intelectual. A partir das pontuações em um teste nacional de
1566 habilidade verbal realizado com pessoas nascidas entre o final do século XIX e os anos 60, o
1567 artigo explora as diferenças nas classes ocupacionais (i.e.: gerentes, técnicos, trabalhadores
1568 manuais etc.). As diferenças na classe social, conforme a pontuação no teste de habilidade
1569 verbal, diminuíram no período observado, o que sugeriria que os EUA não pudessem ser
1570 vistos como se movendo em uma direção mais meritocrática, uma vez que o desempenho nos
1571 testes teria pouco efeito na mobilidade social. Os autores criticam o excesso de ênfase nas
1572 credenciais acadêmicas, que reduziriam a importância de um desempenho superior que
1573 poderia ser apresentado em alguma profissão.

1574 Para Au (2016)*, os testes padronizados acabam por aprofundar a desigualdade racial
1575 na educação, que seria justificada pelo discurso meritocrático, uma vez que consideram
1576 aqueles com baixo desempenho como sendo falhas, reforçando um discurso excludente de que
1577 os que falham o fazem por falta de esforço ou trabalho duro.

1578 Clycq, Ward e Vanderbroucke (2014)* discutem as noções de sucesso e fracasso
1579 escolar no contexto educacional da Bélgica, a partir de um levantamento nacional com mais
1580 de 11 mil estudantes, além de entrevistas com alunos, pais, professores e diretores. Observam
1581 o endosso ao ideal meritocrático do indivíduo, com os respondentes acreditando que têm
1582 controle do seu próprio sucesso em praticamente toda a amostra investigada. Consideram que
1583 o discurso meritocrático se vale de uma perspectiva de pensamento deficitário para definir o

1584 fracasso escolar, na qual é o indivíduo que não é bem sucedido no sistema educacional, e não
1585 o sistema que tem problemas.

1586 Segundo Nahai (2013)*, processos de admissão de estudantes em universidades de
1587 elite que sejam pautados no mérito deveriam selecionar apenas os mais talentosos com base
1588 nas conquistas acadêmicas, sem levar em consideração a posse de capital social (i.e.: os
1589 contatos que alguém possui devido às suas redes sociais) e cultural (a educação formal, por
1590 exemplo). Para o autor, a Universidade de Oxford, na Inglaterra, uma universidade de elite,
1591 pode ser considerada meritocrática de acordo com esta definição. No entanto questiona se o
1592 desempenho acadêmico, tomado como parâmetro de mérito, sendo este fortemente
1593 correlacionado com renda familiar e classe social, expressaria um método satisfatório de
1594 admissão.

1595 Ainda no contexto inglês, Warikoo e Fuhr (2014)* entrevistaram estudantes de
1596 universidades de elite para saber como percebiam o processo de admissão nessas instituições.
1597 Mesmo reconhecendo a desigualdade no processo, consideram o processo justo e
1598 meritocrático, e não apoiam a adoção de medidas para tornar a seleção mais igualitária.

1599 Para Scully (2002)*, as universidades não podem ser consideradas meritocráticas, uma
1600 vez que renda familiar, vieses sociais e a política influenciam os processos de admissão de
1601 estudantes. De acordo com a autora, a crença na meritocracia é central para a reprodução da
1602 desigualdade, uma vez que a partir dos resultados do processo de admissão, o conceito de
1603 mérito seria revisto nas universidades, ajustando-se aos resultados e mantendo uma
1604 interpretação de meritocracia. Nesse processo, os que são selecionados, caso confrontem
1605 algum princípio considerado meritocrático anteriormente, provocam um reajuste no conceito
1606 de mérito para justificar a seleção desses novos estudantes.

1607 Lim e Tam (2018)* entrevistaram professores em Singapura para entender como o
1608 conceito de meritocracia é negociado e disputado entre discursos do governo e práticas dos

1609 professores. Para o governo, a meritocracia seria o mérito individual, mensurado por
1610 pontuações em um sistema educacional altamente competitivo, sendo recompensado com
1611 posição social e postos de trabalho (na burocracia governamental, no caso de Singapura). No
1612 caso dos professores, há resistência a essa concepção e um reconhecimento de que as
1613 habilidades não são inatas, precisando ser ensinadas de modo planejado.

1614 Em outra instituição californiana, no Vale do Silício, Chang (2018)* discute o impacto
1615 provocado por uma organização (que faz a intermediação entre startups de tecnologia de
1616 ensino e o governo dos EUA) nas políticas públicas educacionais. A empresa promoveria um
1617 discurso de meritocracia digital, em que os recursos digitais são capazes de mais eficazmente
1618 avaliar o mérito, desconsiderando desigualdades históricas e materiais e excluindo maneiras
1619 mais consistentes de planejar as políticas de reforma educacional.

1620 Tannock (2009)* discute a meritocracia a partir da igualdade de oportunidades de
1621 acesso à educação em escala global. Para o autor, o mérito é avaliado pelo seu produto; ou
1622 seja, se nossas ações produzirem algo que é valorizado na sociedade, são consideradas
1623 meritórias. Afirma que o ideal de meritocracia no resto do planeta espelha-se no
1624 estadunidense. Este promoveria uma perspectiva globalizante – que prometeria que qualquer
1625 um de qualquer lugar pode ser bem-sucedido, com base unicamente no talento e no esforço
1626 individual – ao mesmo tempo em que seria nacionalista, no que diz respeito à educação. A
1627 mão-de-obra qualificada estrangeira é importante, desde que atenda aos interesses do país
1628 para o qual migraram (os EUA, no caso), além de ter como pano de fundo a dispensa da
1629 necessidade de bancar os estudos (pelo menos nos níveis primário e secundário) dos mais
1630 talentosos de outros países.

1631 Analisando discursos e práticas na Universidade de Califórnia, Liu (2011)* enxerga o
1632 mérito como sendo impossível de definir fora de um contexto, à parte das instituições que o
1633 utilizam. Ainda que seja frequentemente relacionada a talentos, habilidades, inteligência e

1634 esforços (que devem ser recompensados), e defendida enquanto sistema de justiça
1635 distributiva, a meritocracia pode acabar produzindo estratificação e profundas implicações
1636 sociais.

1637 López e O'Connor (2018)* pesquisaram a percepção de efeitos da micropolítica (i.e.:
1638 uso de redes sociais informais, como pedir indicação de colegas em uma instituição para a
1639 qual se está concorrendo a um cargo ou padrões dúbios de avaliação, resultantes da não
1640 definição explícita dos critérios de seleção) na carreira acadêmica na Espanha e na Irlanda.
1641 Constataram que, de um modo geral, se reconhece que a micropolítica tem papel fundamental
1642 na carreira acadêmica, o que violaria o pressuposto meritocrático, comumente atribuído a
1643 universidades.

1644 Sliwa e Johansson (2014)* entendem o conceito de mérito como denotando tanto as
1645 qualificações formais de um indivíduo (demonstrações de capacidades internas e de
1646 habilidades) como a mensuração de capacidades internas, e habilidades específicas.
1647 Estudaram, a partir de entrevistas, o papel que funcionárias imigrantes de faculdades de
1648 administração no Reino Unido podem ter na reprodução ou contestação do discurso
1649 meritocrático em organizações contemporâneas. As autoras tratam a meritocracia como um
1650 discurso “regulador de identidades”. Nas entrevistas em que a meritocracia era endossada, ou
1651 seja, que as entrevistadas afirmavam estar na posição profissional que estão por conta de suas
1652 credenciais acadêmicas, as respostas pareciam sugerir a construção de uma identidade
1653 positiva, em que as respondentes se percebem como bem-sucedidas, ou com potencial de o
1654 serem, além de possuírem boas perspectivas de progressão na carreira e acreditarem que o
1655 trabalho duro protegeria as pessoas de serem discriminadas. Já para as que contestaram a
1656 meritocracia da faculdade em que trabalham, afirmando que sua etnia, gênero ou outras
1657 variáveis que não as credenciais acadêmicas afetam sua carreira, isso não implicou em
1658 contestar a defesa de que os resultados da carreira deveriam ser baseados no esforço

1659 individual e no talento. Isso implicaria em uma sensação de impotência e em resignação.
1660 Propõem que o conceito de mérito precisa ser construído junto com as minorias, e não
1661 imposto a elas.

1662 Cao (2004)*¹⁶ discute a ênfase no desempenho para distribuir recompensas no
1663 trabalho (i.e.: remunerações maiores ou promoções) em mais de 1500 organizações chinesas,
1664 em 1994 e 1995, a partir de dados coletados em pesquisas realizadas pelo poder público em
1665 Xangai e Cantão, na China. O autor defende que a adoção de práticas meritocráticas, como as
1666 que observa nos dados que analisa, está mais fortemente correlacionada com a exposição de
1667 uma organização a um mercado competitivo, algo que seria mais recorrente na China pós-
1668 socialista e em outros países que transicionaram seu mercado para um modelo mais alinhado
1669 aos ideais meritocráticos do ocidente.

1670

1671 **DISCUSSÃO**

1672 A ubiquidade da meritocracia ao longo dos séculos, nas mais diversas instituições e
1673 nos mais variados contextos é notável e contribui para demonstrar a relevância de estudos
1674 sobre o tema, uma vez que propostas meritocráticas apresentam implicações profundas nas
1675 relações humanas desde há muito tempo. Os contextos de ocorrência de uso do termo nos
1676 artigos aqui analisados são os mais diversos, bem como os métodos utilizados nos estudos e
1677 as conclusões propostas. A Figura 5 sistematizou os mais recorrentes contextos de ocorrência,
1678 métodos utilizados para discuti-los e conclusões em cada área do saber:

¹⁶ Apesar de estar classificado em uma revista de Educação, no SJR, esse artigo não apresenta nenhuma discussão referente à educação. Por razões metodológicas foi mantido aqui.

Área das discussões	Principais contextos de ocorrência do termo	Principais métodos	Principais conclusões sugeridas
Ciências Sociais e relacionados	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Uso de credenciais acadêmicas como parâmetro indicador de mérito. • Os processos de seleção ou avaliação profissional (pública ou privada) são meritocráticos? • É possível caracterizar uma sociedade como meritocrática de acordo com como a mobilidade social é observada nela? • Existe relação entre crença na meritocracia e percepção de desigualdades, controlando, principalmente, as variáveis de gênero, raça e etnia? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Estudos correlacionais com dados de levantamentos nacionais, na maioria das vezes, que possibilitariam correlacionar nível educacional e status socioeconômico de destino ou alocação profissional • Experimentos de correlação entre crença na meritocracia e outras características (alinhamento político, autoritarismo, percepção de desigualdades etc.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prescrição de uma meritocracia que não apresente as inadequações demonstradas nos estudos. Não há um detalhamento de como se chegaria nisso, na maior parte das vezes. • Apontamento da meritocracia como um mito ou ideologia que serviria para justificar o sistema social como está (i.e.: desigual e estratificado)
Psicologia e relacionados	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Correlação entre crença na meritocracia e: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • percepção de discriminação sofrida por si e por outro; • engajamento em ações coletivas contra desigualdades; • posicionamento acerca de ações afirmativas controlando principalmente variáveis como raça, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Estudos correlacionais com experimentos laboratoriais que aferiam a crença na meritocracia baseada em escalas ou reações a situações hipotéticas e correlacionavam a crença com variáveis como: percepção de discriminação; legitimação de ideologias hierarquizantes; justificação 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As conclusões costumam girar em torno da descrição dos principais achados e da necessidade de mais pesquisas. Há, de maneira mais contida, a expressão de algum posicionamento favorável ou contrário à meritocracia.

	gênero e grupo étnico.	do sistema social como está (i.e.: desigual e estratificado); bem-estar psicológico; apoio a ações afirmativas; ideologia política etc.	
Educação e relacionados	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Efeitos do discurso meritocrático na educação; • avaliação de se um país ou instituição de ensino é meritocrático, segundo seus processos de admissão de estudantes e de seleção de profissionais. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alguns estudos correlacionais entre nível educacional e mobilidade social; • outros teóricos que discutem os impactos do discurso nas narrativas presentes no fracasso escolar e; • entrevistas com estudantes ou profissionais que investigavam suas percepções de meritocracia em suas instituições. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Críticas negativas à meritocracia enquanto discurso dominante no contexto educacional, mas sem apresentar alternativas.

Figura 5. Sistematização dos resultados mais recorrentes em cada área do saber.

1680 **Meritocracia ocidental e oriental**

1681 A despeito da ampla e diversa utilização do termo “meritocracia”, constata-se uma
1682 grande variedade no que diz respeito aos contextos de ocorrência de seu uso. Essa variedade
1683 se expressa já no que são considerados os principais pressupostos filosóficos da meritocracia
1684 no ocidente e no oriente. Na primeira região, o endosso à meritocracia seria mais pautado em
1685 promover maior igualdade de oportunidades de acesso a bens sociais e com maior influência
1686 da ética protestante do trabalho, detalhada na sequência (ainda que sejam apontadas também
1687 influências do Confucionismo, especialmente a partir do Iluminismo) (McCoy et al., 2013;
1688 McCoy & Major, 2007). Já no oriente, a meritocracia teria sido mais diretamente influenciada
1689 pelo Confucionismo e mais direcionada à constituição das burocracias governamentais
1690 (Cheng, 2018).

1691 A ética protestante do trabalho teria sido conformada a partir da Reforma Protestante,
1692 já apresentada neste estudo. Essa ética teria sido levada da Inglaterra, por protestantes
1693 puritanistas que fugiam da perseguição da Coroa (católica), para as colônias inglesas no
1694 território estadunidense, em meados do século XVI. Orientada nos princípios do
1695 protestantismo, pautava-se em uma mudança importante, segundo Weber (2004/1904), na
1696 concepção que se tinha do trabalho até aquele momento – que era visto como algo necessário
1697 até então, e passou, a partir dos escritos de Lutero, a poder ser entendido como uma missão
1698 divina, imbuindo de religiosidade a noção de trabalho. Lutero teria se inspirado no ascetismo
1699 de monges e passou a defender que o comprometimento e disciplina com o dever
1700 aproximariam os indivíduos da graça de Deus. Para Weber (2004/1904), ao observar a
1701 presença de maior número de protestantes nas classes econômicas mais elevadas da Alemanha
1702 e estender sua hipótese para analisar outros países do ocidente, essa ética seria o "espírito do
1703 capitalismo". Já o confucionismo, filosofia oficial do governo chinês durante, pelo menos,
1704 dois mil anos, tinha como maior preocupação a administração pública, que era até seu

1705 surgimento ocupada por critérios de sangue ou de afinidade política, e buscou definir
1706 parâmetros para a seleção dos mais capazes a administrarem a China.

1707 O nepotismo e a arbitrariedade, portanto, na alocação de cargos profissionais ao longo
1708 da história são dois dos principais disparadores das discussões sobre como enfrentar a
1709 desigualdade oriunda, por exemplo, das indicações a cargos governamentais de membros da
1710 família ou amigos sem a verificação de critérios técnicos. Um dos primeiros produtos dessa
1711 preocupação é a criação de exames nacionais que supostamente seriam capazes de selecionar
1712 os mais competentes tecnicamente para algum cargo. A utilização de provas com esse fim tem
1713 início na China, entre os séculos V e IV AC (Cheng, 2018), e perdura até hoje, tanto no
1714 oriente como no ocidente, como principal instrumento de aferição de mérito para os mais
1715 diversos casos, seja a admissão em universidades ou o recrutamento e seleção em empresas.
1716 Além disso, a partir do século XX, com o surgimento da psicometria, testes padronizados,
1717 como o de Q.I., passam a ser utilizados como parâmetros considerados eficazes de aferição
1718 das "habilidades" de uma pessoa, que seriam, para alguns autores (e.g.: Marks, 2010), a parte
1719 mensurável do mérito, uma vez que o conceito de "esforço" seria elusivo.

1720 Uma distinção importante, no entanto, entre os casos ocidental e oriental é que,
1721 contemporaneamente, conforme exposto na sistematização dos resultados, a meritocracia em
1722 países do ocidente teria uma preocupação mais democrática, ou seja, de garantir que os bens
1723 sociais (i.e.: postos de emprego, remuneração, educação etc.) sejam distribuídos para todos,
1724 segundo suas habilidades e demonstração de mérito. Já no oriente, as principais recompensas
1725 seriam a conquista de cargos profissionais na burocracia governamental, tendo como objetivo
1726 a constituição de uma elite técnica que seria capaz de administrar determinado país, ainda que
1727 comece a se observar uma influência maior da lógica ocidental nos últimos anos,
1728 especialmente na China (Poocharoen & Brillantes, 2013).

1729 **CrITÉrios de aferiÇ o do m rito**

1730 Embora as credenciais acad micas de uma pessoa tenham centralidade na aferi  o do
1731 que seria m rito (Alon & Tienda, 2007), outros elementos podem ser evocados para constituir
1732 o significado desse termo - como o esfor o e a habilidade, conforme mencionamos h  pouco.
1733 Nesse ponto aparecem algumas das principais diverg ncias entre os autores nas discuss es
1734 sobre meritocracia. Se, por um lado, h  os que consideram pontua  es em testes ou resultados
1735 de avalia  o de desempenho suficientes para a distribui  o de recompensas sociais, por outro,
1736 h  cr ticas duras   imprecis o das defini  es do que seriam esfor o ou habilidade (Driessen,
1737 Sleegers & Smit, 2008; Marks, 2010; Henderson, 2004). Al m disso, mesmo nos exames de
1738 sele  o e nos testes padronizados, n o se costuma deixar expl cito que outras vari veis afetam
1739 os resultados, como, por exemplo, a flu ncia do respondente na l ngua prim ria utilizada na
1740 reda  o das quest es (Mitchell, 2013) ou mesmo que fatores, al m da “habilidade”, poderiam
1741 influenciar a velocidade de resposta em um teste (Henderson, 2004), mas que n o s o
1742 operacionalizados. Para alguns autores (e.g.: Henderson, 2004; Mithcell, 2013; Oller Jr.,
1743 1997), a variedade de comportamentos que podem acabar sendo avaliados implicitamente
1744 (como os citados), sem que sejam objetivamente definidos ou mesmo levados em conta na
1745 hora de se pensar em um instrumento, prejudicariam a efic cia da avalia  o do m rito.

1746 Para diversos autores (e.g.: Alon & Tienda, 2007; Darnon et al., 2018; Driessen,
1747 Sleegers & Smit, 2008; Marks, 2010; Weakliem, Mcquillan & Schauer, 1995),   preciso
1748 tamb m considerar o quanto credenciais acad micas ou resultados em avalia  es de
1749 desempenho s o suficientes para aferir o m rito, uma vez que sistemas educacionais e
1750 processos de sele  o e avalia  o podem estar contaminados pelos mais diversos vieses, como
1751 de g nero,  tnia, idade, n vel escolar etc., que acabariam por reproduzir ou fortalecer as
1752 desigualdades sociais. Nesse sentido, se a meritocracia existe, ela n o s o produziria como
1753 mascararia desigualdades.

1754 **Meritocracias diferentes para estratos sociais diferentes**

1755 Outra diferença importante é observada entre a descrição da meritocracia enquanto um
1756 sistema de distribuição de recursos (i.e.: cargos profissionais ou vagas em universidades)
1757 (Castilla & Bernard, 2010; He & Markachev, 2018; Krauze & Slomeczynski, 1985; Petersen,
1758 2000; Phillips, 2014, Tan, 2008) e enquanto um mito, segundo a literatura (Chua, 2011;
1759 Foster & Tsarfati, 2005; Harvard Law Review, 2008; Liu, 2011; Mitchell, 2013). Para o
1760 primeiro grupo, o mérito precisa ser entendido contextualmente. Esse argumento, apresentado
1761 como utilitarista, propõe que o mérito deve ser descrito a partir de sua utilidade em dado
1762 contexto, como para selecionar a burocracia governamental, por exemplo, ou para atender a
1763 critérios de produtividade. Ou seja, o que se provou mais eficaz, segundo os aplicadores, para
1764 selecionar um melhor candidato seria o mérito, por exemplo. Ao discutir a meritocracia nessa
1765 perspectiva, alguns autores (Castilla, 2008; Haney & Hurtado, 1994; Scully, 2002) chegam a
1766 afirmar que a maneira como ela é praticada em processos de seleção, para citar um contexto,
1767 pode contribuir para reforçar desigualdades sociais. Contudo, salvo dois modelos que
1768 propõem mesclar práticas ditas meritocráticas com ações afirmativas (Walter, Spencer &
1769 Erman, 2013; Gündemir et al., 2017), não há a apresentação de alternativas para corrigir a
1770 não-meritocracia dos casos que analisam, tampouco preocupação em explicitar o que seria
1771 mérito para além das pontuações em uma prova ou em avaliações de desempenho. Nesses
1772 casos, a oposição costuma ser o argumento mais recorrente. Se não há maior número de
1773 promoções baseadas em redes sociais informais ou se não se observa correlação entre raça e
1774 contratação, então o processo de seleção e o curso da carreira profissional consideraram o
1775 mérito, e a organização poderia ser considerada meritocrática. Um problema que poderia
1776 decorrer desse utilitarismo do termo é que a elite, ou qualquer grupo dominante, poderia
1777 manipular o conceito, ainda mais considerando sua imprecisão, para favorecer seus próprios
1778 parâmetros de produtividade. Assim, tal grupo dominante poderia, por exemplo,

desconsiderar injustiças sociais que poderiam ser produzidas por um entendimento de mérito, como equivalendo a esforço e habilidades – essas últimas credenciadas por um sistema educacional que seria desigual e excludente (Chua, 2011; Tan, 2008).

Para outros autores (Chua, 2011; Foster & Tsarfati, 2005; Harvard Law Review, 2008; Liu, 2011; Mitchell, 2013), a meritocracia seria um mito, pois as promessas que seguem a defesa de um determinado tipo de meritocracia, bem como a adoção de práticas que seriam meritocráticas segundo essa interpretação, não se verificaram nas investigações que os autores fazem, tendo como resultado mais frequente a manutenção de hierarquias e de desigualdades. Parte principal do suposto mito seria a ética protestante de trabalho, que, segundo Weber (1904; 1905), a partir de Lutero, passou a colocar a riqueza como comprovação da honestidade e trabalho duro de um indivíduo. Essa nova interpretação de trabalho e da riqueza é outro ponto recorrente nos debates sobre mérito. Para alguns autores (Cao, 2004; Gillies, 2005; Scully, 2002, Tan, 2008), entender como mais merecedor quem possui maior status socioeconômico reforçaria desigualdades e estratificação. Nesse sentido, a meritocracia favoreceria as elites econômicas estabelecidas, que teriam uma justificativa para sua condição, naturalizando disparidades, enquanto que os mais pobres seriam culpados por sua condição. Esse argumento vai ao encontro do que, na literatura analítico-comportamental, Holland (1983/1978) sugeriu ao discutir o uso de princípios behavioristas para mudanças sociais:

Nós já verificamos que a principal fonte de recursos econômicos é dominada por uma pequena classe dominante. Então os problemas, bem como as políticas de atuação, são definidos por aqueles que obtêm o máximo de nossos atuais sistemas sócio-políticos-econômicos.

O mito das causas internas é alimentado devido ao reforçamento fornecido à elite e também devido ao papel que ele desempenha na manutenção do presente sistema.

As pessoas que ocupam alta hierarquia no poder afirmam que atingiram essa posição elevada devido a um grande mérito pessoal. Os ricos têm liberdade de usar seus recursos internos, sua vontade, determinação, motivação e inteligência de forma a

1806 alcançarem seu alto nível. As causas internas servem como justificativa para aqueles
1807 que tiram proveito da desigualdade.
1808 Aos pobres é reservado um conjunto especial de causas internas. Diz-se que eles são
1809 preguiçosos, sem ambição, sem talento. Aqueles que extraem o máximo de nosso
1810 sistema social podem considerar punitivo encarar sua boa sorte como o resultado de
1811 um sistema que explora as pessoas menos privilegiadas e que cria a pobreza e a
1812 infelicidade. Se isso é verdade, as afirmações verbais que atribuem a posição de cada
1813 indivíduo na sociedade a traços pessoais, tanto inatos como resultantes de uma
1814 cultura “menos desenvolvida”, seriam reforçadoras.
1815 E é especialmente importante para os que “estão por cima”, convencer aos que estão
1816 em posições inferiores que eles próprios são os culpados das suas dificuldades.
1817 (Holland, 1983/1978, p. 69)

1818 Skinner (1971) também discute esse tema ao tratar de conceitos como a liberdade e a
1819 dignidade, discutindo-os a luz dos principais problemas sociais que observava na época,
1820 muitos dos quais persistem até hoje, como a desigualdade social e o controle
1821 predominantemente aversivo em nossa sociedade. Para o autor, a Psicologia, além de muitas
1822 explicações de fenômenos sociais, seria permeada pela suposição de causas internas, em que o
1823 comportamento seria mera manifestação de um agente iniciador. Isso seria um problema por
1824 ignorar o caráter funcional e relacional do comportamento e por dificultar a avaliação da
1825 eficácia de planejamentos comportamentais, dada a imprecisão que pode ser encontrada
1826 quando se utilizam conceitos como esforço, por exemplo, sem descrever quais
1827 comportamentos o comporiam.

1828 Outro ponto que Skinner (1971) discute é que preocupações como as que os
1829 behavioristas radicais têm ao investigar o comportamento humano podem agredir a dignidade
1830 e a percepção de liberdade, tão propagadas nas sociedades ocidentais modernas e
1831 contemporâneas. Para o autor, a liberdade é defendida de maneira a induzir uma crença de que
1832 o comportamento não é causado ou determinado por variáveis ambientais, sendo o ser

humano "livre" para escolher e podendo ser responsabilizado individualmente por suas ações. Porém, explicar liberdade em termos como esses, ou em termos de sentimentos, seria enganoso, uma vez que eventuais reforçadores positivos imediatos que seriam atribuídos aos comportamentos ditos “livres” estariam, no longo prazo, ligados a consequências aversivas remotas. As pessoas podem, por exemplo, acreditar que os destinos de suas vidas são determinados pelos seus esforços e habilidades, mas o fariam porque, no longo prazo, deixar de fazer isso implicaria em pobreza, julgamento moral etc.

Alguns artigos sugerem que a crença na meritocracia pode estar relacionada com maior percepção de autocontrole sobre os rumos da vida (Clycq, Ward & Vandenbroucke, 2014; Harvard Law Review, 2008; McCoy et al., 2013; McCoy & Major, 2007). O autocontrole é um elemento importante na constituição dos significados de liberdade que costumamos adotar. Junto da noção de racionalismo, essa perspectiva de maior controle sobre os resultados em nossas vidas foi fundamental como contraposição a noções filosóficas teológicas que vigoravam até o século XVIII. O auge dessas oposições toma forma no pensamento iluminista que, como já foi dito, teve papel importante não só nos pressupostos da meritocracia ocidental, como na disseminação da oriental. Haveria maior liberdade para o controle da própria mobilidade social, segundo esse discurso de autocontrole, mas com efeitos diferentes nos vários estratos sociais. Nos estratos mais vulneráveis, essa percepção se constituiria de tal modo que sugerir que a meritocracia não existe, ou ainda, que ela poderia estar contribuindo para a situação em que estão (ao invés de para sair dela) atacaria diretamente a construção da própria identidade desses indivíduos. Os possíveis efeitos decorrentes mais frequentes seriam um grau maior de culpabilização de si mesmo e um menor de engajamento em ações coletivas contra as desigualdades, conforme sugerido por alguns autores abordados neste estudo (McCoy et al., 2013; Kuppens et al. 2018; Wiley, Deaux e Hagelskamp, 2012). Já no caso das elites estabelecidas ou de grupos que não são

discriminados, sua condição atual seria a prova de que são merecedores, além de mais esforçados e mais competentes. Reconhecer que a meritocracia não é o que de fato ocorre também agrediria profundamente a construção de suas identidades - que, segundo alguns autores (Darnon et al., 2018; Horberg, Kraus & Keltner, 2013; Knowles & Lowery, 2012), seria mais orientada ao próprio interesse e a uma necessidade de autoafirmação. Esse grupo elitizado, quando confrontado com desigualdades ou injustiças que seriam possíveis efeitos colaterais da meritocracia que acreditam que existe, tendem a mais frequentemente evocar o Estado ou outros agentes para justificar as inadequações no sistema.

Há uma inversão, portanto, em relação aos mais pobres, ainda que os dois mecanismos pareçam operar para não agredir percepções de liberdade e de dignidade nos dois grupos. Sobre a dignidade, Skinner (1971) comenta que ela pode ser entendida como o crédito dado a algum comportamento, e que “o grau dessa valorização é inversamente proporcional à evidência das causas de seu comportamento” (p. 58). Em outras palavras, quanto mais se entender o porquê de alguém agir como age, menos crédito essa pessoa receberia. Assim, para os mais pobres, entender as causas de sua desigualdade poderia afetar a percepção que têm de serem livres e agredir sua dignidade. Já no caso das elites, entender o que é considerado mérito poderia agredir a identidade de competentes, esforçados etc. que têm de si mesmos (e que os pobres também têm das elites) e agredir, também, sua sensação de dignidade.

1876

1877 **Existem alternativas?**

Não obstante as ressalvas, Skinner (1971), assim como a maioria dos autores aqui investigados, são favoráveis a uma distribuição mais justa e igualitária de recompensas sociais (e.g.: Alon & Tienda, 2007, Breen, 2004; Castilla, 2008; Daniels, 1978; Domanski, 2011; Haney & Hurtado, 1994, Petersen, 2000) - ou, como descreve Laurenti (2009), uma

distribuição “contingente e proporcional à quantidade¹⁷ de comportamento” (p. 266). Há, no entanto, de se observar, nesta última proposição, o mesmo problema de imprecisão verificado na grande maioria dos textos aqui analisados. Ainda que muitos autores afirmem que a busca por uma distribuição mais igualitária de recursos segundo o mérito deve persistir, poucos deles se aprofundam ou sequer abordam o que teria que ser considerado mérito - ou seja, quais comportamentos teriam que ser recompensados e por que, ou ainda, qual a quantidade (considerando que essa seria, de fato, uma boa métrica) de comportamento que seria proporcional a qual porção de recompensas sociais e como se chegaria a essa conclusão.

São raras as discussões que propõem uma alternativa à meritocracia, ou que se questionam se é o mérito que, de fato, deve orientar as sociedades e organizações. Deve-se destacar também que em nenhum dos experimentos¹⁸ (e.g.: Darnon, Smeding & Redersdorff, 2018; Kuppens et al., 2018; Major & McCoy, 2007); os participantes foram questionados sobre o que entendiam como sendo mérito, sendo a tarefa a eles designada quase sempre a de indicar em escalas o grau de concordância com afirmações que expressariam os ideais meritocráticos. Muito do debate em torno da viabilidade de uma meritocracia se baseia, portanto, nas correlações entre grau de concordância com afirmações sobre fenômenos distintos (i.e. crença na meritocracia e percepção de discriminação). Isso não é um problema em si, mas parece reforçar uma dificuldade conceitual: a literatura discute mais o “nível de crença” na meritocracia do que as práticas meritocráticas, ou o que seria mérito. Além disso, a literatura sugere um círculo vicioso: a meritocracia poderia servir para reduzir a desigualdade, mas as desigualdades precisam ser reduzidas para que a meritocracia possa acontecer.

¹⁷ Há de se destacar, no entanto, a imprecisão em torno da expressão “quantidade de comportamento”, que não estabelece critérios mais precisos para se afirmar a qual quantidade de comportamento uma distribuição seria proporcional.

¹⁸ O uso do termo “experimentos” é proposital, pois trata especificamente dos estudos em que foram realizados experimentos em laboratório, em contraste com os que analisaram dados de levantamentos nacionais, entrevistas etc.

1903 Há um amplo potencial de aprofundamento na discussão de tais temas. Por ora, cabe
1904 notar que, dada a alta frequência de críticas negativas e de sugestões de que a meritocracia
1905 não existe nos contextos que os artigos investigaram, chama a atenção que poucos autores
1906 tenham considerado investigar práticas meritocráticas em si ou explorar alternativas a
1907 modelos meritocráticos. Alguns autores descrevem outro sistema de distribuição de bens que
1908 seria igualitário ou humanista, baseado em atender às necessidades das pessoas,
1909 independentemente de mérito (Barberà, Bevia & Posati, 2015; Daniels, 1978; Gradstein,
1910 2004; Bukodi & Goldthorpe, 2010). Outros propõem sistemas de recompensa que mesclam
1911 políticas afirmativas (Gündemir et al., 2017; Walton, Spencer & Erman, 2013), o que
1912 corrigiria as distorções provocadas por uma meritocracia pura. A posição mais frequente, no
1913 entanto, é a de defender uma justiça distributiva baseada em mérito, mesmo que não consigam
1914 descrevê-lo para além de termos pouco elucidativos. Isso parece sugerir que, de fato, há uma
1915 ameaça iminente de agressão à dignidade, como ela é entendida contemporaneamente e
1916 exposta por Skinner (1971), no que diz respeito a considerar uma distribuição de recursos que
1917 não seja meritocrática. As resistências em perceber discriminação e desigualdades por parte
1918 das elites e a atribuição de culpa a si mesmos, no caso dos mais pobres, pela condição
1919 desigual em que estão parecem sugerir o potencial aversivo de questionar a identidade
1920 meritocrática construída em nossa sociedade e do que seria mérito, uma vez que retirar o
1921 crédito pelos sucessos e a culpa individual pelos fracassos poderia provocar efeitos colaterais
1922 psicológicos que seriam problemáticos (i.e.: resignação, apatia, agressividade etc.).

1923 Contudo o argumento de que a agressão à dignidade e à liberdade seria maior quanto
1924 mais fossem questionados o crédito e a liberdade de escolha não pode nortear a defesa da
1925 meritocracia. Como Skinner (1971) já aponta, quanto maior a capacidade de discriminação
1926 das causas de nossos comportamentos, ou seja, das variáveis envolvidas em nossas relações
1927 com o ambiente, mais “livres”, de fato, seríamos. Se buscar investigar quais comportamentos

seriam considerados meritórios e quais funções possuem pode levar as pessoas a notarem mais claramente como algumas percepções, tais quais a de controle dos rumos da vida e de merecimento, podem ser ilusórias, a depender de como são disseminadas e ensinadas; e se notar isso pode, não obstante, provocar resignação, apatia, irritabilidade etc., o papel dos cientistas deveria ser de planejar condições que minimizem esse sofrimento, na investigação do fenômeno e no dia-a-dia das pessoas, ao invés de apenas propor que o mérito é importante, mas precisa ser corrigido, ou de que ele não deve ser considerado.

Meritocracia descritiva e prescritiva

Os problemas citados por Holland e Skinner, no que diz respeito ao mérito, podem ser verificados em diversos estudos aqui analisados. Para os críticos da meritocracia, a crença de que ela existe seria altamente prejudicial por naturalizar as hierarquias presentes na sociedade e diminuir o engajamento em ações que reduzam discriminação e desigualdades (e.g.: Darnon et al., 2018; Foster, Sloto & Ruby, 2006; Hing, Bobocel & Zanna, 2002). Alguns estudos sugerem que essa norma descritiva (acreditar que a meritocracia já existe) é mais frequente entre pessoas que se identificam como conservadoras politicamente (Darnon, Smeding & Redersdorff, 2018; Hing et al., 2011), ainda que, pelo menos no que diz respeito aos discursos de figuras políticas, o termo seja evocado independentemente da posição no espectro ideológico político, como exposto na introdução deste estudo.

No que diz respeito à norma meritocrática, além da descritiva, alguns artigos apresentam a existência de outra percepção: a prescritiva (Hing, et al., 2011; Hing, Bobocel & Zanna, 2002; Knowles & Lowery, 2012). Trata-se, neste caso, da noção de que a meritocracia *deveria* existir. Para esse segundo grupo, o que existe atualmente não é uma meritocracia e pode, inclusive, estar se distanciando de qualquer ideal meritocrático. Segundo a norma descritiva, a meritocracia existe, embora precise de alguns ajustes, e as desigualdades são

1953 efeitos colaterais esperados. Já segundo a norma prescritiva, não é possível considerar a
1954 maneira como as recompensas sociais são distribuídas em nossa sociedade como sendo
1955 meritocráticas, nem que os esforços para torná-la possível envolvem, necessariamente, o
1956 enfrentamento das desigualdades. Essa divisão é particularmente interessante, uma vez que
1957 colocaria em lados praticamente opostos os que acreditam na norma descritiva e os que
1958 prescrevem meritocracia. As críticas negativas, de um modo geral, são direcionadas aos que já
1959 acreditam que ela existe (norma descritiva), enquanto o outro grupo (norma prescritiva) foi
1960 mais frequentemente correlacionado à defesa da redução de desigualdades e de algum apoio a
1961 medidas como ações afirmativas.

1962 Nos artigos investigados, os autores propõem que a norma descritiva poderia ser
1963 justificada por promover uma sensação aumentada de controle sobre os rumos da vida,
1964 mesmo em indivíduos que percebam seu contexto como não-meritocrático. Nesse sentido, a
1965 crença na meritocracia serviria como uma justificação do sistema social vigente. Para os de
1966 maior status socioeconômico, ao minimizar o papel das desigualdades e ao atribuir a correção
1967 delas a fatores externos às organizações em que estão, a crença impediria que esses indivíduos
1968 se sentissem responsáveis ou culpados por problemas sociais que poderiam advir da defesa da
1969 meritocracia, sendo o esforço o responsável pelo lugar que ocupam na sociedade. Já para os
1970 de menor status socioeconômico, ao promover maior sensação de controle, permitiria que os
1971 indivíduos continuassem tentando se engajar em comportamentos que sejam reconhecidos
1972 como mérito, a despeito da incompatibilidade da promessa meritocrática com os resultados
1973 efetivos em suas vidas.

1974 Benvenuti (2010), ao discutir o contato com a realidade, as crenças, as ilusões e as
1975 superstições, aborda o tema da incompatibilidade entre o que se vive e o que se acredita que
1976 acontece, tomando-as (como não poderia ser diferente para analistas do comportamento)
1977 como relações operantes - ou seja, que seriam explicadas pela função de dado comportamento

na manutenção de respostas. Uma pré-condição para o comportamento operante é a nossa sensibilidade a estímulos consequentes ao nosso responder. O processo, no entanto, pode envolver consequências contíguas e acidentais, que podem acabar selecionando diferencialmente respostas que não têm relação direta com as consequências. Esse padrão, chamado comportamento supersticioso, estaria na base das regras supersticiosas ou das superstições, mas nem todo comportamento supersticioso torna-se superstição, como afirma Skinner (1953/1965):

. . . apenas uma pequena parte do comportamento fortalecido por contingências acidentais evolui para as práticas ritualísticas as quais denominamos “superstições”, mas o mesmo princípio está presente. . . rituais supersticiosos na sociedade humana em geral envolvem fórmulas verbais e são transmitidos como parte da cultura. Nessa medida, diferem quanto ao simples efeito de um reforço operante acidental. Mas devem ter tido sua origem no mesmo processo e são provavelmente mantidos por contingências ocasionais que obedecem ao mesmo padrão. (pp. 86-87)

No caso da superstição, segundo Ono (1994), não há necessidade de relação direta com um reforçador acidental, sendo variáveis mais importantes quem descreve a contingência, de que maneira (i.e.: em partes ou como um todo) e quais as consequências sociais pelo seguimento ou não da regra. De acordo com Benvenuti (2010), quando as descrições são parciais ou imprecisas, isso pode favorecer o surgimento das chamadas autorregras – isto é, regras que o próprio indivíduo formula a partir das condições disponíveis para resolver seus problemas e que não necessariamente têm relação com as consequências produzidas em dada contingência. O autor acrescenta que comportamentos verbais que descrevam superstições podem ser efeitos de uma circunstância que produziu respostas supersticiosas, e não causas. Benvenuti (2010) conclui que a compreensão do que seria chamado de “distorções da realidade” deve ser realizada como em qualquer outro comportamento: tais “distorções” seriam respostas ao ambiente de organismos sensíveis a contingências, tendo menor importância como acontece o contato com a realidade e maior,

2005 como se constrói a realidade de quem se comporta. Nesse sentido, interessaria aos analistas do
2006 comportamento, muito mais que verificar se a meritocracia é um mito, investigar como se
2007 constroem as condições para sua disseminação e manutenção enquanto prática cultural
2008 aparentemente tão reforçadora. Quais comportamentos são apontados como descrevendo que
2009 nossa sociedade é meritocrática e quais são elencados na prescrição de uma sociedade
2010 meritocrática? Sob controle do que costumam estar e quais os possíveis efeitos no próprio
2011 indivíduo e no grupo? De que maneira as comunidades verbais arranjam contingências que
2012 favoreçam à manutenção ou enfraquecimento da(s) proposta(s) meritocrática(s)? Essas são
2013 apenas algumas das perguntas para as quais investigações analítico-comportamentais podem
2014 oferecer novos ângulos.

2015

2016 **Possíveis vias de debate para a Análise do Comportamento**

2017 Esses e outros debates são relevantes para a comunidade analítico-comportamental,
2018 dada a centralidade das consequências no fortalecimento ou enfraquecimento do
2019 comportamento e a frequente crítica dessa comunidade ao uso de causas internas como
2020 explicação preferencial para o comportamento. É possível planejar a distribuição de
2021 recompensas de maneira diferente a comportamentos diferentes em nossa sociedade? É, de
2022 fato, necessário que as recompensas se deem em graus diferentes e em termos de merecimento
2023 para promover maior coesão grupal ou isso está necessariamente atrelado à competitividade e
2024 individualismo promovidos na atualidade? Estudos que investigassem os efeitos da adoção de
2025 modelos humanitários, assim como meritocráticos, seriam de grande contribuição para
2026 compreender melhor se as dificuldades em adotar a meritocracia se devem a barreiras
2027 impostas por fatores que independem da noção de mérito (i.e.: desigualdades sociais e acesso
2028 a recursos, como saúde ou educação) ou a alguma limitação da própria concepção de mérito,

que não consideraria adequadamente as desigualdades e poderia, até mesmo, contribuir para sua manutenção.

Um bom exemplo de aplicação dos princípios analítico-comportamentais na análise de sistemas de distribuição de bens sociais é a dissertação de Fernandes (2018), sobre programas de distribuição de renda básica. O autor parte de uma análise comportamental não-linear (Goldiamond, 1965; 1975a; 1975b; 1976; 1984) para avaliar conceitualmente os efeitos de um experimento de distribuição de renda básica no comportamento dos indivíduos receptores desse benefício em Madhya Pradesh, na Índia. Para tanto, utiliza-se de um documento que sistematiza os relatórios oficiais apresentados pelos pesquisadores e de um livro que discute esse experimento. O autor propõe que a renda básica serviria como operação motivadora que reduziria em alguma medida o grau de privação decorrente da escassez de recursos apresentada pelos beneficiados. O experimento sugere impactos relevantes, por exemplo, na redução de práticas como o trabalho infantil e também no maior engajamento em comportamentos relativos à educação, ou seja, no surgimento e manutenção de comportamentos com maior custo-benefício em detrimento dos com menor.

Outra importante via de debate para os behavioristas radicais gira em torno de como as agências controladoras promoveriam e reforçariam o discurso meritocrático. Essas agências, segundo Skinner (1953/1965), teriam a função de organizar a vida social a partir da manipulação de variáveis envolvidas nos comportamentos sociais. O autor propõe cinco agências que controlariam nossas práticas culturais: o governo, a religião, a psicoterapia, a economia e a educação. Nos trabalhos analisados nesta dissertação, apenas a psicoterapia não recebe atenção nos debates sobre como os ideais meritocráticos são propagados.

No que diz respeito a governos, a meritocracia aparece na seleção de profissionais para a burocracia governamental, no desenho de políticas públicas e de leis e nos discursos de figuras públicas de todos os pontos do espectro ideológico político. O não seguimento dos

ideais meritocráticos implicaria na perda de acesso a recursos sociais, sendo, portanto, outro elemento que poderia explicar a manutenção da crença que a meritocracia existe, a despeito das incoerências relatadas pelos mesmos que nela acreditam. Na religião, vimos como o confucionismo (que é entendido como uma filosofia religiosa) e a ética protestante, especialmente em sua versão puritanista, informam profundamente os conceitos atuais de meritocracia. A economia contemporânea defende, de modo geral, a distribuição de bens sociais e a possibilidade de ascensão econômica com base no mérito, e incentiva a competitividade e a produtividade como parâmetros para definir o que pode ser recompensado. Por sua vez, a educação talvez seja, atualmente, o pilar mais importante de sustentação da meritocracia, sendo as instituições de ensino, especialmente as de nível superior, frequentemente consideradas organizações meritocráticas por excelência, e já desde cedo promovendo ambientes de competição, em que as notas e os rankings escolares seriam demonstrações suficientes de mérito. Como este fenômeno aparece e é tratado no ambiente psicoterapêutico segue uma pergunta em aberto, com grande potencial de contribuição dos analistas do comportamento. Nico, Leonardi e Zeggio (2016), por exemplo, discutem a depressão como fenômeno cultural na sociedade atual. Em dado momento, os autores afirmam:

Outro fator cultural que presumivelmente produz uma constante sensação de “incompetência e fracasso” são as contingências organizadas numa sociedade individualizada. Os indivíduos são requisitados a tomar suas decisões e fazer suas escolhas de modo independente e autônomo e lhes é ofertada, no mundo moderno industrializado, uma gama cada vez mais ampla de possibilidades de consumo e de cursos de vida. Eles passam a ter de lidar, portanto, com o “peso” das renúncias feitas, das possibilidades perdidas, das vidas não vividas. Isso é particularmente aversivo numa sociedade que atribui ao indivíduo, tido como independente dos demais, a responsabilidade pelo próprio sucesso ou fracasso. Um mundo com novos aversivos condicionados passa então a existir, sendo, assim, estabelecidas novas

condições para o fortalecimento de padrões de fuga e esquiva de possíveis fracassos sociais. Fica fácil imaginar, portanto, que sensações de “incompetência e fracasso” sejam produzidas por essas contingências sociais, e que padrões deprimidos possam assumir função de fuga e esquiva de desaprovações sociais deste tipo. (p.54)

Compreender os modos como a sociedade dissemina e mantém práticas culturais pode ser de grande contribuição para ampliar o olhar sobre os fenômenos clínicos, como no exemplo citado, e possibilitar intervenções que levem em conta esses aspectos na hora de planejar, por exemplo, a generalização de uma resposta aprendida no contexto psicoterapêutico. Além disso, estudos que investiguem, a partir da teoria analítico-comportamental, as possíveis narrativas em torno de merecimento, crédito, recompensas etc. na clínica podem auxiliar na compreensão de se e como também essa agência de controle poderia estar contribuindo para a manutenção do discurso meritocrático.

Outra área da Análise do Comportamento que pode oferecer importantes contribuições para esse debate é a da Teoria das Molduras Relacionais (RFT), que discute, entre outras coisas, como se constituem significados em nossa sociedade. A ampla capacidade de estabelecer relações agindo diante de um estímulo ambiental como se fosse outro, ou seja, de operar com símbolos (Souza, Cortez, Aggio, e De Rose, 2012), é uma das características distintivas do ser humano. Somos ensinados, pela comunidade verbal em que estamos inseridos, a estabelecer relações entre estímulos de três principais maneiras: a. por similaridade física ou outros atributos comuns; b. arbitrariamente, via mediação de respostas comuns e; c. arbitrariamente entre estímulos (De Rose, 1993). Interessa-nos aqui a terceira situação, que é central para a RFT: a relação arbitrária de equivalência estabelecida diretamente entre estímulos, sem a necessidade de mediação. Neste caso, o procedimento costuma envolver o que na literatura analítico-comportamental é chamado de *matching to sample* (pareamento arbitrário com o modelo), em que elementos de um grupo modelo devem ser condicionalmente relacionados aos de um grupo de comparação (De Rose, 1993), como,

2107 por exemplo, quando aprendemos a relacionar sinais gráficos a objetos (i.e.: as letras que
2108 compõem a palavra “bola” passam a ser relacionadas com o objeto redondo que usamos no
2109 futebol). Os significados seriam, portanto, relações entre estímulos que são determinadas
2110 arbitrariamente por nossas comunidades verbais, que convencionam usos e consequências
2111 dessas utilizações ao longo de nossas vidas (Souza, Cortez, Aggio & De Rose, 2012).

2112 Um mesmo estímulo pode apresentar uma infinidade de relações a depender de com
2113 qual outro estímulo é arbitrariamente tomado como equivalente. O que irá determinar a
2114 relação a ser considerada são dicas contextuais, oferecidas pelo grupo social. As molduras
2115 relacionais, segundo De Rose e Rabelo (2012), são as relações estabelecidas arbitrariamente
2116 entre estímulos, como as de hierarquia, comparação, causa, oposição, espaço, tempo ou as
2117 dêiticas (que dependem da perspectiva de quem fala ou observa). Por conta dessas relações de
2118 equivalência, outra característica importante da RFT é a de que pode haver transferência das
2119 funções de um estímulo para outro (De Rose & Rabelo, 2012). A crença em uma religião, por
2120 exemplo, se estende para os símbolos e práticas relacionadas ao seguimento daquela fé, e são
2121 tratados como sendo a própria fé. Nesse sentido, tudo que, por relações de equivalência, for
2122 arbitrariamente relacionado à fé de alguém por oposição, tenderá a evocar aversão, mesmo
2123 que o indivíduo não tenha aprendido a relacionar diretamente dado evento com algo aversivo,
2124 assim como tudo que for relacionado por molduras de igualdade tenderá a produzir os
2125 mesmos reforçadores positivos. Por fim, as pessoas não aprendem apenas as relações já
2126 presentes em suas comunidades, mas também o comportamento de relacionar eventos
2127 arbitrariamente, como na abstração ou na analogia (De Rose & Rabelo, 2012).

2128 O conceito de mérito poderia, desse modo, ser avaliado em função das relações que
2129 descreveria. É *igual a* esforço, habilidade e competência; é *oposto a* nepotismo; é a *causa* de
2130 seleções profissionais; é um princípio distributivo (*hierarquia*); é *melhor que* distribuições de
2131 recompensa humanitárias; que já existe ou deveria existir e outras tantas relações que as

2132 agências de controle e nossas comunidades verbais mais localizadas nos ensinaram ao longo
2133 da vida. Tais relações são muito mais que meras descrições; as equivalências e transferências
2134 de função envolvidas na construção de conceitos e significados têm papel fundamental na
2135 educação formal e informal, bem como na avaliação que faremos de nós mesmos e do mundo
2136 que nos circunda. Nesse contexto, a proposta apresentada por Sliwa e Johansson (2014) de
2137 que a meritocracia seria um “discurso regulador de identidade” parece fazer ainda mais
2138 sentido. Os significados que atribuo, por conta das relações convencionadas em minha
2139 comunidade, a características que seriam essenciais para o meu bem-estar são determinantes
2140 de como perceberei meus fracassos e sucessos, bem como os dos outros. Ademais, se
2141 entendermos “ideologia” como um conjunto de relações arbitrárias que são propagadas por
2142 todas - ou quase todas - as agências de controle de maneira mais ou menos consistente (mas
2143 não se resumindo somente a isso), como a que foi possível observar nas discussões sobre
2144 meritocracia aqui investigadas, torna-se mais viável discutir como a meritocracia se tornou
2145 algo tão presente ao longo do tempo e tão reforçador para grupos distintos.

2146 A solidez da manutenção dessas relações arbitrárias dependeria de um grau elevado de
2147 consistência nas descrições apresentadas por nossas comunidades verbais, com destaque para
2148 as agências de controle. Se tomarmos como verdadeira a hipótese da maioria dos autores de
2149 que o que afeta a distribuição de recursos em nossa sociedade – seja no nível de organizações
2150 profissionais e educacionais, seja em nível de políticas públicas – não são critérios de mérito
2151 (ou pelo menos não exclusivamente), faz-se importante levantar questões sobre o que mantém
2152 a crença na meritocracia fortalecida, assim como a defesa persistente de seu emprego. Parte
2153 dos problemas levantados pelo conceito de meritocracia certamente é relevante – por
2154 exemplo, a necessidade de algum critério mensurável (e não na afinidade ou ligação política)
2155 para distribuições de recursos. No entanto, se com frequência observa-se que nem mesmo os
2156 critérios de mérito considerados insuficientes por parte da literatura definem a distribuição, o

2157 que manteria essa crença como algo tão reforçador? Uma possibilidade é a de que o controle
2158 aversivo, exercido na forma de impedimento de acesso a recursos (e.g.: inacessibilidade a
2159 cargos profissionais melhor remunerados) se não forem atendidos os critérios meritocráticos
2160 (e.g.: notas em um exame), manteria a crença na meritocracia. Além da ameaça de não ter
2161 acesso à saúde ou educação, por exemplo, o discurso meritocrático seria revestido de valor
2162 religioso, sendo associado ao trabalho duro e a maiores chances de merecimento da graça
2163 divina. Nesse sentido, seria um discurso que promoveria maior coesão grupal, podendo até ser
2164 baseado em preocupações importantes, como a de distribuição de bens de maneira justa - mas,
2165 segundo a literatura aqui investigada (e.g.: Hing, Bobocel & Zanna, 2012; Hing et al., 2011),
2166 quanto mais algo for percebido como violando essa norma grupal de meritocracia e essa
2167 suposta justiça, maior tende a ser a resistência a ações alternativas que poderiam reduzir as
2168 desigualdades. O discurso se manteria por, dentre outros fatores, ameaçar com impedimento
2169 de acesso a recursos, caso não se siga o que ele prega e por promover, de modos que ainda
2170 precisam ser melhor compreendidos, maior coesão intragrupos (dentro da elite e entre os mais
2171 pobres, por exemplo). A teoria das molduras relacionais poderia ser um passo na direção da
2172 melhor compreensão das relações verbais implicadas no conceito de mérito. Ser meritoso é
2173 ser oposto a nepotismo, equivale a atribuir apenas ao esforço pessoal o acesso a algum bem
2174 social, a aproveitar as oportunidades da vida, é ser mais merecedor de promoções no trabalho,
2175 é ser mais competitivo, é ser mais digno etc. Opor-se ou atacar o conceito de meritocracia
2176 implicaria em negar tudo isso, em não ser merecedor de recompensas sociais. Tal oposição
2177 seria, portanto, proveniente de pessoas “preguiçosas” ou “conformadas”.

2178 De fato, ao longo da vida, a relação entre resultados e esforço parece ser uma das que
2179 aprendemos mais cedo, tendo a educação (via rankings escolares, recomendações para escolas
2180 de elite, seleção para vestibulares, além de narrativas presentes na descrição de características
2181 desejáveis em alunos etc.) papel central na consolidação das bases comportamentais verbais

(“ideológicas”) e não-verbais para aquilo que será replicado em políticas públicas, processos de seleção e destinação de bens sociais (i.e.: acesso à saúde ou moradia). Dessa forma, será tanto mais violento para a percepção pessoal de liberdade e para a sensação individual de dignidade, por conta das molduras estabelecidas, quanto mais for questionado ou buscado entender o que, de fato, está implícito (ou mesmo explícito) na defesa da meritocracia, ecoando a afirmação de Skinner (1971) sobre a relação inversamente proporcional entre grau de crédito e descrição das causas de um comportamento.

CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS

Este estudo teve como objetivos (1) identificar processos comportamentais e contextos de ocorrência mais frequentes no uso do termo de "meritocracia" em amostra da literatura especializada sobre o tema, em diferentes áreas do saber; (2) avaliar sistematicamente o uso do conceito em tal literatura, oferecendo subsídios para uma compreensão behaviorista radical e analítico-comportamental do(s) fenômeno(s) que designa(m). A primeira etapa consistiu na sistematização dos artigos analisados segundo suas áreas do conhecimento, tipos de estudo e descrições dos objetivos, métodos e conclusões dos estudos. Tais procedimentos permitiram a identificação de contextos mais recorrentes de uso do termo, quais ações foram mais recorrentemente realizadas nesses contextos (métodos) e quais conclusões foram sugeridas com mais frequência, visando subsidiar a avaliação dos usos.

Os processos comportamentais que foram mais presentes nos usos da palavra “meritocracia” por parte dos autores parecem ser os mesmos que descrevem em suas investigações: relações entre grau de crédito e explicação das causas do comportamento; convenções arbitrárias estabelecidas pelas comunidades verbais, em especial, as agências de controle; descrições de práticas tidas como meritocráticas e de potenciais alternativas; e

2206 mesmo as dificuldades e divergências presentes em comunidades verbais acadêmicas sobre os
2207 conceitos de mérito e meritocracia.

2208 A literatura investigada neste estudo sugere que há muitas lacunas a serem preenchidas
2209 na discussão das implicações dos discursos meritocráticos em nossa sociedade, em especial
2210 para os analistas do comportamento. Presente em praticamente todas as esferas de nossa vida
2211 em sociedade, o conceito de mérito apresenta as mais diversas relações arbitrárias - o que
2212 pode, em parte, explicar a dificuldade em avaliar quão meritocrático é um sistema ou
2213 processo. Investigar de maneira mais detalhada (a partir, por exemplo, da Teoria das
2214 Molduras Relacionais), as convenções do termo nas sociedades e organizações via agências
2215 de controle e outras comunidades verbais pode contribuir na compreensão mais refinada dos
2216 contextos de ocorrência do termo “meritocracia”. Além disso, analisar narrativas apresentadas
2217 em sessões de psicoterapia, assim como em outros contextos, como no entretenimento
2218 (filmes, telenovelas, músicas e outras artes), por exemplo, pode desvelar outras fontes
2219 importantes de disseminação das relações arbitrárias estabelecidas entre esforços e resultados.

2220 Devemos considerar a preocupação, tanto entre analistas do comportamento como em
2221 cientistas de outras áreas, de uma sociedade mais igualitária na distribuição de recursos. No
2222 entanto é necessário também levar em conta a maneira como as comunidades verbais,
2223 especialmente as agências de controle, mantêm a crença em uma meritocracia que parece
2224 promover justamente o contrário da igualdade. As narrativas que promovem uma meritocracia
2225 estão presentes em propagandas, peças de entretenimento, nos meios de informação, nos
2226 processos de seleção, nas religiões e nas justificativas de leis e políticas públicas, ainda que os
2227 casos e experimentos expostos nos estudos aqui investigados apontem consistentemente a
2228 presença de desigualdades e injustiças na distribuição de recursos. Uma das maneiras pelas
2229 quais as comunidades verbais poderiam contribuir para manutenção de uma narrativa
2230 meritocrática que promoveria desigualdades é reiterando a relação inversamente proporcional

entre grau de crédito e explicação do comportamento. Nesse contexto, saber mais sobre como se constitui a noção de mérito agrediria a identidade tanto das elites socioeconômicas como dos estratos mais vulneráveis. Estudos sobre práticas culturais relacionadas à meritocracia teriam, também, grande variedade de ângulos a explorar. A meritocracia parece ser um exemplo interessante de como se disseminam e se mantêm “visões de mundo”, e o papel disso na construção das identidades grupais e das relações entre grupos.

Há de se destacar, no entanto, as limitações envolvidas no estudo aqui apresentado. Os critérios utilizados para se atingir uma literatura relevante e de qualidade sobre o tema podem ter deixado de fora importantes discussões e análises que se fazem sobre o tema. Em um primeiro momento da pesquisa, a maioria dos estudos era teórico, enquanto após a aplicação do filtro $SJR \geq 1$, o número de estudos aplicados superou em muito as pesquisas básicas. Isso pode sugerir que trabalhos que analisam conceitualmente ou filosoficamente a meritocracia recebem menos atenção dos pesquisadores que discutem o tema. Uma possibilidade a ser explorada é se isso estaria relacionado com a proposta skinneriana de que descrever em detalhes o que seria mérito ou que comportamentos seriam considerados meritórios poderia agredir o senso de dignidade das pessoas. Outra limitação diz respeito ao viés geográfico. A grande maioria dos artigos discorre sobre a meritocracia no ocidente, especialmente nos EUA e países do Reino Unido. Dos artigos analisados, apenas um deles discute a meritocracia na América Latina, um na Oceania e, cinco, no sudeste asiático. Além disso, o critério $SJR \geq 1$ pode explicar a ausência de publicações de autores latino-americanos, considerando que, por vários motivos, são proporcionalmente pouco numerosas as publicações de tais autores que satisfaçam a critérios de impacto mais exigentes. Apesar da ubiquidade da ideia de meritocracia, seria importante observar como o fenômeno se reproduz em outras partes do mundo. Por fim, as dificuldades em observar o que muitos autores queriam dizer quando se referiam a termos como esforço ou habilidade, bem como a abordagem do conceito a partir

2256 das “crenças” dos indivíduos acerca dele, tornou mais desafiador averiguar quais processos
2257 comportamentais podem estar envolvidos nesses conceitos.

2258 De acordo com De Rose (1993), uma prática cultural se estabelece e se reproduz por
2259 possibilitar que membros de uma cultura se relacionem de maneira mais eficaz com seu
2260 ambiente. Segundo a maioria dos autores aqui analisados, a meritocracia poderia proporcionar
2261 maior eficácia na resolução de alguns importantes problemas sociais (como o nepotismo e a
2262 desigualdade na distribuição de cargos, admissão acadêmica etc.), mas seria impedida por
2263 diversas barreiras (como vieses subjetivos, indefinição de termos como ‘esforço’ e
2264 ‘habilidade’, ou controle da narrativa meritocrática por parte de um grupo dominante). Dito
2265 isto, e considerando a proposta de que acreditar na meritocracia promoveria maior sensação
2266 de autocontrole e minimizaria o enfrentamento a desigualdades, a função principal do
2267 discurso meritocrático atualmente parece ser a de promover maior conformidade a como o
2268 sistema social de distribuição de recursos atualmente se organiza (de maneira hierarquizante e
2269 injusta), dado o alto custo psicológico, segundo o que defendem alguns autores, de romper
2270 com essa crença. Novamente, isso não significa que não haja uma preocupação legítima com
2271 maior justiça social nos debates envolvendo a meritocracia, que poderia inclusive promover
2272 maior eficácia na resolução de algumas desigualdades - mas há uma dificuldade persistente
2273 relatada na observância de coerência entre autoproclamações meritocráticas e as práticas que
2274 se realizam nas sociedades e organizações. As organizações e instituições se afirmam
2275 meritocráticas, mas quando investigadas as variáveis que podem estar interferindo em
2276 seleções ou promoções, por exemplo, com frequência nota-se a interferência de fatores como
2277 o gênero, o nível escolar (no caso de acesso a políticas públicas), a etnia etc.

2278 As análises realizadas neste estudo demonstram a polissemia envolvendo os conceitos
2279 de mérito e meritocracia e os problemas decorrentes dessa diversidade semântica, bem como a
2280 sugestão de possíveis contextos e processos comportamentais envolvidos em seus vários usos.

2281 Longe de exaurir a discussão ou as possibilidades de interpretação desse termo, a presente
2282 pesquisa buscou apontar a relevância e importância para a comunidade analítico-
2283 comportamental de investigar mais profundamente os desdobramentos da(s) meritocracia(s) e
2284 o quanto as narrativas nela(s) embutidas influenciam nossas relações comportamentais
2285 conosco e uns com os outros.

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ANEXO I

Sistematização das ocorrências de termos com o radical *merit-* na literatura analisada neste estudo

Daniels, N (1978).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
1	1	5	In what sense do such abilities and interests constitute a basis for claiming the more capable person merits the job?	
1	1	10		I shall explore some of the issues associated with these questions by analyzing the notion of a meritocracy, a social order built around a particular notion of merit.
1	1	11	I shall explore some of the issues associated with these questions by analyzing the notion of a meritocracy, a social order built around a particular notion of merit.	
1	1	13	I hope that examination of such a hypothetical social order will allow me to assess the border implications of this particular notion of merit for a theory of distributive justice	
1	1	14		I am not concerned with certain classical meritocracies, that is, with certain views of aristocracy according to which social class was thought to imply differences in merit or ability with positions and rewards conferred accordingly.'
206	1	16	I am not concerned with certain classical meritocracies, that is, with certain views of aristocracy according to which social class was thought to imply differences in merit or ability with positions and rewards conferred accordingly.'	
206	1	18		Rather, I take as my model variants of the type of meritocracy portrayed by Michael Young who, in his now classic satire or fantasy, The Rise of the Meritocracy, anticipated many features of a social ideal adopted by more recent writers.
207	1	3	Young imagines a world-wide society in the twenty-first century in which all assignments of jobs and rewards are based on merit.	
207	1	15	Overall, rewards are proportional to merit.	

207	1	15	Merit is construed as ability plus effort.	
207	1	16		Though Young's meritocracy can be viewed as the inspirational model behind my remarks, I shall not discuss the details of his construction, except for his notion of merit.
207	1	18	Though Young's meritocracy can be viewed as the inspirational model behind my remarks, I shall not discuss the details of his construction, except for his notion of merit.	
207	1	19		Instead, I would like to sketch a theory of meritocracy-or, rather, of meritocracies, since there are many variants-which generalizes some of Young's ideas.
207	1	21		We will see that a number of social theories share what might be called a "meritocratic core," though they differ on other critical features of distributive justice.
207	1	24	My analysis of the principles underlying this core reveals, I believe, that claims of merit, in the restricted sense of that term relevant to meritocracies, are derived from considerations of efficiency or productivity and will not support stronger notions of desert.	
207	1	25		My analysis of the principles underlying this core reveals, I believe, that claims of merit, in the restricted sense of that term relevant to meritocracies, are derived from considerations of efficiency or productivity and will not support stronger notions of desert.
207	1	29		I take a meritocracy to be a society whose basic institutions are governed by a partial theory of distributive justice consisting of principles of the following types:
207	1	34	(i) A principle of job placement that awards jobs to individuals on the basis of merit;	
208	1	9		But I shall concentrate on just this much here since most meritocrats do.
208	1	11		There is, I shall argue, a preferred principle for job placement and one for opportunity to which most meritocrats would agree.

208	1	11		But meritocrats will still vary widely on reward principles
208	1	13		My schema allows us to separate problems common to what meritocrats generally share from problems that arise from reward schedules.
208	1	15		Most meritocrats share certain empirical assumptions which give rise to a principle of job placement.
208	1	20		Second, meritocrats assume that people differ in the constellation of abilities and personality traits they possess.
208	1	29		In any case, most meritocrats believe it is obvious that people differ in levels of skill and it is at least probable that they differ in the capacity to acquire levels of skills.
Rodapé	1	1		Some meritocrats assume (see Richard Herrnstein, IQ in the Meritocracy, Boston: Atlantic, Little Brown, 1973) that there is some one scale of capacity differences, usually taken to be IQ, which suffices to rank-order people for job eligibility across the whole spectrum of jobs.
Rodapé	1	5		I do not think such a uniquely hierarchical view is presupposed by the meritocratic core principles I describe.
209	1	1		From these two assumptions meritocrats infer that some arrays of assignments of individuals to jobs will be more productive than others.
209	1	18		Meritocrats and non-meritocrats alike operate with intuitively acceptable, if imprecise, notions of competent or productive job performance
209	1	32		I want to leave it an open question how a meritocrat would respond to a claim that justice demanded-as compensation for past services or past injuries-that someone not selected by the PJAP nevertheless be given a particular job.
210	1	6		If the PJAP is adopted, then the notion of individual merit can be applied in the following restricted way.

210	1	8	An individual may claim to merit one job more than another job, or to merit one job more than another person does, if and only if his occupying that job is an assignment that is part of an array of assignments selected by the PJAP	
210	1	11	The claim of merit or relative merit is dependent for its basis on the rationale for the PJAP.	
210	1	12	Merit does not derive from having the abilities themselves, but only from the fact that abilities can play a certain social role.	
210	1	15	We focus on the relevant abilities because of their utility, not because there is something intrinsically meritorious about having them.	
210	1	16	Clearly the particular notion of merit I am concerned with here should not be confused with the more general concept of desert; it should also not be confused with certain ordinary uses of "merit" which are similar to the broader notion of desert.	
210	1	18	I am concerned with merit as it plays a role in the types of meritocracies I am analyzing	
210	1	18		I am concerned with merit as it plays a role in the types of meritocracies I am analyzing
210	1	28		It might be felt that the "real"meritocrat would balk at such a macroprinciple.
210	1	29		The "real" meritocrat, it might be argued, is one who thinks a person should get a job if he or she is the best available person for that job.
211	1	2	Given the rationale for treating job-related abilities as the basis for merit claims in the first place, namely that it is socially desirable to enhance productivity where possible, I think that the macroprinciple seems preferable.	
211	1	4 e 5	There is something anomalous about basing a merit claim, given our restricted notion of merit, on claims about microproductivity considerations while at the same time ignoring macroproductivity considerations.	

211	1	9 e 11	Alternatively, we might try to divorce the merit claim from all productivity considerations, but this approach makes it completely mysterious why jobrelated abilities are made the basis of merit in the first place	
211	1	10	I suppose one reason some may think the micromerit principle is preferable to the PJAP is that it seems unfair to Jill that she gets the job she wants less even though she can do the job Jack gets better than he can.	
211	1	25	So in most hiring that is done on a merit basis (and of course much is not), we tend to use the microprinciple.	
Rod (5)	1	3	5. Yet another alternative, which I am not concerned to refute here, is that personal traits or achievements other than those related to job competence should be the basis for claims of desert or merit for job placement.	
212	1	30	Since my task here is to analyze where a particular notion of merit leads us, I need not evaluate these last considerations to determine the ultimate desirability of the PJAP or the microprinciple.	
212	1	34		In any case, keeping in mind the compromise just proposed, I will assume that meritocrats can agree on the macro-PJAP
212	1	35	But it must be clear what this assumption implies: an individual merits a job if his or her placement in that job is part of an array of maximally productive job assignments.	
213	1	1	Such a merit claim does not presuppose that any kind of desert claim is present other than what can be derived from productivity considerations.	
213	1	3	Our obligation to honor a merit claim so derived is only as strong as the prima facie obligation to encourage productivity.	
213	1	6	Some may feel that the truncated notion of merit emerging from my analysis must be an incorrect one because it omits any appeal to a stronger notion of desert.	

213	1	25	I conclude that ability-based merit claims of the type I have picked out do not support claims to "deserve" particular placements.	
213	1	29		Before considering the two remaining types of principles regulating meritocracies, I would like to comment briefly on the relevance of merit claims as I have described them to the contemporary issue of affirmative action and preferential hiring.
213	1	30	Before considering the two remaining types of principles regulating meritocracies, I would like to comment briefly on the relevance of merit claims as I have described them to the contemporary issue of affirmative action and preferential hiring.	
214	1	3	Suppose I am right that the proper way to analyze a merit claim for a job based on possession of certain abilities is to derive the claim from a macroproductivity principle such as the PJAP	
214	1	7	Then several difficulties face the opponent of preferential hiring who appeals to a merit claim.	
214	1	12	Even assuming valid criteria, such scores would automatically establish a merit claim only on a microprinciple, such as the one we thought less desirable.	
214	1	27		Suppose, for example, productivity is reduced because of sexist or racist opposition to what otherwise would be a meritocratic placement.
215	1	1	I think there is an even more important effect of accepting the analysis of merit I have proposed.	
215	1	1	Whether my claim to merit a particular job more than another depends on the PJAP or on a microprinciple, it nevertheless depends for its justification only on efficiency or productivity.	
215	1	11	Many will feel less concerned about such compromises of productivity than they would if a claim to merit a job was really a claim of right, a claim of justice.	

215	1	12	If a claim to merit a job is a real desert claim supporting a right claim, if it is derived from considerations other than productivity alone, then it might seem far more problematic why such a claim is given less weight than the other principle of justice appealed to in overriding it.	
216	1	7		Suppose, for example, that Rawlsian contractors in an original position would agree to adopt meritocratic job placement principles and conditions of opportunity as part of a preferred conception of justice.
216	1	16	I need not argue that merit claims can never be construed as entitlements; I need only show that they are entitlements only if they are not superseded by stronger ones.	
217	1	2		I would like to return now to discuss the remaining types of principles meritocrats share.
217	1	3		Although there may be some exceptions, I believe that most meritocrats would view fair, rather than just formal, equality of opportunity as the appropriate precondition for application of the PJAP
217	1	6	Formal equality of opportunity obtains when there are no legal or quasibarriers to people having equal access (based on merit) to positions and offices or to the means (education and training) needed to qualify one for access to such jobs.	
218	1	1		In any case, I will assume that meritocrats generally treat fair, not formal, opportunity as the precondition for applying the PJAP.
218	1	7	So far, although an individual may claim to merit a job when his having it satisfies the PJAP, there is no sense given to his meriting any particular set of rewards or burdens.	
218	1	10		I have deliberately dissociated the meritocratic basis for job assignment from the process of determining the schedule of benefits and burdens associated with different jobs or positions.

218	1	13		I think it is possible for meritocrats to differ on the reward schedules they join to the system structured by the PJAP and fair equality of opportunity
218	1	15		Consider the following six meritocracies which differ only in their reward schedules
218	1	18		(i) Unbridled meritocracy. The reward schedule allows whatever rewards those who attain positions of power and prestige can acquire for themselves.
218	1	22		(2) Desert meritocracy. The reward schedule allows rewards proportional to the contribution of the jobs (but not constrained by efficiency considerations as in meritocracy 3); alternatively, the desert basis might have nothing to do with productivity it might be moral worthiness, for example.
218	1	28		(3) Utilitarian meritocracy. The reward schedule allows inequalities that act to maximize average or total utility
218	1	31		(4) Maximin meritocracy. The reward schedule allows inequalities that act to maximize the index of primary social goods of those who are worst off.
Rod (9)	1	6		9. Thomas Nagel makes a related point when he says, "Certain abilities may be relevant to filling a job from the point of view of efficiency, but they are not relevant from the point of view of justice, because they provide no indication that one deserves the rewards that go with holding that job. The qualities, experience, and attainments that make success in a certain position likely do not in themselves merit the rewards that happen to attach to occupancy of that position in a competitive economy."
219	1	1		(5) Strict egalitarian meritocracy. No inequalities in reward are allowed
219	1	4		(6) Socialist meritocracy. The reward schedule allows no inequalities in the satisfaction of (basic?) needs.
219	1	7		My list allows for meritocracies which no one may explicitly have

219	1	10 e 13		supported. But the main point should be clear, namely, I do not consider it an essential feature of a meritocracy that efficiency is the sole principle governing selection of reward schedules, but I do believe that an appeal to productivity in job assignment is always involved in meritocracy through the PJAP
219	1	15		First, unless certain empirical conditions obtain, meritocracy may prove to be a theory which greatly underdetermines social structure on just the points it was intended to determine
219	1	25		At the least, relevant abilities will turn out to be far less scarce a resource than most meritocrats think.
219	1	27	If I am right, then the claims that individuals can make vis-a-vis one another-for example, that one merits a job more than another-would be substantially weakened.	
220	1	6		All this point means is that we are far from having available to us the measuring and predicting instruments needed to operate a thoroughly meritocratic society such as the one Young describes, since we cannot meet the conditions necessary for applying the PJAP
220	1	9		Third, my analysis of meritocracy seems to allow too many types of theories in under that name.
220	1	12		For example, Rawls explicitly argues that his Second Principle does not lead to the type of meritocracy advocated by Young because natural abilities are viewed as social, not just individual assets, and inequalities act to help the worst-off members of the society.
220	1	16 e 18		But if Rawls, or at least someone much like him who subscribes to type (4) meritocracy, is stuck with the label "meritocrat" on my schema, still, he is not thereby committed to any of the undesirable features of the meritocracies attacked in A Theory of Justice.

220	1	20	At the same time, the label captures the fact that he shares with other meritocrats certain common principles
220	1	32	But this fact does not alter my main point: we can distinguish the PJAP from the reward principles, and what all meritocrats share is appeal to the PJAP and fair equality of opportunity, however else they may differ in their use of reward schedules.
221	1	3	If we keep our attention on the shared features of meritocracy, we can see why many varied theorists have found something attractive in it.
221	1	5	Indeed, insisting that job placement be meritocratic under conditions of fair equality of opportunity leads to serious criticism of existing institutions.
221	1	10	And in our society, the reward schedule is rarely itself the target of challenge by meritocrats.
221	1	10 e 11	Meritocracy becomes controversial when we begin to see the consequences of meritocratic job placement operating in a context of certain reward schedules
221	1	13	The meritocracies I listed earlier include three types of reward schedules
221	1	14	Inegalitarian meritocracies (unbridled, desert according to contribution, and utilitarian) allow significant inequalities in rewards with no special constraints to protect those with the worst jobs.
221	1	17	Egalitarian meritocracies either allow no significant inequalities or allow inequalities not based on the social functions of the jobs but rather on the needs or other deserts of the job holder.
221	1	19	The maximin meritocracy allows inequalities but constrains them in ways that act to benefit those whose abilities tend to lead to low reward jobs.
221	1	22 e 23	Inegalitarian meritocracies may be open to a criticism that egalitarian or maximin meritocracies avoid.

Rod (12)	1	6	The answer is, I think, that people might consistently want to know that their rewards will be based on, say, moral worthiness or industriousness and still believe that access to jobs should be determined by merit, as earlier defined, because it is important to secure proper performance.	
222	1	6		Then it seems one's qualifications for meritocratic job placement are largely the result of happy or unhappy accident, and one has done little to deserve them.
222	1	10	It is just this fact which made it so hard to establish a desert claim, which connects abilities to jobs, stronger than the weak merit claim I derived from productivity considerations.	
222	1	11		So it seems that the meritocrat is committed, given his concern for productivity, to distributing at least some social goods, the jobs themselves, in accordance with a morally arbitrary distribution of abilities and traits.
222	1	20		This objection, of course, is the basis for Rawls' attack on non-maximin meritocracies.
222	1	21		Egalitarian meritocracies avoid the criticism.
222	1	21		And maximin meritocracies dodge its main force since they moderate the effects of fortuitous distributions of talents.
222	1	25		For anyone who feels the power of this argument against moral arbitrariness (and not everyone does, notably Nozick), 1-5 the price the meritocrat must pay is the adoption of egalitarian-or fairly egalitarian (maximin)-reward schedules.
222	1	27 e 28		Unfortunately, many proponents of meritocracy have been so concerned with combating the lesser evil of non-meritocratic job placement that they have left unchallenged the greater evil of highly inequalitarian reward schedules.
223	1	1		One even suspects that an elitist infatuation for such inequalitarian reward schedules lurks behind their ardor for meritocratic job placement.

Bacharach, S., & Aiken, M. (1979).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
1	1	14		On the other hand public sector bureaucrats are generally expected to be satisfied with their work situation because it is governed by a meritocratic system of rewards.
2	1	3		Using data collected in 44 local administrative bureaucracies in Belgium this paper examines the relationship between alienation, meaningfulness, meritocracy, and dissatisfaction among bureaucrats.
3	1	4		While alienation has been cast as a primary predictor of worker dissatisfaction, two other dimensions of contemporary social organizations must be considered: (1) the degree to which there exists a state of meaningfulness among the workers; and (2) whether meritocracy is a primary reward mechanism.
3	1	17	As Weber argued, bureaucracies tend to rely on the merit system as a means of distributing rewards.	
3	1	20		Just as modern bureaucracies are purported to be characterized by alienative work processes and a lack of integration, they are also purported to be governed by a set of meritocratic principles.
3	1	23		Although a positive relationship may be posited between alienation and dissatisfaction and between a lack of integration and dissatisfaction, a similar relationship between meritocracy and dissatisfaction may be more problematic.
3	1	26		Indeed, although is debatable, we contend that primary reliance on meritocracy will result in a high level of worker dissatisfaction (Young)
3	1	27		It may be argued that in an organization with a meritocratic system of promotion, the stress is primarily on efficiency, implying impersonal evaluation of one's performance.
3	1	29		Furthermore, meritocratic relationships enhance competition, increasing the probability of greater distance among workers.
3	1	31		Meritocracy implies some objective yardstick for promotion, and it is these consequences of this purported objectification of performance criteria, which may result in worker dissatisfaction

3	1	35		Therefore, this paper will empirically examine the following: (1) the relationships between the various dimensions of alienation and the various dimensions of dissatisfaction, (2) the relationship between lack of integration and dissatisfaction, and (3) the relationship between meritocracy and dissatisfaction.
9	1	37		Beyond alienation, we have suggested that both meaningfulness and meritocracy be examined as predictors of dissatisfaction.
10	1	33		Meritocracy was operationalized by asking department heads and subordinates about organizational commitment to the use of merit criteria for promotions.
10	1	33	Meritocracy was operationalized by asking department heads and subordinates about organizational commitment to the use of merit criteria for promotions.	
10	1	36	Promotions on the basis of written exams, work performance or potential were taken as indicating the use of merit criteria.	
10	1	40-42	The responses were coded in the following manner: 4 = sole reliance on merit criteria; 3 = primary reliance; 2 = secondary reliance; 1 = merit indicators as the third most important criterion; 0 = no reliance on merit criteria.	
15	1	2		Examining our third measure, the perceived meritocratic relationship between the worker and the organization, we find a consistent pattern for both subordinates and department heads.
15	1	4	In general, the more merit is stressed as the primary criterion for promotion, the more satisfied are workers at both levels with their work, their superiors and their salary.	
15	1	8	As in the other instances, no significant relationship is found between stress on merit and satisfaction with co-workers.	
15	1	9		The implication of these relationships is especially interesting, for indeed, while a meritocracy may well be competitive and remote, this apparently does not preclude the possibility in such a system that department heads and subordinates will perceive the distribution of rewards as being commensurate with their work.
15	1	18		For department head work satisfaction, influence in work decisions (beta = .33) and perceived freedom to communicate (beta = .37) appear as the strongest predictors, while meritocracy is significant at the .10 level (beta = .22).

15	1	19	For subordinate work satisfaction, meritocracy (beta = .31) and norm reification (beta = .42) are most significant.
16	1	4	Finally, as to satisfaction with salary, meritocracy appears as the most significant predictor for department heads (beta = .38), while both meritocracy (beta = .38) and influence in work decisions (beta = - .37) appear as significant predictors of subordinate satisfaction with salary.
16	1	21	These findings generally support the position that the more traditional relationships between measures of alienation, meaninglessness, meritocracy and satisfaction prevail in the middle echelons of these bureaucracies.
16	1	28	Subordinates, however, are satisfied along these two dimensions when they perceive the work process as having a high level of norm reification and the use of meritocracy.
16	1	34	Finally, as to satisfaction with salary, we find that meritocratic rewards operate on both levels of the organization, suggesting the elements of an instrumental model for all workers.

Griffin, L., & Kalleberg, A. (1981).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
2	1	3		This states Parkin, is the 'meritocratic critique' of stratification.
2	1	9		Certainly socio-economic achievement in the U.S. has long been characterized (at least for white males) as a meritocratic phenomenon; that is, as a process largely determined by an individual's ability, effort, motivation, and, above all, educational credentials and technical skills.
2	1	14		At least four structural tendencies of the American economy suggest the plausibility - even utility - of a meritocratic basis of stratification in the United States.
2	1	35		Hence, a meritocratic system of stratification is assumed to be functional in that it represents an efficient method to identify, develop, and, exploit scarce human resources.
2	1	44		Featherman and Hauser, moreover, present evidence suggesting that the selection and sorting functions of formal education have become even more salient in the very recent past, thus reinforcing the meritocratic interpretation of stratification in the United States.
3	1	2		While we find these theoretical and empirical observations insightful, we argue that research has yet to demonstrate sufficiently the validity of the meritocratic image of achievement even in the supposedly most 'open' of all societies, the United States.
3	1	4		We have no quarrel with Blau and Duncan's exposition of the meritocratic principle, which tend to equate occupational differentiation with stratification and occupational achievement with the 'process of stratification': ...a fundamental trend toward expanding universalism characterizes industrial society...
3	1	20		What we do question in the implicit assumption that the demonstration of a strong education-occupation linkage is, in and of itself, sufficient to label socio-economic achievement process in the United States as meritocratic or Blau and Duncan's terminology, 'universalistic'.
4	1	11		These considerations suggest that the identification of achievement patterns in contemporary America as meritocratic is premature or,

				possibly, misleading.
4	1	23		Research by Mills and Domhoff, among others, suggest that these non-meritocratic criteria are indeed salient, but their inferences apply only to a small group of uniquely powerful and wealthy individuals who are hardly representative of the American labour force.
4	1	33		If we find that recruitment patterns into class positions, the case for a meritocratic interpretation of achievement is strengthened.
4	1	36		On the other hand, if these processes are observed to be strongly divergent, especially with respect to the importance of schooling and technical training, a meritocratic explanation becomes less tenable or, minimally, one to be limited to the (admittedly important) occupational sphere.
8	1	40		These variables measure one aspect of what we mean by meritocratic criteria, but we noted above that the concept of meritocracy also implies ability.
8	1	41		These variables measure one aspect of what we mean by meritocratic criteria, but we noted above that the concept of meritocracy also implies ability.
8	1	45		Later, we discuss the consequences of expanding our measurement of meritocratic variables beyond those discussed here.
13	1	23		That class membership only loosely relates to occupational membership and produces inequalities in pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards naturally leads to the question we raised earlier: are recruitment processes into class positions based on such meritocratic criteria as educational qualifications, technical training, ability and/or skills obtained through work experience?
15	1	13		Considered together with the relatively minor direct importance of parental occupational status, these results strongly suggest a meritocratic basis of achievement into occupational positions, regardless of how these positions are measured.
18	1	1		Again, however, the coefficients are rather small. In sum, we find little evidence that class recruitment processes are exclusively or even pronouncedly meritocratic.

18	1	7	Before concluding the meritocratic criteria are not of overriding importance, however, we need to consider whether these essentially null results are simply artifacts of the peculiarities of our measurement procedures (of class and/or meritocratic influences), of the aggregated nature of our sample, of the analytic portion of this paper will be devoted to exploring these alternative hypotheses.
18	1	10	Before concluding the meritocratic criteria are not of overriding importance, however, we need to consider whether these essentially null results are simply artifacts of the peculiarities of our measurement procedures (of class and/or meritocratic influences), of the aggregated nature of our sample, of the analytic portion of this paper will be devoted to exploring these alternative hypotheses.
18	1	21	Even though we expanded our view of 'learning' or 'skills' to include a number of non-r-r post-schooling labour market resources were nonetheless too limited and/or deficient to reflect salient meritocratic influences.
18	1	45	The components of class appear to be no more affected by meritocratic variables (or, we should add, by background variables) than do the class categories themselves.
19	1	25	We had no expectation as to which sector (if either) would be characterized by more meritocratic processes.
19	1	28	Hence, this sector might rely more heavily on meritocratic criteria for allocating men into positions of control.
19	1	37	While a few differences are observed between sectors (e.g. the influence of education for placing men into the supervisor class is much higher in the public sector) meritocratic influences - with respect both to class and the components of class - are once again observed to be, at best, quite modest.
19	1	46	Analysis of this sub-sample affords us an opportunity to examine a number of issues associated with the meritocratic image of stratification that is not possible with a general sample of respondents.
22	1	7	By evaluating the impact of such variables as college quality, type of degree or training (business or engineering versus others), and college performance and certification for a select group of men (college-goers presumably resemble a 'knowledge' or technical

				elite more than do a general sample of the population), we were simultaneously able to further extend and refine our operationalization of meritocratic variables and address the aggregation issues.
22	1	19		Occasionally, the presentation of the meritocratic argument stresses the particular importance of schooling (and, more generally, labour market resources) for the sons of manual workers.
22	1	38		We must so far conclude that the recruitment of individuals into classes, as we have defined them, is only modestly affected by meritocratic criteria and that this influence applies to several theoretically defined groups, be they defined in terms of sector, educational certification, or social origins.
29	1	5		We simply do not find much evidence of meritocratic recruitment processes into the United States class structure in any of the five data sets we examined.
30	1	1		Meritocratic societies ideally embrace the principle of achievement and shun the principle of ascription, but no society, of course, exists in this pure form.
30	1	6		Nonetheless, as we noted at the outset of this paper, the United States has often been singled out, at least for white males, as the society most closely approximating the meritocratic ideal.
30	1	18		Blau and Duncan, among many others, infer that importance of education in positioning men in the American occupational structure implies a relatively 'open' meritocratic stratification system.
31	1	2		Were does all of this take us in answering the central question posed by this paper: are achievement processes in the US meritocratic?
31	1	9		One is based on occupational position (and not solely on status), na indicator of the technical division of labour, and the evidence - especially on very powerful role of schooling - suggests that achievement in this system is largely meritocratic.
31	1	11		The other stratification system is based on ownership and control relations, and achievement in this system is but modestly susceptible to meritocratic influences.
31	1	13		Our results suggest that both supporters and critics of stratification in the US have overestimated the succes of the 'meritocratic

					critique' of inequality.
31	1	15			Hence, in our view, we should be quite cautious about accepting an overall meritocratic interpretation of achievement and inequality in contemporary American society.
37	2	13			In this sense, recruitment to certain classes does exhibit some meritocratic elements.
37	2	31			The consequence of this respecification was that meritocratic influences on class recruitment were markedly lower than those presented in this paper.
37	2	39			Hence, the estimates of meritocratic influences which are presented here should be regarded as quite generous plausible alternative specifications would reduce the impact of skills even further.

Krauze, T., & Slomeczynski, K. K. (1985).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
623	1	15		The concept of meritocracy has been considered in discussions of the functional theory of social stratification (Wrong), status attainment and mobility research (Boudon; Jencks), futurology of post-industrial society (Bell, a, b; Touraine), and the job competition theory (Thurow).
623	1	19		In these contexts the concept of meritocracy refers to a large-scale social system in which a positive relationship exists between "merit" and such commonly desired values as income, power, and prestige.
623	1	20	In these contexts the concept of meritocracy refers to a large-scale social system in which a positive relationship exists between "merit" and such commonly desired values as income, power, and prestige.	
623	1	21	Merit is usually indicated by IQ and other tests of cognitive skills, or by educational attainment.	
624	1	4		Therefore, the extend to which meritocracy is achieved can be expressed in terms of matching individuals with a given level of merit to occupational positions with given levels of rewards.
624	1	6		It follows that our use of the term meritocracy is equivalent to Hope's meritelection.
624	1	7		It follows that our use of the term meritocracy is equivalent to Hope's meritelection.
624	1	8		In this paper we focus on "educational meritocracy" in which formal educational credentials serve as a criterion of allocating people to differentially rewarded jobs.
624	1	12		We chose this criterion not because we personally believe that merit equals education but because education plays a crucial role in discussions of meritocracy.
624	1	13		Some writers (e.g. Bell, a; Boudon; Halsey; Thurow) explicitly define meritocracy by means of the relationship between education and special rewards - income and prestige.
624	1	15		Others, who consider "IQ meritocracy", treat formal education as a key variable.

624	1	16		For example, Olneck and Crouse write: "In the IQ meritocracy, formal education is assigned the task of sorting, selecting, and channeling individuals according to their cognitive competence... If employers in the meritocracy were interested primarily in cognitive skills, we ordinarily would expect educational attainment to affect occupational status".
624	1	19		For example, Olneck and Crouse write: "In the IQ meritocracy, formal education is assigned the task of sorting, selecting, and channeling individuals according to their cognitive competence... If employers in the meritocracy were interested primarily in cognitive skills, we ordinarily would expect educational attainment to affect occupational status".
624	1	22		Since allocation criteria unrelated to formal schooling have been neglected consequences of using education as the sole criterion of merit-selection.
624	1	23	Since allocation criteria unrelated to formal schooling have been neglected consequences of using education as the sole criterion of merit-selection.	
624	1	24		In the literature, meritocratic allocation of persons to positions is typically described as follows: "...there is a range on the selection criterion that marks the level of merit required for the position, and all those in the range should be in the position and all those outside the range should not be in that position" (Rosenbaum, 61).
624	1	26	In the literature, meritocratic allocation of persons to positions is typically described as follows: "...there is a range on the selection criterion that marks the level of merit required for the position, and all those in the range should be in the position and all those outside the range should not be in that position" (Rosenbaum, 61).	
624	1	28		Green points out that the "meritocratic model is of no ordinal ranking process, in which the 'best' person (according to some single, quantifiable scale) is fitted to the 'highest' position, the next best to the next highest, and so on" (172).
624	1	32		Still, however, there is a need to formulate an operational procedure for arriving at meritocratic allocation for the general case in which the number of persons is much larger than the number of distinguishable levels of rewards.
624	1	34	The operational procedure should specify for that levels of merit which positions, ordered in terms of rewards, are appropriate, and how many persons should be assigned to each combination of level	

				of both variables.	
624	1	38		In this paper we propose a mathematically and conceptually simple model of meritocratic allocation and apply this model to answer the question "how far to meritocracy" from empirical reality?	
624	1	39		In this paper we propose a mathematically and conceptually simple model of meritocratic allocation and apply this model to answer the question "how far to meritocracy" from empirical reality?	
625	1	7		The relationship between formal education and such conceptualization of status has been considered crucial in many discussions of meritocracy (e.g., Griffin and Kalleberg; Grusky; Olneck and Crouse), as well as in other contexts.	
625	1	9		Formulation of the model of meritocratic allocation is critically important for any rigorous testing of the implications of the meritocratic thesis which, broadly, speaking, asserts that modern society is essentially meritocratic (e.g., Bell; Boudon; Halsey; Hunsen; Ornstein; see also the discussion in Griffin and Kalleberg).	
625	1	10		Formulation of the model of meritocratic allocation is critically important for any rigorous testing of the implications of the meritocratic thesis which, broadly, speaking, asserts that modern society is essentially meritocratic (e.g., Bell; Boudon; Halsey; Hunsen; Ornstein; see also the discussion in Griffin and Kalleberg).	
625	1	12		Formulation of the model of meritocratic allocation is critically important for any rigorous testing of the implications of the meritocratic thesis which, broadly, speaking, asserts that modern society is essentially meritocratic (e.g., Bell; Boudon; Halsey; Hunsen; Ornstein; see also the discussion in Griffin and Kalleberg).	
625	1	14		Our goal is to derive specific hypotheses from the meritocratic thesis and subject them we develop a model of meritocratic allocation as na ideal type with which the data can be contrasted.	
625	1	16		Our goal is to derive specific hypotheses from the meritocratic thesis and subject them we develop a model of meritocratic allocation as na ideal type with which the data can be contrasted.	
625	1	20		Finally, we discuss the implications of the results for the validity of the meritocratic thesis and the theoretical premises on which this thesis rests.	

625	1	25	In the literature, claims are made that "...meritocracies tendencies...are inherent in the highly industrialized society itself" (Husen, 174) and that "(t)he post-industrial society, in its logic, is a meritocracy" (Bell, a, 30); similar formulations can be found in Dahrendorf (27), Halsey (298), and others.
625	1	27	In the literature, claims are made that "...meritocracies tendencies...are inherent in the highly industrialized society itself" (Husen, 174) and that "(t)he post-industrial society, in its logic, is a meritocracy" (Bell, a, 30); similar formulations can be found in Dahrendorf (27), Halsey (298), and others.
625	1	29	We treat these claims as expressions of the meritocratic thesis according to wig, in modern societies, a strong association between individual merit and social rewards exists primarily in order to efficiently utilize human resources.
625	1	31	We treat these claims as expressions of the meritocratic thesis according to wig, in modern societies, a strong association between individual merit and social rewards exists primarily in order to efficiently utilize human resources.
625	1	34	As Griffing and Kalleberg point out, "the United States has often been singled out...as the society most closely approximating the meritocratic ideal" (30).
625	1	34	The meritocratic thesis, when applied to American society, is often taken for granted but also frequently disputed (for a review of the opposing arguments see Griffin and Kalleberg; see also Bowles and Gintis; Cohen and Lazerson; Collins; Wrong).
625	1	40	In order to evaluate "how far to meritocracy?" we contrast this question with the one "how far to lottery?" (Seabury, 45), the lottery being a metaphor for a probabilistic assignment of persons to positions.
626	1	6	We begin by analysing a given bivariate distribution of the U.S. labor force, Classified by education and status, for which two ideal type distributions (i.e., "meritocracy" and "lottery") are constructed.
626	1	12	Thus our hypotheses and their tests are conceptualized as a comparison of two distances from the observed distribution: to meritocratic allocation and to random allocation.
626	1	13	We believe that it is incorrect to call a society meritocratic if the first distance is larger than the second.

626	1	21	If the meritocratic thesis is valid then none of the following three hypotheses should be rejected.
626	1	24	The number of persons who would change their status as a result of the transition to meritocratic allocation is smaller than that which would occur because of the transition to random allocation.
626		29	The absolute increment of between-group status inequality which would occur as a result of the transition to meritocratic allocation is smaller than that which would occur because of the transition to random allocation.
626		32	The absolute increment of between-group status inequality which could occur as a result of the transition to meritocratic allocation is smaller than that which occurs because of the transition to random allocation.
626		37	Testing these hypotheses allows one to take a position not only with regard to the meritocratic thesis but also to its foundation, the functional theory of social stratification.
626		40	It has been aptly pointed out (e.g., Grusky; Wesolowski) that meritocratic allocation expresses the central proposition of the functional theory of stratification stating that the most important, and therefore most rewarded, positions are "conscientiously filled by the most qualified persons" (Davis and Moore, 243).
627	1	5	However, a consensus has not yet been reached about the extent to which American society is meritocratic, that is, operates according to the premises of functional theory.
627	1	8	This state of affairs can be attributed, at least in part, to the absence of a clearly stated model incorporating an "ideal type" of meritocracy against which data be contrasted.
627	1	10	Formulating such a model and investigating its properties seem important not only for discussions of meritocracy, but also for assessing and testing the functional theory of social stratification.
627	1	37	In sociological literature, meritocratic allocation is defined, implicitly or explicitly, by the principle: the more education a person has, the higher should be his or her social status.
628	1	5	Since it is unlikely that the above condition would describe any realistic situation, we formulate the principle so that transition from any observed distribution to meritocratic allocation is possible.

628	1	10	Meritocratic allocation is a frequency distribution d_{ij} constructed on the basis of margins a_i and b_j of the observed distribution.
628	1	24	All groups in the meritocratic allocation (i.e., all positive entries d_{uv} , d_{rt}) have to satisfy this relationship.
628	1	25	Notice that the equivalent version of the meritocratic principle is: "persons at a given level of education should have status levels equal to or higher than those of persons at a lower level of education."
628	1	36	The formula for d_{ij} , where $i = 1, 2, \dots, m$; $j = 1, 2, \dots, n$, is formula and the terms d_{ik} and d_{kj} refer to the already determined entries of the meritocratic matrix.
629	1	6	Using distributional constraints (i.e., row and column sums) of Panel (A) and applying formula (3), we determine $d_{11} = \min(a_1 - 0, b_1 - 0) = \min(178, 263) = 178$, which provides the starting point for finding entries of meritocratic allocation in Panel (B).
629	1	15	The contrasting baseline to meritocratic allocation is random allocation, which is also constructed on the basis of the observed distribution.
629	1	21	Starting with the observed distribution (Panel A), one can obtain meritocratic allocation (Panel B) and random allocation (Panel C) entirely by means of status advancements and status demotions.
629	1	29	The transition from the observed distribution Y to the two ideal type allocations, that is meritocratic allocation M and the random allocation R , requires that some persons change their status.
631	1	2	Minimal proportion of status mobile persons required by the transition from observed distribution to the meritocratic and random allocations, for the U.S. total labor force in 1977, by three levels of data aggregation.
631	1	34	The hypothesis states that the observed distribution Y is closer to meritocratic allocation M than to random allocation R .
632	1	26	Given fixed scales and distributional constraints we shall show that r reaches its maximum under meritocratic allocation.
632	1	36	The construction of meritocratic allocation, based on the meritocratic principle, does not depend on any explicit assumptions about the strength of relationship between the variables.

632	1	36	The construction or meritocratic allocation, based on the meritocratic principle, does not depend on any explicit assumptions about the strength of relationship between the variables.
632	1	39	Na intuitive notion of meritocracy suggests that a strong association exists between education and status.
632	1	40	In our formulation of the model of meritocracy the correlation between these variables is maximal.
633	1	11	This property of meritocratic allocation has far-reaching consequences for analyzing multivariate model with constraints analogous to (1) and (2) because it allows for normalizing the regression coefficients by means of their maximal possible values.
633	1	21	Denoting by $r^2(X)$ the proportion of explained variance for distribution X , the hypothesis is stated as $(H2) r^2(Y) - r^2(M) < r^2(Y) - r^2(R) $ where Y , M , R are the observed, meritocratic and random allocations, respectively.
634	1	2	Determination of status by education in the observed distribution and in the meritocratic allocation, for U.S. total labor force in 1977, by three levels of data aggregation.
634	1	40	Jencks' stable value for these years, $r^2_{\max} - r^2$, suggests that during the period of almost sixty years the trend toward meritocracy was not pronounced, if it existed at all.
634	1	43	Although American society is argued to be increasingly subjected to "educational credentialism" (Collins), it does not become increasingly meritocratic in the sense used in this paper.
635	1	7	Therefore the values of a given measure of status inequality for the observed distribution are the same as for the meritocratic and random allocations.
635	1	7	However, transition toward meritocracy changes the relative magnitudes of within-group and between-group components of total status inequality.
635	1	34	According to the status inequality hypothesis we expect that the observed distribution is closer to meritocratic allocation than to the random allocation with respect to the components of Theil's measure.
636	1	2	Components of Theil's index computed for status inequality between and within educational groups in the observed, meritocratic and random distributions, for the U.S. total labor force in 1977, by three levels of

					data aggregation.
636	1	28			Indeed, at all levels of aggregation the value of between-group inequality in the observed distribution is closer to that in random allocation than to inequality in meritocratic allocation.
636	1	36			In the additional analyses we shall explore some of the implications of the transition to meritocracy in terms of status gains and status losses for educational groups.
636	1	39			Table 5 presents a comparison of status averages for educational groups in the observed distribution with those obtained under meritocratic and random allocations.
636	1	40			It can be seen that the range of meritocratic status is larger than the range of average observed status by 21.4 points.
636	1	43			What the exception of high school graduates, the differences between meritocratic status and the average observed status are large for each educational group.
637	1	1			Average status for educational groups in the observed meritocratic and random distributions, for U.S. total labor force in 1977.
637	1	23			This compelling evidence points to the fact that the distribution of status in the American labor is far from meritocratic.
637	1	26			As noted in the literature, persons at high educational levels gain from the transition toward meritocracy while those at low levels lose.
637	1	30			At each educational level the transition toward meritocracy involves the decrease of within-group inequality of status.
637	1	31			Since for educational groups the range of meritocratic status is larger than the range of observed status, the transition to meritocracy would result in the "Matthew effect" (Merton): "For unto him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath".
637	1	32			Since for educational groups the range of meritocratic status is larger than the range of observed status, the transition to meritocracy would result in the "Matthew effect" (Merton): "For unto him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath".
637	1	36			The Matthew effect accompanying the transition to meritocratic allocation, as applicable to groups, occurs here in the strong form: the range of expected status increases and the within-group inequality of status

					decreases.
638	1	4			If individuals were to act in their self-interest with respect to status gain, then the transition to meritocracy would not be opposed by any college educated person and would not be supported by the majority of those with incomplete high school.
638	1	7			On this ground the assertion that "stratification in accord with the principle of merit, (is) generally accepted at all levels of society" (Young, 99) can be questioned.
638	1	9			In largest educational group, high school graduates, the acceptance of meritocracy is very problematic.
638	1	13			Cohen and Lazerson noted that "the extent to which the meritocracy actually worked, and the value of merit selection and its implications for equality, have been in dispute" (162).
638	1	16			Indeed, in spite of the proponents of the thesis that modern societies are meritocratic (Bell; Halsey) some writers maintain that meritocracy is chiefly na ideological notion which poorly corresponds to reality (Bowles and Gintis; Collins).
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638	1	21			The model of meritocracy presented in this paper strictly implements the meritocratic criterion for the distribution of the labor force with respect to education and status.
638	1	22			The model of meritocracy presented in this paper strictly implements the meritocratic criterion for the distribution of the labor force with respect to education and status.
638	1	23			Advocates of the meritocracy thesis are likely to concur that under pure meritocracy more educated persons should not have lower social status than less educated ones.
638	1	24			Advocates of the meritocracy thesis are likely to concur that under pure meritocracy more educated persons should not have lower social status than less educated ones.

638	1	26	The constructed meritocratic allocation allows one to pose and answer the empirical question: How far is the observed distribution of the U.S. labor force from the meritocratic ideal?
638	1	28	The constructed meritocratic allocation allows one to pose and answer the empirical question: How far is the observed distribution of the U.S. labor force from the meritocratic ideal?
638	1	34	We hypothesized that transition from the observed and meritocratic allocations shows that, in order to achieve meritocracy, at least 31.5 percent of persons in the labor force would have to change their status.
638	1	35	We hypothesized that transition from the observed and meritocratic allocations shows that, in order to achieve meritocracy, at least 31.5 percent of persons in the labor force would have to change their status.
638	1	38	Thus the hypothesis that the observed distribution is close to meritocratic allocation with respect to status mobility is rejected.
638	1	40	The meritocratic thesis can be also rejected on the basis of the test of the hypothesis of status determination by education.
639	1	6	Thus the strength of the observed relationship between education and status is closer to statistical independence, which implies $r = 0$, than to complete determination by the meritocratic criterion.
639	1	8	Using correlational analysis we attempted to assess the existence of a secular trend toward meritocracy.
639	1	10	In the diachronic context Halsey noted that "The trend in most countries is...from ascription to achievement, a trend in the direction of meritocracy, guided by the tightening link of education and economy" (298).
639	1	12	Other authors state that in modern societies "ascriptive stratification was replaced by meritocratic stratification" (Ornstein, 157) and that, as a consequence, education became a factor of increasing significance in the determination of social status.
639	1	18	However, even controlling for changes in the distributional constraints on education and status, we find no support for the trend to meritocracy in American society during the previous six decades.
639	1	20	According to Hypothesis 3, in the observed distribution status inequality among educational groups is more similar to that under meritocratic allocation than to that under random assignment.

639	1	24	The only group whose status would be higher under meritocracy than at present consists of those who had at least some college education.
639	1	28	If individuals from this group jointly pursued their group interest they would support meritocracy.
639	1	29	In contrast, the transition to meritocracy is not in the interest of less educated groups since as a result of such transition they would lose status.
639	1	34	A priori, each age cohort could be quite close to meritocratic allocation while the total labor force is distant from it. We examined this possibility using a data set in which classification by age was included.
639	1	38	Our analysis showed that each age group is closer to random allocation than to meritocracy.
639	1	40	In conclusion, the observed distribution of the labor force is and has been far from the meritocratic ideal with respect to status mobility, status determination, and status inequality.
639	1	42	It seems questionable to apply the label meritocratic to a society which is closer to random allocation than to ideal type meritocracy.
639	1	43	It seems questionable to apply the label meritocratic to a society which is closer to random allocation than to ideal type meritocracy.
640	1	1	The compelling rejection of hypotheses derived from the meritocratic thesis should lead to its abandonment.
640	1	3	Moreover, the foundation of the meritocratic thesis, the functional theory of social stratification, should be modified with respect to some of its assumptions.
640	1	12	The discrepancy between the properties of the observed and meritocratic allocation is attributable, in the language of functional theory, to dynamic tensions (Moore).
640	1	19	Insofar as the level of education has a measurable relationship to social class, any policies or programs promoting meritocracy fulfill class interests to differing extents for different classes since their ensuing benefits or losses differ.
640	1	24	In the original presentation of meritocracy (Young) the selection criterion for occupational positions was "IQ plus effort."

640	1	26	(The IQ criterion has been subsequently used by some advocates of meritocracy, especially by Herrnstein; for discussion and critique of this work see Green; Olneck and Crouse).
640	1	29	Although in models of status attainment IQ is causally prior to education, and in this context can be considered in discussions of meritocracy, all determinants of education are outside the scope of this paper.
640	1	36	Boudon writes "X can be called a meritocratic society: if a high social position is available, it is much more likely to be filled by an individual with a higher level of education" (7).
640	1	39	Similarly, in this empirical analysis of occupational careers, Tachibanaki uses the probabilistic framework in discussing meritocracy.
640	1	40	However, this approach seems to obscure and complicate the definition of an inherently deterministic concept according to which meritocracy results from exact fulfillment of certain rules of allocation.
641	1	11	Faia, considering functional aspects of the status attainment model, correctly points out that a version of human capital theory implies meritocracy.
641	1	12	Insofar as this implication is deductive, some assumptions of human capital theory should be allowed because meritocracy is far from reality.

Haney, C., & Hurtado, A. (1994).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
224	1	23	We focus in this analysis upon the jurisprudential role played by the concept of "merit," and argue that this concept has performed a mystifying function in legal attempts to address the structural causes of racial discrimination in the workplace.	
224	1	27	Further, we contend that, in its seemingly unproblematic usage in conventional legal discourse, the concept of merit is employed to mediate between the belief in fair treatment and the reality of unfair outcomes by individualizing the effects of structural barriers to racial justice.	
225	1	7		Second, the use of standardized testing in the allocation of employment opportunities and rewards represents a psychological technology by which meritocratic assumptions are translated uncritically into employment decisions.
227	1	4	Yet, as Crenshaw (1988) has argued, the "race neutrality of the legal system creates the illusion that racism is no longer the primary factor responsible for the condition of the black underclass; i n s t e a d . . . , class disparities appear to be the consequence of individual and group merit within a supposed system of equal opportunity" (p. 1383).	
227	1	15		The operative legal model that has dominated employment discrimination law for the last several decades incorporates a deep-seated belief in meritocracy, one steeped in the cultural and legal history of the United States.

227	1	16			The core assumptions of this meritocratic model are so central to legal thinking that they are neither made explicit nor called into question, not even in the most sweeping legal decisions aimed at eradicating racial discrimination.
227	1	21			There is some more or less tangible quality, which can be loosely described as "merit," that people possess in varying amounts.
227	1	21			Merit refers for the most part to the bundle of ability and skills that individuals possess and upon which they can and should be allocated opportunities and rewards.
227	1	24			Thus, Fass (1980) has accurately described what she called the "impulse toward meritocracy," namely, "the just and equitable distribution of training and rewards according to individual abilities" (p. 436).
227	1	27			The law recognizes discrimination only when actions or outcomes violate this merit-allocation principle.
227	1	30			Otherwise, people are thought to "deserve" what they get. In the early development of antidiscrimination law, courts were willing to presume actionable discrimination on the basis of disparities in outcome that could not be attributed to the absence of merit.
227	1	32			In recent years, the presumptions have been subtly shifted: increasingly, an absence of merit is presumed to explain disparities in outcome whenever intentionally discriminatory actions cannot be established.
227	1	34			Merit is measurable.

227	1	42			In the deservingness calculus of the meritocracy, especially in the context of employment, terms like "qualifications," "ability," "competency" are used interchangeably with "merit" to denote this tangible quality.
227	1	43			In the deservingness calculus of the meritocracy, especially in the context of employment, terms like "qualifications," "ability," "competency" are used interchangeably with "merit" to denote this tangible quality.
228	1	2			In the allocation of job opportunity, "merit" means primarily a measured potential to succeed or perform appropriately in the job in question.
228	1	4			When economic rewards are being allocated, then merit often includes explicit consideration of measured past performance (thought to involve some combination of ability and effort).
228	1	7			Promotions function in this scheme as something of a hybrid and are allocated typically on the basis of measures of both meritorious past performance and merit-potential for more rewarding work.
228	1	8			Promotions function in this scheme as something of a hybrid and are allocated typically on the basis of measures of both meritorious past performance and merit-potential for more rewarding work.
228	1	10			The standard by which merit is measured is thought to be relatively unitary.
228	1	11			That is, although the type of merit most relevant to a particular job may vary, ~3 the same kind of merit, measured in the same way, is equally relevant to all people who occupy or aspire to the same job.

228	1	12	That is, although the type of merit most relevant to a particular job may vary, ~3 the same kind of merit, measured in the same way, is equally relevant to all people who occupy or aspire to the same job.	
228	1	16	In the context of employment discrimination law, "validation" is the process by which employers can demonstrate that disproportionate numbers of White recipients of occupational opportunities and rewards possess greater amounts of the type of merit that is relevant to the job in question.	
228	1	17	Merit is relatively immutable.	
228	1	21	Finally, concerns about measuring the merit of individual workers typically override concerns about measuring and transforming the nature of the workplace.	
228	1	26	Persons and performances that lack sufficient merit are thought to be properly devalued or punished.	
228	1	31	Group disadvantage or "disparate impact" (which is visited with uncanny regularity upon minority groups in the workplace) is thought to be the product of either a collective lack of merit or overt discrimination.	
228	1	32	The law acts only upon group disadvantage that is not caused by a collective lack of merit and, therefore, must be the result of discrimination.	
228	1	34		The most controversial issues in the legal meritocracy involve establishing the tolerable limits to which these assumptions can be taken without offending, on the one hand, the public's sense of fairness, and, on the other, the empirical premises that underlie the meritocracy.

228	1	36			The most controversial issues in the legal meritocracy involve establishing the tolerable limits to which these assumptions can be taken without offending, on the one hand, the public's sense of fairness, and, on the other, the empirical premises that underlie the meritocracy.
228	1	39		ts proponents argue, in essence, that "merit" is entirely and universally one-dimensional.	
229	1	3		Thus, the Court's requirement that employment tests be "jobrelated"--established in <i>Griggs v. Duke Power Co.</i> (1972)--reflects a concern that the merit appropriate for the opportunity or reward in question has been properly measured and utilized in any employment decision-making process that results in racially disparate outcomes.	
229	1	8		At the other end of the spectrum, recent attempts to use validity generalization (Hartigan & Wigdor, 1989), whereby employment tests shown to be valid or job-related for one kind of job performance are simply generalized to another, push the notion of a unitary measure of merit about as far as (or farther than) it can go.	
229	1	11		Shorn of its technical complexities, validity generalization is just another way of saying that there is a single--indeed, universal--standard of merit that can be applied to all persons as a yardstick of deservingness in all occupations.	
229	1	15		imilarly, more recent debates over the exact nature of job relatedness is another way of arguing about how carefully employers must demonstrate that merit is being properly measured, as opposed to allowing them simply to assume that those who are rewarded most (by virtue of these	

				measurements) are most meritorious.	
229	1	17		imilarly, more recent debates over the exact nature of job relatedness is another way of arguing about how carefully employers must demonstrate that merit is being properly measured, as opposed to allowing them simply to assume that those who are rewarded most (by virtue of these measurements) are most meritorious.	
229	1	21		When selection and promotion systems that are based on standardized tests result in a disproportionately White labor force, and employers resist the requirement that such tests be validated or shown to be job-related, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the disparate outcomes simply confirm many employers' implicit notions about the distribution of merit and relative deservingness of various groups.	
229	1	25		To fully grasp this implicit assumption, imagine the reverse--that standardized instruments for the measurement of merit consistently resulted in opportunities and rewards being disproportionately allocated to minority group members at the expense of their White counterparts.	
229	1	33		Indeed, absent implicit assumptions about relative group merit, rational employers who could not be certain that their employment screening and promotion instruments were job-related would not otherwise persist in using them.	

230	1	2	The implication is now clearly and regularly drawn that group disadvantage, so persistent and widespread even after years of attempted legal remedies, is the likely product of a collective lack of merit.	
230	1	5	This shift in focus thus acts to legitimize group differences by implying that they are the product of a lack of merit whenever they cannot be attributed to overt discrimination.	
230	1	17	The emphasis on individual merit as an explanation for disparate outcomes leads to a devaluing of racial differences and an oversensitivity to deviations from dominant culture norms.	
230	1	27		Under the terms of the meritocracy, the fewer of such persons participating in the work force and partaking of its opportunities and rewards the better.
230	1	37	Not surprisingly, this shift has been accompanied by the reemergence of genetic arguments about racial or group inferiority, a collective lack of merit that is rooted in biology rather than social conditions (e.g., see Rushton, 1988; 1991).	
230	1	47	Evidence of persistent inequalities combined with belief in fair treatment and equal opportunity leads to only one inference: lack of merit.	
231	1	8	This individualism is widespread in our culture and its persistence is supported by the use of legal doctrines and business practices (like standardized employment tests) that legitimize group differences by helping to confuse the effects of structural barriers with the absence of individual merit.	
231	1	11	We would argue further that the concept of merit helps to legitimize this individual-rights perspective.	

231	1	14	By appearing to introduce individual deservingness into the fairness equation by which procedures and practices are judged, the faulty concept of merit allows the legacies of structural inequality to be ignored. Indeed, direct attempts to confront and ameliorate these legacies can be attacked as violations of the individual rights of others claiming to be more "meritorious."	
231	1	17	By appearing to introduce individual deservingness into the fairness equation by which procedures and practices are judged, the faulty concept of merit allows the legacies of structural inequality to be ignored. Indeed, direct attempts to confront and ameliorate these legacies can be attacked as violations of the individual rights of others claiming to be more "meritorious."	
231	1	22	tempts to address the structural barriers to minority under employment through remedies like affirmative action are repeatedly criticized as undermining the principle of merit-based hiring, a principle that is asserted as if it were a uniformly unproblematic and categorical mandate.	
231	1	26	The concept of "merit" has played a central although often unspoken role in this debate.	
231	1	29	To most White Americans what makes quotas unfair is that they imply the allocation of opportunity and rewards to persons who are otherwise undeserving (that is, insufficiently meritorious) but who nonetheless benefit simply because of their race.	

231	1	30	On the other hand, to grapple with the essential nature of merit would require members of the dominant culture to examine the nature of their own privilege.	
231	1	32	By assuming that the basis of privilege rests upon the principle of merit, White Americans can at once ignore the structural advantages that account for the privileges of dominant culture membership and condemn even modest departures (like affirmative action) as violations of an unassailable moral principle.	
231	1	36	Nowhere were the parameters of the debate over merit versus quotas (and its centrality to the symbolic legality) made clearer than in the recent attempts to modify the impact of several Supreme Court cases through passage of the Civil Rights Acts of 1990 and 1991.	
232	1	6	Congressional opponents of the Civil Rights Bill repeatedly raised the banner of "merit" in an attempt to defeat the bill, arguing that the new legislation would repudiate the time-honored principle of merit-based hiring and promotion in favor of "quotas."	
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232	1	12	He ended his testimony with this observation: "Although the substitution of quotas for merit can never be justified, it is particularly inappropriate in this time of intense and growing international competition" (p. 135).	
232	1	17	According to the Report of the minority of House members opposing passage of the bill, statistics about the gap in equal employment spoke not to discrimination but to the many characteristics of inferiority--which translated into an overall lack of merit--with which minority workers were still plagued:	
232	1	27	Noteworthy in the Congressional debates over the Civil Rights Act, as well as in virtually all public, political, and legal discourse over racial fairness, is the way in which nearly every explicit reference to the concept of "merit" assumes its unproblematic nature.	
232	1	28	Thus, when merit is employed explicitly in the discourse about equal employment opportunity, it is asserted as a natural category, part of the "given" of everyday life: The concept is rarely defined--as if everyone knows what it is and it is never debated--as if everyone acknowledges its appropriate importance.	
233	1	1	Thus, two commentators recently chided a National Academy of Science report (that was mildly critical of the part played by standardized testing in employment discrimination) because "the Report never mentions a person's right to be hired on his or her own merit, not	

			even when it discusses the law" (Blits & Gottfredson, 1990, p. 6).	
233	1	4		Of course, no such explicit statutory or constitutional right exists, except through sheer unquestioned assumption (a kind of "common law of meritocracy").
233	1	5	In addition, however, these authors failed to define or discuss the nature of the "merit" on which such a right might be premised, except to assert that it was unproblematically represented in standardized test scores.	
233	1	14	When conservative Black author Shelby Steele (1990) confessed: "I, too, am strained to defend racial quotas and any affirmative action that supersedes merit" (p. 9), he also failed to define the concept.	
233	1	17	The tendency to juxtapose the unexamined concept of merit with the evil of quotas is not restricted to discussions of blue-collar jobs in which employment tests are commonly used.	
233	1	21	Thus, a prominent Berkeley professor recently ended an angry editorial denouncing affirmative action in academia with the dire prediction that "without reliance on merit there will only be racial and ethnic warfare" (Wildavsky, 1992)	
233	1	22	Yet, nowhere in his piece was the concept of merit, in whose name affirmative action hiring was cast as a dire violation, defined.	

233	1	36	West (1993) has noted that the "importance of [the] quest for middle-class respectability based on merit rather than politics cannot be overestimated" but that Black conservatives have overlooked "the fact that affirmative action policies were political responses to the pervasive refusal of most white Americans to judge black Americans on that basis" (p. 52).	
234	1	1	Thus, persons selected through affirmative action are said to be less happy, evaluate themselves less highly and, under some circumstances, perform less well than those crassly juxtaposed and described unproblematically as "selected meritoriously."	
234	1	8	But it is the use of so-called "merit selection" and the implicit message of fairness that it carries that allows these studies to mask the racist/sexist questions at the core of the research: Why don't minorities and women learn to react better to discrimination, and can't things be structured differently so they will "handle" it with less personal and professional disruption?	
234	1	13	Often, however, the concept of merit has operated as an implicit assumption, one so deeply embedded that it is neither acknowledged nor made reference to.	
234	1	16	Thus, as a core implicit jurisprudential assumption of employment discrimination law, the widely held, unchallenged, and even unmentioned concept of merit has allowed courts to beg many of the very questions that the cases before them demanded be answered.	

234	1	31			Yet these same question-begging passages were later quoted by the Supreme Court, which simply built upon the unexamined meritocratic assumptions of the lower court in its subsequent opinion: "It is untenable that the Constitution prevents the Government from seeking modestly to upgrade the communicative abilities of its employees rather than to be satisfied with some lower level of competence" (Washington v. Davis, 1976, p. 246; emphasis added).
234	1	41		The most that has ever been required of employers in cases after Griggs is that they demonstrate the fairness of the process by which the elusive entity of merit was measured and used in their employment decision making.	
234	1	43		The high number of employment discrimination cases speak to how many have balked at doing so, as though an essential nexus between merit and employment test scores was beyond question and above proof.	
235	1	2		However, Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion also relaxed the standard by which merit would be measured in future employment discrimination cases: "Employers are not required, even when defending standardized or objective tests, to introduce formal 'validation studies' showing particular criteria predict actual on-the-job performance" (p. 998).	
235	1	19		year later, in Wards Cove v. Atonio (1989)--the case that finally led Congress to conclude that the Court had gone too far--Justice White's majority opinion begged the merit question several times in formulations like these: "If the absence of minorities holding such skilled positions is due to a dearth of qualified	

			nonwhite applicants (for reasons that are not [the employers'] fault), employers' selection methods or employment practices cannot be said to have had a 'disparate impact' on nonwhites" (p. 651, footnote omitted, emphasis added).	
235	1	26	On this issue, Justice White gave employers considerable latitude in defining and measuring merit: "There is no requirement that the challenged practice [by which merit was measured] be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employers' business for it to pass muster; this degree of scrutiny would be almost impossible for most employers to meet, and would result in a host of evils" like quotas and preferential hiring (p. 659).	
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235	1	31	Finally, the Court held that whatever definition of merit employers ultimately decided that their tests measured, they were under no obligation to prove that they were actually using this definition (i.e, they had no burden of persuasion, only a burden of producing or putting forward this claim).	

235	1	35	Thus, the tough question of defining (and defending) a particular conception of merit, and proving that it was actually being used by employers in hiring practices that resulted in racially disparate outcomes, was sidestepped completely.		
236	1	21		This technology is a major component in the American meritocratic vision.	
236	1	25	Another summarized the perceived historical connection: "The growth of merit systems coincided with the development by psychologists of a wide variety of objective tests that have proven helpful in selecting qualified employees" (Hunt, 1975, p. 690).		
236	1	29	The nexus between employment testing, individualism, and merit--and the degree to which it is embraced across legal and political spectrums--was underscored in Connecticut v. Teal (1982).		
236	1	39	He argued that Title VII "guarantees these individual respondents the opportunity to compete equally with white workers on the basis of job-related criteria" (p. 451, emphasis in original), so that even outcomes that were fair or favorable to minorities as a group were illegitimate if parts of the process by which they occurred violated the merit-based focus on job-relatedness for individuals.		
236	1	47	"The process-oriented technique of 'validating' certain employment practices that produce group adverse impact 9 is more closely allied with an ideal of 'merit selection' that relegates equality of results to a beneficial by-product of fair procedures" (p. 309).		
237	1	4	So, too, has the practice of rank-ordering individuals on the basis of standardized test scores and allocating educational and occupational opportunities as		

				a function of one's place in the merit hierarchy that is generated.	
238	1	2		"Each adult gets benefits in proportion to merit, reward in proportion to desert, merit and desert being understood as ability to fulfill all the requirements of life" (p. 67).	
238	1	2		"Each adult gets benefits in proportion to merit, reward in proportion to desert, merit and desert being understood as ability to fulfill all the requirements of life" (p. 67).	
238	1	38		For a critical and incisive discussion of the notion that "ability" can be equated with "merit" and serve as a decisive claim to opportunity, see Wasserstrom (1980, pp. 68-77).	
239	1	29		Yet, the moral, economic, and professional formulations used to support standardized testing--like the legal doctrines founded on them--make certain unquestioned and unwarranted assumptions about the nature of merit.	
239	1	30		We contend that these assumptions cannot withstand careful scrutiny. The very concept of "merit" and the associated notions of "ability" and "qualification" are socially constructed categories.	
240	1	5		Yet, the mythology of meritocracy masks these contingencies and obscures the ways in which the assumptions of this system are "built into" the workplace.	
241	1	27			In addition, there are several important limitations to the technology of testing itself that are often overlooked when the mythology of meritocracy is invoked.

241	1	28	The first is that attempts to equate "merit" with "ability" often ignore the imprecision and narrowness with which ability is typically measured.	
241	1	31	Ironically, it is often those persons who defend tests on meritocratic grounds who nonetheless vehemently resist the imposition of legal standards that require careful scrutiny of how well tests measure what they purport to measure.	
241	1	34	However, before the connection between employment test scores and "merit" can be made plausible, there must be a convincing demonstration of the relationship between job performance and the test scores in question.	
242	1	1		But before this ordering can be represented as a genuine meritocratic concern, it must be meaningful and valid. Too often, it is not.
242	1	3	Similarly, when the concept of "merit" is used to convey a notion of human worth or moral deservingness, it must be based on more than the ability to answer standardized test questions or to perform on paper-and-pencil measures of aptitude and skill.	
242	1	7	Were the rejected Black applicants to the District of Columbia police force in <i>Washington v. Davis</i> (1976) truly devoid of "merit" because they were unable to demonstrate knowledge of words like "impertinence" and "promontory"?	
242	1	13	Especially when merit is defined in such a way that dominant culture characteristics and preferences are invariably incorporated, while minority points of view are underrepresented or excluded, the concept cannot and should not be asserted as a moral absolute.	

242	1	16	As long as explicit recognition of the special merit that racial minorities bring to the workplace by virtue of their unique perspectives and experiences continues to be absent from test-based selection and we believe this is an intractable feature of standardized employment testing-- this inherent limitation compromises not only the morality but the utility of these procedures in an increasingly diverse work force.	
242	1	22	Thus, even if ability, qualifications, and competence the basis of merit could be measured in an accurate and meaningful fashion through standardized testing, another problem is raised by the meritocratic claims with which tests are defended.	
242	1	24	Thus, even if ability, qualifications, and competence the basis of merit could be measured in an accurate and meaningful fashion through standardized testing, another problem is raised by the meritocratic claims with which tests are defended.	
243	1	5	Indeed, our society has often tolerated or ignored gross deviations from our narrow, putative meritocratic ideals in arenas that matter even at the very highest levels of economic and political life-- and we have done so in the name of other legitimate values against which meritocratic claims must be balanced.	
243	1	7	Indeed, our society has often tolerated or ignored gross deviations from our narrow, putative meritocratic ideals in arenas that matter even at the very highest levels of economic and political life-- and we have done so in the name of other legitimate	

					values against which meritocratic claims must be balanced.
243	1	17	1	<p>These approaches have the practical advantage of leaving virtually untouched the entrenched and elaborate system by which merit is presumably measured.</p> <p>However, because they ultimately do nothing to correct, challenge, or even illuminate the core meritocratic assumptions of testing itself, they are easily criticized and have even contributed to perceptions of moral impropriety by members of the dominant culture, especially those who oppose affirmative action more generally.</p> <p>Alternatively, fundamentally different measures of competence, ones that embrace flexibility and diversity, can be adopted to reflect and reward the unique contributions of persons who do not fit the dominant culture's definition of merit.</p>	
243	1	31	1	<p>It may well be that only radically different systems of allocating opportunity and rewards, ones that abandon entirely the narrowly constructed and inherently hierarchical concept of merit, are up to the task of creating and maintaining a racially fair society.</p>	
243	1	32	1	<p>If the problematic concept "merit" is one mechanism by which the powerful transform their structural advantage into matters of personal worth, then the most effective response is one that addresses the redistribution of power and the direct dismantling of structural barriers to equality in all realms of social life.</p>	

243	1	45	Although a more exacting discussion of the shape and dimensions of these possible solutions is beyond the scope of the present essay, we have argued here that no satisfactory resolution to racial injustice in the workplace can avoid grappling with the problematic concept of merit.	
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Weakliem, D. Mcquillan, J. Schauer, T. (1995).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
271	2	13		In contrast, if all people compete on an equal basis with no special preference given to any group, the most desirable positions will usually be won by the most talented people, and occupation will be closely aligned with ability. Young's (1958) term meritocracy has been widely adopted as a label for the latter type of society.
271	2	30		These developments imply that the United States may also be becoming more meritocratic, that is, that intellectual performance is increasingly determining class attainment.
272	1	22		Both Winship and the New York Times editorial pointed to recent increases in the difference between the wages of college graduates and less educated workers as evidence of a move toward meritocracy.
272	1	47		Kaus (1992) also anticipated Herrnstein and Murray's arguments about a movement toward meritocracy.
275	1	29		Age effects, although necessary as controls, are not relevant to the hypothesis of a movement toward meritocracy.
275	1	54		For example, if the United States suddenly became substantially more meritocratic, a middle-aged truck driver, no matter how intelligent, would still have little prospect of becoming a lawyer or a physician; even a more modest rise would be difficult, since the truck driver would probably lack the educational credentials and capital that are usually required to obtain a white-collar job or to start a small business.
278	1	36		As was suggested earlier, they are more likely to be cohort effects, but in either case they contradict the claim of a move toward meritocracy.
282	2	15		We interpret this finding as a refutation of claims that the United States has moved toward meritocracy

283	2	32		This change is sometimes interpreted as evidence of a move toward meritocracy ("The 'Bell Curve' agenda 1994; Herrnstein and Murray 1994).
284	1	13		The United States appears to be moving away from meritocracy, not toward it.
284	2	17	Hope's (1984, p. 30) suggestion that "Americans seem to feel that character and effort are more meritorious than mere ability" is relevant to this point.	
284	1	44		This discussion assumes that T has remained the same. However, if T increased, that also should not necessarily be interpreted as a move toward meritocracy.
284	1	51		An increase in T could be interpreted as a move toward meritocracy only if it was larger than the increases in the effects of other factors-technically, if not only the regression coefficient but the partial correlation increased.

Goux, D., & Maurin, E. (1997).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
160	1	12		These initial tests lead us to validate an alternative empirical model in which the non-meritocratic mechanisms are significant and indicate a meaningful social-reproduction trend within each group of graduates.
161	2	38		We designate societies of this kind as egalitarian meritocracies (EMs).
161	2	39		They are meritocracies, because individuals' social destinations (D) depend solely on their education (E); and they are egalitarian, because school competition is not biased in favour of any particular social category (O).
161	2	44		To test the fit of the actual data with the EM hypothesis of pure egalitarian meritocracy, we have estimated the corresponding log-linear model: (OED) = (OXED)
162	1	9		The true model would thus be an inegalitarian meritocracy (IM): (OED) = (OE)(ED)
162	2	7		In fact, model (2) explains about two-thirds of the destinations unaccounted for by model (1) and appears far less unrealistic than the egalitarian educational meritocracy model.
163	1	9		As we see it, therefore, French society is not a pure meritocracy.
163	1	9		Its meritocratic processes are inextricably intermingled with 'hereditary' mechanisms and intergenerational links that bypass the educational system.

163	2	9	Boudon sought to understand the interlinking of predominantly meritocratic mechanisms and predominantly hereditary ones.
164	1	1	Second, the specifically hereditary mechanisms begin to operate only after the meritocratic mechanisms have finished allocating the individuals with the highest educational qualifications to the positions they seek.
164	1	9	This creates imbalances, requiring the introduction of non-meritocratic selection processes.
164	2	3	To understand better the inadequacies of the meritocratic model and the Boudon model, we need to make a more detailed analysis of inter-graduate competition mechanisms (Table 3).
164	2	12	The non-meritocratic nature of mobility patterns is basically due to a replicative tendency — i.e. to social immobility.
164	2	34	We could give many more examples, but the basic finding would remain the same: at any given level of educational attainment, individuals replicate their family status far more regularly than would be predicted by the meritocratic model or Boudon's theory.
165	1	4	In other words, their competition to attain (or avoid) a social status outside their class of origin is governed by fairly meritocratic principles.
165	1	5	Finally, the non-meritocratic characteristics of French society are mainly expressed through a trend towards social immobility within each category of graduates.

166	2	8		<p>The results obtained are highly convergent and give a consistent picture of the way in which the laws of meritocracy and the forces of heredity combine. But these analyses apply to different birth cohorts observed at different points in their working careers.</p>
167	2	7		<p>In other words, meritocratic mechanisms are largely circumvented largely during a working career.</p>
168	1	16		<p>This overview reveals a predominantly meritocratic society.</p>
168	2	7		<p>Is France heading towards fairer educational opportunities and a more meritocratic social selection, or have the decades of economic slowdown tightened the barriers around each social class?</p>
168	2	11		<p>The 1993 FQP survey would not have provided the data necessary to analyse current trends in the French meritocracy, instead we have drawn on data from the last four surveys.</p>
169	2	7		<p>There is no more or less of a meritocracy, and the role of heredity is neither stronger nor weaker.</p>
169	2	21		<p>The status allocation among members of a given birth cohort appears neither more nor less meritocratic or hereditary today than twenty years ago.</p>
170	1	32		<p>The social mobility observed in France complies neither with the meritocratic model nor with Boudon's rationing model.</p>
170	2	42		<p>This hypothesis of a specific family capital is the feature that distinguishes our analysis from both the meritocratic model and the Boudon model.</p>

173	1	37	Although living in different worlds, successive generations have shared educational and social opportunities allocated on the same broad principles — neither more nor less egalitarian or meritocratic.
173	1	49	from a more theoretical standpoint, the available data fit neither the-assumptions of the egalitarian meritocratic model nor the assumptions of the non-meritocratic models which postulate an entirely homogeneous social space.
173	2	1	from a more theoretical standpoint, the available data fit neither the-assumptions of the egalitarian meritocratic model nor the assumptions of the non-meritocratic models which postulate an entirely homogeneous social space.
175	1	46	Towards meritocracy? recent evidence on an old problem.

Oller Jr., J. W. (1997).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
468	1	4		They insist that observed differences in IQ scores are linked to race (that Whites are smarter than Blacks) and that the more intelligent rise to the top The latter idea is what Herrnstein called the theory of the meritocracy (Herrnstein and Murray 1994 511-12)
469	1	27		In fact, the evidence shows (Cummins 1984, Figueroa 1989, Hakuta 1986, Hamayan and Damico 1991, Kamin 1995a, Oiler and Perkins 1978, 1980, Oiler 1978, 1979, 1983, 1992, Oiler, Chesarek, and Scott 1991, Valdes and Figueroa 1994) that the proponents of racial differences in IQ scores and even some of their critics (eg Fraser 1995, Gartner, Greer, and Reissman 1974, Jacoby and Glaberman 1995, Mercer 1984, Sternberg 1996) are remarkably impervious to the role that language proficiency plays in IQ tests, school achievement, and in any conceivable definition of the 'meritocracy'
475	1	3		In other words, the conventional and culturally unique basis of distinct linguistic systems is either ignored or explicitly denied in Jensen's theory of intelligence and in the theory of the 'meritocracy' (Herrnstein 1973, Herrnstein and Murray 1994)
483	1	22		The question is are 'nonverbal' IQ tests really 'language-free' and 'dialectfree' measures of 'innate intelligence'? Do they justify the theory of the 'meritocracy' and its unsavory racial conclusions?

490	1	9			There are a number of 'mysteries' in the IQ literature that are often singled out by supporters or detractors of the innateness premise and its meritocracy theory.
492	1	28		<p>The Deaf children of Hearing parents by contrast have vastly reduced access to English speech (the merits of lip-reading being mostly exaggerated or misunderstood by Hearing persons, Lane, Hoffmeister, and Bahan 1996 99, 213ff) and their parents, at best, are usually non-native models of signed language systems because the primary language of the Hearing parents is invariably a spoken language.</p>	
502	1				IQ m the Meritocracy

Petersen, T., Saporta, I., & Seidel, M. D. L. (2000).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
765	1	22		In the analysis, we focus on the role of meritocratic factors, age and education, and of network factors for understanding the impact of gender.
792	1	27		The meritocratic variable scan thus not account for the race differences.
795	1	2		Thus, in terms of the initial salary offer, there is a clear overall difference between men and women, but after controlling for age and education, it drops to zero: nothing but pure meritocracy.
795	1	17		For the initial salary offer, the process is entirely meritocratic also for race.
798	1	22		So again, for sex, it is exclusively meritocracy at work.
798	1	23		For race, it is a good portion of meritocracy plus a bit of drawing on social networks. that explain the differences in final salary offer.
799	1	12		Again, for gender, the process is entirely meritocratic, but for race one also needs to control for the referral method.
809	1	35		For gender, the process is entirely meritocratic: Age and education account for all gender differences.
809	1	37		But even without taking in to account the two meritocratic variables, there are small if no differences between men and women at most stages in the hiring process.
809	1	42		For ethnic minorities the process is partly meritocratic but partly about social networks, both personal and professional, and to some extent influence by head hunters.
810	1	29		For women then, and also for minorities once network ties are taken into account, the organization corresponds to the perception that "the high-tech industry is one of the world's purest meritocracies."
814	1	13		The list of meritocratic factors is short: age and education.

814	1	15	So in this singularly clean and well-lit case,it can all be reduced to meritocracy and social networks.
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Hing, L. S. S., Bobocel, D. R., & Zanna, M. P. (2002).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
493	2		However, as noted in the past (Bobocel, Davey, Son Hing, & Zanna, 2001; Bobocel, Son Hing, Holmvall, & Zanna, 2002; R. L. Cohen, 1994; Heilman, Battle, Keller, & Lee, 1998; Murrell, Dietz-Uhler, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Drout, 1994; Smith-Winkelmann & Crosby, 1994), specific affirmative action programs are often criticized for their violations of the merit principle and are met with opposition.	
493	2		The merit principle—also referred to as the equity principle—is a distributive justice rule that prescribes that an individual's relative outcomes (e.g., pay) should be allocated in proportion to his or her relative inputs (e.g., effort; Deutsch, 1975).	
493	2			Meritocracy is a widely known and widely endorsed ideology.
493	2		Such programs may be construed as violating the merit principle.	
493	2			The exact role of meritocracy in opposition to affirmative action is a contentious issue.
493	2		Studies reveal that people evaluate affirmative action programs more negatively to the extent that the programs place less weight on merit and more weight on target-group status in the decision-making process (Kravitz, 1995; Kravitz & Platania, 1993; Nacoste, 1985; Nosworthy, Lea, & Lindsay, 1995; Veilleux & Tougas, 1989).	
493	2		One interpretation of these findings is that people are more opposed to affirmative action to the extent that programs violate the merit principle.	
494	1			Thus, concerns that affirmative action violates meritocracy may be an excuse for rather than a cause of opposition.

494	1				The researchers reasoned that, to the extent that justice concerns (e.g., about meritocracy) are a true source of opposition to affirmative action, people with a strong preference for or endorsement of the merit principle should be more opposed to programs that violate this principle, regardless of their prejudice levels. ¹
494	1				The researchers reasoned that, to the extent that justice concerns (e.g., about meritocracy) are a true source of opposition to affirmative action, people with a strong preference for or endorsement of the merit principle should be more opposed to programs that violate this principle, regardless of their prejudice levels. ¹
494	1				As expected, the authors found that when participants evaluated a merit-violating preferential treatment program, their endorsement of the merit principle (measured 1 month earlier) was a unique predictor of opposition.
494	1				In contrast, when participants evaluated a program that upheld the merit principle, prejudice was a unique predictor of opposition to affirmative action such that more prejudiced participants were more opposed.
494	1				The researchers concluded that prejudice and endorsement of the merit principle are independent sources of opposition to affirmative action and that the relative role of each determinant in predicting attitudes depends on the nature of the program.
494	1				Supporters of affirmative action might be disheartened to learn that concerns about meritocracy can lead to opposition to affirmative action because many programs can be construed as violating the merit principle (Bobocel et al., 1998; Leck, Saunders, & Charbonneau, 1996; Heilman, McCullough, & Gilbert, 1996; Nacoste, 1987, 1994; Tyler & McGraw, 1986).

494	1			Supporters of affirmative action might be disheartened to learn that concerns about meritocracy can lead to opposition to affirmative action because many programs can be construed as violating the merit principle (Bobocel et al., 1998; Leck, Saunders, & Charbonneau, 1996; Heilman, McCullough, & Gilbert, 1996; Nacoste, 1987, 1994; Tyler & McGraw, 1986).	
494	1			Furthermore, in the absence of a detailed description, people often assume that affirmative action programs involve violations of the merit principle (e.g., preferential treatment or quotas; Eberhardt & Fiske, 1994; Kravitz & Platania, 1993).	
494	1			Therefore, it is important to ask whether people who strongly endorse the merit principle will always oppose merit-violating affirmative action programs.	
494	1			We extend our previous research on opposition to affirmative action (Bobocel et al., 1998; Davey et al., 1999) by examining whether individuals with a strong preference for the merit principle might be less opposed than usual to a preferential treatment program if these individuals also perceive high levels of discrimination in the workplace.	
494	1			In particular, we hypothesize that the relation between endorsement of the merit principle and opposition to a preferential treatment program might be contingent on the extent to which people perceive discrimination against women and visible minorities to be the current state of affairs.	
494	1				We propose that if people who strongly endorse meritocracy view the world as a fair and equitable place, they should oppose policies that potentially violate norms of meritocracy.

494	1				In contrast, we propose that if these individuals view the world as discriminatory and biased against certain groups, they might make concessions for policies that aim to correct for such bias—even if such policies violate norms of meritocracy.
494	1				Meritocracy is a principle or ideal that prescribes that only the most deserving individuals are rewarded.
494	1				As such, meritocracy can operate accurately only in an unbiased system (Clayton & Tangri, 1989; Smith-Winkelman & Crosby, 1994).
494	2			To the extent that discrimination exists against target-group members, however, the current system of assessing merit is not equitable.	
494	2			Rather, biases in the favor of dominant groups may exist in terms of (a) the criteria chosen to measure merit, (b) the tests used to assess merit, and (c) the subjective evaluation of another's performance (Clayton & Tangri, 1989; Eberhardt & Fiske, 1994; Fraser & Kick, 2000).	
494	2			However, research reveals that people's perceptions of discrimination typically do not predict their opposition to affirmative action when programs clearly violate the merit principle (Bobocel et al., 1998; Heilman et al., 1996; Matheson, Echenberg, Taylor, Rivers, & Chow, 1994; Nacoste, 1985).	
494	2			People who perceive more discrimination tend to be as opposed to meritviolating affirmative action programs as are people who perceive less discrimination.	
494	2			In contrast, perceptions of discrimination do predict reactions to affirmative action programs that are either (a) undefined and therefore not clearly merit violating or (b) explicitly merit upholding (Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Bobocel et al., 1998; Heilman et al., 1996; Kravitz & Klineberg, 2000; Kravitz et al., 2000; Matheson et al., 1994; Tougas & Veilleux, 1990).	

494	2				We propose that the perception of discrimination should reduce opposition for one group in particular: those who strongly endorse meritocracy.
494	2			Because discrimination can be conceptualized as a form of merit violation, people who strongly care about merit should be most offended by discrimination.	
494	2				As a result, perceiving high levels of discrimination should motivate individuals who strongly endorse meritocracy to be less opposed to a preferential treatment program (as a means of correcting discrimination and restoring equity) than they would otherwise be.
494	2			First, we expect participants who perceive more workplace discrimination to be less opposed to a preferential treatment program, but this should be true primarily among those with a strong preference for the merit principle.	
494	2			Second, consistent with our previous work (Bobocel et al., 1998; Davey et al., 1999), we expect participants who more strongly endorse the merit principle to be more opposed to a preferential treatment program, but this should be true primarily among those who perceive little discrimination in the workplace.	
494	2				Because we expect participants who strongly endorse meritocracy but not those who weakly endorse meritocracy to reduce their opposition in the face of discrimination, the relation between preference for the merit principle and opposition to a preferential treatment program should be mitigated among individuals who perceive high levels of discrimination.
495	1			Because we expect participants who strongly endorse meritocracy but not those who weakly endorse meritocracy to reduce their opposition in the face of discrimination, the relation between preference for the merit principle and opposition to a preferential treatment program should be mitigated among individuals who perceive high levels of	

				discrimination.		
495	1				Just as people's strongly held attitudes act as a filter through which they view relevant attitude objects (Fazio, 1990), we expect that people's attitudes about meritocracy and discrimination may act as a filter through which they view a preferential treatment program.	
495	1				We hypothesize that, under conditions of low discrimination, when they are evaluating a program that in principle could violate meritocracy, people who strongly endorse meritocracy are more likely to believe that it will, compared with people who weakly endorse meritocracy.	
495	1				Such differential construal could occur because people who strongly endorse meritocracy might be more sensitive to potential merit violations.	
495	1			Such differential construal could occur because people who strongly endorse meritocracy might be more sensitive to potential merit violations.		
495	1			Furthermore, independent of people's preference for the merit principle, construal of an affirmative action program as more merit violating should lead to greater opposition (see Bobocel et al., 1998, for evidence).		
495	1			Thus, among those who perceive little discrimination, the relation between preference for the merit principle and opposition to a preferential treatment program might be mediated by their construal of the program as more merit violating.		

495	1				In addition, among people who strongly endorse meritocracy, those who perceive higher levels of discrimination in the workplace might construe a preferential treatment program that promotes a lower-ranked target-group candidate over a higher-ranked White man as less merit violating because, to these individuals, true merit is unknown when indicators of merit are biased.
495	1				In addition, among people who strongly endorse meritocracy, those who perceive higher levels of discrimination in the workplace might construe a preferential treatment program that promotes a lower-ranked target-group candidate over a higher-ranked White man as less merit violating because, to these individuals, true merit is unknown when indicators of merit are biased.
495	1				Indeed, a preferential treatment program might be construed as merit restoring to the extent that one views discrimination to underestimate target-group members' merit (Clayton & Crosby, 1992).
495	1				Perceptions of the program as less merit violating might lead to lessened opposition.
495	1				Thus, among people with a strong preference for the merit principle, the relation between perceptions of discrimination and opposition to a preferential treatment program might be mediated by their construal of the program as less merit violating.
495	1				The purpose of Study 1 was to test for the relations of people's preference for the merit principle and their perceptions of workplace discrimination to their opposition to a preferential treatment program.
495	1				As noted earlier, among participants who perceive low levels of workplace discrimination, we expected stronger preference for the merit principle to predict greater opposition to a preferential treatment program.

495	1			In addition, among participants with a strong preference for the merit principle, we expected greater perceptions of workplace discrimination to predict lessened opposition.	
495	1			Finally, we tested whether these effects are mediated by the degree to which the program is construed as more or less merit violating.	
495	2			Following procedures used earlier (Bobocel et al., 1998), approximately 1 month prior to the students' participation in the study, we assessed (in a mass-testing booklet) 555 participants' endorsement of the merit principle and their perceptions of workplace discrimination.	
495	2			Participants completed a 15-item Preference for the Merit Principle (PMP) Scale that measures individuals' preferences for outcomes to be distributed on the basis of merit (Davey et al., 1999).2	
495	2			In Sample 3, we broadened the 8-item version to include an additional 10 items that measure more directly the construct of interest, that is, people's perceptions of bias and discrimination against women and visible minorities in how merit is assessed during personnel selection and performance evaluations.	
495	2			In particular, items tapped participants' perceptions of bias in (a) the criteria chosen to indicate merit, (b) the tests used to measure the criteria, and (c) personal evaluations of merit.	
495	Rod			2 We referred to this scale in our initial research as the Belief in Merit Scale (see Bobocel et al., 1998) but relabeled it (see Davey et al., 1999) to better reflect the construct being measured.	

496	1			<p>The program described violates the merit principle in the eyes of most people, because it allows for the hiring of a less qualified individual over a more qualified candidate (see Bobocel et al., 1998, for evidence).</p>	
496	1			<p>Two items in the Cochrane survey were used to measure participants' construal of the program as violating the merit principle: "Under Corporation A's program, what is the likelihood that a less qualified target-group member would be hired or promoted over a more qualified non-targetgroup member?" (positively keyed) and "Under Corporation A's program, what is the likelihood that all employees will be evaluated by the same standards in hiring and promotions?" (negatively keyed).</p>	
496	1			<p>The merit construal items, which appeared first, were separated from the opposition items by a few filler questions about the program.</p>	
496	1			<p>The negatively keyed construal and opposition items were recoded for analyses so that higher numbers indicate greater perceptions of merit violation and greater opposition.</p>	
496	1			<p>Across samples, there was a homogeneous effect size for the preference for the merit principle and opposition relation, 2(2, N 108) 1.73, ns.</p>	
496	1			<p>We did not test effect sizes for the interaction term because to do so would involve testing simple effects (e.g., preference for the merit principle at low discrimination) with small sample sizes (e.g., 12).</p>	
496	2			<p>A marginal inverse relation between preference for the merit principle and perceptions of workplace discrimination was found, $r(105) = -.18$, $p = .06$.</p>	

496	2			Although there was a slight trend for those who strongly endorse the merit principle to perceive less workplace discrimination, the effect was small, as there was only 3% of shared variance.	
496	2			The two items that tapped participants' construal of the program as merit violating correlated at $r(106) = .38$, $p < .001$, and were averaged to create a merit-violation composite ($M = 5.50$, $SD = 1.21$).	
496	2			It is possible that the relation between the two merit-violation items is underestimated because of ceiling effects or restriction of range for the items.	
496	2			To test the central hypothesis, we regressed opposition on preference for the merit principle, perceptions of workplace discrimination, and the interaction between these variables.	
497	1			Replicating prior research (Bobocel et al., 1998; Davey et al., 1999), there was a main effect of preference for the merit principle such that greater endorsement of the merit principle was related to greater opposition to the preferential treatment program ($B = 0.22$, $SE = 0.11$), $F(1, 103) = 4.06$, $p = .05$.	
497	1			However, both main effects were qualified by a Preference for the Merit Principle Perceptions of Discrimination interaction ($B = -0.37$, $SE = 0.18$), $F(1, 103) = 4.15$, $p = .04$.	
497	1			As shown in Figure 1, among people who perceived little workplace discrimination, merit-based opposition to the preferential treatment program was found.	
497	1			That is, there was a significant simple effect for preference for the merit principle ($B = 0.42$), $F(1, 103) = 7.33$, $p = .008$, such that the more strongly participants endorsed the merit principle, the more they opposed the preferential treatment program.	

497	2			However, consistent with the current hypothesis, among people who perceived high levels of workplace discrimination, those with a strong preference for the merit principle were no more opposed than those with a weak preference for the merit principle ($B = 0.00$), $F(1, 103) = 0.05$, ns.	
497	2			Thus, as predicted, merit-based opposition to the preferential treatment program was mitigated when participants perceived high levels of workplace discrimination	
497	2			Looking at the interaction from a different perspective, we note that there was a significant simple effect of perceptions of discrimination for people who strongly endorsed the merit principle such that the more participants perceived discrimination to exist, the less they opposed the preferential treatment program ($B = -0.99$), $F(1, 103) = 7.01$, $p = .009$.	
497	2			However, the perception of workplace discrimination did not affect opposition to affirmative action for people who weakly endorsed the merit principle ($B = -0.16$), $F(1, 103) = 0.38$, ns.	
497	2			Thus, consistent with our predictions, greater perceptions of workplace discrimination were related to reduced opposition to affirmative action, but only for people who strongly endorsed the merit principle.	
497	2			Using techniques outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986), we tested for mediation of each of the predicted simple effects; that is, (a) the effect of preference for the merit principle on opposition among people who perceived little workplace discrimination (i.e., those who fell below the median on perceived discrimination) and (b) the effect of perceptions of discrimination on opposition among people who strongly endorsed the merit principle (i.e., those who fell above the median on preference for the merit principle).	
497	2			To test for mediation of the simple effect of preference for the merit principle, we conducted the following regression analyses.	

497	2			First, opposition to the preferential treatment program was regressed on preference for the merit principle to obtain the total effect of the predictor.	
497	2			Second, perceptions of merit violation were regressed on preference for the merit principle.	
497	2			Third, opposition to the preferential treatment program was simultaneously regressed on perceptions of merit violation and preference for the merit principle.	
497	2			As shown (see top panel of Figure 2), first, the stronger participants' preference for the merit principle was, the more they construed the program as merit violating ($.25$), $F(1, 52) 3.33$, $p .07$.	
497	2			Second, when we controlled for participants' preference for the merit principle, those who construed the program as more merit violating were more opposed ($.50$), $F(1, 51) 16.71$, $p .001$.	
497	2			Third, the effect of participants' preference for the merit principle on opposition ($.26$), $F(1, 52) 3.69$, $p .06$, was reduced ($.14$), $F(1, 51) 1.26$, ns , once participants' construals of the program were controlled.	
497	2			These results are consistent with the notion that the effect of preference for the merit principle among people who perceived little discrimination was partially mediated by construal of the program as more merit violating.	
497	2			In addition, the low reliability of the perceptions of merit violation measure results in a conservative test of mediation (see Baron & Kenny, 1986, for a discussion of these issues).	
498	1			In addition, we tested for mediation of the simple effect of perceptions of discrimination on opposition among people with a strong preference for the merit principle.	

498	1				In contrast to the meritocracy effect, there was no evidence for mediation (see bottom panel of Figure 2), primarily because participants' perceptions of workplace discrimination did not relate to construal of the preferential treatment program as less merit violating. ⁵
498	1				In contrast to the meritocracy effect, there was no evidence for mediation (see bottom panel of Figure 2), primarily because participants' perceptions of workplace discrimination did not relate to construal of the preferential treatment program as less merit violating. ⁵
498	1				Replicating our earlier research (Bobocel et al., 1998; Davey et al., 1999), we found that the stronger participants' preference for the merit principle was, the more they opposed a merit-violating preferential treatment program.
498	1				It is important to note, however, that both of these main effects were qualified by a Preference for the Merit Principle X Perceptions of Discrimination interaction.
498	1				Specifically, we found that merit-based opposition to a preferential treatment program exists only for individuals who perceive little discrimination in the workplace.
498	1				In contrast, preference for the merit principle failed to predict opposition to the preferential treatment program for participants who perceived high levels of discrimination.
498	1				In other words, the current data support our main hypothesis that merit-based opposition to a preferential treatment program is not absolute; rather, it can be mitigated by perceptions of high workplace discrimination.
498	1				These results are consistent with the notion that workplace discrimination can be conceptualized as a form of merit violation against target-group members.
498	1				Thus, participants who strongly endorse the merit principle are motivated to correct for discriminatory bias, and, consequently, they reduce their opposition to a

				preferential treatment program.	
498	2			As noted by a reviewer, some may wonder why preference for the merit principle does not predict greater support for a preferential treatment program when perceptions of discrimination are high.	
498	2				We suggest that perceptions of discrimination may be reason to lessen opposition to a preferential treatment program for people who strongly endorse meritocracy but may not be sufficient reason for these individuals to reverse their attitudes toward a program that is still construed as violating merit (i.e., 5.50 on a 7-point scale).
498	2			We suggest that perceptions of discrimination may be reason to lessen opposition to a preferential treatment program for people who strongly endorse meritocracy but may not be sufficient reason for these individuals to reverse their attitudes toward a program that is still construed as violating merit (i.e., 5.50 on a 7-point scale).	
498	2				The mediation results are consistent with the notion that, among people who perceived little workplace discrimination, those who more strongly endorsed meritocracy were more opposed to the preferential treatment program in part because they construed the program as more likely to violate the merit principle.
498	2			The mediation results are consistent with the notion that, among people who perceived little workplace discrimination, those who more strongly endorsed meritocracy were more opposed to the preferential treatment program in part because they construed the program as more likely to violate the merit principle.	
498	2			In contrast, the simple effect of perceptions of discrimination on opposition does not appear to be driven by construal of the program as less merit violating.	

498	2			In other words, among people with a strong preference for the merit principle, greater perceptions of workplace discrimination produced lesser opposition to a preferential treatment program but not altered construal of the program as merit violating.	
498	2				We were surprised that, among participants who strongly endorse meritocracy, those with greater perceptions of discrimination did not construe the preferential treatment program as less merit violating.
498	Rod			5 Mediation analyses for the main effects of preference for the merit principle and perceptions of workplace discrimination were consistent with those for the simple effects of preference for the merit principle and perceptions of workplace discrimination.	
499	1			We were surprised that, among participants who strongly endorse meritocracy, those with greater perceptions of discrimination did not construe the preferential treatment program as less merit violating.	
499	1			Why should perceptions of discrimination lead to lessened opposition to a preferential treatment program among people who care about merit if not for its effects on construal of the program as less merit violating?	
499	1				To get a better sense of why people who strongly endorse meritocracy and who perceive discrimination might lessen their opposition to a preferential treatment program, we asked participants themselves in a follow-up study. ⁶
499	1			Following procedures similar to those in Study 1, we measured 94 participants' preference for the merit principle and their perceptions of workplace discrimination.	
499	1			Three judges coded participants' responses as they related to the merit principle.	

499	1			Specifically, they coded whether participants suggested the argument that the program would uphold the merit principle for (a) all employees (e.g., “everyone would be judged on his or her achievements”), (b) White men (e.g., “assurances that the program will not hinder the advancement of non-target group members”), and (c) target-group members (e.g., “it helps the company recognize that there are a lot of qualified minorities who don’t get the recognition they deserve”).	
499	1			A mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA; Preference for the Merit Principle Perceptions of Discrimination Type of Merit Argument, with repeated measures on the last factor) revealed only a significant Preference for the Merit Principle Perceptions of Discrimination interaction, $F(1, 90) = 4.48, p = .04$.	
499	1			Among participants with a strong preference for the merit principle, those who perceived more discrimination were more likely to suggest that the company generate the argument that affirmative action is merit upholding, compared with those who perceived less discrimination, $F(1, 90) = 3.77, p = .05$.	
499	1				Therefore, a viable justification for affirmative action among people who strongly endorse meritocracy and believe that discrimination exists is that affirmative action upholds meritocracy.
499	1			However, rather than simply assessing participants’ belief that the program was less merit violating, we should have also measured their belief that the program was merit restoring for target-group members.	
499	1				In Study 1, we measured the predictor variables 1 month prior to the criterion measure; thus, results are consistent with the idea that perceiving greater levels of workplace discrimination leads people who strongly endorse meritocracy to reduce their opposition to the preferential treatment program.

499	1				For example, it is quite possible that, among those who strongly endorse meritocracy, people who perceive workplace discrimination also differ from those who do not along some unmeasured dimension (e.g., political liberalism) that drives attitudes toward affirmative action.
499	2				The primary goal of Study 2 was to test whether merit-based opposition to the preferential treatment program is mitigated when participants are experimentally induced to perceive high levels of workplace discrimination.
500	1				To replicate Study 1, we also tested whether the relation between preference for the merit principle and opposition is mediated by construal of the preferential treatment program as merit violating among people who are induced to perceive low levels of workplace discrimination.
500	1				The second major purpose of Study 2 was to investigate how people who strongly endorse meritocracy might differentially construe the preferential treatment program under conditions of high discrimination (vs. low).
500	1				In Study 1, we found that greater perceptions of workplace discrimination are related to lessened opposition to the preferential treatment program among participants who strongly endorse meritocracy but not to construal of the program as less merit violating.
500	1				In Study 1, we found that greater perceptions of workplace discrimination are related to lessened opposition to the preferential treatment program among participants who strongly endorse meritocracy but not to construal of the program as less merit violating.
500	1				Thus, under conditions of high discrimination, people with a strong preference for the merit principle perceive the preferential treatment program as merit violating in some sense (because the most qualified White man might not be hired or promoted).

500	1				However, more important, these people may also perceive it as restoring meritocracy in another sense.
500	1				We hypothesize that among people who strongly endorse meritocracy, greater perceptions of discrimination might lead to construal of the preferential treatment program as more merit restoring for target-group members.
500	1			We hypothesize that among people who strongly endorse meritocracy, greater perceptions of discrimination might lead to construal of the preferential treatment program as more merit restoring for target-group members.	
500	1			Thus, we also explored how perceptions of discrimination might impact nonmerit-related construal of the preferential treatment program.	
500	2			To investigate participants' construal of the preferential treatment program, we first tested for a Preference for the Merit Principle Discrimination Condition interaction for the above constructs.	
500	2				If any interaction was significant, we then examined the simple effect of discrimination among participants who strongly endorse meritocracy.
500	2			Second, we investigated participants' preference for the merit principle. Participants' scores tended to fall near the top range of the 7-point scale (M = 5.24), and there was little variance (SD = 0.60).	
500	2			To create more distinct groups, we identified participants as having either a weak or a strong preference for the merit principle on the basis of 40th and 60th percentile cuts on the PMP Scale distribution.	
500	2			Participants were classified as weakly endorsing the merit principle if their scores ranged from 3.27 to 5.07 on a 7-point scale and as strongly endorsing the merit	

				principle if their scores ranged from 5.40 to 6.73.	
501	1			Although the research assistant was aware of experimental condition, he was unaware of participants' strength of preference for the merit principle. The opposition and merit-violation items were the same as in Study 1.	
501	1			In addition, we included items to explore the effects of perceptions of discrimination on construal of the preferential treatment program among those who strongly endorse merit.	
501	1			In particular, we measured construal of the program as merit restoring, specifically as assisting underrated target-group members, with the following item: "Corporation A's program would facilitate the hiring and promotion of women and visible minorities whose qualifications (given current assessment procedures) underestimate their actual abilities."	
501	2			The manipulation check consisted of seven items designed to tap perceptions of bias against women and visible minorities in the assessment of their merit (i.e., skills, abilities, and knowledge).	
501	2			The manipulation check was not included in the main study to avoid potential contamination of the item used to measure construal of the program as merit restoring (i.e., as assisting underrated target-group members).	
501	2			Second, we identified participants as having either a weak or a strong preference for the merit principle on the basis of 40th and 60th percentile cuts on the PMP Scale distribution.	

501	2		Participants were classified as weakly endorsing the merit principle if their scores ranged from 3.53 to 5.07 and as strongly endorsing the merit principle if their scores ranged from 5.53 to 6.73 on a 7-point scale.	
501	2		We conducted a 2 (discrimination condition) 2 (preference for the merit principle) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on participants' mean agreement with the discrimination items, with participants' initial perceptions of general workplace discrimination as a covariate.	
501	2		Participants' initial perceptions of workplace discrimination did not predict endorsement of the discrimination items, $F(1, 51) = 0.19$, ns, nor did participants' preference for the merit principle, $F(1, 51) = 0.32$, ns.	
502	1		Similar to the above analysis, a 2 (condition) 2 (preference for the merit principle) ANCOVA was conducted.	
502	1		Neither participants' initial perceptions of discrimination nor their preference for the merit principle predicted their response to the manipulation check, $F(1, 50) = 0.33$, ns, and $F(1, 50) = 1.16$, ns, respectively.	
502	1		Initial analyses using a 2 (discrimination condition: low vs. high) 2 (preference for the merit principle: weak vs. strong) ANOVA revealed that participants in the two experimental conditions differed in respect to their initial perceptions of general workplace discrimination, as measured in the mass-testing booklet.	
502	1		As shown in Table 2, there was an effect of discrimination condition as well as a Preference for the Merit Principle Discrimination Condition interaction on participants' initial perceptions of workplace discrimination.	
502	2		It is important to note that participants in the low-discrimination condition endorsed the merit	

				principle to the same degree as the participants in the highdiscrimination condition.	
502	2			We calculated an average agreement score for the six discrimination manipulation items. A 2 (discrimination condition) X 2 (preference for the merit principle) ANCOVA was then conducted on participants' mean agreement with the discrimination items.	
503	1			To investigate opposition to the preferential treatment program, we conducted a 2 (discrimination condition) X 2 (preference for the merit principle) ANCOVA. ⁷	
503	1			Preference for the merit principle did not predict opposition to the program, $F(1, 76) = 0.14$, ns, nor did discrimination condition, $F(1, 76) = 0.29$, ns.	
503	1			However, the Preference for the Merit Principle X Discrimination Condition interaction was significant, $F(1, 76) = 4.39$, $p = .04$ (see Figure 3).	
503	1			Simple effects analyses revealed a marginally significant relation between preference for the merit principle and opposition to the preferential treatment program in the low-discrimination condition, $F(1, 76) = 2.98$, $p = .08$.	
503	1			More specifically, when induced to perceive little workplace discrimination, participants with a strong preference for the merit principle tended to be more opposed to the preferential treatment program ($M = 5.57$), compared with their low-scoring counterparts ($M = 4.82$).	
503	1			In contrast, in the high-discrimination condition, preference for the merit principle had no effect on opposition, $F(1, 76) = 1.49$, ns (strong preference for the merit principle, $M = 4.77$; weak preference for the merit principle, $M = 5.30$).	

503	1			Thus, replicating Study 1, the effect of preference for the merit principle on opposition existed when participants were induced to perceive little workplace discrimination, but it was mitigated when participants were induced to perceive more workplace discrimination.	
503	1			Looking at the interaction a different way, we note that among participants who strongly endorsed meritocracy, those induced to perceive more workplace discrimination tended to be less opposed to the program, compared with those who were induced to perceive little workplace discrimination, $F(1, 76) = 3.61, p = .06$.	
503	1			Thus, greater perceptions of workplace discrimination led people who strongly endorsed meritocracy to reduce their opposition to affirmative action.	
503	1			In contrast, among participants who weakly endorsed the merit principle, discrimination condition did not affect opposition to the preferential treatment program, $F(1, 76) = 0.84, ns$.	
503	2				These results suggest that people who strongly endorse meritocracy are more offended by and are willing to combat workplace discrimination to the extent that they perceive it.
503	2			To replicate Study 1, we tested whether the simple effect of preference for the merit principle for people in the low discrimination condition was mediated by construal of the program as merit violating (see Figure 4).	
503	2			Mediation analyses indicated that, first, the stronger participants' preference for the merit principle was, the more they construed the program as merit violating ($r = .39$), $F(1, 40) = 6.40, p = .02$.	
503	2			Second, when we controlled for participants' preference for the merit principle, those who construed the program as more merit violating were more opposed ($r = .78$), $F(1, 39) = 53.25, p = .001$.	

503	2			Third, the effect of participants' preference for the merit principle on opposition (.29), $F(1, 40) = 3.42, p = .07$, was reduced (.01), $F(1, 39) = 0.01, ns$, once participants' construal of the program as merit violating was controlled.	
503	2			When participants were induced to perceive little workplace discrimination, those with a strong preference for the merit principle were more opposed to the preferential treatment program, compared with their low-scoring counterparts, because of their construal of the program as more merit violating.	
503	2			We hypothesized that, under conditions of high (vs. low) discrimination, people with a strong preference for the merit principle might construe a preferential treatment program as more likely to assist target-group members whose abilities are underrated.	
503	2			Therefore, we conducted a 2 (discrimination condition) X 2 (preference for the merit principle) ANCOVA on construal of the program as assisting underrated target-group members.	
503	Rod			In both versions, the merit violation items were administered first.	
504	1			We also found a marginally significant Merit Principle Discrimination Condition interaction, $F(1, 76) = 3.70, p = .06$ (see Figure 5, Table 2).	
504	1				As predicted, among participants who strongly endorsed meritocracy, those induced to perceive more workplace discrimination perceived the program as more likely to assist target-group members whose abilities are underrated, compared with those who were induced to perceive little workplace discrimination, $F(1, 76) = 5.26, p = .02$.
504	1			To explore other effects of the discrimination manipulation on construal of the program for those who strongly endorsed meritocracy (i.e., the program is necessary; the program is a short-term solution for unequal representation; feelings of White guilt), we conducted 2 (discrimination condition) X 2 (preference for the merit principle) ANCOVAs.	

504	1			As shown in Table 2, no Preference for the Merit Principle Discrimination Condition interactions emerged for participants' perceptions of the preferential treatment program as a short-term solution to ensure equal representation of all groups or for participants' feelings of White guilt.	
504	1			A marginal Preference for the Merit Principle Discrimination Condition interaction was found for perceptions of the program as necessary.	
504	1				However, among participants who strongly endorsed meritocracy, those induced to perceive more workplace discrimination construed the program as no more necessary, compared with those who were induced to perceive little workplace discrimination, $F(1, 76) = 0.57$, ns (see Table 2).
504	1				Quite inexplicably, among those who weakly endorsed meritocracy, the program was construed as more necessary under conditions of low (vs. high) discrimination, causing the interaction trend.
504	2			In other words, participants in the high-discrimination condition later indicated that they perceive more bias in the evaluation of target-group members' merit, compared with participants in the low-discrimination condition.	
504	2			First, we found that participants' perceptions of workplace discrimination interacted with their preference for the merit principle to produce opposition to a preferential treatment program.	
504	2				Among those experimentally induced to perceive little workplace discrimination, participants who strongly endorsed meritocracy tended to oppose a preferential treatment program, compared with those who weakly endorsed meritocracy.

504	2			Thus, the typical relation between participants' preference for the merit principle and opposition to a preferential treatment program did not hold for participants who were experimentally induced to perceive high levels of workplace discrimination.	
504	2			Considering the same interaction from a different perspective, we found that, among participants with a strong preference for the merit principle, those induced to perceive more workplace discrimination tended to reduce their opposition to a preferential treatment program, compared with those induced to perceive little workplace discrimination.	
504	2				Thus, greater perceptions of workplace discrimination caused participants who strongly endorsed meritocracy to reduce their opposition to a preferential treatment program.
504	2			In contrast, the experimental manipulation of perceptions of discrimination did not affect opposition for participants with a weak preference for the merit principle.	
505	1			In contrast, the experimental manipulation of perceptions of discrimination did not affect opposition for participants with a weak preference for the merit principle.	
505	1			Mediation analyses were consistent with the notion that when participants perceive little workplace discrimination, those with a stronger preference for the merit principle are more opposed to a preferential treatment program because of their construal of the program as more merit violating.	
505	1			Third, as predicted, participants with a strong preference for the merit principle in the high-discrimination condition construed the preferential treatment program as more likely to facilitate the hiring and promotion of underrated target-group members, compared with those in the low-discrimination condition.	

505	1			In contrast, discrimination condition did not influence construal of the program as assisting underrated target-group members for participants with a weak preference for the merit principle.		
505	1				Although we believe that people who strongly endorse meritocracy should reduce their opposition to a preferential treatment program when they are induced to perceive high levels of workplace discrimination because they construe the program as hiring underrated targetgroup members, we did not conduct a formal test of mediation.	
505	1			Taking the above into account, we did not formally test mediation for the simple effect of perceptions of discrimination on opposition to the preferential treatment program among those with a strong preference for the merit principle.		
505	1			Therefore, at best, the results of Study 2 suggest a potential mediator of the simple effect of discrimination condition on opposition for those who strongly endorse merit.		
505	1			Exploratory analyses provided no evidence for the notion that people with a strong preference for the merit principle alter their construal of a preferential treatment program under conditions of high workplace discrimination such that they are more likely to perceive the program as (a) more necessary to reduce discrimination or (b) a short-term solution for unequal representation.		
505	1			The starting point for this research was the assumption that merit-based opposition to affirmative action is real.		
505	1			What was less clear, however, was whether merit-based opposition to affirmative action is absolute and unchangeable.		
505	1				In other words, do people who strongly endorse meritocracy always oppose merit-violating affirmative action programs?	

505	1			In other words, do people who strongly endorse meritocracy always oppose merit-violating affirmative action programs?	
505	1			We hypothesized that merit-based opposition to a preferential treatment program should be mitigated when participants perceive high levels of workplace discrimination against women and visible minorities (i.e., two of the intended beneficiary groups).	
505	2			Because discrimination can involve unmerited outcomes, people who strongly endorse meritocracy should be offended by discrimination and, thus, motivated to reduce it (see Bobocel et al., 2002, for a fuller discussion of these issues).	
505	2				Because discrimination can involve unmerited outcomes, people who strongly endorse meritocracy should be offended by discrimination and, thus, motivated to reduce it (see Bobocel et al., 2002, for a fuller discussion of these issues).
505	2			Consequently, participants with a strong preference for the merit principle should reduce their opposition to a preferential treatment program when they perceive high levels of workplace discrimination.	
505	2			Across two studies, the relation between participants' preference for the merit principle and their opposition to the preferential treatment program was contingent on their perceptions of workplace discrimination.	
505	2			In Study 1, using participants' preexisting perceptions of workplace discrimination, and in Study 2, using an experimental manipulation of perceptions of workplace discrimination, we found that participants' preference for the merit principle and perceptions of discrimination significantly interacted to produce opposition to a preferential treatment program.	

505	2			When we combined Studies 1 and 2 using Bush and Mosteller's (1954) Stouffer method for adding z s, as recommended by Rosenthal (1984), the Preference for the Merit Principle Discrimination interaction term was significant ($z = 2.45, p = .01$).	
505	2			When we combined Studies 1 and 2 using Bush and Mosteller's (1954) Stouffer method for adding z s, as recommended by Rosenthal (1984), the Preference for the Merit Principle Discrimination interaction term was significant ($z = 2.45, p = .01$).	
505	2				Examining the interaction from a different perspective shows that when participants who strongly endorse meritocracy perceive more discrimination against women and visible minorities in the assessment of their merit, they are less opposed to a preferential treatment program than they would otherwise be ($z = 2.77, p = .006$).
505	2			Examining the interaction from a different perspective shows that when participants who strongly endorse meritocracy perceive more discrimination against women and visible minorities in the assessment of their merit, they are less opposed to a preferential treatment program than they would otherwise be ($z = 2.77, p = .006$).	
505	2				It is important to note that perceiving more discrimination does not lessen opposition to the preferential treatment program for those who weakly endorse meritocracy ($z = 0.23, ns$).
505	2			In conclusion, in both a correlational and an experimental study, we consistently find that people who strongly care about merit reduce their opposition to a preferential treatment program when they perceive high levels of workplace discrimination against women and visible minorities.	

505	2				We had hypothesized that, among people who perceive little discrimination, those who strongly endorse meritocracy are more opposed to a preferential treatment program because they construe it to be more merit violating.
505	2				We had hypothesized that, among people who perceive little discrimination, those who strongly endorse meritocracy are more opposed to a preferential treatment program because they construe it to be more merit violating.
505	2				First, greater endorsement of the merit principle is related to greater perceptions of the program as merit violating ($z = 2.57, p = .01$).
505	2				Second, when we controlled for individual differences in endorsement of meritocracy, greater perceptions of the program as merit violating were related to greater opposition ($z = 5.32, p = .0001$).
505	2				Second, when we controlled for individual differences in endorsement of meritocracy, greater perceptions of the program as merit violating were related to greater opposition ($z = 5.32, p = .0001$).
506	1				Third, the relation between endorsement of the merit principle and opposition to the program ($z = 2.14, p = .03$) was no longer significant when construal of the programs as merit violating was controlled ($z = 0.44, ns$), and a test of this reduction in the beta is highly significant ($z = 2.91, p = .004$).
506	1				Thus, among people who perceive little workplace discrimination, those who more strongly endorse the merit principle construe the preferential treatment program as more merit violating and, consequently, are more opposed.
506	1				It appears that people with weak versus strong preference for the merit principle have different attitudes toward the preferential treatment program because, in essence, they are evaluating different programs.
506	1				The potential for the program to violate meritocracy is likely more important to people who strongly care about merit.

506	1			The potential for the program to violate meritocracy is likely more important to people who strongly care about merit.	
506	1			Therefore, participants with a strong preference for the merit principle might have selectively elaborated relevant information (e.g., spent more time reading the details of the program), which led them to construe it as more merit violating (see Boninger, Krosnick, Berent, & Fabrigar, 1995, for a review).	
506	1			In addition, participants with a strong preference for the merit principle might have retrieved these attitudes from memory, which influenced their construal of the program (see Fazio, 1995, for a review).	
506	1			Future research could investigate some of the cognitive processes that might lead participants who strongly endorse meritocracy to construe affirmative action as merit violating.	
506	1			As predicted, participants with a strong preference for the merit principle were more likely to perceive the preferential treatment program as facilitating “the hiring and promotion of women and visible minorities whose qualifications (given current assessment procedures) underestimate their actual abilities” under conditions of high versus low discrimination.	
506	1				Furthermore, this is the only construct that we tested, which could potentially mediate the simple effect of discrimination among participants who strongly endorse meritocracy.
506	1				It makes sense that people who care about meritocracy might be less opposed to affirmative action under conditions of high discrimination because they perceive the beneficiaries of affirmative action as meritorious—rather than because they perceive the program as necessary or as a quick fix for unequal representation or because of increased feelings of guilt.

506	1			<p>It makes sense that people who care about meritocracy might be less opposed to affirmative action under conditions of high discrimination because they perceive the beneficiaries of affirmative action as meritorious—rather than because they perceive the program as necessary or as a quick fix for unequal representation or because of increased feelings of guilt.</p> <p>Future research should further investigate the specific processes through which increased perceptions of workplace discrimination lead people who strongly value merit to reduce their opposition to affirmative action.</p>	
506	1			<p>We propose that when people recognize discrimination in the assessment of merit, they then view target-group members' qualifications as greater than they appear on paper.</p> <p>For instance, if an organization ignores the contributions that employees from diverse groups can bring (e.g., plurality of ideas, ability to communicate with a diverse customer base), then the merit of these employees is undervalued.</p>	
506	1			<p>Consequently, a program that promotes target-group members, who rank lower than a White man on traditional criteria, could restore meritocracy to a biased system.</p>	
506	2			<p>First, we have argued that people with a strong preference for the merit principle who perceive high levels of workplace discrimination will reduce their opposition to a preferential treatment program to correct for discrimination.</p> <p>Second, in examining how the perception of discrimination mitigates merit-based opposition to affirmative action, we focused on opposition to a preferential treatment program.</p>	
506	2				

507	1				First, because only participants who value meritocracy reduce their opposition to a preferential treatment program under conditions of high discrimination, our data suggest that people who value meritocracy care more about reducing discrimination, compared with those who weakly value merit.
507	1				First, because only participants who value meritocracy reduce their opposition to a preferential treatment program under conditions of high discrimination, our data suggest that people who value meritocracy care more about reducing discrimination, compared with those who weakly value merit.
507	1				This conclusion is consistent with the notion that participants conceptualize workplace discrimination as a form of merit violation.
507	1				It would be interesting in future research to investigate directly how people who weakly and strongly endorse meritocracy conceptualize discrimination.
507	1				
507	1				Are participants with a strong preference for the merit principle more likely to conceptualize discrimination in selection and assessment as merit violating, compared with their low-scoring counterparts?
507	1				Or are the two groups equally likely to conceptualize discrimination as merit violating, but those with a strong preference for the merit principle are then more offended?
507	1				Second, our findings indicate that people can construe a policy as both merit violating and merit restoring depending on their point of reference.
507	1				Participants who strongly endorsed meritocracy and who perceived high levels of workplace discrimination construed the program as merit violating for White men but as merit restoring for target-group members.

507	1			Participants who strongly endorsed meritocracy and who perceived high levels of workplace discrimination construed the program as merit violating for White men but as merit restoring for target-group members.	
507	1			Indeed, it is likely that the perception of workplace discrimination was not sufficient to induce support for the program among participants who highly value merit because of the fact that, whereas these people perceived the program as restoring merit for target-group members, they also perceived it to be merit violating for White men.	
507	1				Third, the current research sheds some light on the motivations and concerns of people who strongly endorse meritocracy.
507	1			It has been argued that concerns about meritocracy serve to justify opposition to affirmative action (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1996; Murrell et al., 1994).	
507	1				More broadly, meritocracy has been described as an ideology that helps to maintain group inequality and legitimize discrimination because the dominant group controls the inputs that society considers when evaluating merit (Pratto, 1999; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius et al., 1996).
507	1			More broadly, meritocracy has been described as an ideology that helps to maintain group inequality and legitimize discrimination because the dominant group controls the inputs that society considers when evaluating merit (Pratto, 1999; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius et al., 1996).	
507	1			Furthermore, the perception that outcomes are distributed on the basis of merit has been described as a belief that rationalizes or justifies the status quo (Garcia, Pancer, Desmarais, & Jackson, 2001; Jost & Banaji, 1994).	

507	2				However, the current research reveals that participants who value meritocracy do not persist in their opposition to a preferential treatment program in the face of high discrimination, as individuals who want to maintain the status quo might.
507	2				In discussions of meritocracy, it is critical to distinguish between meritocracy as a prescriptive norm (i.e., the belief that meritocracy should be operating in society) versus a descriptive norm (i.e., the belief that meritocracy is currently operating in society; Davey et al., 1999; Garcia et al., 2001).
507	2			The current research focuses on people who strongly believe that the merit principle should ideally be used to allocate resources.	
507	2				In future research, it would be interesting to investigate how both prescriptive and descriptive meritocratic norms relate to opposition to affirmative action.
507	2				First, when one is speculating how people who strongly endorse meritocracy will respond to an affirmative action program, it is important to consider societal shifts in views about the prevalence of discrimination.
507	2			Individuals who value merit should be less opposed to affirmative action programs such as the preferential treatment program at times when workplace discrimination is believed to be prevalent.	
507	2			Second, the current set of studies suggest that if organizations increase employees' awareness of the existence of discrimination against beneficiaries, they might be able to garner more support among those who strongly value merit than is typical for affirmative action programs that can be construed as violating the merit principle.	

507	2				Increasing the awareness of discrimination against women and visible minorities might result in greater support for other organizational initiatives designed to restore equity to selection and job performance processes, particularly among people who strongly endorse meritocracy.
507	2			Finally, they might support new policies and procedures that aim to reduce bias in the assessment of merit, such as having representative committees rather than an individual review job applicants or switching to a structured (rather than an unstructured) interview.	
507	2			In contrast to a preferential treatment program, the initiatives described above should be construed only as merit restoring.	
507	2			Thus, when perceptions of discrimination are high, preference for the merit principle should predict support for such initiatives.	
508	1			In many studies, participants—including those in the beneficiary role—evaluate women as less competent if they are selected under a preferential treatment program, compared with a program in which merit is the only selection criteria (Heilman et al., 1996, 1998; Major, Feinstein, & Crocker, 1994).	
508	1			Perhaps the most heartening finding in the current research is that participants with a strong preference for the merit principle in the high-discrimination condition perceived the beneficiaries of affirmative action as underrated in terms of their qualifications.	

Saunders, P. (2002).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
559	1	2		A paper by Breen and Goldthorpe recently claimed to have exposed 'fatal flaws' in my work on meritocracy in Britain.
559	1	9		Based on these results, the paper identifies three core propositions about meritocracy in Britain on which all parties to this debate should now be able to agree.
559	1	25		This argument is broadly consistent with a 'meritocracy' hypothesis in which occupational achievement mainly reflects 'ability plus effort'.
560	1	37		Even in a genuine meritocracy we should not expect to find odds ratios approaching unity.
560	1	39		Indeed, I showed that odds of the magnitude reported by Goldthorpe were close to those we should expect to find in a genuine meritocracy where the most able children rise to the top positions and the least able gravitate to the bottom, irrespective of the class backgrounds from which they come.
560	1	42		The reason for this is that able parents (who in a meritocracy will be recruited into top positions) will be more likely to produce relatively able children (because of the genetic and environmental advantages that they can pass on), and these children will often therefore emulate the achievements of their parents.
561	1	6		We may therefore assume that all parties to this debate now accept that the existence of a meritocracy does not require (as Goldthorpe had previously suggested) that there be no association between class of origin and class of destination, and that the SAD thesis cannot be 'presumed' to be true simply because class origins and destinations are found to co-vary.
561	1	14		Proposition I: Evidence of inter-generational transmission of class identities does not of itself demonstrate that meritocratic selection is failing to occur, nor that class advantages and disadvantages are

				necessarily in• uencing individual outcomes.
561	1	19		Although my analysis of Goldthorpe's Findings showed that his data were broadly consistent with what would be predicted in a meritocratic society, there was one area where greater movement between classes should have been expected had recruitment been based on ability alone.
561	1	26		Given that the rate of working-class upward mobility into the service class was more-or-less as predicted in the meritocracy model, I concluded that the main 'blockage' in social mobility has less to do with talented lower- class individuals failing to move up the system than with less talented higher-class individuals failing to move down it.
561	1	32		This conclusion was borne out in my later work, where I drew on data from the National Child Development Study (NCDS) to provide evidence on the relative strength of the SAD and meritocracy theses.
561	1	34		I found that relatively low rates of downward mobility are the major source of non-meritocratic selection in the British occupational class system: 'The barriers against bright working class children succeeding are quite low, but . . . the safeguards against failure enjoyed by dull middle class children are still quite strong' (Saunders 1997: 269).
562	1	2		I have throughout my work repeatedly drawn attention to this principal weakness in the meritocracy thesis: namely, the 'stickiness' of middle-class downward mobility rates.
562	1	6		Proposition II: The main factor preventing a true meritocracy from operating in Britain is not the failure of bright working-class children to rise in the occupational class system, but is the ability of middle-class parents to reduce the chances that their less talented children will fall.

562	1	14	Of course, some bright and hard- working children from lower-class origins still do not achieve as high a position as they ‘should’, but the main ‘problem’ with meritocracy today appears to be the continuing success of the ‘undeserving’ children of the middle classes. ⁴
562	1	18	This has important policy, as well as academic, implications, for it means that the most effective way of increasing meritocracy in Britain would be to adopt policies designed to force more middle-class children to fail.
562	1	22	As most participants at a recent government seminar recognized, however, there are many good sociological and political reasons for drawing back from such a ‘strong’ form of meritocratic policy (Aldridge 2001), particularly at a time when the size of the middle class is expanding while that of the working class is shrinking.
565	1	35	Whether this justifies Breen and Goldthorpe’s claim that mean substitution is ‘likely to introduce additional biases’ (1999: fn.9) is, however, another matter, for there is no reason to believe that it has reduced the strength of association between variables likely to support the SAD thesis any more than between variables which measure meritocracy.
565	1	39	My approach to evaluating the SAD and meritocracy hypotheses has been to measure the relative predictive strength of different sets of variables representing each of the two positions in the debate.
565	1	41	The meritocracy thesis suggests that ability test scores and motivation indicators will account for most of the explained variation in people’s class destinations, while the SAD thesis would expect more of the variation to be accounted for by things like parental occupations, parental support for their children’s education, material conditions in the home, the type of school attended, and so on.
566	1	23	They explain their logic thus: ‘If a substantial association remains, the meritocracy thesis is undermined; if the association largely disappears, the thesis is supported.

566	1	25		In a perfect meritocracy, class of origin and class of destination would be statistically independent once merit was taken into account' (1999: 6).
566	1	26		In a perfect meritocracy, class of origin and class of destination would be statistically independent once merit was taken into account' (1999: 6).
566	1	44		We cannot measure (or even be aware of) every potentially relevant influence, yet in Breen and Goldthorpe's approach, all residual co-variation not explained by merit is automatically attributed to class with no allowance made for possible effects from other factors not included in the model.
567	1	6		In Breen and Goldthorpe's approach, however, we start with the association between class of origin and class of destination, and any co-variation not explained by merit variables automatically defaults as a class effect
567	1	9		Breen and Goldthorpe's approach thus sets an impossibly high hurdle for the meritocracy thesis to clear (virtually all the co-variation must disappear when ability and effort are entered into the model) while at the same time setting the default to favour the SAD thesis (any co-variation left unexplained is attributed to the influence of class origins).
567	1	37		Let us handicap the two simplified merit variables as much as we can by entering them only at the third step, following which we can complete the model by entering the qualifications which people have accumulated at school and later in life.
571	1	13		Surveying their findings, Breen and Goldthorpe seek to assure us that 'inequality is far from eliminated when "merit" variables are brought into the analysis' (1999: 17), and that 'there is a far from negligible part of the association between class origins and class position as at age 33 that is not

				attributable to merit in terms of ability, effort or educational attainment' (1999: 18).	
571	1	16		Surveying their findings, Breen and Goldthorpe seek to assure us that 'inequality is far from eliminated when "merit" variables are brought into the analysis' (1999: 17), and that 'there is a far from negligible part of the association between class origins and class position as at age 33 that is not attributable to merit in terms of ability, effort or educational attainment' (1999: 18).	
571	1	20		First, the reductions that they report in their odds ratios point to the same sort of conclusion as that derived from the proportion of variance explained by these same merit variables in my regression models (columns 1 and 2 in Table II), and in the path model reported in my paper with Bond (column 3).	
571	1	30		Breen and Goldthorpe's models do not directly measure the effect of class origins on class destinations, but much of the unexplained co-variation that remains between them after 'merit' has been taken into account is undoubtedly due to measurement error and the effect of other variables not included in the model rather than to the influence of class.	
571	1	36		Drawing all this together, it is clear from Breen and Goldthorpe's work as well as my own that 'merit' substantially outweighs the social advantages and disadvantages associated with class origins in influencing class destinations.	
571	1	44			This does not mean that Britain is a perfect meritocracy, but I never claimed that it was.

572	1	8		This has enabled us to identify three key propositions regarding social mobility and meritocracy in Britain.
572	1	10		The first is that the amount of movement between classes is not inconsistent with the operation of a system of meritocratic selection.
572	1	11		The second identifies the main departure from meritocratic selection as being the ability of the middle class to retain and transmit its position more successfully than it 'should'.
573	2	33		My work, for example, found that most of the variance in class destinations still remains unexplained even after meritocracy and SAD measures are taken into account.
573	2	45	The fall is partly because fewer variables have been included this time round, but is also because the merit variables are more crudely measured, thereby increasing measurement error.	
574	1	18		But what does this result actually tell us? In my 1997 paper I suggested that the effect of qualifications in itself supports neither the meritocracy nor SAD hypotheses since neither thesis denies that qualifications are important (while the latter sees qualifications as a product of class-bias in education, the former sees them as the result of ability and effort).

Scully, M. (2002).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
398	1	45		Most universities consider themselves to be a 'meritocracy' (Scully, 1997)
399	1	2-3		Even as faculty member acknowledge, and sometimes study, the ways that politics, family wealth, and social biases compromise the meritocratic operation of other domains, they uphold the university as the true meritocracy.
399	1	3		The idea of meritocracy is invoked in the United States, and increasingly in other countries to which the US exports this idea, as a way to explain and legitimate inequality.
399	1	8		Meritocracy is a fulcrum in the debate over whether markets work fine or whether redistribution is needed.
399	1	10		The stance of the political right is that the meritocracy is working and any redress of the inequalities it produces would only make the game unfair.
399	1	12		The stance of the political left is that the meritocratic promise has failed, so that additional remedies—in the form of welfare, scholarships, affirmative action, public housing—are required to clean up the unfair inequalities the system produces.
399	1	15		Faith in meritocracy is at the heart of how inequality is reproduced (Scully, 1995) and is a powerful issue for critical theorists to engage.
399	1	18		To address meritocracy at the societal level, however, requires a look at the faith in meritocracy that universities hold.
399	1	19	In admissions processes, the idea of merit is invoked in direct as well as stealthy ways.	
399	1	20		These debates focus on the university as a meritocracy.

399	1	25		Not only students but also faculty are affected by the university's faith in its meritocratic governance.
399	1	27		On the one hand, they are populated by those who have faith in meritocracy as part of the operation of a capitalist economy.
399	1	29		On the other hand, they are also peopled with scholars who study a range of systemic departures from meritocracy.
400	1	4		Amidst this research program, there should be voices of skepticism raised about the management school's own promotion practices and claims to be meritocratic.
400	1	9	A priori discussions of the likely chances of each year's crop of tenure candidates almost always focus on the merits of the individual's research.	
400	1	14	When the results of tenure decisions become known, post-hoc discussions of the merits of the candidates are almost instantaneously revised to fit and maintain a meritocratic interpretation.	
400	1	15		When the results of tenure decisions become known, post-hoc discussions of the merits of the candidates are almost instantaneously revised to fit and maintain a meritocratic interpretation.
400	1	17		I have seen this robust clinging to a meritocratic explanation happen over and over again.
400	1	22		In other words, if we begin to doubt that the university is a meritocracy, then redistribution might be required, and that is a frightening unknown.
400	1	25		Even in the best case, when a system creates some central tendency toward meritocracy, not left to itself but with various forms of oversight and corrections built in, there will be errors.

400	1	26	<p>Meritocracies produce both ‘Type 1 errors’ or ‘false negatives’ (e.g. people who did not get tenure but probably should have) and ‘Type 2 errors’ or ‘false positives’ (e.g. people who did get tenure but probably should not have).</p> <p>Even this representation is too simple, as Systems evolve, and learning over time should clarify the errors of the meritocracy.</p> <p>Organizational learning might make a department go back and reassess how it is doing vis-a-vis its meritocratic aspirations.</p> <p>However, this is a dangerous endeavor, and, instead, past decisions are retrofitted to a meritocratic account.</p> <p>Indeed, the stakes in a tenure contest are not nearly so dire as the stakes in the broader societal meritocracy, where some people wrongly suffer terrible poverty and others wrongly reap huge gain.</p> <p>The dominant view fits these outcomes to a self-satisfied meritocratic account; critical voices show the outcomes to be errors and seek to prevent or redress them.</p> <p>To begin the dialogue about redressing inequality in society, it may be useful to look at our own institutions and how unquestioned assumptions—like ‘the university is a meritocracy’—undergird and reproduce inequality.</p>
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Breen, R. (2003).

Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
2		Meritocracy' must be one of the most successful neologisms in 20thcentury English. Since it was coined by Michael Young in 'The Rise of the Meritocracy' 1870–2023 (1958) its use has expanded rapidly, particularly among politicians, social scientists and social commentators.
4		Meritocracy' must be one of the most successful neologisms in 20thcentury English. Since it was coined by Michael Young in 'The Rise of the Meritocracy' 1870–2023 (1958) its use has expanded rapidly, particularly among politicians, social scientists and social commentators.
8		In Young's fantasy the meritocracy proves to be unworkable and things end badly.
9		But in contemporary discourse meritocracy is unfailingly presented as a good thing and a state of affairs in which social justice and economic efficiency might both be realized.
12	This follows from the twin connotations of the word merit.	
15	People are to be rewarded for their merits – that is, the possession and utilization of job relevant attributes, skills or qualities.	
17	At the same time people are given rewards that they 'merit' or deserve.	
17	And insofar as merit met both criteria, meritocracy would indeed be a good thing.	
18		And insofar as merit met both criteria, meritocracy would indeed be a good thing.
34	Consideration of the other side of the concept of merit – namely as something that is rewarded in the labour market because it is what employers find useful in employees – makes the issue still more complicated.	

43		The problem of meritocracy that critics such as Hayek (1960, 1976; see also Goldthorpe, 1996 and Breen and Goldthorpe, 2001) have seized upon is that there is no reason why what is rewarded in the labour market should in any way lead to people getting their 'just deserts'.
3		Sociological analyses which use the term 'meritocracy' are, in fact, usually content to document the degree to which recruitment to positions occurs on the basis of achieved, rather than ascribed, characteristics of individuals.
10	In this approach the emphasis is shifted to the role of educational qualifications since these are held to function as the marker of job-relevant merit.	
12	Thus Jonsson (1992) calls the increase over time in the significance of achievement at the expense of ascription, 'the increased merit selection (IMS) hypothesis'.	
21	For Bell, educational qualifications are the sign of merit and are therefore the things to which labour market rewards are attached.	
26	Increasing merit selection and the consequent extending of equality of opportunity is good not only from the perspective of social justice but also because, by preventing the 'wastage of talent' that occurs under less meritocratic arrangements, it benefits economic efficiency.	
28		Increasing merit selection and the consequent extending of equality of opportunity is good not only from the perspective of social justice but also because, by preventing the 'wastage of talent' that occurs under less meritocratic arrangements, it benefits economic efficiency.
30		So it transpires that the apparently simple concept of meritocracy is beset by difficulties.
31		In this paper I use the term 'educational meritocracy' in something of the spirit of Bell to mean the allocation of class positions on the basis of educational attainment.
34		The substantive issue addressed is how far Northern Ireland can be considered to be an educational meritocracy.

37	It might be argued that these inequalities had 'meritocratic legitimization' if it transpired that they were, in fact, largely the result of the differential distribution of merit across sexes, classes or ethnic groups.
38	It might be argued that these inequalities had 'meritocratic legitimization' if it transpired that they were, in fact, largely the result of the differential distribution of merit across sexes, classes or ethnic groups.
42	This argument has indeed been advanced in respect of class and, most famously, ethnic group inequalities in the USA by Herrnstein and Murray in <i>The Bell Curve</i> (1994) where measured intelligence is taken as the yardstick of merit.
4	Breen and Goldthorpe (1999), using the same data set as Saunders, showed that this was not the case, and, in a later analysis, demonstrated that, over time, there was no evidence that British society was tending towards greater meritocracy (Breen and Goldthorpe, 2001).
15	But the importance of educational credentials can vary over a career and thus the choice of which age to focus on might bias our results towards or against finding the existence of an educational meritocracy.
18	This is a broad age range, but it gives us an 'average' picture of the way in which ascriptive influences are, in fact, legitimated as the result of a meritocratic process of class allocation.
45	Likewise, proponents of meritocracy might hope that taking account of educational qualifications would cause all inequalities based on ascriptive characteristics to vanish.
18	However, it may reduce such inequalities, and, were it to do so, we could argue that Northern Ireland, while falling short of being a complete educational meritocracy, is, nevertheless, not entirely non-meritocratic.
19	However, it may reduce such inequalities, and, were it to do so, we could argue that Northern Ireland, while falling short of being a complete educational meritocracy, is, nevertheless, not entirely non-meritocratic.

8		Rather, we sought to gauge the extent to which inequalities in mobility chances deriving from class origins, gender and ethnic group might be justified as the unequal outcomes of an educational meritocracy.
22		However this very fact would then seem to tell against the argument in favour of meritocracy, given that one of the requirements of an educational meritocracy should be that the returns to merit are independent of ascriptive features.
23		However this very fact would then seem to tell against the argument in favour of meritocracy, given that one of the requirements of an educational meritocracy should be that the returns to merit are independent of ascriptive features.
23	However this very fact would then seem to tell against the argument in favour of meritocracy, given that one of the requirements of an educational meritocracy should be that the returns to merit are independent of ascriptive features.	
25		All in all these findings are not very encouraging news for those who might argue that Northern Irish society was meritocratic.
25	Merit does not account for gender differences, and while it seems to do rather well in explaining class origin inequalities among women it fares much less well for men.	
36		They write 'it seems to be the case that ... class of origin and sex can, in some measure, undermine the meritocratic principle' (Marshall and Swift, 1993: 206) and this conclusion would apply equally well to the Northern Irish case.
37		Someone seeking to make the case for a meritocracy would undoubtedly want to argue that our four educational levels are too crude to capture the kind of distinctions that employers would make in allocating jobs.
5		The same argument could be made in respect of ability (e.g. Saunders, 1997), though, since our interest is in whether Northern Ireland is an educational meritocracy, the fact that we have no measure of ability is not strictly to the point.

15		Nevertheless, one important consideration is the degree to which recruitment to class positions might be meritocratic, albeit using other measures of merit than education, but which might, like education, be related to class origins.
15	Nevertheless, one important consideration is the degree to which recruitment to class positions might be meritocratic, albeit using other measures of merit than education, but which might, like education, be related to class origins.	
26	Again, the 'advanced personnel policies' or 'human resource management programmes' favoured by modern enterprises place great emphasis on personality characteristics as indicators of such meritorious qualities as 'loyalty', 'commitment', 'adaptability' and 'capacity for teamwork'.	
30	As a result of such considerations, it is moreover entirely possible that the distinction between merit and ascription breaks down.	
33	Ascribed attributes, and including ones that are linked to class origins, may be regarded by employers as having economic value and as therefore constituting merit from their point of view – which, in a free-market economy, is the only point of view that counts.	
41	Nevertheless, the processes just described are, from an employer's point of view, the legitimate rewarding of merit in the labour market and so a greater share of ascriptive inequality can be attributed to differential merit than is the case if we restrict merit to mean educational qualifications or measured ability.	
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43	But then this is a sense of merit in which the notion of just desert has been abandoned in favour of an emphasis on merit in the service of economic efficiency – and this may, of course, be the only sense in which merit is a useable concept.	
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10		It is usual to consider meritocracy in terms of labour market rewards, but there is in principle no reason to confine the idea to markets.
12		One might simply argue that in a meritocracy individuals should receive their just deserts and these need not necessarily be channelled through the labour market.
12	It is implicit in the IMS hypothesis that the relationship between merit and nonmeritocratic factors should be additive, since the very existence of interactions between them implies that the returns to merit are local rather than universal.	
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Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
436	1	5		While much of it remains controversial (see AJS Symposium on Market Transition, 1996; Bian, 2002; Cao and Nee, 2000; Nee and Matthews, 1996), one finding seems beyond dispute: there has been a trend of rising meritocracy ¹ in the allocation of material rewards and career opportunities during the post-1978 reform period.
436	1	17		This trend of rising meritocracy represents a profound departure from Maoist China, where meritocratic standards were suppressed by strong political favoritism and distributive egalitarianism (Bian, 1994; Shirk, 1982; Walder, 1986).
436	1	18		This trend of rising meritocracy represents a profound departure from Maoist China, where meritocratic standards were suppressed by strong political favoritism and distributive egalitarianism (Bian, 1994; Shirk, 1982; Walder, 1986).
436	1	30		Still a third stresses the cultural aspect of socioeconomic behavior, pointing to the diffusion of Western market-oriented managerial models as an indispensable force behind the rising meritocracy (Guthrie, 1997, 1999).
436	1	rodapé 1		“Meritocracy” here refers to a distributive pattern based on individual s job-related merits such as ability, skill, effort, and contribution.
436	1	rodapé 1		“Meritocracy” here refers to a distributive pattern based on individual s job-related merits such as ability, skill, effort, and contribution.
436	1	rodapé 2		As a type concept, meritocracy may be contrasted with nepotism, egalitarianism, political virtuocracy (Shirk, 1982), and so on.
438	1	rodapé 2		It should be emphasized from the onset that this article does not equate egalitarianism with state redistribution, nor meritocracy with market.

438	1	rodapé 3	Instead, it explicitly recognizes market, state, and Western cultural influence as potential causes of merit-based reward allocation in urban China.	
438	1	rodapé 4		The central task is to assess empirically their respective roles in the recent rise of meritocracy.
438	1	rodapé 6		Meritocratic allocation of material incentives is to be attributed to the state to the extent performance-based reward and sanctioning practices correlate with state control; likewise, it is to be attributed to market to the extent such practices correlate with organizational exposure to market discipline.
439	1	2		In response to the strong egalitarianism and political favoritism, Chinese employees quickly recognized the secondary role of meritocratic standards. By the 1970s, it had become a popular cliché, especially among young workers, that “good or bad, performance makes no difference” (Lin et al., 1996, p. 139).
439	1	29		Meritocracy arises insofar as market competition rewards human capital and work effort.
440	1	17		Given the importance of productive efficiency in market competition, it would only appear sensible that public enterprises turn to material incentives and develop more meritocratic distributive mechanisms in order to induce effort and performance (Groves et al., 1994; also see Abowd, 1990; Gaynor and Gertler, 1995).
441	1	8		New rules and procedures are easier to adopt, and the absence of intricate guanxi networks and preexisting Maoist practices inside the organization also facilitates the enforcement of meritocratic standards
441	1	19		Taken all together, the market perspective suggests that Sino-foreign joint ventures should be less likely than private firms and foreign companies, but more likely

					than public enterprises, to adopt meritocratic standards and practices.
441	1	21			Critics of the market perspective argue that egalitarianism and the lack of meritocracy in pre-reform China are not intrinsic features of state socialism.
441	1	30			This opens up the possibility, at least in theory, that the recent rise of meritocracy in China might have merely coincided with, rather than resulted from, the emergence of markets.
442	1	2			Meritocracy results from the party/state's attempt to promote functional efficiency and economic development.
442	1	rodapé 1			There is no logical contradiction between this idea and the previous prediction of greater meritocracy in nonprofit organizations.
443	1	42			To the extent they entail more meritocratic practices than in Maoist organizations, the cultural perspective suggests that multinational companies be more likely than indigenous firms, both public and private, to adopt performance-based standards in allocating rewards and penalties.
446	1	14			The greater the value of DV1, the more meritocratic the bonus allocation. ¹
446	1	25			Similar to DV1, larger values of DV2 indicate more meritocratic organizational practices.
450	1	8			Although they appear similar in Model 4, nonprofit organizations as a group are considerably less meritocratic than public enterprises when the rank and size variables take on realistic, nonzero values.
455	1	10			The verdict seems clear. Meritocracy in the allocation of bonus and sanctions is strongly correlated with organizational exposure to market discipline.

455	1	26		In this article, I undertake the challenge of disentangling competing institutional processes that, in theory, could all lead to a societal-wide rise of meritocracy.
455	1	27		My analysis shows, unequivocally, that on the organizational level, meritocratic practices are correlated foremost with the exposure to competitive market.
455	1	34		I do not claim that this mechanism is the sole cause of the recent rise of meritocracy in urban China.
455	1	35		However, it is highly unlikely that meritocratic reward allocation practiced by employer organizations exerts no significant impact on the stratification outcome.
458	1	5		One pertains to the construction of DV1, where bonus allocation based on position/rank is grouped with that according to workload/output and is assumed meritocratic in nature.
458	1	15		I treat the residual category as meritocratic for two reasons.
458	1	22		This difference between the two positions ought to be considered meritocratic since the chef's work contribution is no doubt greater than that of his helper.
461	1	2	Given highly interdependent work tasks, a merit-minded employer may opt for equal bonus for everyone, but it is unlikely that the amount of bonus money remains fixed over time and insensitive to group performance.	

Gradstein, M. (2004).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
798	1	1		Another possibility would be to allocate in accordance to the relative efforts made, this allocation mechanism being more meritocratic than the former.
798	1	2		Individual preferences of a degree of meritocracy should anticipate its effects on effort levels and may, in general, differ.
798	1	4		The paper's focus is on endogenous determination, through voting, of the degree of meritocracy in the resource allocation system.
798	1	10		The degree of meritocracy inherent in university admission processes is a hotly debated topic in many countries.
798	1	12	In the United States, for example, claims have been made that basing these policies solely on merit could turn to be detrimental for historically underprivileged groups, thus furthering inequalities, see Bowen and Bok (1998).	
798	1	30		With the example of the allocation of educational resources in mind, we find that higher degrees of meritocracy imply a less equal distribution rule of these resources.

799	1	21	<p>In general, the shares s_i are determined endogenously as follows:</p> $s_i = \frac{q_i}{1 + \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{q_j}{d_j}} \quad (3)$ <p>where q_i, $0 \leq q_i \leq 1$, is interpreted as the degree of meritocracy or, alternatively, as the marginal productivity of a household's investment in enhancing the propensity of its child receiving a larger share of educational resources; the larger is q_i the more individually beneficial the e_i is.</p>
799	1	35	<p>They first collectively determine the degree of meritocracy inherent in university policies, upon which they individually allocate family budget according to (1).</p>
800	1	11	<p>After some manipulations we get for the equilibrium values of investments:</p> $x_i = \frac{V(q(A_i))}{1 + \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{V(q(A_j))}{q_j(1-q_j)}} \quad (6)$ <p>Clearly, an individual parent's investment e_i or, increases in her child's productivity, $9x_i = 9A_i$; also, its cross-derivative with respect to productivity and q_i is positive, indicating that the slope becomes steeper as the system gets more meritocratic.</p>
800	1	19	<p>The higher is the degree of meritocracy the larger are the inequalities in the allocation of the educational resources across the individuals</p>

800	1	22		<p>This result hinges on the assumed complementarity between individual productivity on the one hand and the degree of meritocracy as embodied in the parameter q on the other hand and is at the cornerstone of the results below.</p>
801	1	15		<p>The preferred level of meritocracy is an increasing function of an α:- spring's productivity; in the democratic equilibrium, the median productivity individual is decisive.</p>
801	1	18		<p>Households with more productive children tend to favor higher levels of meritocracy because it enhances their ability to appropriate a larger share of the pie.</p>
801	1	22		<p>For suppose that the political decision making system is biased so that only high-ability households, say those whose children productivity exceeds A^*, determine the meritocracy of tertiary education.</p>
801	1	23		<p>Then the decisive voter will be a highly productive household and the system will be meritocratic.</p>
801	1	rodapé 1		<p>In other words, consider two meritocracy levels, q and q^*.</p>
802	1	17		<p>An elitist decision making is likely to lead to a more meritocratic and less egalitarian system than a democratic one; and even under democratic decision making, only if the distribution of productivity is sufficiently skewed in the above specified sense would the equilibrium consist of an egalitarian allocation; if the distribution of individual productivities is symmetric, the equilibrium still entails a positive degree of meritocracy.</p>

802	1	22	<p>An elitist decision making is likely to lead to a more meritocratic and less egalitarian system than a democratic one; and even under democratic decision making, only if the distribution of productivity is sufficiently skewed in the above specified sense would the equilibrium consist of an egalitarian allocation; if the distribution of individual productivities is symmetric, the equilibrium still entails a positive degree of meritocracy.</p>
802	1	24	<p>This paper examines a political determination of the degree of meritocracy in allocating a public resource, such as education scholarships in universities.</p>
802	1	28	<p>The precise equilibrium allocation depends on the degree of meritocracy, i.e., the extent to which an individual share is elastic with respect to the individual effort made in obtaining it.</p>
802	1	31	<p>A larger degree of meritocracy implies a less equal distribution of the resource at equilibrium.</p>
802	1	32	<p>Consequently, more productive families are more supportive of a meritocratic system, whereas less productive ones support a more egalitarian system.</p>
802	1	36	<p>In particular, if political decisions on the allocation of resources are controlled by an elite oligarchy, meritocracy is more likely to win its support; a more democratic process is likely to result in a less meritocratic system.</p>
803	1	1	<p>In particular, if political decisions on the allocation of resources are controlled by an elite oligarchy, meritocracy is more likely to win its support; a more democratic process is likely to result in a less meritocratic system.</p>

Henderson, W. D. (2004).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
976	1	6	The current emphasis on time-pressured law school exams, therefore, may skew measures of merit in ways that have little theoretical connection to the actual practice of law.	
982	1	13	Since numerous academic and career opportunities often hinge on relatively small variations in law school grades, test-taking speed implicitly becomes a measure of merit.	
984	1	17		The advantage of this approach is that it can demonstrate the technical limitations of the LSAT while simultaneously identifying a broader range of options to help us balance the dual goals of meritocracy and social justice.
1039	1	4		Scrutinizing the issue of speed on law school exams may be a way to make the testing system more meritocratic while achieving the educational benefits of a more diverse student body.
1039	1	Rodapé 9		My broader point is that a closer examination of law school testing practices may further both the interests of meritocracy and social justice: this situation should be attractive to all factions that participated in the Grutter debate.
1045	1	6		Understanding the relationship between testing method and the LSAT potentially gives the legal academy a valuable new tool for confronting the LSAT “arms-race” among law schools, 202 203 while also advancing the dual goals of meritocracy and social justice.

1045	1	26	If the evidence is sufficiently compelling, the legal academy will be well-equipped to adopt a more meritocratic and socially just system of law school testing.
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Uitermark, J., & Pruijt, H. (2004).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
689	1	32		Thus the local government condones or even supports these segments whilst it excludes or ignores those parts that do not contribute to the culturally-driven development strategies, giving rise to what may be referred to as a 'movement meritocracy' that ever more subtly integrates desirable and excludes undesirable elements.
697	1	4		In all cases, a process of 'unmilitant particularization' (compare Harvey, 1996) is evident: as some segments of the movement or cultural groups are granted special incentives by the government, it becomes increasingly difficult for the remainder of the movements to mobilize resources and to claim universal rights. What we see is the emergence of a movement meritocracy: the way in which the local polity delivers incentives follows an increasingly discriminatory pattern, allowing some movements access to the governance structures while at the same time withholding others.

Foster, M. D., & Tsarfati, E. M. (2005).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
1730	2	16		More specifically, we examined beliefs about meritocracy because it is referred to by several authors as one of the most persistent ideologies in North America (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; Kluegal & Smith, 1986; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).
1730	2	20		Meritocracy beliefs have been most commonly defined as a preference for the merit principle, or an endorsement of merit as an appropriate way of distributing goods (e.g., Kluegal & Smith, 1986; Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002).
1730	2	22	Meritocracy beliefs have been most commonly defined as a preference for the merit principle, or an endorsement of merit as an appropriate way of distributing goods (e.g., Kluegal & Smith, 1986; Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002).	
1730	2	22	Meritocracy beliefs have been most commonly defined as a preference for the merit principle, or an endorsement of merit as an appropriate way of distributing goods (e.g., Kluegal & Smith, 1986; Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002).	
1730	2	25		Defined this way, meritocracy beliefs reflect what people think should happen in society.
1730	2	27		Yet, although individuals may endorse meritocracy as a positive goal, this endorsement does not indicate their beliefs about whether such a goal has been achieved.
1731	1	3	An individual can believe people should be rewarded for merit but also recognize that there are social barriers that prevent that from happening.	

1731	1	6	Thus, we were interested in how coping with discrimination would be affected by the belief or disbelief that meritocracy actually exists (Lalonde, Doan, & Patterson, 2000; Liss, O'Connor, Morosky, & Crawford, 2001), reflecting what people think does happen in society.
1731	1	32	From these findings, we might expect that believing that meritocracy exists also would be positive for the well-being of disadvantaged group members.
1731	2	8	For example, if a woman believes that meritocracy exists, she may attribute pay inequity or a missed promotion to her own inabilities ("I'm just not as qualified") rather than to an inequitable system.
1731	2	14	Consciousness-raising groups sought to discredit these myths and instead promoted critical, presumably more realistic, beliefs about the social system (e.g., that meritocracy is a myth) so that women would instead blame that system.
1731	2	29	To begin to examine the effects of beliefs about the social system in a more direct manner, our laboratory has recently assessed how perceptions of personal discrimination and meritocracy beliefs interact to predict psychological and collective well-being (Foster, Sloto, & Ruby, in press).
1731	2	35	In particular, minority group members (both gender and ethnic groups) completed questionnaires measuring the degree to which they have personally experienced discrimination, their beliefs about whether meritocracy exists, and individual (self-esteem) and collective (intergroup anxiety, collective action) well-being.

1731	2	39	Results showed a significant interaction between perceived personal discrimination and meritocracy beliefs, such that those who had experienced personal discrimination yet also believe meritocracy exists reported lower self-esteem, increased intergroup anxiety, and less collective action compared to those who disbelieved that meritocracy exists.
1731	2	41	Results showed a significant interaction between perceived personal discrimination and meritocracy beliefs, such that those who had experienced personal discrimination yet also believe meritocracy exists reported lower self-esteem, increased intergroup anxiety, and less collective action compared to those who disbelieved that meritocracy exists.
1731	2	43	Results showed a significant interaction between perceived personal discrimination and meritocracy beliefs, such that those who had experienced personal discrimination yet also believe meritocracy exists reported lower self-esteem, increased intergroup anxiety, and less collective action compared to those who disbelieved that meritocracy exists.
1731	2	45	Thus, consistent with group consciousness theories, being critical of the existence of meritocracy was more protective than a belief in its existence.
1732	1	3	The present study was therefore designed to examine how beliefs about the social system, namely, believing or disbelieving that meritocracy exists, will affect women's well-being in the face of an acute situation of gender discrimination.
1732	1	7	This was a 2 (meritocracy beliefs: disbelievers, believers) × 2 (condition: discrimination, control) design.

1732	1	10		Participants were pretested on both their perceived discrimination and meritocracy beliefs and then exposed to either an acute situation of gender discrimination or a nondiscrimination failure condition (control).
1732	1	24		Consistent with group consciousness theories (e.g., Bartky, 1977), we expected that meritocracy beliefs would interact with the condition such that disbelievers facing discrimination would report greater well-being than believers.
1732	1	28		In our past work (Foster et al., in press), meritocracy beliefs tended to be unrelated to well-being among those with low personal discrimination.
1732	1	30		Thus, we did not expect that meritocracy beliefs would affect wellbeing in the control condition.
1732	1	37		Female introductory psychology students (N = 739) at Wilfrid Laurier University in Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, completed mass-testing questionnaires containing measures of past personal discrimination and meritocracy beliefs at the beginning of the fall semester.
1732	1	43		We further selected those in the top (believers) and bottom (disbelievers) thirds of the distribution of meritocracy scores.
1732	1	45		Thus, those who qualified were low perceivers of discrimination who reported belief or disbelief in meritocracy (N = 151).
1733	1	44	A nondiscrimination failure versus a success condition was considered to be the most appropriate comparison group so that the effects of the two types of failures (gender vs. individual merit-based) could be assessed.	

1733	2	26	At mass-testing, participants completed four items from Lalonde et al.'s (2000) Belief in Meritocracy Ideology scale, which were rated using a 7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (−3) to strongly agree (3).
1733	2	36	Items were recoded so that higher scores represented the belief that meritocracy exists, whereas lower scores represented a disbelief in the existence of meritocracy.
1733	2	38	Items were recoded so that higher scores represented the belief that meritocracy exists, whereas lower scores represented a disbelief in the existence of meritocracy.
1733	2	42	Those in the top (cutoff = .75) and bottom (cutoff = −.50) thirds of the distribution were classified as those who believe and disbelieve that meritocracy exists, respectively.
1734	2	4	To assess the extent to which discrimination was successfully portrayed, a 2 (meritocracy belief: disbelievers, believers) × 2 (condition: discrimination, control) MANOVA was conducted on the two fairness scores.
1734	2	11	For the manipulation to have been successful, we expected a main effect for condition, but no other effects so that unfair treatment would be perceived differently across the discrimination and control conditions but equally across meritocracy groups.
1734	2	24	A 2 (meritocracy beliefs: disbelievers, believers) × 2 (condition: discrimination, control) ANOVA was conducted on the well-being composite.
1734	2	27	There was a significant two-way interaction between meritocracy beliefs and condition, $F(1, 74) = 12.71$, $p = .001$, $\eta^2 = .147$ (see Figure 1).

1734	2	31	Simple effects showed that among those exposed to discrimination, those who disbelieve that meritocracy exists reported greater well-being ($n = 19$, $M = 3.23$, $SD = .49$) than those who believe that meritocracy exists ($n = 20$, $M = 2.54$, $SD = .92$), $t(37) = 2.85$, $\eta^2 = .180$, $p = .007$.
1734	2	32	Simple effects showed that among those exposed to discrimination, those who disbelieve that meritocracy exists reported greater well-being ($n = 19$, $M = 3.23$, $SD = .49$) than those who believe that meritocracy exists ($n = 20$, $M = 2.54$, $SD = .92$), $t(37) = 2.85$, $\eta^2 = .180$, $p = .007$.
1734	2	35	In the control condition, however, those who disbelieve that meritocracy exists reported lower well-being ($n = 14$, $M = 2.64$, $SD = .64$) than those who believe that meritocracy exists ($n = 25$, $M = 3.08$, $SD = .56$), $t(37) = -2.18$, $\eta^2 = .114$, $p = .036$.
1734	2	37	In the control condition, however, those who disbelieve that meritocracy exists reported lower well-being ($n = 14$, $M = 2.64$, $SD = .64$) than those who believe that meritocracy exists ($n = 25$, $M = 3.08$, $SD = .56$), $t(37) = -2.18$, $\eta^2 = .114$, $p = .036$.
1734	2	40	We examined how beliefs about the existence of meritocracy affected well-being among those experiencing a first-time, acute situation discrimination.
1734	2	45	As in our past work (Foster et al., in press), results showed that women experiencing discrimination reported greater well-being if they disbelieved that meritocracy exists than if they were believers.

1735	1	2		These theories argue that shattering such myths will encourage women to turn their blame for failure onto the system. In the present study, disbelieving that meritocracy exists may have encouraged women to direct the blame of their failure on the presumably biased tests used in the study (“No wonder I failed, given that biased test!”), thereby increasing well-being.
1735	1	6		In contrast, a belief that meritocracy exists may encourage women to blame themselves for not being able to overcome the barriers put up by discrimination (“I should have tried harder”), and consequently reduce well-being.
1735	1	12		In the control condition, however, the opposite pattern was found; believing that meritocracy exists was more adaptive than disbelief.
1735	1	13	Individual, merit-based failure may therefore be a condition under which “thinking positively” about the system may be beneficial.	
1735	2	5		In line with this, the control condition posed an individual-based (i.e., personal failure) versus group-based threat. Believing that meritocracy exists may have provided these women with a sense of control over their failure by allowing for future attempts at success; if people get rewarded on their merit, then “if I try harder next time, I may succeed.”
1735	2	8	Believing that meritocracy exists may have provided these women with a sense of control over their failure by allowing for future attempts at success; if people get rewarded on their merit, then “if I try harder next time, I may succeed.”	
1735	2	12		In contrast, women who disbelieve that meritocracy exists would not agree that working harder will necessarily result in ultimate success.

1735	2	19	An alternative explanation for the buffering qualities of meritocracy beliefs may be the degree of consistency between beliefs and experiences.
1735	2	32	First, believing that meritocracy exists was consistent with women's experiences in the control condition.
1735	2	35	Those participants entered the lab believing that meritocracy exists and while in the lab were told they failed because of their own individual ability.
1736	1	1	Second, disbelieving that meritocracy exists was consistent with women's experience in the discrimination condition.
1736	1	9	As Janoff-Bulman (1992) notes, then, positive world assumptions that have previously been challenged (e.g., disbelief that meritocracy exists) may serve to inoculate people against future distress (e.g., first-time discrimination).
1736	1	18	Furthermore, consistent with past research (e.g., Schmader et al., 2001), the present study found a relationship between past discrimination and meritocracy beliefs.
1736	1	20	It was, however, a low correlation, with discrimination accounting for only approximately 11% of the variability in meritocracy beliefs.
1736	1	21	Women who entered the lab with a disbelief that meritocracy exists may therefore have come to that belief for reasons other than past discrimination.
1736	1	25	Exploring those reasons may ultimately be important in understanding the buffering qualities of disbelief in the existence of meritocracy.
1736	1	48	Despite such limitations, however, this study suggests that encouraging a disbelief in meritocracy may be a useful educational tool to enhance well-being for those experiencing first-time acute instances of discrimination.

1736	2	6	<p>It may instead be necessary to encourage a disbelief in meritocracy's existence in situations where there is a high incidence of discrimination or to combine disbelief with alternative buffers to individual stressors (e.g., selfaffirmation) (Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 1999; Steele, 1988).</p>
1736	2	11	<p>Also notable is that a disbelief in the existence of meritocracy served as a buffer against obvious discrimination.</p>
1736	2	33	<p>This study suggests that under such conditions, a disbelief in meritocracy may be one of these strategies.</p>

Gillies, V. (2005).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
837	1	14	Walkerdine (1996) has also shown how traditional sociological understandings of class in terms of occupational or economic status, are caught within this framework, reinforcing dominant discourses around mobility and merit.	
837	1	22		According to Giddens (1998), achieving a more meritocratic society requires people to embrace their individualized citizenship and become 'responsible risk takers'.
837	1	39		Inequalities among the 'included' majority are then normalized, with both the privileges of the rich and the struggles of the poor rationalized through reference to an inclusive, meritocratic society.
839	1	10		In reviewing research highlighting early developmental differences in low-income children (Feinstein and Symons, 1999), Hodge draws the conclusion that poor parents are failing to impart the necessary skills and traits that are needed to sustain a meritocratic society.
849	1	39		Complex and often painful pressures face middle-class parents and their children as a result of this meritocratic ideal.

Foster, M., Sloto, L., & Ruby, R. (2006).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
403	2	20		We, however, focused on meritocracy beliefs, as a belief that is referred to by several authors as a persistent ideology in North America (e.g. Jost & Banaji, 1994; Kleugal & Smith, 1986; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).
403	2	24		Meritocracy beliefs are most commonly defined as a preference for the merit principle, or an endorsement of merit as an appropriate way of distributing goods (Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002), which reflects what people think should happen.
403	2	26	Meritocracy beliefs are most commonly defined as a preference for the merit principle, or an endorsement of merit as an appropriate way of distributing goods (Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002), which reflects what people think should happen.	
403	2	26	Meritocracy beliefs are most commonly defined as a preference for the merit principle, or an endorsement of merit as an appropriate way of distributing goods (Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002), which reflects what people think should happen.	
403	2	31		In contrast, we examined a belief or disbelief in the existence of the meritocracy (Lalonde, Doan & Patterson, 2000), reflecting what people think does happen.

403	2	35		<p>We used the latter definition as a world assumption because although individuals may endorse the meritocracy as a positive goal, they may or may not assume that it has not been achieved.</p>
403	2	38		<p>As such, belief in the existence of the meritocracy reflects an assumption about how the current system operates.</p>
404	1	6		<p>Thus we were interested in how meritocracy beliefs would moderate this relationship.</p>
404	1	18		<p>Given the relationship between stronger perceptions of personal discrimination and increased collective action (e.g. Foster & Matheson, 1995, 1999; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996), we were interested in how meritocracy beliefs would moderate this relationship.</p>
404	1	47		<p>We expected an interaction between meritocracy beliefs and personal discrimination on responses to discrimination (self-esteem, collective action, intergroup anxiety) (see Figure 1 for hypothesized interaction).</p>
404	2	12		<p>Thus, we expected that among those who have experienced discrimination, those who believe the meritocracy exists (mismatch) will report lower self-esteem and collective action as well as increased intergroup anxiety than those who disbelieve the meritocracy exists.</p>

404	2	16	Thus, we expected that among those who have experienced discrimination, those who believe the meritocracy exists (mismatch) will report lower self-esteem and collective action as well as increased intergroup anxiety than those who disbelieve the meritocracy exists.
404	2	18	Similar hypotheses were made about how meritocracy beliefs may affect well-being among those who have not experienced personal discrimination.
404	2	21	Those who have not experienced discrimination and believe the meritocracy exists are reporting experiences that are consistent with their beliefs, and likely have unshattered assumptions.
404	2	26	In contrast, those who have not experienced personal discrimination but disbelieve the meritocracy exists are reporting a mismatch between their experiences (no discrimination) and beliefs (the system does not provide equal opportunities to all groups).
405	1	9	Thus, we expected that among those who have not experienced discrimination, believers in the meritocracy would report greater self-esteem, collective action and less intergroup anxiety than disbelievers.
405	1	42	Meritocracy beliefs Four items from Lalonde et al.'s (2000) Belief in meritocracy ideology scale were rated using a 7-point scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree).
405	1	43	Meritocracy beliefs Four items from Lalonde et al.'s (2000) Belief in meritocracy ideology scale were rated using a 7-point scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree).
405	2	4	Items were recoded so that higher scores reflected the belief that the meritocracy exists.

406	1	12	To test how personal discrimination and beliefs about the meritocracy predicted responses to discrimination, several regression analyses were conducted on the combined sample.
406	2	9	Among those who reported high personal discrimination, a stronger belief that the meritocracy exists was associated with lower self-esteem ($= -.34$; $t(131) = -2.77$, $p = .006$).
406	2	16	Among those who reported little personal discrimination, stronger beliefs that the meritocracy exists (i.e. matched experiences and beliefs) was associated with greater self-esteem ($= .25$; $t(131) = 2.057$, $p = .042$).
407	1	8	Consistent with expectations, there was a simple effect of meritocracy beliefs among those who have experienced personal discrimination such that a stronger belief in the meritocracy was associated with lower action-taking ($= -.33$; $t(131) = -2.95$, $p = .004$), again suggesting that those with a mismatch between experiences and beliefs took less action.
407	1	10	Consistent with expectations, there was a simple effect of meritocracy beliefs among those who have experienced personal discrimination such that a stronger belief in the meritocracy was associated with lower action-taking ($= -.33$; $t(131) = -2.95$, $p = .004$), again suggesting that those with a mismatch between experiences and beliefs took less action.
407	2	13	Among those who perceived personal discrimination, stronger beliefs that the meritocracy exists was associated with greater intergroup anxiety, $= .32$, $t(128) = 2.50$, $p = .014$.

407	2	21	Among those who perceived little personal discrimination, meritocracy beliefs were not associated with intergroup anxiety $= -.19$, $t(128) = -1.53$, $p = .128$.
408	1	4	Compared to those whose reported experiences and beliefs were consistent, those whose experiences of discrimination did not match their beliefs that the meritocracy exists reported less self-esteem and greater intergroup anxiety, suggesting that they appeared to feel greater discomfort not only with themselves, but with others who also experience discrimination.
408	1	24	Those who believe the meritocracy exists but experience discrimination may be a group whose negative experiences are shattering their world assumptions, and such are experiencing greater distress, not only on a psychological level, but a social one.
408	1	32	In contrast, those with discrimination experiences that were consistent with their beliefs that the meritocracy does not exist reported more positive responses to discrimination (increased self-esteem and action, decreased intergroup anxiety).
408	1	43	This suggests that encouraging a disbelief in the meritocracy may be a useful educational tool to enhance psychological, social and intergroup benefits for those experiencing discrimination.
408	2	4	Also as expected, those who reported little personal discrimination and believe the meritocracy exists, reported greater self esteem than disbelievers.

408	2	11	In contrast, the fact that disbelievers reported lower self-esteem suggests that being critical of the meritocracy may not be useful for disadvantaged group members who have not yet experienced discrimination.
408	2	46	Consistent with this, our recent work (Foster & Tsarfati, 2005) has examined how women who reported no prior experiences with discrimination, and who either believed or disbelieved the meritocracy exists, would respond to an acute laboratory situation of discrimination.
409	1	1	Results showed that those with no prior experience, but disbelieved the meritocracy exists, showed greater wellbeing upon experiencing acute discrimination than believers.
409	2	5	To test for a possible moderating effect of gender and ethnicity, the two, three and four-way interactions between personal discrimination, meritocracy beliefs, sex and ethnicity were conducted.
409	2	8	The moderating effects of sex and/or ethnicity were significant in only one case: there was a significant sex by meritocracy beliefs interaction ($F(6, 119) = 3.61, p = .003$), such that among women, stronger beliefs that the meritocracy exists was associated with decreased collective action ($= -.42, p = .001$).
409	2	11	The moderating effects of sex and/or ethnicity were significant in only one case; there was a significant sex by meritocracy beliefs interaction ($F(6, 119) = 3.61, p = .003$), such that among women, stronger beliefs that the meritocracy exists was associated with decreased collective action ($= -.42, p = .001$).

409	2	14	Among men, there was a marginal relationship between stronger belief that the meritocracy exists and increased collective action (= .42, p = .06).
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Alon, S., & Tienda, M. (2007).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
487	1	4	Several recent social and demographic trends have rekindled debate about what constitutes merit in higher education and whether ascriptive criteria should be considered in college admissions.	
488	2	2	In this article, we evaluate the significance of changes in the relative weighting of merit criteria in college admissions for equalizing educational opportunity and increasing diversity.	
488	2	8		First, we offer historical evidence showing how the higher education "meritocracy" shifted, and we evaluate its consequences for the evolution of affirmative action practices.
489	1	3		Results show that selective institutions have increased their reliance on test scores to screen students, which we dub "the shifting meritocracy."
489	1	4		The emergence of a test-score meritocracy amid pervasive test-score gaps required selective institutions to give underrepresented minorities an admission boost to achieve campus diversity.
489	1	11	Our simulations, based on nationally representative data and from Texas after the implementation of the top 10 percent law, reveal that using class rank as a measure of merit requires smaller or no race preferences to achieve diversity and that ignoring test scores does not lower graduation rates.	
489	1	18		Meritocratic ideals are deeply entrenched in the consciousness of the U.S. public.

489	1	19		A meritocracy is a social system where individual talent and effort, rather than ascriptive traits, determine individuals' placements in a social hierarchy.
489	1	24		Although popularized in Young's <i>The Rise of the Meritocracy</i> (1958), the concept dates back to Plato.
489	1	25		Two defining features of meritocratic systems are competition and equality of opportunity.
489	1	36		In a truly meritocratic system, equal opportunity generates a high degree of social mobility because talent, unconstrained by social origin, rises to the top
489	1	40	The use of merit in admission decisions should ensure that the most meritorious youth are selected for the most selective institutions.	
489	1	41	The use of merit in admission decisions should ensure that the most meritorious youth are selected for the most selective institutions.	
489	1	43		The existence of meritocratic ideals presumes there is a consensus on what merit is, and that the multidimensional construct of merit can be adequately, if not accurately, measured
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489	1	45	The existence of meritocratic ideals presumes there is a consensus on what merit is, and that the multidimensional construct of merit can be adequately, if not accurately, measured	

489	1	51	We address this two-fold concern by examining two common measures of merit: class rank and test scores.	
489	2	5	The definition of merit shifted fundamentally in the past century, from mastering Latin and Greek, to having the right "character" and proper social background, to high test scores and grades (Karabel 2005; Lemann 1999)	
489	2	39	Testing Service (ETS) was founded in 1948. With increased demand for college education, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a telescoping on standardized test scores as a criterion for admission to selective institutions, rendering the SAT a prominent measure of merit by default (NACAC 2006).	
489	2	rodapé 10	In 1934, Harvard's representatives, seeking to screen candidates from the Midwest for a new merit scholarship, chose the SAT over other tests that measured subject-specific knowledge (Lemann 1999).	
490	1	39	In effect, the growing practice of using the mean SAT scores of entering freshmen to represent institutional quality has become a self-fulfilling prophecy and given legitimacy to the belief that achievement exams are a reliable measure of merit.	
491	1	27	In states that modified their admission regimes to circumvent statutory and judicial bans on the use of race sensitive admissions, class rank has become a preferred measure of merit (Horn and Flores 2003; Walker and Lavergne 2001).	

491	2	44		Opponents of affirmative action argue that in a true meritocracy, ascribed characteristics, such as race or national origin, should not influence educational opportunity.
492	1	13		Our empirical analyses illustrate how the shifting meritocracy has aggravated the affirmative action debate by accentuating the tension between merit and diversity and increasing the admission boost required to diversify campuses.
492	1	15		Our empirical analyses illustrate how the shifting meritocracy has aggravated the affirmative action debate by accentuating the tension between merit and diversity and increasing the admission boost required to diversify campuses.
493	1	39		We use the enrollment, rather than admission, data from all three data sets to characterize the shifting meritocracy.
494	2	1		Empirically, we test one set of hypotheses about the shifting meritocracy and another set about affirmative action.

494	2	3	<p>Shifting Meritocracy Hypotheses: Rising demand for postsecondary education suggests three testable hypotheses with respect to the weight of test- and performance based merit criteria and college destinations: (1) the magnitude of both test scores (a) and class rank (X) increases monotonically with institutional selectivity, implying that selective institutions rely on these merit criteria in selecting students more than nonselective schools do; (2) test scores receive a higher weight than class rank in admission decisions, especially at selective institutions ($a > X$); and (3) the weight of test scores increased over time?in 1992 the reliance on test scores was higher than in 1982 ($a_{82} < a_{92}$).</p>
494	2	7	<p>Shifting Meritocracy Hypotheses: Rising demand for postsecondary education suggests three testable hypotheses with respect to the weight of test- and performance based merit criteria and college destinations: (1) the magnitude of both test scores (a) and class rank (X) increases monotonically with institutional selectivity, implying that selective institutions rely on these merit criteria in selecting students more than nonselective schools do; (2) test scores receive a higher weight than class rank in admission decisions, especially at selective institutions ($a > X$); and (3) the weight of test scores increased over time?in 1992 the reliance on test scores was higher than in 1982 ($a_{82} < a_{92}$).</p>

494	2	12	<p>Shifting Meritocracy Hypotheses: Rising demand for postsecondary education suggests three testable hypotheses with respect to the weight of test- and performance-based merit criteria and college destinations: (1) the magnitude of both test scores (a) and class rank (X) increases monotonically with institutional selectivity, implying that selective institutions rely on these merit criteria in selecting students more than nonselective schools do; (2) test scores receive a higher weight than class rank in admission decisions, especially at selective institutions ($a > X$); and (3) the weight of test scores increased over time? in 1992 the reliance on test scores was higher than in 1982 ($a_{82} < a_{92}$).</p>	
495	1	20	<p>To assess whether the weight of merit criteria was uniform among demographic groups, we introduce two product terms between minority status and test scores/class rank to Equation 1, $\wedge^{>SXR}$ and TjC^i, to determine whether minorities' advantage increases uniformly with test scores and class rank or whether their advantage is constant across the test scores/class rank distributions (the formal test is whether $\beta > 0$ or $\gamma > 0$).</p>	
495	1	31	<p>Finally, to appreciate the significance of the shifting meritocracy for the affirmative action debate, we simulate several counterfactuals about minority students' enrollment advantages at the more selective institutions by constraining the temporal changes in the weight of test and performance-based merit criteria.</p>	

495	2	5	Finally, to appreciate the significance of the shifting meritocracy for the affirmative action debate, we simulate several counterfactuals about minority students' enrollment advantages at the more selective institutions by constraining the temporal changes in the weight of test and performance-based merit criteria.	
496	1	28	But whether this was associated with a trade-off between merit and diversity is an empirical question.	
496	1	31	Table 3 characterizes both national cohorts based on the two merit measures of interest: test scores and class rank.	
496	2	2	Group differences in class rank are smaller than those in test scores, especially in 1992, indicating more equal group distributions on this measure of merit.	
496	2	6	Table 4 reports odds ratios for the group dummies and the two merit criteria on the polytomous college destination outcome (two-year is the comparison group).	
496	2	25	For both cohorts the relative influence on enrollment of test- and performance-based merit indicators was similar across college destinations except for the more selective institutions, where the test-score weights are higher than those of class rank.	

496	2	32	Taken together, the results corroborate our hypotheses that the magnitude of the two effects corresponding to the use of race/ethnicity and merit criteria in admissions increases monotonically with institutional selectivity.	
496	2	Rodapé 16	The results show that all the coefficients of interest (race/ethnicity and the two merit criteria) are significant in all contrasts.	
498	1	2	We also test whether the weights of the two merit-based criteria are uniform across groups in both periods.	
498	1	4	That none of the 2-way product terms between race and merit are statistically significant indicates that minority students' admissions advantage is uniform across the test score and class rank distributions.	
499	1	28	None of the 3-way interaction terms among groups, year, and the two merit indicators attain statistical significance, which indicates uniform temporal changes in the weight of class rank and SAT scores for the four groups.	
499	1	37		The two graphs in the top panel (Figure 1a) clearly depict the shifting meritocracy.
499	2	29	One is the monotonic rise in the magnitudes of the merit coefficients among more selective institutions.	
499	2	41	Clearly, admissions officers at the most selective institutions use both merit criteria, but they accord greater weight to test scores compared with class rank.	

499	2	43			As hypothesized, this shifting meritocracy is accompanied by a monotonic rise in the magnitudes of the race coefficients, which confirms that affirmative action is largely used by the most selective institutions and to a lesser extent by the highly selective schools.
502	2	40		To maximize comparability between the merit measures, we also replace the percentile measures of test scores with a dummy designating top decile.	
503	1	Rodapé 4		Results (not shown) yield point estimates for the merit criteria that are very similar to the C&B results.	
503	2	8		Specifically, why do these elite institutions pay special attention to minority students' class rank while placing less weight on this merit criterion for white applicants?	
504	1	11		Because these attributes are unobserved in our specification, their influence is captured by class rank, the performance-based measure of academic merit, and the error term.	
504	1	30			Because the gap in test scores is larger than that in class rank, and because this disparity continues to rise, the minority disadvantage will persist and even widen if the college meritocracy continues its shift toward greater emphasis on test-based, relative to performance-based, measures of achievement.
504	1	33			A higher education meritocracy so defined requires affirmative action to achieve racial diversity.

504	1	37			To illustrate the affirmative action consequences of the shifting meritocracy, we simulate several counterfactuals about minority students' enrollment advantages at the more selective institutions (combining highly, very, and most selective) if the weights of performance- and test-based achievement criteria were different in 1992.
504	1	46			In other words we simulate the required minority advantage at the more selective institutions to maintain the same racial composition if the educational meritocracy were not shifting.
504	2	5		We simulate these scenarios by constraining the temporal changes in the weight of test- and performance-based merit criteria and estimating minority students' advantage while keeping the same racial and ethnic composition.	
504	2	17		First, while all other analyses conduct cross-sectional simulations, ours are longitudinal, linking changes in the weighting of merit criteria to the increase in minorities' admission advantages.	
504	2	23		Second, these studies evaluate the admission advantage granted to underrepresented minorities based on SAT gaps with whites, which, by default, reinforces beliefs about test scores as the most meaningful measure of merit.	

504	2	28	Third, our simulations are derived using probabilistic estimates that statistically allow all determinants to evolve as they actually did, except for the components of merit, to achieve the observed racial/ethnic composition of the enrollment cohorts at each point in time.	
505	1	14		Although these counterfactuals are limited in their capacity to simulate real world changes, they convey succinctly the affirmative action consequences of the shifting meritocracy toward greater reliance on test scores, almost rendering them sufficient for admissibility.
506	2	10	Moreover, consistent with other studies, in both years class rank remains a stronger predictor of six-year graduation compared to SAT scores. ²⁵ The UT-Austin data also reinforce our claims that SAT scores are overrated measures of merit because the pre- and post-1996 cohorts have academically equal performances.	
507	1	19	In this article we consider the impact of changes in the relative weighting of two merit criteria in college admissions for equalizing educational opportunity and increasing diversity.	
507	1	22		We document the shifting meritocracy? over time institutions have relied more heavily on standardized test scores to screen applicants.
507	2	12	Questioning the growing reliance on test scores in admission decisions is important because the definition of merit that prevails in a given society generally expresses the interests of its dominant groups (Karabel 2005).	

507	2	17	The emphasis on test scores in college admissions notably benefits those with more resources and the power to influence how merit is defined, while disadvantaging others.	
507	2	20		Our analyses demonstrate that the emergence of a test-score meritocracy amid pervasive test score gaps required selective institutions to give underrepresented minorities an admission boost to achieve campus diversity.
507	2	24	The seemingly inevitable tension between merit and diversity exists only when merit is narrowly defined by SAT scores.	
508	1	1	The seemingly inevitable tension between merit and diversity exists only when merit is narrowly defined by SAT scores.	
508	1	4	Our simulations and the Texas natural experiment show that defining merit using performance-based criteria, rather than test scores, is more compatible with institutional diversity.	
508	1	16	The intensifying college squeeze demanded a metric of merit to identify the "aristocracy of talent," and test scores assumed this role.	

508	1	35	Because the college squeeze is expected to intensify, the number of applications will continue to rise faster than openings at most colleges through about 2010 (College Board 2006). Researchers and policy makers should think of ways to recover the philosophy of equal opportunity that was derailed by the myth that test scores are the premier measure of merit.	
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McCooy, S. K., & Major, B. (2007).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
341	1	2	Americans adhere to a cultural worldview in which social rewards and status are assumed to reflect individual merit and hard work (Kluegel & Smith, 1986).	
341	1	8		Although endorsement of this belief in a meritocracy varies at the individual level, it is so widely held that it has been termed America's dominant ideology (Kluegel & Smith, 1986).
341	1	12		By locating the responsibility for social status within the efforts and abilities of individuals, the belief in meritocracy legitimizes existing status differences among individuals and groups and helps to justify the status quo (Augustinos, 1998; Gramsci, 1937/1971; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Lukacs, 1923/1971; Major, 1994; Major et al., 2002; Marx & Engels, 1846/1970; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Thompson, 1990). 1
341	1	4		In the current research, we examine the extent to which the belief in meritocracy leads individuals to psychologically justify status inequalities, even when those inequalities are disadvantageous to the self.
341	1	7	If the status hierarchy is based on merit, the logical inference is that those who have higher status must also be more talented, valuable, hardworking, or in other ways more meritorious than those who have lower status.	
341	1	9	If the status hierarchy is based on merit, the logical inference is that those who have higher status must also be more talented, valuable, hardworking, or in other ways more meritorious than those who have lower status.	

341	1	11	Indeed, research has shown that the more strongly individuals endorse meritocratic beliefs such as the belief in individual mobility (BIM; the belief that any individual can get ahead, regardless of their group membership), the protestant work ethic (PWE; the belief that hard work leads to success), or the belief in a just world (BJW), the more they favor members of higher status groups over lower status groups (e.g. Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002) and blame members of lower status groups for their relative disadvantage (e.g. Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001; Crandall, 1994; Katz & Hass, 1988).
342	1	1	Thus, individuals who endorse a meritocratic worldview psychologically justify the status hierarchy by viewing members of high status groups as more deserving than low status groups.
342	1	4	The system-justifying effects of endorsing meritocratic beliefs also occur among members of disadvantaged or lower status groups.
342	1	20	In sum, the belief in meritocracy leads to different assumptions about the deservingness or “worthiness” of members of high and low status groups.
342	1	29	If social status is assumed to be based on merit, one’s own (or ingroup’s) lower status will be seen as due more to a lack of effort or ability than to the discrimination of others.
342	1	33	It follows, then, that the more members of low status groups endorse a meritocracy worldview the more they may fail to recognize the extent to which they, or their group, face discrimination.
342	1	35	In contrast, the belief in meritocracy suggests that high status group members deserve their position of relative advantage.

342	1	38		Consequently, the more members of high status groups endorse a meritocracy worldview, the more they may view outcomes that favor low, over high, status groups or individuals as a violation of distributive justice principles.
342	1	43		Based on this reasoning, Major and colleagues (Major et al., 2002) hypothesized that greater endorsement of meritocratic beliefs would be associated with a reduced tendency among members of low status groups to see themselves and their group as victims of discrimination but with an enhanced tendency among members of high status groups to see themselves and their group as victims of discrimination.
342	1	51		Across a series of three studies, Major et al. (2002) found support for these hypotheses using an individual difference measure of the belief in meritocracy
342	1	54		The more strongly women endorsed meritocratic beliefs, the less likely they were to attribute rejection by a man (higher status) to discrimination.
342	2	1		In contrast, the more strongly men endorsed meritocratic beliefs the more likely they were to attribute rejection by a woman (lower status) to discrimination.
342	2	4		These studies did not demonstrate, however, that endorsement of meritocracy leads members of low status groups to psychologically justify their own disadvantage by blaming themselves for the rejection (i.e. no effect on internal attribution)
342	2	10		Because individuals who do not recognize that they are treated unjustly will not protest, status differences in perceptions of discrimination among those who endorse the belief in meritocracy serves to justify and maintain the existing status hierarchy
342	2	12		The above studies suggest that meritocratic beliefs lead people to engage in system justifying attributions.

342	2	14	Because meritocratic beliefs were measured rather than manipulated in the above research, however, they do not establish the causal impact of meritocracy beliefs on attributions.
342	2	16	Because meritocratic beliefs were measured rather than manipulated in the above research, however, they do not establish the causal impact of meritocracy beliefs on attributions.
342	2	17	It is possible that some unmeasured variable, rather than meritocracy beliefs, was responsible for the observed pattern of results.
342	2	19	Furthermore, because meritocracy beliefs were measured as an individual difference variable, these studies imply that psychological system justification may occur only among individuals who strongly endorse a meritocratic worldview.
342	2	22	Furthermore, because meritocracy beliefs were measured as an individual difference variable, these studies imply that psychological system justification may occur only among individuals who strongly endorse a meritocratic worldview.
342	2	23	We believe that because meritocracy is a dominant worldview in North American society it is well known to members of this cultural context, even if they do not personally endorse this worldview.
342	2	27	Thus, we believe that subtle meritocracy cues in the immediate environment can induce system justifying responses among individuals who are aware of this worldview, irrespective of personal endorsement.
342	2	31	Finally, previous research has not directly tested the hypothesis that meritocracy beliefs can lead members of low status groups to psychologically justify the system by perceiving their own disadvantage as deserved.

342	2	36	First, rather than measuring individual differences in meritocracy beliefs, the studies reported here experimentally manipulated meritocracy beliefs using a subtle priming procedure.
342	2	37	First, rather than measuring individual differences in meritocracy beliefs, the studies reported here experimentally manipulated meritocracy beliefs using a subtle priming procedure.
342	2	39	Study 1 examined whether experimentally activating meritocracy attributions of personal disadvantage to discrimination in a manner similar to personal endorsement of meritocracy beliefs.
342	2	41	Study 1 examined whether experimentally activating meritocracy attributions of personal disadvantage to discrimination in a manner similar to personal endorsement of meritocracy beliefs.
342	2	43	Study 1 examined whether experimentally activating meritocracy attributions of personal disadvantage to discrimination in a manner similar to personal endorsement of meritocracy beliefs.
342	2	45	Second, we extended our prior research by examining whether activating meritocracy beliefs can lead to the psychological justification of blatant ingroup disadvantage (Study 2), as well as personal disadvantage (Study 1).
342	2	48	Third, in addition to examining the effects of activating meritocracy beliefs on attributions (Study 1), we also examined their impact on the extent to which participants viewed their group as a target of discrimination, and stereotyped themselves and their group in system-justifying ways (Study 2).
342	2	53	Meritocracy cues are ubiquitous in North American society

343	1	5		<p>The sheer pervasiveness of this message in America means that most citizens are aware of a meritocratic worldview, even if they do not personally endorse it.</p>
343	1	10		<p>Consequently, their thoughts, behaviors, and feelings may be influenced by this message whenever cues in the environment (e.g., motivational posters, advertisements, news stories about individuals who succeed despite adversity) make it salient. Specifically, when the belief in meritocracy is activated, individuals are likely to construe and explain the world around them in a manner consistent with this activated belief system</p>
343	1	15		<p>Based on this reasoning, we hypothesized that situational cues that activate meritocracy beliefs will cause individuals to engage in system-justifying responses.</p>
343	1	17		<p>Furthermore, we expected that activating meritocracy would produce responses similar to those observed among individuals for whom these beliefs are chronically activated (i.e., those who strongly endorse meritocracy beliefs).</p>
343	1	20		<p>Furthermore, we expected that activating meritocracy would produce responses similar to those observed among individuals for whom these beliefs are chronically activated (i.e., those who strongly endorse meritocracy beliefs).</p>
343	1	22		<p>We tested this hypothesis by experimentally priming the belief in meritocracy vs. neutral information and examining the effects of these primes on system justifying responses to personal and group disadvantage.</p>
343	1	26		<p>In an initial pilot study we developed a manipulation to prime meritocracy</p>

343	1	30		We expected that a meritocracy prime (relative to a neutral prime) would lead individuals rejected by a member of a higher status group to see the rejection as more just (e.g., to blame the rejection more on themselves), but would lead individuals rejected by a member of a lower status group to see it as less just (e.g., to blame the rejection more on discrimination).
343	1	37		In Experiment 2, we examined the effect of the meritocracy prime on the extent to which members of a low status group engage in system-justification when faced with group disadvantage.
343	1	41		We hypothesized that when faced with group disadvantage, women primed with meritocracy would be more likely than those not so primed to justify the social system by minimizing discrimination against women and by stereotyping women, men, and themselves in ways that justify men's higher status relative to women's.
343	2	6		Thus, we predicted that priming individuals with meritocracy concepts would result in thoughts and behavior consistent with individual endorsement of a meritocracy worldview.
343	2	8		Thus, we predicted that priming individuals with meritocracy concepts would result in thoughts and behavior consistent with individual endorsement of a meritocracy worldview.
343	2	10		Some prior research has demonstrated that temporarily activating meritocracy beliefs does influence perceptions of low status groups

343	2	21	In related research, Quinn and Crocker (1999) found that overweight women who read and summarized a passage exemplifying meritocracy prior to reading about prejudice toward the overweight, subsequently reported lower self-esteem than overweight women who Wrist summarized a passage exemplifying an inclusive ideology
343	2	28	As a Wrist step in our research, we conducted a pilot study to ascertain whether subtly priming simple concepts relevant to meritocracy via a sentence unscramble task would temporarily increase endorsement of a meritocratic worldview.
343	2	29	As a Wrist step in our research, we conducted a pilot study to ascertain whether subtly priming simple concepts relevant to meritocracy via a sentence unscramble task would temporarily increase endorsement of a meritocratic worldview
343	2	34	This departs from the work reviewed above that used much more overt manipulations of the salience of meritocracy.
343	2	44	Those who agreed completed one of two priming tasks, followed by distracter and meritocracy questionnaires
343	2	47	We used a scrambled sentence task (e.g. Bargh et al., 1996; Srull & Wyer, 1979) to prime meritocracy.
343	2	50	Participants were given 5 min to unscramble 20 sets of 5 words into 4 word sentences. These sentences unscrambled to make meritocracy or neutral content salient.
343	2	51	For example, in the meritocracy prime condition, “eVort positive prosperity leads to” unscrambled to “EVort leads to prosperity”, “ people are merit judge on” unscrambled to “Judge people on merit”, “deserve people rich house it” unscrambled to “Rich people deserve it.”

343	2	53	For example, in the meritocracy prime condition, “eVort positive prosperity leads to” unscrambled to “EVort leads to prosperity”, “people are merit judge on” unscrambled to “Judge people on merit”, “deserve people rich house it” unscrambled to “Rich people deserve it.”	
344	1	1	For example, in the meritocracy prime condition, “eVort positive prosperity leads to” unscrambled to “EVort leads to prosperity”, “people are merit judge on” unscrambled to “Judge people on merit”, “deserve people rich house it” unscrambled to “Rich people deserve it.”	
344	1	2		The meritocracy prime condition contained 15 prime sentences and 5 neutral sentences.
344	1	5		Participants in the neutral condition1 unscrambled sentences that were unrelated to meritocracy (e.g. “a computer time calculator saves”, “by college goes quickly time”, “cakes she XuVy likes cats”).
344	1	9		Once time was called, participants completed a brief distraction questionnaire prior to completing the meritocracy questionnaire.
344	1	10		Endorsement of meritocracy.
344	1	11		We assessed endorsement of meritocracy with the four individual mobility items used by Major et al. (2002): “America is an open society where all individuals can achieve higher status”; “Individual members of certain groups are often unable to advance in American society” (reverse scored); “Most people who don’t get ahead should not blame the system; they really have only themselves to blame”; “Individual members of certain groups have difficulty achieving higher status” (reverse scored).

344	1	22	Prior research has shown that endorsement of individual mobility beliefs is positively and significantly correlated with endorsement of other merit-related beliefs, including BIW, PWE, and the belief in system legitimacy (see O'Brien & Major, 2005).	
344	1	29		There were no significant differences in number of sentences unscrambled by prime condition (Meritocracy: MD 18.06; Neutral: MD 18.56).
344	1	30		As predicted, priming meritocracy concepts led both the high and low status groups (men and women) to more strongly agree that America is an open society in which success is possible for all individuals (MD 4.03, SDD 1.16) than priming neutral content (MD 3.43, SD D.59); $t(30)D \geq 2.11$, ($p < .05$).
344	1	36		Thus, our pilot study established that priming simple concepts related to meritocracy temporarily increased personal endorsement of meritocratic beliefs.
344	1	37		Thus, our pilot study established that priming simple concepts related to meritocracy temporarily increased personal endorsement of meritocratic beliefs.
344	2	6	Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that priming the belief that status is based on merit prompts individuals to engage in system-justifying responses to explain personal disadvantage.	
344	2	9		Specifically, we hypothesized that when primed with meritocracy (relative to a neutral prime), members of a lower status group (women) who were rejected by a member of a higher status group (men) would engage in system justification by blaming the rejection more on themselves (their poor work) than on discrimination.

344	2	14	In contrast, we predicted that when primed with meritocracy (relative to a neutral prime), members of a higher status group who were rejected by a member of a lower status group would engage in system justification by blaming the rejection more on discrimination than on themselves.
344	2	25	Males and females were randomly assigned to one of two prime conditions, resulting in a 2 (Status: High (male), Low (female)) \times 2 (Prime: Meritocracy, Neutral) between-participants design.
344	1	Rodapé 2	We used a neutral prime rather than an egalitarian prime as the control condition for our meritocracy prime, consistent with Katz and Hass (1988).
344	1	Rodapé 4	Some researchers have used egalitarianism as the control condition for meritocracy (e.g. Biernat et al., 1996; Quinn & Crocker, 1999)
344	1	Rodapé 5	Although egalitarianism and meritocracy beliefs may appear antithetical, research has demonstrated that Americans simultaneously endorse both belief systems (Katz & Hass, 1988).
344	1	Rodapé 13	Interpretation of results becomes difficult when both egalitarianism and meritocracy are hypothesized to influence the dependent variable.
345	1	31	As in the pilot study, half of the participants were randomly assigned to unscramble sentences that primed meritocracy while the remaining half unscrambled sentences that were neutral in content.
345	2	31	We predicted that the extent to which participants blamed the rejection on discrimination vs. on themselves would be moderated by status and prime condition. To test this prediction, we conducted a 2 (Status: High, Low) \times 2 (Prime: Meritocracy, Neutral) mixed design ANOVA treating attribution type (Discrimination, Internal) as a repeated measure.

346	1	1	Consistent with our hypothesis that priming meritocracy would lead individuals to justify rejection when it came from a member of a higher status group, women primed with meritocracy blamed rejection by a male significantly more on themselves than on discrimination ($F(1, 71) D3.83 p < .05$).
346	1	4	Consistent with our hypothesis that priming meritocracy would lead individuals to justify rejection when it came from a member of a higher status group, women primed with meritocracy blamed rejection by a male significantly more on themselves than on discrimination ($F(1, 71) D3.83 p < .05$).
346	1	11	Examination of the means within each attribution suggests that this attributional pattern is primarily driven by the effect of meritocracy on increasing women's self-blame.
346	1	13	When primed with meritocracy, men blamed rejection by a woman as much on discrimination as on themselves ($F < .10$; $p > .80$).
346	1	20	Examination of the means within each attribution separately suggests that this attributional pattern is primarily driven by the effect of meritocracy on increasing men's attributions to discrimination.
346	1	23	Experiment 1 extends prior research by demonstrating that experimentally activating meritocracy beliefs leads to different attributions for rejection when people are rejected by a member of a higher vs. a lower status group
346	1	26	We predicted that a meritocracy prime (relative to a neutral prime) would increase the extent to which individuals explain rejection in ways that maintain the overall perceived justice of the status system.

346	1	29		Specifically, we expected that a meritocracy prime would lead individuals rejected by a member of a higher status group to see the rejection as more just, in that they would blame the rejection more on themselves than on discrimination.
346	1	34		In contrast, we predicted that a meritocracy prime would lead individuals rejected by a member of a lower status group to see the rejection as less just, in that they would blame the rejection more on discrimination than on themselves.
346	1	39		Results were largely consistent with our predictions. When meritocracy was salient, women blamed being rejected by a male (in favor of another male) more on the quality of their essay than on discrimination, thereby justifying the rejection.
346	1	42		They did not do so, however, when meritocracy was not made salient.
346	1	44		Further, women primed with meritocracy blamed themselves more, and tended to blame discrimination less than women primed with neutral content.
346	1	48		In contrast, men who were rejected by a woman (in favor of another woman) blamed this rejection on discrimination significantly more when primed with meritocracy than when primed with neutral content, although they did not blame discrimination more than they blamed themselves in this condition.
346	2	1	The contrasting attribution patterns observed here among women and men who were randomly assigned to a merit prime replicate the status differences in discrimination attributions observed by Major et al. (2002) in which meritocracy beliefs were measured as an individual difference variable.	
346	2	3		The contrasting attribution patterns observed here among women and men who were randomly assigned to a merit prime replicate the status differences in discrimination attributions observed by Major et al. (2002) in which meritocracy beliefs were measured as an individual difference variable.

346	2	4		In those studies, endorsement of meritocracy beliefs was negatively related to attributing rejection to discrimination among members of low status groups (women and Latinos), but was positively related to attributing rejection to discrimination among members of high status groups (men and Whites).
346	2	11		The current study extends these findings by demonstrating that situationally activating merit can cause individuals to engage in system justifying attributions and by specifically examining the relative pattern of internal and discrimination blame.
346	2	16		If the meritocracy prime simply primed “fairness” it should have led to an assimilation effect such that everyone exposed to the prime would have interpreted their rejection as more fair.
346	2	22		When members of the high status group were rejected by members of a lower status group, the meritocracy prime led to increased perceptions of unfairness (i.e. discrimination).
346	2	26		Together with the results of the pilot study, these data provide further validation that our sentence unscramble task effectively manipulates the belief in a meritocracy.
346	2	28		Although results of this first study are supportive of our hypothesis that priming meritocracy leads to system justification, there are several limitations.
346	2	31		First, although the attribution patterns in Experiment 1 are consistent with the hypothesis that priming meritocracy leads both men and women to view men as more deserving than women of high status, Experiment 1 did not test this hypothesis directly.
346	2	43		It may be relatively easy for individuals to construe these situations in a manner consistent with the activated belief in meritocracy.

346	2	49	Clear evidence of pervasive disadvantage at the group level, however, may be much more difficult to psychologically justify as consistent with a status hierarchy based on merit.	
346	2	51		We hypothesized, however, that when primed with the belief in meritocracy, exposure to information that violates this activated belief system will actually lead to increased and not decreased psychological system justification relative to information that does not violate this belief.
347	1	5		As discussed previously, we propose that when the belief in meritocracy is activated individuals will construe and explain the world around them in a manner consistent with this activated belief system.
347	1	21		Specifically, we hypothesize that individuals primed with meritocracy will be more likely to justify the system when faced with clear evidence that the status of their group is not merit based than when not faced with such evidence.
347	1	23	Specifically, we hypothesize that individuals primed with meritocracy will be more likely to justify the system when faced with clear evidence that the status of their group is not merit based than when not faced with such evidence.	
347	1	28		The function of worldviews such as meritocracy is to provide a sense of stability, predictability, and certainty in one's own life.
347	1	42		Thus, it is not merely injustice that motivates psychological system justification in the presence of meritocracy cues.
347	1	44		Rather, it is evidence of self-relevant injustice that motivates individuals primed with meritocracy to justify their own social system.

347	1	49	In Experiment 2, we examined whether exposure to a meritocracy prime (relative to a neutral prime) increases the extent to which individuals engage in system justification when faced with evidence of pervasive prejudice against their group.
347	2	3	Women were randomly assigned to read about prejudice toward women at their own university, or prejudice toward a group outside the American social system (the Inuit in Canada) following completion of either the meritocracy or neutral prime. We hypothesized that, compared to women primed with neutral content, women exposed to sexism and primed with meritocracy would be more likely to endorse gender stereotypes that imply that men are more deserving of high status than women, and more likely to describe themselves in gender stereotypical ways (i.e., as less competent and more warm) than women in the remaining three conditions.
347	2	9	More interestingly, we also hypothesized that among women who read about pervasive sexism those primed with meritocracy would minimize the extent to which they and women as a group face discrimination compared to women primed with neutral content.
347	2	13	We further hypothesized that women exposed to sexism and primed with meritocracy would be more likely to endorse gender stereotypes that imply that men are more deserving of high status than women, and more likely to describe themselves in gender stereotypical ways (i.e., as less competent and more warm) than women in the remaining three conditions.
347	2	52	Participants were 41 undergraduate women (mean age 18.6 years, SD 1.40 years) who received course credit in exchange for their participation. Participants were predominantly European American (68.3%), with the remainder reporting Asian American (7.3%), Latina American (2.4%), or "other" (21.9%) racial/ethnic backgrounds. They were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (Prime: Meritocracy, Neutral) x 2 (Article: Sexism, Inuit) between participants design.

348	1	12	As in Experiment 1, participants were randomly assigned to complete either the meritocracy or neutral sentence unscramble prime.
348	2	47	As recommended by Rosenthal, Rosnow, and Rubin (2000), we conducted a priori contrasts to test our focused predictions that women in the meritocracy prime condition who read about pervasive sexism would be more likely to engage in psychological system justification relative to women in the remaining conditions.
349	1	16	We next examined whether the meritocracy prime reduced perceptions of discrimination.
349	1	20	Consistent with predictions, women who read an article about prejudice against women perceived significantly less sexism if primed with meritocracy than if primed with neutral content ($t(34) = 2.92, p < .001$; see Table 2 for means).
349	1	26	We conducted an a priori contrast to test our focused prediction that women in the meritocracy prime condition who read about prejudice against women would be more likely to endorse system-justifying stereotypes (stereotypes that locate the cause of gender differences in status within characteristics of women and men) compared to women in the other three conditions.
349	1	32	To test this prediction, we compared the mean of the meritocracy prime/sexism condition to the three remaining conditions.
349	1	34	As predicted, women primed with meritocracy who read about sexism endorsed system-justifying stereotypes to a significantly greater extent than did women in the other three conditions ($t(34) = 2.08, p < .05$; see Table 2 for means).
349	2	1	Specifically, we predicted that women exposed to sexism and primed with meritocracy would also rate themselves significantly higher on warmth traits than on competence traits compared to women in the other three conditions.

349	2	5		<p>We conducted a one way mixed design ANOVA testing our meritocracy prime/sexism article condition against the remaining conditions on the within subjects variable of trait ratings (warmth, competence).</p>
349	2	10		<p>Only women who were primed with meritocracy and who read the sexism article rated themselves significantly higher on warmth traits than on competence traits ($F(1, 34) = 15.25, p < .001$).</p>
349	2	17		<p>The self-stereotyping pattern of trait endorsement observed in the meritocracy prime/sexism condition appears to be driven by the effect of the meritocracy prime on both increasing warmth and decreasing competence trait ratings relative to the remaining conditions.</p>
349	2	18		<p>The self-stereotyping pattern of trait endorsement observed in the meritocracy prime/sexism condition appears to be driven by the effect of the meritocracy prime on both increasing warmth and decreasing competence trait ratings relative to the remaining conditions.</p>
349	2	22		<p>Experiment 2 demonstrated that subtle activation of the belief in meritocracy influences the construal of even the most overt inequality messages.</p>
349	2	25		<p>When faced with evidence of the widespread disadvantage of their ingroup and primed with meritocracy, women were more likely to justify this disadvantage by minimizing sexism, by endorsing stereotypes that justify women's subordinate status relative to men, and by self-stereotyping (as more warm than competent) than women in the remaining conditions.</p>
349	2	30		<p>Experiment 2 furthered our investigation of meritocracy's role in the justification of disadvantage in two important ways.</p>
349	2	38		<p>Second, perhaps most surprisingly, we demonstrated that system justifying responses are most likely when the belief in meritocracy is both salient and threatened by belief violating evidence.</p>

349	2	41	An alternative hypothesis could have been that in the face of clear evidence of sexism subtle meritocracy cues would exert little effect on women's perceptions of sexism.
349	2	44	Women who read about sexism, however, increased their system justifying responses when primed with meritocracy.
350	1	3	Thus, these data support our dissonance based argument by demonstrating increased adherence to the belief in meritocracy in the face of meritocracy-opposing evidence.
350	1	4	We propose that situational cues that make meritocratic beliefs salient increase the extent to which individuals psychologically justify existing status inequalities in society, even when those inequalities are disadvantageous to the self.
350	1	9	In Experiment 1, we demonstrated that when primed with meritocracy both high and low status individuals explained an ambiguous personal rejection in a manner consistent with the activated belief.
350	1	12	In particular, women primed with meritocracy were more likely to view the rejection as deserved and fair than women primed with neutral content.
350	1	14	Men primed with meritocracy, in contrast, were more likely to view the rejection as discriminatory than men primed with neutral content.
350	1	17	In Experiment 2, we examined the effect of priming meritocracy on system justifying responses in the face of clear evidence of injustice.
350	1	19	Subtle activation of the belief in meritocracy led women who read about pervasive sexism to minimize perceptions of sexism and to stereotype themselves, and women in general, in ways that justified women's subordinate status

350	1	26	Our findings demonstrate that subtle meritocracy cues can result in psychological system justification in the face of disadvantage.
350	1	29	Our effects occurred irrespective of personal endorsement of the belief in meritocracy.
350	1	50	This is in contrast with some previous research that has shown meritocracy primes effects only among individuals who personally endorsed the belief (e.g. Biernat et al., 1996).
350	1	53	This divergence in findings may be due to the nature of the meritocracy prime.
350	1	59	Our data suggest that regardless of individual level of endorsement, Americans who are aware of the cultural ideology of meritocracy may be subject to its influence without their awareness.
350	1	64	In previous work, we have demonstrated that endorsement of a meritocratic worldview functions similarly to reduce perceptions of discrimination among women, African Americans, and Latino/a Americans (Major et al., 2002).
350	2	2	which may influence their reaction to a meritocracy prime.
350	2	3	For example, priming meritocracy among African Americans could arguably lead to a contrast effect and increased perceptions of discrimination in the face of personal and group disadvantage.
350	2	9	Thus, although we propose that the meritocracy prime will function similarly for all low status groups, this remains an open question.
350	2	13	Second, we examined the effects of priming one type of cultural ideology in the present research: the belief in a meritocracy.
350	2	17	Cues that activate egalitarianism are arguably just as pervasive as are cues that activate meritocracy.

350	2	29	<p>Third, the current research examined the effects of priming meritocracy on ways of psychologically justifying the existing status hierarchy.</p>
350	2	35	<p>In related research we found that when exposed to evidence of pervasive discrimination against their group, members of low status groups (women, Latino-Americans) who endorse the belief in a meritocracy report lower self-esteem, whereas those who reject meritocracy beliefs report higher self-esteem (Major et al., 2006).</p>
350	2	36	<p>In related research we found that when exposed to evidence of pervasive discrimination against their group, members of low status groups (women, Latino-Americans) who endorse the belief in a meritocracy report lower self-esteem, whereas those who reject meritocracy beliefs report higher self-esteem (Major et al., 2006).</p>
350	2	40	<p>We hypothesize that these self-esteem effects result from the fact that pervasive discrimination violates the worldview of those who endorse a meritocratic worldview but whereas the worldview of those who reject a meritocratic worldview (Major et al., 2006) Finally, endorsement of meritocracy may be beneficial for psychological wellbeing in the face of transient personal disadvantage.</p>
350	2	41	<p>We hypothesize that these self-esteem effects result from the fact that pervasive discrimination violates the worldview of those who endorse a meritocratic worldview but whereas the worldview of those who reject a meritocratic worldview (Major et al., 2006) Finally, endorsement of meritocracy may be beneficial for psychological wellbeing in the face of transient personal disadvantage.</p>

350	2	42	<p>We hypothesize that these self-esteem effects result from the fact that pervasive discrimination violates the worldview of those who endorse a meritocratic worldview but verifies the worldview of those who reject a meritocratic worldview (Major et al., 2006) Finally, endorsement of meritocracy may be beneficial for psychological wellbeing in the face of transient personal disadvantage.</p>
350	2	45	<p>Such disadvantage is less of a threat to the meritocratic worldview, and, the belief in a meritocracy can increase perceptions of control over, and decrease the anxiety associated with, the negative event (McCoy, 2003).</p>
350	2	46	<p>Such disadvantage is less of a threat to the meritocratic worldview, and, the belief in a meritocracy can increase perceptions of control over, and decrease the anxiety associated with, the negative event (McCoy, 2003).</p>
350	2	51	<p>The current research represents a significant advance over our previous work examining the effects of individual differences in meritocracy beliefs (i.e. Major et al., 2002).</p>
350	2	54	<p>First, we demonstrated that all individuals, regardless of personal level of endorsement, may be subject to the influence of subtle meritocracy cues.</p>
351	1	1	<p>Second, we provided evidence that meritocracy cues can lead to the psychological justification of personal and ingroup disadvantage.</p>
351	1	4	<p>Specifically, we demonstrated that women primed with meritocracy were more likely to blame themselves vs. discrimination for a personal rejection, perceived less sexism, and stereotyped themselves and women in general in subordinate ways.</p>
351	1	13	<p>Subtle cues to meritocracy in the cultural environment may encourage members of low status groups to construe personal and group disadvantage as deserved and to minimize the perception that such disadvantage is due to discrimination.</p>

351	1	18		These system justifying responses to meritocracy cues may be most likely precisely when individuals would least like them to occur: in the presence of clear, meritocracy-violating inequality.
351	1	20		These system justifying responses to meritocracy cues may be most likely precisely when individuals would least like them to occur: in the presence of clear, meritocracy-violating inequality.

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Página	Columna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
1479	1	2	This study helps to fill a significant gap in the literature on organizations and inequality by investigating the central role of merit-based reward systems in shaping gender and racial disparities in wages and promotions.	
1479	1	13	s. This finding demonstrates a critical challenge faced by the many contemporary employers who adopt merit-based practices and policies.	
1479	1	15		Although these policies are often adopted in the hope of motivating employees and ensuring meritocracy, policies with limited transparency and accountability can actually increase ascriptive bias and reduce equity in the workplace.
1480	1	29	One approach that has gained considerable popularity is the use of merit-based practices in organizations.	
1481	1	3	However, this traditional model of employment has gradually been replaced by market-driven employment strategies, including merit-based reward systems and other performance management practices (Cappelli et al. 1997; Cappelli 1999).	
1481	1	5	Perhaps organizations are increasingly adopting these merit-based practices and standards in the hope of ensuring that rewards are allocated meritocratically and eliminating inequity (Jackson 1998).	
1481	1	7		Perhaps organizations are increasingly adopting these merit-based practices and standards in the hope of ensuring that rewards are allocated meritocratically and eliminating inequity (Jackson 1998).
1481	1	19	One of the key aspects of this market-driven way of organizing work has been the adoption of pay-for-performance and performance-management systems to measure and reward employees' merit and contributions to the company.	

1481	1	26	Even though the study of pay-for-performance programs promises to contribute to our understanding of whether contemporary organizations that adopt merit-based practices remedy gender and racial inequality, we know little to date about how these policies influence the distribution of salaries and other rewards among employees.	
1481	1	30	A few recent studies have looked at employee wages and careers within organizations, but in doing so they have ignored the role of merit and performance evaluations (for a review, see Petersen and Saporta [2004])	
1481	1	35	In addition, this body of research is incomplete because it has not examined in depth how these organizational merit-based practices can create the “opportunity structure” for gender and race discrimination (Petersen and Saporta 2004).	
1481	1	38	In addition, this body of research is incomplete because it has not examined in depth how these organizational merit-based practices can create the “opportunity structure” for gender and race discrimination (Petersen and Saporta 2004).	
1481	1	41	In order to make progress in our understanding of organizations and social stratification, I investigate in this article the role formal merit-based reward systems play in shaping gender and racial disparities in the distribution of wages in one work organization. Specifically, I examine the relationships between performance evaluations and two key outcomes—wage growth and promotions—using personnel data from a large service organization in the United States that started a performance evaluation	

1482	1	Rodapé 13	<p>I later argue that if merit-based practices linking performance evaluations to employee rewards work the way advocates of meritocracy claim, then their conclusion of stage 2 (that is, the performance-reward process) should also explain away both the direct effect of ascriptive characteristics (arrow 2) as well as the interaction effects between ratings and ascriptive characteristics (arrow 3) on employee outcomes over time.</p>	
1483	1	4	<p>For the first time in the literature on organizations and gender/racial inequality, I develop and test two theoretical propositions that isolate processes of what I call performance-reward bias, whereby, even after merit is constructed in the performance evaluation stage, employers consciously or unconsciously discount the performance ratings of employees because of their gender, race, or nationality, <i>ceteris paribus</i>.</p>	
1483	1	10	<p>Because equal merit results in equal rewards in any truly meritocratic system, a key challenge of these systems is how to measure merit.</p>	
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1483	1	Rodapé 2	<p>I later argue that if merit-based practices linking performance evaluations to employee rewards work the way advocates of meritocracy claim, then their conclusion of stage 2 (that is, the performance-reward process) should also explain away both the direct effect of ascriptive characteristics (arrow 2) as well as the interaction effects between ratings and ascriptive characteristics (arrow 3) on employee outcomes over time.</p>	

1483	1	Rodapé 10	Consistent with the valuative discrimination literature, the performance-reward bias is a more precise mechanism under which, once the merit or performance score has been constructed for each employee in the evaluation process, some workers still obtain different rewards for the same score as others.	
1484	1	1	Once merit is measured for each employee, though, any differential reward for the same merit score is evidence of this performance-reward bias.	
1484	1	2	Once merit is measured for each employee, though, any differential reward for the same merit score is evidence of this performance-reward bias.	
1484	1	22		Ironically, while the practice of linking salary increases to performance ratings can create the appearance of meritocracy, it also creates the second (as well as the first) stage of performance management and thereby introduces the possibility of bias and discrimination.
1484	1	Rodapé 1	The main empirical question of the article is whether similar measures of “merit” lead to similar levels of reward.	
1484	1	Rodapé 2		I treat meritocracy as a process in which merit is somehow measured and then compensated.
1484	1	Rodapé 2	I treat meritocracy as a process in which merit is somehow measured and then compensated.	
1484	1	Rodapé 3		Meritocracy is thus one possible way of assigning rewards (nepotism and seniority, e.g., are other ways).
1484	1	Rodapé 5		This is a definition of meritocracy as a process, not as a value.
1484	1	Rodapé 7	Seen through this lens, the question at issue in the article is whether the process is consistent and, therefore, whether employees get the same reward for the same level of merit regardless of their gender, race, or nationality.	

1484	1	Rodapé 10	If rewards are not consistent, they are either arbitrary (no telling who gets what rewards), discriminatory (some groups systematically get more or less rewards than others for equal levels of merit), or both at the same time.	
1484	1	Rodapé 10		Meritocracy is also, however, an ideology that justifies the distribution of rewards.
1484	1	Rodapé 12		Sometimes I may seem to equate meritocracy with fairness, because these two concepts are popularly equated, but what I study is not fairness by some substantive standard, or in the perception of the individuals being judged, but the consistency of the formal process of assigning rewards that we call merit based.
1484	1	Rodapé 15	Sometimes I may seem to equate meritocracy with fairness, because these two concepts are popularly equated, but what I study is not fairness by some substantive standard, or in the perception of the individuals being judged, but the consistency of the formal process of assigning rewards that we call merit based.	
1484	1	Rodapé 16		Unpacking what is actually happening inside a performance evaluation system described as meritocratic is the point of the study
1485	1	7	Finally, because the results of this study imply that merit-based policies with high transparency and accountability may reduce bias and increase equity, this is an important contribution to our thinking about how employer practices can counteract discrimination and remediate bias.	

1486	1	28	One reason is that decoupling these two processes and strengthening the tie between the performance evaluations of employees and their career outcomes encourages employees' perception of merit, increases job satisfaction, and motivates them to work hard (Martocchio 2004; Milkovich and Newman 2004)	
1486	1	Rodapé 10	In addition, reports by consulting firms indicate that higher-performing companies give out far more merit pay to their top performers than do lower-performing companies (IOMA 2000).	
1487	1	18	Despite wide interest in the issues of equity and fairness in the use of merit-based practices and their importance in helping us understand wage inequality in organizations, little research has explored how performance programs directly impact employees' wages and careers.	
1488	1	33	This potential link is especially important to study in organizations that adopt merit based reward systems.	
1489	1	3	Because of this gap in the literature, it is less understood at this point how gender, race, and performance—specifically, subjective performance evaluations aimed at measuring employee merit and contribution—influence employee career outcomes within organizations.	
1489	1	8	Studying the processes underpinning the link between the evaluation of merit and reward allocation is therefore vital if we are to understand inequality in today's organizations.	
1489	1	11		The most important challenge of meritocracy is measuring merit so that equal merit results in equal rewards.
1489	1	11	The most important challenge of meritocracy is measuring merit so that equal merit results in equal rewards.	
1489	1	12	The most important challenge of meritocracy is measuring merit so that equal merit results in equal rewards.	

1489	1	12	But once merit is measured for each employee, it is also crucial that there not be any differential rewards for the same merit scores.	
1489	1	14	But once merit is measured for each employee, it is also crucial that there not be any differential rewards for the same merit scores.	
1489	1	18	With this article, rather than looking into the specific motivations or determinants of discriminatory behaviors or whether the performance evaluations themselves are biased, I seek to explore how employee performance evaluations (used as a way of measuring employee merit and contribution) are associated with two important career-related outcomes, namely, salary increases and promotions, in one large service organization.	
1490	1	5	Formal merit-based practices linking performance evaluations to employee compensation and promotions are meritocratic when the following theoretical proposition is supported: Proposition 1.—After controlling for key human capital and job characteristics, equally performing employees are equally likely to obtain a performance-based reward, earn similar amounts in salary increases, and be promoted regardless of their non-performance-related demographic characteristics such as gender, race, or country of origin	
1490	1	6		Formal merit-based practices linking performance evaluations to employee compensation and promotions are meritocratic when the following theoretical proposition is supported: Proposition 1.—After controlling for key human capital and job characteristics, equally performing employees are equally likely to obtain a performance-based reward, earn similar amounts in salary increases, and be promoted regardless of their non-performance-related demographic characteristics such as gender, race, or country of origin

1490	1	27	<p>If formal merit-based practices linking performance evaluations to employee compensation and promotions are meritocratic, then the following proposition should be supported:</p> <p>Proposition 2.—The effects of performance ratings on the likelihood of obtaining a performance-based reward, earning similar amounts in salary increases, and being promoted are the same for all employees regardless of their non-performance-related demographic characteristics such as gender, race, or country of origin.</p>	
1490	1	28	<p>If formal merit-based practices linking performance evaluations to employee compensation and promotions are meritocratic, then the following proposition should be supported:</p> <p>Proposition 2.—The effects of performance ratings on the likelihood of obtaining a performance-based reward, earning similar amounts in salary increases, and being promoted are the same for all employees regardless of their non-performance-related demographic characteristics such as gender, race, or country of origin.</p>	
1490	1	Rodapé 2	<p>1 I emphasize here that this is the prediction when the design and implementation of this performance-based reward is meritocratic—i.e., when it ensures that (or the subjective evaluation of it) is the main predictor in the distribution of rewards</p>	
1493	1	6	Consequently, a performance appraisal must be completed for any employee obtaining a merit increase in order to validate the award.	
1497	1	7		Other company documents contain similar statements; this organization is clearly concerned with ensuring a meritocratic link between good performance and rewards: “[E]specially in years with budget constraints,] increases must be reserved for the most productive employees.”
1512	1	11	Theoretically, I claim that the use of merit-based reward systems such as this one can result in organizations introducing bias at two different stages (as summarized in fig. 1).	

1512	1	25		In my analyses, I find empirical evidence that both of these scenarios exist at the organization under study, leading me to reject the meritocratic claims for this performance-reward system.
1512	1	28	Even in a work organization that institutionally values and supports the allocation of compensation on the basis of merit, I show bias in the translation of performance evaluation scores into amounts of salary increases over time: different salary increases are granted for observationally equivalent employees (i.e., those in the same job and work unit, with the same supervisor	
1517	1	11		I believe that this research can be extended in several promising directions toward an understanding of race, gender, and meritocracy in organizational careers.
1517	1	Rodapé 7	This would imply that white males are receiving lower performance ratings than their true performance merits—but we know from the experimental literature that this is not the case (see Biernat and Kobrynowicz 1997).	
1518	1	27		Thus, the use of performance-based bonuses may even appear to be quite meritocratic and unbiased.
1519	1	13	Although I study only a single organization, it is worth noting that this organization's human resource practices are not very different from those of current organizations that have chosen to adopt merit-based practices for distributing rewards among employees.	
1519	1	15	According to Noe et al. (2006, p. 504), some type of merit-pay program "exists in almost all organizations (although evidence on merit pay effectiveness is surprisingly scarce)."	
1519	1	16	According to Noe et al. (2006, p. 504), some type of merit-pay program "exists in almost all organizations (although evidence on merit pay effectiveness is surprisingly scarce)."	

1519	1	18	Under the new system of market-driven employment practices (Cappelli 1999), organizations introduce performance-reward programs and other merit-based practices—perhaps in the hope of ensuring that rewards are allocated meritocratically and eliminating unfairness (Jackson 1998).	
1519	1	19		Under the new system of market-driven employment practices (Cappelli 1999), organizations introduce performance-reward programs and other merit-based practices—perhaps in the hope of ensuring that rewards are allocated meritocratically and eliminating unfairness (Jackson 1998).
1519	1	33	Perhaps implicit in the creation and use of these programs is the presumption that today's organizational practices are based on merit and consequently that a significant positive relationship between performance, wages, and wage growth is institutionally valued and strongly supported. B But since meritbased reward systems often introduce a sequence of organizational processes or routines, I argue that the nature and implementation of these programs may make it possible for bias and discriminatory judgments to occur at several stages.	
1519	1	35		
1520	1	15	This performance-reward bias is a new form of valuatative discrimination, because once merit is measured in the appraisal process, women and minority employees still receive different rewards for the same merit scores as white men (after controlling for job, work unit, supervisor and other relevant human capital characteristics).	

1520	1	16	<p>This performance-reward bias is a new form of valiative discrimination, because once merit is measured in the appraisal process, women and minority employees still receive different rewards for the same merit scores as white men (after controlling for job, work unit, supervisor and other relevant human capital characteristics).</p> <p>This finding is of substantive significance because it demonstrates a critical challenge faced by employers who adopt merit-based practices to fairly reward and motivate their employees.</p>	
1520	1	22		
1520	1	24	<p>Ironically, although these merit-reward policies create the appearance of meritocracy, this study shows that the less formalized, less transparent, and less accountable stages of the performance appraisal process can actually create a greater opportunity for subtle ascriptive biases to emerge, negatively affecting the fair distribution of rewards among employees in a way that is more or less invisible to everyone in the organizational setting.</p>	
1520	1	24		<p>Ironically, although these merit-reward policies create the appearance of meritocracy, this study shows that the less formalized, less transparent, and less accountable stages of the performance appraisal process can actually create a greater opportunity for subtle ascriptive biases to emerge, negatively affecting the fair distribution of rewards among employees in a way that is more or less invisible to everyone in the organizational setting.</p>
1520	1	31	<p>Previous studies looking at wages and careers within organizations have not included performance or merit in their models, nor have they examined in depth the many organizational processes and stages at work behind these employee outcomes.</p>	
1520	1	39		<p>This article is intended to be the first step toward correcting this imbalance in the literature on organizations and stratification and toward unpacking what is actually happening inside an organizational practice described as meritocratic.</p>

1520	1	41	Future research should continue examining how the formalization and implementation of overall organizational merit-based practices may affect an individual's structures of opportunity and attainment in contemporary organizations.	
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Driessen, G., Slegers, P., & Smit, F. (2008).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
527	2	1		Viewed from a meritocratic perspective, this situation is problematic as the occupation of a particular social position should be determined only by the talents, capacities, and efforts of the individual (i.e. his or her 'merits').
527	2	5	Viewed from a meritocratic perspective, this situation is problematic as the occupation of a particular social position should be determined only by the talents, capacities, and efforts of the individual (i.e. his or her 'merits').	
527	2	11	Research nevertheless shows that pupils coming from lower social milieus, which frequently include the children of non-western immigrants, must demonstrate substantially more 'merit' than children coming from more privileged milieus to acquire comparable starting positions in society (Breen and Goldthorpe, 2001; Goldthorpe and Jackson, 2006).	
527	2	16		Politicians and policymakers in most western countries frequently assert that one can speak of increased meritocratization, but the results of empirical research raise some major doubts about these assertions.
528	1	22		From a theoretical perspective, however, over-recommending represents a deviation from the meritocratic principle and thus constitutes a form of positive discrimination with alternative explanations nevertheless available for the deviation.
528	1	25		In a broad interpretation of the meritocratic principle, both cognitive and non-cognitive competencies are used to determine educational recommendations.

528	1	32		In a narrow interpretation of the meritocratic principle, only cognitive competencies—that is, school test performance—are used to determine educational recommendations (Tesser and Iedema, 2001).
531	1	50		In doing this, we have adopted both a strict and a broad interpretation of the meritocratic principle.
538	1	14		In doing this, the extent to which educational recommendation can be predicted on the basis of ‘merits’ (e.g. talent, competencies, and effort) will be examined along with the extent to which other factors which do not relate directly to school performance contribute to the variance in educational recommendation.
538	2	4		In such a manner, insight can be gained into the degree to which one can speak of a meritocratic system of education in the Netherlands.
539	2	4		Overrecommending represents a deviation from the meritocratic principle and, in the present research, it was studied from three perspectives (i.e. in terms of ethnicity, type of community, and cognitive level of the class).
540	1	3		When school performance is controlled for, moreover, one can actually speak of under-recommending in the classes with a high cognitive level: The pupils in such classes receive a relatively lower level of educational recommendation after school performance is taken into consideration—which is also counter to the meritocratic principle.
540	1	17		In addition to the occurrence of overrecommending, the meritocratic character of the educational recommendations provided by primary schools was also examined.

540	1	39		The present results suggest that the association between capacities and educational recommendations has increased over the years and that, as a result of these increases, the already strong meritocratic calibre of Dutch educational advising has also increased.
540	2	1		With the results of such research, clearer and better insight into the meritocratic calibre of educational recommendations in the Netherlands and elsewhere can thus be obtained.

Harvard Law Review. (2008).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
2156	1	1		Many Americans believe we now live in a meritocratic society in which everyone has an equal opportunity for success regardless of race or sex.
2156	1	Rodapé 3		The ideal of meritocracy is arguably at the very foundation of American society.
2157	1	2		The first explanation of workplace inequality suggests that the workplace is meritocratic and therefore individuals, through the choices they make, are responsible for any resulting inequality.
2157	1	8		This Note argues that the first explanation — the myth of meritocracy — has its origin in the “just world phenomenon,” the cognitive desire to view our society, the organizations of which we are a part, and ourselves as just and legitimate.
2157	1	13		Even individuals who are members of groups that have been traditionally disadvantaged — individuals who might perceive subtle discrimination more readily — may perpetuate the myth of meritocracy, especially if they are upwardly mobile.
2157	1	22		Law firms point to minorities’ and women’s “success stories” as proof that the law firm is a meritocracy.
2157	1	31	Part I examines the two predominant explanations for an unequal and segregated workforce: individual merit and structural discrimination.	

2157	1	36	Part II explains the foundation of system-legitimizing rhetoric by upwardly mobile members of disadvantaged groups and analyzes the negative consequences of the resulting myth of meritocracy, focusing in particular on legal standards that are inadequate to combat structural discrimination and on the cooptation of potential system challengers.
2157	1	40	It examines how law firms view themselves as meritocratic and use the success of women and minorities as proof of an absence of institutional barriers to advancement.
2157	1	Rodapé 1	The contrast between the two frameworks does not imply that the “meritocracy” and “discrimination” explanations for inequality are mutually exclusive.
2158	1	21	I. Individual Failings in a Meritocracy.
2158	1	22	Put simply, the ideal of meritocracy presumes that “opportunity [is awarded] based on individual merit rather than inherited status.”
2158	1	23	Put simply, the ideal of meritocracy presumes that “opportunity [is awarded] based on individual merit rather than inherited status.”
2158	1	23	The meritocracy ideal is congruent with other fundamental American values: “[u]pward mobility and individualism are both core values of the American Dream; they legitimate our democratic ideal of equal opportunity for all.”
2158	1	27	In the employment context, the meritocracy ideal is founded on two interconnected beliefs: “that employment discrimination is an anomaly” and that “merit alone determines employment success.”

2158	1	28	In the employment context, the meritocracy ideal is founded on two interconnected beliefs: “that employment discrimination is an anomaly” and that “merit alone determines employment success.”	
2158	1	30		Many Americans persist in viewing the workforce as meritocratic.
2159	1	6		There are reasons to question the meritocratic account described above.
2160	1	24		Such legitimizing ideologies “include beliefs in a just world, in personal causation, in personal control, in a meritocratic society, and in the Protestant work ethic,” and, as such, “help to sustain the perception of the social system as just and fair and justify the hierarchical and unequal relationships among groups in society.”
2161	1	4		This legitimizing ideology prompts the adoption of the myth of meritocracy as an explanation for unequal outcomes.
2161	1	7	Legitimizing ideology’ relies on “the belief that people can get ahead . . . based on hard work and individual merit,” “that the American system is open to advancement of individuals from all ethnic backgrounds.”	
2161	1	9		System-legitimizing rhetoric may thus lead to a perception of an organization as a meritocracy and attribution of inequality to individual responsibility.
2161	1	14		It is perhaps unsurprising that individuals who are members of groups that traditionally have been advantaged by society, and who have achieved high-status positions, believe that the system that has elevated them is a meritocracy.

2161	1	26		And it is true that many women and minorities, as well as many traditionally advantaged individuals, such as white men, are cognizant of structurally discriminatory barriers to the advancement of disadvantaged group members and do not generally view our society as fundamentally meritocratic.
2161	1	28		Most importantly, some upwardly mobile women and minorities represent true “success stories,” achieving their accolades on their own merit and overcoming structural obstacles.
2162	1	2		The problem occurs when these individuals perceive discriminatory structures but minimize their significance or avoid challenging them publicly, creating the impression of a meritocracy.
2162	1	3		This Note is concerned with the universal meritocracy image created by such “success stories,” and the detrimental consequences of believing this illusion.
2162	1	23		Consequently, the disadvantaged group members will “reinforce and legitimize the dominant ideology that individual merit is the criterion for success” and “become staunch supporters of the existing social structure.”
2163	1	11		Together, these groups advance the notion that the organization of which they are a part is a meritocratic one that treats equally all individuals regardless of race or sex.
2163	1	19		This Note now turns to the question of why these system-legitimizing ideologies may be a problem in the employment context, and posits that the system-justifying rhetoric adopted by some upwardly mobile women and minorities and by their white male colleagues leads to a perception of meritocracy, which may lead to ignorance of structural discrimination.

2163	1	24		In essence, this Note cautions only against a false perception of a universal meritocracy that could lead to cooptation of system challengers and inadequate legal response to structural discrimination.
2165	1	3		In addition, when upwardly mobile members of disadvantaged groups promote a belief in individualism and meritocracy, ⁵⁷ in effect, they may be experiencing the “coopting effect of. . . ‘robust tokenism,’ or superficial diversity in leadership roles.”
2165	1	25		Advantaged group members who adhere to system legitimizing beliefs may therefore experience self-satisfaction regarding the workplace as a meritocracy and a lack of urgency regarding fixing structurally discriminatory practices.
2165	1	29		One possible socially damaging effect of the myth of meritocracy is that the myth becomes reflected in legal standards that are, as a result, inadequate to fight the real threat of structural discrimination.
2165	1	Rodapé 11		Wright, <i>supra</i> note 40, at 246 see also Beth Bonniwell Haslett & Susan Lipman, <i>Misem Inequities: Up Close and Personal</i> , in <i>SUBTLE SEXISM: CURRENT PRACTICE AND PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE</i> 34, 39 (Nijole V. Benokraitis ed., 1997) (“[M]en believe that both judicial appointments and the hiring and promotion decisions made within law firms are merit-based.” (quoting <i>The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force</i> (1993), <i>n.pmi</i> <?rfiH 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 745, 786 (1994))).
2166	1	2		The myth of meritocracy is reflected in discrimination law generally, and in employment discrimination law in particular.
2166	1	4		From the top of the judicial hierarchy, the Supreme Court has emphasized the ideal of individual merit in its discrimination decisions.
2166	1	8		The Court’s refusal to use the Equal Protection Clause to strike down laws unless they were created with a discriminatory purpose reflects the ideal of individual responsibility and meritocracy by making structurally discriminatory laws — like veteran preference statutes — not legally actionable, thus effectively placing the blame for unequal outcomes on the disadvantaged group members.

2167	1	2	In effect, Title VII decisions “reinforce the prevailing belief that merit, not subtle or systemic discrimination, accounts for the significant disparities in pay, position, and employment status between blacks and whites, and men and women, in today’s workplace.”	
2168	1	1		The myth of meritocracy is absorbed into the law through various processes.
2168	1	5		The societal norm of meritocracy can be reflected in the law through the combination of the lawmakers’ own experience and daily interactions with society — many judges and congresspersons have migrated from the private sector, canning along perceptions of meritocracy that they then generalize to other employment contexts.
2168	1	8		The societal norm of meritocracy can be reflected in the law through the combination of the lawmakers’ own experience and daily interactions with society — many judges and congresspersons have migrated from the private sector, canning along perceptions of meritocracy that they then generalize to other employment contexts.
2168	1	14		The myth of meritocracy may lead to the cooptation of some of the most likely challengers to this unequal system.
2168	1	21		Justice Clarence Thomas is a quintessential example of the highly mobile racial minority, whose personal success has led him to validate our society as meritocratic, to himself and to others.
2168	1	28		Justice Thomas also believes that “blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life without the meddling of university administrators,” ⁸⁰ and he translates this idea of meritocracy into case law.
2169	1	15		Still, Justice Thomas’s persistent disregard of structurally discriminatory practices and implicit biases that hinder blacks from succeeding suggests that he has partaken in system-justifying ideologies that further the myth of meritocracy.
2169	1	19		This Note now takes the legal profession as a case study of the myth of meritocracy, and seeks to examine how system-legitimizing rhetoric could lead to the myth of meritocracy and to ignorance of structural discrimination.

2169	1	20			This Note now takes the legal profession as a case study of the myth of meritocracy, and seeks to examine how system-legitimizing rhetoric could lead to the myth of meritocracy and to ignorance of structural discrimination.
2170	1	16			This Note attempts only to demonstrate that women and minority attorneys help law firms propagate the image of meritocracy and eschew honest discussion of structurally discriminatory practices.
2171	1	1			System-legitimizing tendencies “may be especially powerful within institutions highly steeped in the ideology of merit, such as the legal profession.” ⁹⁵ Law firms are imbued with the rhetoric of merit.
2171	1	2			System-legitimizing tendencies “may be especially powerful within institutions highly steeped in the ideology of merit, such as the legal profession.” ⁹⁵ Law firms are imbued with the rhetoric of merit.
2171	1	4			They have proudly pointed to the progress made by women and minorities in the last few decades as evidence that, in their organizations, individuals are judged on their merits alone, not on immutable characteristics such as race or gender.
2171	1	27			Female and minority partners may not internalize this view, but some do participate in the attribution of inequality to individual failings in a meritocracy.
2171	1	29			Many of them actively promote diversity efforts, and in doing so, they advertise the firm as providing equal opportunities to succeed — legitimating it as a meritocracy
2171	1	33			“Settings where the belief in meritocracy is especially pronounced discourage perceptions of bias against those who do not rise to the top.”
2172	1	2			If and when these attorneys personally perceive structurally discriminatory practices, the strategy of adopting the dominant rhetoric of meritocracy and refraining from making those personal views a part of their message may be adaptive — a way of fitting in with the firm culture

2172	1	6	Once again, this Note does not suggest that women and minority attorneys need to sacrifice their own careers in order to take on the law firm as a structurally discriminatory system. Its primary concern is that espousing unqualified accounts of a meritocracy while eschewing discussion of structurally discriminatory practices may send the wrong message to law student applicants and members of society who consequently believe that legal workplaces are bastions of equal opportunity.
2172	1	31	These attorneys may be combating negative stereotypes by adopting the dominant rhetoric of meritocracy. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1276 & nJ5 (2000).
2174	1	18	As described above, firms view themselves as meritocratic, committed to the practice of equal treatment and nondiscrimination.
2174	1	22	However, this rhetoric of meritocracy ignores that the structures and institutions of law firms have not changed to accommodate a heterogeneous workforce, pairs of which are afflicted by implicit biases. ¹¹⁹
2175	1	4	One possible consequence of this myth of meritocracy is institutional complacency: the idea that “enough has been done” for women and minorities toward equal treatment in the workforce. ¹²²
2175	1	13	A similar critique has been issued by Professor Lani Guinier, who argues that the election of black officials to office “legitimated the electoral process” because “their election signals that society’s institutions are ‘color-blind’ pure meritocracies.”
2175	1	42	Professor Guinier warns that the idea of a meritocracy is sustained by “the shorthand of counting elected black officials,” id. at 1091, without analysis of actual experience.
2176	1	4	She suggests that “when individuals are selected for qualities of ‘merit’ primarily possessed by those who are already privileged, the chances of widely dispersed upward mobility are seriously eroded . . . because the proxies for merit that are familiar and accepted tend to credentialize the existing social oligarchies.”

2176	1	6	She suggests that “when individuals are selected for qualities of ‘merit’ primarily possessed by those who are already privileged, the chances of widely dispersed upward mobility are seriously eroded ... because the proxies for merit that are familiar and accepted tend to credentialize the existing social oligarchies.”	
2176	1	20		Third, even if they do identify with their racial or gender groups and work toward increasing diversity in the firm, their avoidance of discussion and denunciation of structurally discriminatory practices legitimizes the law firm as a meritocracy, mischaracterizing the organization to the outside world.
2176	1	23		Fourth, their white male colleagues — the majority of attorneys in most firms — are likely to perceive the women’s and minorities’ “success stories” as evidence of meritocracy.
2176	1	27		Therefore, unless these attorneys are vigilant in framing their “success stories” as not dismissive of the possibility of structural discrimination, the presence of women and minorities and the legitimizing rhetoric they espouse may be taken as evidence of a meritocracy and may lead to institutional complacency.
2176	1	31		This Note has attempted above all to be a cautionary tale against a tempting belief in a post-racial or post-gender — a fully meritocratic — society.
2176	1	34		It may be easy to look at increasingly diverse workforces, consider the presence of women and minorities in high-status careers, and believe that our society, if not already equal, reflects meritocratic and equal treatment principles.
2177	1	9	Institutions should still be committed to the ideal of merit, but that commitment must be “framed and tempered by an awareness of how structures ... tend to privilege some groups of people over others,” ¹³³ and include a willingness to change those structures in order to ensure that individual merit can truly explain all outcomes.	
2177	1	12	Institutions should still be committed to the ideal of merit, but that commitment must be “framed and tempered by an awareness of how structures ... tend to privilege some groups of people over others,” ¹³³ and include a willingness to change those structures in order to ensure that individual merit can truly explain all outcomes.	

Tan, K. P. (2008).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
7	1	1		Meritocracy has been a key principle of governance in Singapore, most visibly embodied in the civil service and the political leadership, whose upper ranks are filled mainly by the top performers in a highly competitive education system largely through “bonded” government scholarships (Mauzy and Milne, 2002: 55–6).
7	1	5		However, the concept of meritocracy contains inherent contradictions that may, in practice, lead to the unraveling of Singapore’s political society.
7	1	7		Presently, there are already signs of tension as the main contradiction between meritocracy’s egalitarian and elitist strands is gradually being amplified by Singapore’s deepening engagement with the forces of globalization.
7	1	12		As Singaporeans witness more frequent and serious episodes of national crisis, gain access to alternative ideas in cyberspace, and observe a widening income gap, the old consensus on meritocracy will have to shift and adjust in order to contain a new politics of disillusionment and resistance.
8	1	1		Meritocracy in Singapore is not, therefore, just a myth or a fiction told by the dominant to trick the subordinate into unquestioning obedience.
8	1	3		Instead, meritocracy is an ideology that, beneath the calm surface of politics in Singapore, is negotiated (even struggled over) as different classes and social forces attempt, amid changing circumstances, to forge an unavoidably contradictory

					consensus on how it might be meaningful for and beneficial to their own lives.
8	1	9			Meritocracy, as the rule of merit, may be conceived in a broad sense as a practice that rewards individual merit with social rank, job positions, higher incomes, or general recognition and prestige.
8	1	9			Meritocracy, as the rule of merit, may be conceived in a broad sense as a practice that rewards individual merit with social rank, job positions, higher incomes, or general recognition and prestige.
8	1	10			Meritocracy, as the rule of merit, may be conceived in a broad sense as a practice that rewards individual merit with social rank, job positions, higher incomes, or general recognition and prestige.
8	1	13			The practice gives all potentially qualified and deserving individuals an equal and fair chance of achieving success on their own merit, which is usually a mixture of effort and talent, both innate and cultivated.
8	1	14			Meritocracy, in this wider sense, points to merit as the rule or principle that governs how the economy, society, and politics are organized.
8	1	14			Meritocracy, in this wider sense, points to merit as the rule or principle that governs how the economy, society, and politics are organized.
8	1	15			In a narrower sense, the rule of merit refers simply to a political system that can select or produce the wisest and best to form a government: an "aristocracy of talent."

8	1	17	In democratic elections, the people are given the power to decide what counts as “merit” and who possesses it.	
8	1	19		Meritocracy’s loosely coherent central features are themselves potentially contradictory.
8	1	20		In their critique of the American “meritocracy myth,” Stephen J. McNamee and Robert K. Miller Jr (2004) identify four types of “merit”: talent, attitude, hard work, and moral character.
8	1	21	In their critique of the American “meritocracy myth,” Stephen J. McNamee and Robert K. Miller Jr (2004) identify four types of “merit”: talent, attitude, hard work, and moral character.	
8	1	22	A merit-based selection is usually coupled with the principle of nondiscrimination: selection must be blind to race, gender, sexuality, age, or class differences.	
8	1	25		Meritocracy, in trying to “isolate” merit by treating people with fundamentally unequal backgrounds as superficially the same, can be a practice that ignores and even conceals the real advantages and disadvantages that are unevenly distributed to different segments of an inherently unequal society, a practice that in fact perpetuates this fundamental inequality.
8	1	26	Meritocracy, in trying to “isolate” merit by treating people with fundamentally unequal backgrounds as superficially the same, can be a practice that ignores and even conceals the real advantages and disadvantages that are unevenly distributed to different segments of an inherently unequal society, a practice that in fact perpetuates this fundamental	

			inequality.	
8	1	30	In this way, those who are picked by meritocracy as having merit may already have enjoyed unfair advantages from the very beginning, ignored according to the principle of nondiscrimination.	In this way, those who are picked by meritocracy as having merit may already have enjoyed unfair advantages from the very beginning, ignored according to the principle of nondiscrimination.
8	1	30	In this way, those who are picked by meritocracy as having merit may already have enjoyed unfair advantages from the very beginning, ignored according to the principle of nondiscrimination.	
8	1	34		If these relevant social differences are hidden beneath an uncritical, even celebratory, rhetoric of meritocracy (as blindness to differences), then the problem of securing equality of opportunity and a reasonably level playing field will be severely underestimated.
8	1	38		One way to resolve the contradiction between the principles of nondiscrimination and equality of opportunity in an unequal society is to think of meritocracy as a competition with a clear “before” and “after.”
9	1	1		While it would seem reasonable to argue for a meritocracy that limits its concerns about equality of access and resources to the “before” stage of the competition, deciding on the exact “starting point” is not a simple thing to do in practice.
9	1	8		However, as Matt Cavanagh (2002) points out, there is another concept of meritocracy that is less interested in giving “everyone a chance to earn the right to a job” and more concerned about “revealing” the best person for the job.

9	1	10	<p>According to this concept, what matters is for meritocracy to serve as an efficient system that simply identifies individuals who have the right qualities that the positions require.</p> <p>In this sense, then, meritocracy is a mechanism for resource allocation: it is not a matter of ensuring nondiscrimination and equality of opportunity (a focus on fairness), but of finding the right persons for the job and paying them salaries that they deserve (a focus on outcomes).</p> <p>But meritocracy is often seen to go beyond a simple process of sorting out talent.</p>
9	1	12	<p>Meritocracy promotes competition and competitiveness which can bring out the best in everyone.</p>
9	1	18	<p>Conspicuous signs of meritocratic success (wealth, possessions, and social mobility) can ignite ambitions to rise above one's station in life by working harder and more resourcefully than one might have otherwise.</p>
9	1	21	<p>This focus on efficiency and competition can easily obscure the egalitarian (nondiscrimination and equality of opportunity) aspects of meritocracy.</p>
9	1	25	<p>These historical developments further reinforce meritocracy's focus on efficiency and competition at the expense of nondiscrimination, equality of opportunity, and any comprehensive welfare policies driven by egalitarian ideals.</p>
9	1	31	<p>As a result, meritocracy is often an ideology of inequality; that is to say, a widely accepted belief about the "value" of inequality, held to be in the general interest, but mainly serving the interests of a particular segment of society, a fact that the belief actively obscures.</p>
9	1	34	

9	1	40	<p>Antonio Gramsci's notion of ideological hegemony is a particularly useful tool for analyzing how the dominant classes in a capitalist state, supported by an "armor" of coercion that is rarely resorted to, assume moral leadership (reflecting their deeds as "a merit and a source of prestige") by actively and conscientiously working through their intellectuals and organizations in civil society to forge a national consensus among diverse classes and social forces (1971: 269).</p>	
9	1	43	<p>"Merit," as Amartya Sen (2000: 14) acknowledges, is normatively defined by "the preferred view of a good society."</p>	
9	1	45	<p>But the good society (and therefore its idea of merit) is in fact defined by meritocracy's winners and their organic intellectuals, who must actively promote their definition in order to gain widespread consensus and support.</p>	
9	1	45		<p>But the good society (and therefore its idea of merit) is in fact defined by meritocracy's winners and their organic intellectuals, who must actively promote their definition in order to gain widespread consensus and support.</p>
10	1	1		<p>Robert Klitgaard (1986: 1) discusses how meritocracy, "ostensibly anti-elitist," gets co-opted by the winners, who then become an elitist, "self-conscious, exploitative ruling minority" bent on perpetuating their power and prestige.</p>
10	1	10		<p>So "winners" will go on winning, and "losers" (believing that efficiency, competition, and meritocracy are in everyone's interest and that individuals must take personal responsibility for their fate in life) go on losing.</p>
10	1	12		<p>All the while, the egalitarian aspects of meritocracy are further obscured.</p>

10	1	12		<p>Meritocracy as an ideology of inequality also obscures how success often depends on factors other than individual merit, such as inheritance, marriage ties, social connections, cultural capital, opportunities arising from developments in the economy, and plain luck (McNamee and Miller, 2004).</p>
10	1	14		<p>Meritocracy as an ideology of inequality also obscures how success often depends on factors other than individual merit, such as inheritance, marriage ties, social connections, cultural capital, opportunities arising from developments in the economy, and plain luck (McNamee and Miller, 2004).</p>
10	1	26		<p>As a complex articulation of often contradictory assertions and beliefs, hegemony is unstable and even fragile, making it a useful conceptual tool for analyzing how a consensus that is able to connect and contain the contradictory strands of meritocracy can just as easily be disarticulated with pressures from shifting circumstances and new consciousness.</p>
10	1	29		<p>For example, when reward (the “prize” for winning the competition) surpasses the egalitarian aspects of meritocracy, the system may start to unravel.</p>
10	1	46		<p>The system’s losers experience relative deprivation: relatively poor and weaned on the rhetoric of (equal opportunity) meritocracy, they believe that they deserve to have what the relatively rich have (Walker and Smith, 2001).</p>
11	1	1		<p>The contradictory tendencies within the concept and practice of meritocracy can make a society self-reflexive, energetic, and productive; but a society can also</p>

				be torn apart if the contradictions are uncontainable.
11	1	4		In Singapore's national discourse, meritocracy is regularly and straightforwardly advanced as the only viable principle for organizing and allocating the nation's scarce resources to optimize economic performance and political leadership within conditions of vulnerability and resource scarcity.
11	1	7		Not only has the term "meritocracy" become enshrined and celebrated as a dominant cultural value in Singapore, it has also come to serve as a complex of ideological resources for justifying authoritarian government and its pro-capitalist orientations.
11	1	11		However, as a principle that is intuitively appealing, but "essentially underdefined" (Sen, 2000: 5), meritocracy is a cluster of loosely coherent values and ideas that can become unstable and more clearly contradictory in moments of crisis
11	1	16		As Singapore attempts to transform into a global city more deeply embedded in the networks and flows of globalization, participating more integrally in their risks and potentialities, the idea of meritocracy has become increasingly unstable, contradictory, and contested, gradually losing its hegemonic ability to support coherently the needs of capitalism and the continued legitimacy of the authoritarian People's Action Party (PAP) government.

11	1	23		As leaders have become more focused on questions of their reward, ordinary Singaporeans are becoming more conscious of socioeconomic inequalities, the barriers to fair competition, and their divergent life chances in a global city that will find it much harder, or will have to find new ways, to describe itself as meritocratic.
11	1	41	Criteria for recruitment have historically included social values such as military valor, birth, wealth, education, and individual merit.	
11	1	42		The latter two, predominant in modern societies and more closely associated with how meritocracy is now perceived, are mainly reflected in academic and professional qualifications.
11	1	45		The need for recruitment into the political class establishes social mobility between the ruling minority and ruled majority that appears to be consistent with meritocracy
12	1	18	Technocrats are recruited by the PAP on the basis of academic and professional merit and, through the popular vote, given an overwhelming mandate to govern.	
12	1	35		The PAP's claim to meritocracy is not, therefore, reflected in its approach to interparty competition, which is central to liberal democracy.
12	1	41		But a meritocratic electoral process would need to be more adequately competitive to provide an incentive for the "best" people (regardless of social background, ideological inclination, and party affiliation) to come forward and serve as political leaders.
13	1	23		While the PAP's vision of meritocracy in government does not involve interparty competition, it is based on a concept of meritocracy as an efficient resourceallocating mechanism.

13	1	24	While the PAP's vision of meritocracy in government does not involve interparty competition, it is based on a concept of meritocracy as an efficient resourceallocating mechanism.
13	1	26	If in a country whose current population is less than 4.5 million leadership talent is scarce, as the PAP keeps insisting, then meritocracy must serve to "reveal" the best people for government, and it should do this from the widest possible pool of talent.
13	1	31	To legitimize its choices, meritocracy must demonstrate not only that the "best" are chosen, but also that the "best" can be drawn from any social background.
13	1	38	For similar reasons also, individual achievements in the racial minority groups are regularly showcased in the mass media as spectacular evidence of a meritocratic society
13	1	44	The political formulas propagated by them constitute the main components of a Platonic "noble myth" among which the notions of meritocracy and "good governance" have been prominent.
14	1	15	In this sense, a meritocracy that defines merit almost exclusively in terms of educational and professional qualifications and commercial success has made the traditional PAP-controlled grassroots sector seem much less relevant and effective in contemporary public life, a situation that may breed discontent among loyal grassroots activists who increasingly feel betrayed by their political masters. Ordinary Singaporeans who join

14	1	16	In this sense, a meritocracy that defines merit almost exclusively in terms of educational and professional qualifications and commercial success has made the traditional PAP-controlled grassroots sector seem much less relevant and effective in contemporary public life, a situation that may breed discontent among loyal grassroots activists who increasingly feel betrayed by their political masters. Ordinary Singaporeans who join	
15	1	10	An inspection of the PAP's choice of parliamentary candidates (and particularly of those appointed to the cabinet) will reveal that the "merit" that matters most to the party is the kind signaled by professional expertise and academic qualifications.	
15	1	25		The PAP conceives of its meritocratic practice mainly in terms of technocratic government, since the problems faced by modern societies are technical and complicated in nature, requiring specialized knowledge for effective policy-making.
15	1	48		The PAP government is popularly perceived, even by its many admirers, as arrogant, insensitive, compassionless, and convinced of its own superiority, what Ezra Vogel (1989: 1053) calls a "macho-meritocracy."
16	1	48		Vogel also observes how meritocracy emits an "aura of special awe for the top leaders ... [which] provides a basis for discrediting less meritocratic opposition almost regardless of the content of its arguments."
17	1	1		Vogel also observes how meritocracy emits an "aura of special awe for the top leaders ... [which] provides a basis for discrediting less meritocratic opposition almost regardless of the content of its arguments."

17	1	3	In fact, there are strong disincentives against talented Singaporeans “straying” into opposition camps, and the very character of leadership merit is not itself allowed to become the subject of electoral contest.	
17	1	5	As the long-time political winners, the PAP has been able to define merit in Singapore’s politics and, in this way, influence strongly the people’s understanding of who deserves to win.	
17	1	34		These scholarships are among the most tangible of meritocratic instruments in Singapore.
17	1	46		In my life, I have lived the meritocratic dream ...
18	1	3	Hence, with financial aid and scholarships, and through a merit-based promotion system, I escaped the clutches of poverty	
18	1	38		In a country where human resources are limited, meritocracy has drawn the best talents into the civil service (Singapore’s largest employer) and then into politics and government, often via the PAP, leaving the private sector thin on managerial and entrepreneurial talent.
20	1	2		The results gave the PAP a strong mandate to continue in government and they reflect, despite structural disadvantages faced by opposition parties in the dominant party system, a hegemonic consensus on the value of its technocratic, paternalistic, pragmatic, and meritocratic mode of government.
20	1	10		As Singapore becomes more deeply embedded in the networks and flows of globalization, for example, the inherent contradictions in the aspiring global city’s concept and practice of meritocracy becomes more pronounced and its legitimizing role is slowly being compromised.

20	1	44		<p>A government whose authority and popular support are based firmly on its capacity to protect the nation against threat and deliver material success for its citizens will find it much more challenging to secure the people's confidence as they start to question the meritocratic processes that have brought together a government that, in the face of complex and less solvable global problems, will seem to be much less infallible than they had previously believed.</p> <p>Through encounters with alternative political websites, the disenchanted and the disenfranchised learn to articulate their condition in ways that the official discourse of meritocracy has excluded.</p> <p>A Singapore more starkly divided along class lines will be hurled into a politics of alienation, resentment, and envy, as the contradictions of globalization continually dislocate the ideals, practices, and legitimating functions of meritocracy in Singapore.</p>
21	1	8		
23	1	32		
24	1	7	<p>As the elite class endeavors to renew itself, defining merit in its own image, it will become increasingly narrow, exclusive, and dismissive toward others, losing the benefit of a broader range of less traditional talent.</p>	
24	1	18		<p>In fact, Singapore's meritocratic system has been practiced so extremely that it is starting to show signs of becoming a victim of its own success: unintended consequences may, in the near future, take off on sharp tangents as the unsettling power of globalization disarticulates the inherent contradictions in the meritocracy concept itself, mainly between its egalitarian and its elitist dimensions.</p>

24	1	21	<p>In fact, Singapore's meritocratic system has been practiced so extremely that it is starting to show signs of becoming a victim of its own success: unintended consequences may, in the near future, take off on sharp tangents as the unsettling power of globalization disarticulates the inherent contradictions in the meritocracy concept itself, mainly between its egalitarian and its elitist dimensions.</p>
24	1	23	<p>This article has not argued that the concept and practice of meritocracy have already unraveled in Singapore; but many things are in place to start and perhaps accelerate that process of unraveling, which the government will, of course, continue to try to manage ideologically, but with much greater difficulty.</p>

Tannock, S. (2009).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
201	1	4	The world's wealthiest individual has been making much noise lately about the injustice and irrationality of restrictive immigration policies that prevent corporations and nations from bringing in the best and brightest minds from wherever they may be found, and the need to liberate considerations of talent and merit from citizenship-based discrimination.	
202	1	5		The rhetorical vision they promote is of a global meritocracy, in which anyone from anywhere can succeed, if they are bright enough, based solely on their individual talent and effort – a world in which, as one government minister from Singapore put it, ‘talent is a passport and is nationally blind’ (as cited in Koh, 2003, p. 231).
202	1	9		The rise of a global meritocracy, according to a special issue of the Economist that came out in October 2006, ‘offers all sorts of benefits, from higher growth in productivity to faster scientific progress.
202	1	12		But, the Economist warns, a global meritocracy also causes fear and ‘trepidation’ and can unleash a ‘backlash’ of protectionism and patriotic ‘bigotry’ by those who feel threatened by its rise and remain wedded to arbitrary, anachronistic and nationalist ways of dividing up the world.
202	1	15		‘A global meritocracy is in all our interests’, the Economist promises, but we will have to ‘be prepared to fight for it’ (p. 14).
202	1	17		Global meritocracy, as currently invoked, is a transparently elite project: it promotes corporate interests, elevates competition and pursuit of competitiveness as central organizing principles of world society, and reinforces the neoliberal agenda of liberalizing world labor markets.

202	1	20	However, it would be wrong to dismiss the idea of global meritocracy as nothing more than an empty piece of corporate propaganda.
202	1	22	For one thing, simply raising the idea of global meritocracy makes it clear that the efforts of most education activists and advocates to achieve educational equality and justice through making schools and society more genuinely meritocratic are actually efforts that have been unreflectively and (for the most part) invisibly nationalist in spirit.
202	1	24	For one thing, simply raising the idea of global meritocracy makes it clear that the efforts of most education activists and advocates to achieve educational equality and justice through making schools and society more genuinely meritocratic are actually efforts that have been unreflectively and (for the most part) invisibly nationalist in spirit.
202	1	26	What has been pursued in the past is not meritocracy but meritocratic nationalism; equality of opportunity not for all but for some.
202	1	26	What has been pursued in the past is not meritocracy but meritocratic nationalism; equality of opportunity not for all but for some.
202	1	35	While the recent promotion of global meritocracy is an elite project, it is also a project that destabilizes the previous regime of legitimacy for corporate-led capitalism, that had been based in large part on an alignment of nationalist and meritocratic ideology.
202	1	38	While the recent promotion of global meritocracy is an elite project, it is also a project that destabilizes the previous regime of legitimacy for corporate-led capitalism, that had been based in large part on an alignment of nationalist and meritocratic ideology.
204	1	13	The second discourse appeals to meritocratic self-interest.

204	1	16		The ideal of pure meritocracy that rests at the heart of the American Dream (and beyond this of modernity in general) is now to be extended across the entire planet (Hochschild, 1996; McNamee & Miller, 2004).
204	1	22		Regardless of how fully either of these discourses are developed in the future, once they have been taken out of the box, and once the kinds of pressures and shifts that they are attempting to explain away have been introduced, it becomes difficult to return fully to the relatively stable (in the global North, at least) regime of meritocratic nationalism that had preceded them for several decades.
205	1	38		Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims something analogous (but with a slightly different meaning), namely, that 'higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit'.
207	1	5	When individuals compete for top-level jobs or college positions within the boundaries of the nation, equal educational opportunity discourse imposes a normative expectation that they have all been given fair and equal opportunity, through the provision of public education especially, to develop and demonstrate their individual talent – or in other words, their merit for obtaining these limited and privileged social positions.	
208	1	4		One part, at least, of the affront to the global North in recent shifts in global competition (outsourcing of high-skill jobs to the global South, skilled immigration from the global South, and growing talk of global meritocracy for everybody) is that, thanks to a combination of new developments in technology and old strategies of corporate profit seeking, the natives from the world's developing nations are starting to forget their proper place in the natural order of things and compete with developed nations for high-skill jobs as well

209	1	1			The concepts of meritocracy and equality of opportunity are derivative and contingent, not foundational concepts.
209	1	3			There are many different kinds of ability, effort and achievement in the world, but not all of these are deemed to be equally meritorious.
209	1	4			Rather, we judge individuals and actions to have merit when they produce outcomes that we value in our society.
209	1	10			As Amartya Sen (2000, p. 10) argues, there is simply no “natural order” of “merit” that is independent of our value system’ – and the same may be said of equal opportunity as well.
209	1	12			This brings us back to the call by political and business elites for a new global meritocracy at the beginning of this paper.
209	1	20			This is not to say that merit and equality of opportunity are not important, for such matters are of relevance to any social order.
209	1	26			A long-standing critique of both meritocracy and equality of opportunity as social and political ideals is that, superficial appearances to the contrary, both tend toward being profoundly anti-egalitarian in nature (Harding, 1979; Schaar, 1997).
209	1	31			Michael Young, who coined the term ‘meritocracy’ in his 1958 novel, <i>The rise of meritocracy</i> , was alarmed precisely because of the British Labour Party’s apparent willingness at the time to substitute a call for equality of opportunity in place of their original concern for full equality of social and economic outcome – a shift that reached its epitome (or nadir) with the election of Tony Blair’s New Labour government at the end of the century (Young, 1958; Steinberg & Johnson, 2004; Dench, 2006; Hattersley, 2006).

209	1	31	<p>Michael Young, who coined the term ‘meritocracy’ in his 1958 novel, <i>The Rise of Meritocracy</i>, was alarmed precisely because of the British Labour Party’s apparent willingness at the time to substitute a call for equality of opportunity in place of their original concern for full equality of social and economic outcome – a shift that reached its epitome (or nadir) with the election of Tony Blair’s New Labour government at the end of the century (Young, 1958; Steinberg & Johnson, 2004; Dench, 2006; Hattersley, 2006).</p>
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Bukodi, E., & Goldthorpe, J. (2010).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
655	1	2		Michael Young introduced the idea of 'meritocracy' in his celebrated dystopian fantasy, <i>The Rise of the Meritocracy</i> , of 1958.
655	1	4		Michael Young introduced the idea of 'meritocracy' in his celebrated dystopian fantasy, <i>The Rise of the Meritocracy</i> , of 1958.
655	1	5	If merit, defined as 'IQ plus effort' and certified through educational attainment, was to become the basis of social stratification, then those who fared badly would be seen, and might well see themselves, as simply undeserving: if merit is all important, then those judged as having none are left 'morally naked' (Young, 2001).	
655	1	9	If merit, defined as 'IQ plus effort' and certified through educational attainment, was to become the basis of social stratification, then those who fared badly would be seen, and might well see themselves, as simply undeserving: if merit is all important, then those judged as having none are left 'morally naked' (Young, 2001).	
655	1	14		Remarkably, though, in the United States, the idea of meritocracy was rather quickly removed from the satirical and critical context of Young's work and became used in an essentially positive sense.
655	2	6		For these intellectuals, the attraction of the idea of meritocracy was that it provided a basis for countering egalitarian arguments of a kind they regarded as unduly 'socialistic': that is, arguments in favour of a greater equality of outcomes as well as of opportunities.

655	2	18	These inequalities would reflect the differing levels of reward that individuals obtained—and indeed deserved or ‘merited’—in return for their efforts in securing educational qualifications and applying these productively in their working lives (see esp. Bell, 1972, pp. 53–59; 1973, pp. 440–455).	
656	1	6		Moreover, Bell and his associates could claim support for their affirmative reinterpretation of meritocracy from within the mainstream American sociology of the day: in particular, from functionalist theories of industrialism or modernization and from ‘status attainment’ research (for a crucial linking paper, see Treiman, 1970).
656	1	26		As Bell summed up (1972, p. 30; cf. 1973, pp. 409–454), ‘The postindustrial society is, in its logic, a meritocracy’—and the logic was one exerted in capitalist and socialist societies alike (see 1973, pp. 99–119 especially).
656	1	36		That is, the argument, developed most rigorously in the work of Friedrich Hayek (see esp. 1960, chs. 5, 6 and 24; 1976, ch. 9) that a basic incompatibility must arise between any kind of meritocracy and the principles that underlie the operation of a free-market economy and a liberal society.
656	2	2	Moreover, Hayek insists that there are no objective criteria by reference to which merit can be established nor, therefore, any objective means of rewarding individuals according to their merit.	
656	2	4	Moreover, Hayek insists that there are no objective criteria by reference to which merit can be established nor, therefore, any objective means of rewarding individuals according to their merit.	

656	2	14	In a market economy the rewards that individuals receive do not depend on their merits, as they or others may see them, but only on the value of what each individual has to offer on the market.	
656	2	22	Hayek is forced to acknowledge that where, as in modern societies, the large majority of the economically active population do not work on their own account but are employees, employers do in fact continually make what could be regarded as judgments of merit, externally to the market, through their decisions about whom to recruit, retain, promote, discharge, etc.	
656	2	31	In contrast, what must necessarily undermine both freedom and efficiency is 'a situation in which a single comprehensive scale of merit is imposed upon the whole society'—whether a scale based on educational qualifications or any other criterion.	
656	2	39		From a Hayekian standpoint, then, the most obvious examples of both the conditions for and consequences of meritocracy must be those provided by the state socialist societies of the post-war Soviet bloc, although Hayek, unlike Bell, did not see these societies as being convergent in their development with the capitalist societies of the western world.
656	2	46		There are indeed good empirical grounds for regarding the socialist societies in question as representing the most fully developed form of meritocracy of an education-based kind that has so far been realised—and even with due allowance being made for privileges that were enjoyed by the families of the nomenklatura and other 'non-meritocratic' features.

656	2	49	<p>There are indeed good empirical grounds for regarding the socialist societies in question as representing the most fully developed form of meritocracy of an education-based kind that has so far been realised—and even with due allowance being made for privileges that were enjoyed by the families of the <i>nomenklatura</i> and other ‘non-meritocratic’ features.</p>
657	1	23	<p>A unique research opportunity is in this way provided for the re-examination of the two contrasting perspectives on meritocracy that we have outlined.</p>
657	1	26	<p>We have in effect a kind of ‘natural experiment’ by means of which the views of Bell and of Hayek and, more specifically, the ‘meritocracy as functional imperative’ (MFI) and the ‘market versus meritocracy’ (MVM) arguments can be subject to comparative evaluation.</p>
657	1	27	<p>We have in effect a kind of ‘natural experiment’ by means of which the views of Bell and of Hayek and, more specifically, the ‘meritocracy as functional imperative’ (MFI) and the ‘market versus meritocracy’ (MVM) arguments can be subject to comparative evaluation.</p>
658	2	44	<p>In this respect again, as Luijkx et al. (2002) imply, the socialist programme of creating an education-based meritocracy, even if conceived within the context of a command economy, would still appear entirely consistent with the functional requirements of liberal capitalism.</p>

659	1	27		Indeed, insofar as the movement towards an education-based meritocracy in socialist Hungary actually led to a weakening in this association—or that is, to greater social fluidity—then with liberal capitalism this tendency should continue.
665	1	10		In the case of men, Figure 3 shows that for those with tertiary qualifications, the effects of their class origins on their chances of access to the salariat, while perceptible in the first cohort, more or less disappear over the next four cohorts—when, one could say, education-based meritocracy prevails—but then reemerge with the last two cohorts whose members' class positions are mostly recorded under capitalism.
666	1	6	Even though scarcely reflecting merit in any sense, such attributes may still have real productive value for employers, as for example, in the expanding services sector of the economy, or may at all events be increasingly taken by employers as providing informative signals of the productive potential of employees in the context of the rising numbers of those who hold higher-level qualifications (see further on the Hungarian case Blasko' and Ro'bert, 2007 and, more generally, Bowles and Gintis, 2000; Jackson, Goldthorpe and Mills, 2004; Osborne Groves, 2005; Jackson, 2006, 2007).	
666	1	29		As earlier noted, from the standpoint of 'education-based meritocracy as a functional imperative', there is neither any reason why regime change in Hungary should lead to any strengthening in the OD association, nor why, if any weakening in this association was achieved under socialism, it should not continue under capitalism.

666	1	35	<p>But, from the standpoint of 'market versus meritocracy', a strengthening in the OD association is at all events a possibility: that is, if the expected increase in the OE association is not offset by the expected decrease in the ED association in that other factors that become important in influencing class destinations are at least as closely linked to class origins as is educational attainment.</p>
666	2	34	<p>In other words, cohorts entering employment and establishing their class positions in the earlier period of state socialism in Hungary did so under conditions of increasing fluidity within the class structure, which, in the light of our earlier analyses, it seems plausible to link with the development of a form of education-based meritocracy involving a weakening in the OE association and a strengthening in the ED association.</p>
666	2	49	<p>If it were the case that the socialist version of education-based meritocracy created in Hungary after 1949 served simply to meet exigencies of the modernisation process that, under any political regime, would sooner or later have imposed themselves, it is difficult to see why, as the modernization of Hungarian society proceeded under capitalism, this meritocracy and the rising levels of social fluidity that it evidently generated should not have been maintained.</p>
668	1	2	<p>If it were the case that the socialist version of education-based meritocracy created in Hungary after 1949 served simply to meet exigencies of the modernisation process that, under any political regime, would sooner or later have imposed themselves, it is difficult to see why, as the modernization of Hungarian society proceeded under capitalism, this meritocracy and the rising levels of social fluidity that it evidently generated should not have been maintained.</p>

668	1	14	In this article, we have taken the case of Hungary as a critical one for assessing empirically two arguments on meritocracy which we have labelled as the MFI and MVM arguments.
668	1	16	The MFI argument treats a movement towards meritocracy—or, more precisely, education-based meritocracy—as a functional imperative for all modern societies.
668	1	17	The MFI argument treats a movement towards meritocracy—or, more precisely, education-based meritocracy—as a functional imperative for all modern societies.
668	1	19	It thus sees no incompatibility between such meritocracy and the social order of free-market capitalism.
668	1	22	Indeed, in the context of American liberalism the main ideological appeal of education-based meritocracy lies in its potential for legitimating the inequalities of income, wealth, and status that free-market capitalism generates.
668	1	29	It seeks to show, from the standpoint of classic European liberalism, the incompatibilities that must arise between the political creation of a meritocracy and the operation of a freemarket economy and a liberal society.
668	1	31	As regards an education-based meritocracy, these incompatibilities are revealed, on the one hand, in attempts to remove the influence of class (or other sociocultural) background factors on children's educational performance and careers; and, on the other hand, in attempts to make educational attainment the overriding determinant of the type and level of employment, and thus of the class positions, to which individuals gain access.

668	1	45	<p>A case such as that of Hungary is critical in that a transition has occurred, over a fairly short period, from state socialism, under which a form of educationbased meritocracy was relatively highly developed, to a new liberal capitalist society.</p>
668	1	52	<p>In the light of the MFI argument, the efforts of the regime to create an education-based meritocracy can be seen as simply one way of responding to the functional imperatives of modernisation; whereas, in the light of the MVM argument, these efforts would appear, rather, as part of a larger ideologically driven programme aimed at creating quite distinctive forms of economy and society.</p>
668	2	10	<p>Following the MFI argument, there would seem no reason why the movement towards meritocracy achieved in the socialist era should not be sustained as the modernization process continues and is in fact revitalized under capitalism.</p>
668	2	15	<p>But, following the MVM argument, this movement should be checked, if not reversed, as the incompatibilities between meritocracy and the operation of a liberal capitalist society are demonstrated.</p>
668	2	51	<p>Thirdly, we have shown that the weakening in the OD association which is evident across those cohorts whose education and early working lives fell within the prime years of the state socialist meritocracy was not maintained with subsequent cohorts, and that again something of a reversal occurs</p>

669	1	29		Analysis of the Hungarian case undermines the idea that progressive movement towards an education-based meritocracy is a functional imperative of all modern societies, regardless of the form of their economic and political institutions.
669	1	49		Solga (2006), in discussing East Germany, regards the importance of party membership for access to more advantaged class positions as being incompatible with education-based meritocracy and sees this as emerging only after reunification.
669	2	27		Pre-1958 the idea of meritocracy could not of course be itself invoked, and in any event the definition of merit as 'IQ plus effort' would have been unacceptable as far too individualistic.
669	2	29	Pre-1958 the idea of meritocracy could not of course be itself invoked, and in any event the definition of merit as 'IQ plus effort' would have been unacceptable as far too individualistic.	
671	2	6		Moreover, it should be recognized that education-based meritocracy, insofar as it exists, will always be prone to credentialism in some degree (cf. Collins, 1979).

Castilla, E. J., & Bernard, S. (2010).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
543	1	1		The idea of meritocracy as a social system in which “merit or talent is the basis for sorting people into positions and distributing rewards” (Scully, 1997: 413) has received great attention since the term was popularized in 1958 by Young (1994).
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543	1	5		Advocates of meritocracy stress that in true meritocratic systems everyone has an equal chance to advance and obtain rewards based on their individual merits and efforts, regardless of their gender, race, class, or other non-merit factors.
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543	1	8	Advocates of meritocracy stress that in true meritocratic systems everyone has an equal chance to advance and obtain rewards based on their individual merits and efforts, regardless of their gender, race, class, or other non-merit factors.	
543	1	10		In the United States, for example, survey research repeatedly reveals that Americans endorse the meritocratic ethos.
543	1	11		Most believe that meritocracy is not only the way the system should work but also the way the system does work (Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Ladd, 1994; Ladd and Bowman, 1998).
543	1	14		Because meritocracy has been culturally accepted as a fair and legitimate distributive principle in many advanced capitalist countries and organizations (Scully, 1997, 2000; McNamee and Miller, 2004), scholars have sought to assess the extent to which equal opportunity and meritocratic outcomes have been successfully achieved in society (e.g., Arrow, Bowles, and Durlauf, 2000; Dench, 2006).
543	1	18		Because meritocracy has been culturally accepted as a fair and legitimate distributive principle in many advanced capitalist countries and organizations (Scully, 1997, 2000; McNamee and Miller, 2004), scholars have sought to assess the extent to which equal opportunity and meritocratic outcomes have been successfully achieved in society (e.g., Arrow, Bowles, and Durlauf, 2000; Dench, 2006).
543	1	29	Recent empirical studies have found, however, that workplace inequality persists even with the adoption of merit-based pay programs (Castilla, 2008), affirmative action and diversity policies (Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly, 2006), or certain popular team and cross-training arrangements (Kalev, 2009).	

544	1	8		What remains an open question, however, is whether gender and racial inequality persists in spite of management's efforts to promote meritocracy or even because of such meritocratic efforts.
544	1	8		What remains an open question, however, is whether gender and racial inequality persists in spite of management's efforts to promote meritocracy or even because of such meritocratic efforts.
544	1	10		This is an important question given the fundamental shift to meritocratic employment strategies, such as pay-for-performance or merit-based reward practices, over the past two decades (Heneman and Werner, 2005; Miller, 2006; Noe et al., 2008).
544	1	11		This is an important question given the fundamental shift to meritocratic employment strategies, such as pay-for-performance or merit-based reward practices, over the past two decades (Heneman and Werner, 2005; Miller, 2006; Noe et al., 2008).
544	1	13		Although these merit-based efforts are intended to link employees' rewards directly to their performance, rather than to factors such as seniority or demographic characteristics, there is a growing concern that these efforts may not actually result in meritocratic outcomes (e.g., Roth, 2006; Castilla, 2008).
544	1	17		Although these merit-based efforts are intended to link employees' rewards directly to their performance, rather than to factors such as seniority or demographic characteristics, there is a growing concern that these efforts may not actually result in meritocratic outcomes (e.g., Roth, 2006; Castilla, 2008).

544	1	22	It may also be the case that not only merit-based practices but also meritocracy as a cultural value can serve as an “environmental trigger” (DiMaggio, 1997: 279) or be part of a “tool kit” of habits (Swidler, 1986: 273) that unleashes individual cognitive biases.	
544	1	23	It may also be the case that not only merit-based practices but also meritocracy as a cultural value can serve as an “environmental trigger” (DiMaggio, 1997: 279) or be part of a “tool kit” of habits (Swidler, 1986: 273) that unleashes individual cognitive biases.	
544	1	29	Because employment decisions are made by managers embedded in organizational cultures, unintended adverse effects may result from employers’ efforts to reward merit or other practices meant to increase fairness in the workplace.	
544	1	32	Consistent with these research insights, recent scholarship has demonstrated that merit-based pay practices in particular may fail to achieve race or gender neutral outcomes, with results showing that women and minorities (in the same job and work unit, with the same supervisor, and the same human capital) received lower salary increases than white men, even after they are given the same performance evaluation score (Castilla, 2008).	
544	1	44	Because previous empirical studies have evaluated workplace inequality after the introduction of these practices (e.g., Castilla, 2008; Manning and Swaffield, 2008), however, research has not been able to successfully answer the question of whether the introduction of organizational cultures and practices aimed at promoting meritocracy can cause bias in organizations.	
544	1	46	The goal of this article is to investigate the causal link between merit-based organizational efforts and their employment outcomes at the level of individuals involved in making these decisions.	

544	1	50	We develop and test our key hypothesis that managers making decisions on behalf of organizations that emphasize meritocracy will ironically show greater bias in favor of men over equally performing women in the translation of performance into bonuses than managers in organizations that do not emphasize meritocracy.
544	1	53	We develop and test our key hypothesis that managers making decisions on behalf of organizations that emphasize meritocracy will ironically show greater bias in favor of men over equally performing women in the translation of performance into bonuses than managers in organizations that do not emphasize meritocracy.
544	1	55	Drawing on the culture and cognition tradition, we suggest that organizations promoting meritocracy as a cultural value can lead to unintended behaviors, in part by triggering managers' stereotypes and other schematas (Swidler, 1986; DiMaggio, 1997) when making their employment decisions.
545	1	2	This is what we call the "paradox of meritocracy," in which emphasizing meritocracy as an organizational value to reward employees fairly may result in the opposite outcome.
545	1	2	This is what we call the "paradox of meritocracy," in which emphasizing meritocracy as an organizational value to reward employees fairly may result in the opposite outcome.
545	1	5	We test our paradox of meritocracy hypothesis directly with three different experiments (with a total of 445 participants across all three studies) in which individuals with managerial experience are asked to play the role of managers in a hypothetical organization and to evaluate and compensate employees based on their performance reviews.

545	1	12		In our study, we experimentally manipulate both the gender of the employees being evaluated and whether the company's core values emphasize meritocracy in the organization.
545	1	16		The concept of meritocracy as a distributive mechanism resting on equal opportunity and merit has broad cultural appeal (Scully, 1997, 2000; McNamee and Miller, 2004).
545	1	17		The concept of meritocracy as a distributive mechanism resting on equal opportunity and merit has broad cultural appeal (Scully, 1997, 2000; McNamee and Miller, 2004).
545	1	20		As a result, many scholars have been interested in understanding to what extent equal opportunity and meritocratic outcomes have been achieved.
545	1	23		Inside organizations, employment strategies aimed at linking merit to employees' careers, such as pay-for-skill and pay-for-performance reward systems, are often portrayed as variations on meritocracy (Scully, 1997: 413).
545	1	25		Inside organizations, employment strategies aimed at linking merit to employees' careers, such as pay-for-skill and pay-for-performance reward systems, are often portrayed as variations on meritocracy (Scully, 1997: 413).
545	1	25		Merit pay is seen as an important symbol of an organization's culture, emphasizing that work is to be rewarded on the basis of performance alone, rather than other considerations, such as equality, need, or seniority (Heneman and Werner, 2005: 9).
545	1	32		But results of empirical studies that control for employee performance have recently called into question whether the introduction of meritocratic (or merit-based) reward practices and routines in organizations helps to remedy gender and racial disparities in wages in the workplace (e.g., Elvira and Graham, 2002; Castilla, 2008).

545	1	32	But results of empirical studies that control for employee performance have recently called into question whether the introduction of meritocratic (or merit-based) reward practices and routines in organizations helps to remedy gender and racial disparities in wages in the workplace (e.g., Elvira and Graham, 2002; Castilla, 2008).	
545	1	37	The persistence of gender and racial inequality in wages is especially puzzling given the claims that some type of meritbased or incentive pay practices are widespread among employers (Heneman and Werner, 2005; Miller, 2006; Noe et al., 2008).	
545	1	47	According to the Hewitt Associates salary survey in 2002, 90 percent of the large organizations surveyed already had a merit pay plan in place (Hewitt Associates, 2002, cited in Heneman and Werner, 2005).	
545	1	49	These organizational strategies aimed at promoting meritbased reward systems in companies have also received great support in both scholarly and practice-oriented communities.	
546	1	8	Less well understood is whether these merit-based reward practices successfully link employees' compensation directly to their performance evaluations and productivity, thereby reducing the influence of stereotypes and other workirrelevant factors.	
546	1	13		In particular, we know little about the impact of promoting meritocratic cultures and practices on inequality in employee wages and attainment.
546	1	15	The suspicion that adopting these merit-based pay practices in organizations, especially those that promote meritocracy, may not solve inequality in the workplace is not new (e.g., Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly, 2006; Castilla, 2008; Kalev, 2009).	

546	1	16		<p>The suspicion that adopting these merit-based pay practices in organizations, especially those that promote meritocracy, may not solve inequality in the workplace is not new (e.g., Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly, 2006; Castilla, 2008; Kalev, 2009).</p> <p>However, past work has not tested the causal effect promoting meritocracy might have on biases in reward decisions.</p> <p>Under certain circumstances, organizations that emphasize meritocratic values and beliefs may unintentionally introduce bias and create inequity in the distribution of employee rewards.</p> <p>In a recent examination of pay practices, Castilla (2008) showed that the implementation of an ostensibly meritocratic performance-reward system, designed to give workers extra compensation based on their performance, did not eliminate gender and racial bias in earnings.</p> <p>Notably, this penalty occurred even after the organization signaled that it strongly valued and supported meritocracy at the workplace by implementing a performance-reward program that linked employees' performance with the size of pay increases.</p>
546	1	29		
546	1	32		
546	1	36		
546	1	55		
547	1	6	<p>Because these field studies focused exclusively on organizations after the introduction of the merit-based bonus system, however, these findings cannot determine whether ascriptive inequality in the distribution of bonuses persisted in spite of management's efforts to introduce a merit-based reward system or because of these efforts.</p>	
547	1	9	<p>Because these field studies focused exclusively on organizations after the introduction of the merit-based bonus system, however, these findings cannot determine whether ascriptive inequality in the distribution of bonuses persisted in spite of management's efforts to introduce a merit-based reward system or because of these efforts.</p>	

547	1	14	Our goal in this article was to experimentally test whether emphasizing meritocratic values at the organizational level may actually introduce bias in favor of men over equally performing women in translating performance into bonus amounts.
547	1	19	In our study, we focused specifically on how organizations may attempt to promote particular meritocratic values among their managers and employees, which is consistent with one dimension of the broad definition of culture in DiMaggio (1997).
547	1	23	Although our prediction of greater bias in monetary rewards under meritocratic cultures may seem counterintuitive, it is consistent with broader scholarship in this area.
547	1	43	The prediction that emphasizing meritocracy may actually have a paradoxical effect is in accordance with research on the link between culture and cognition.
548	1	6	Drawing on the culture and cognition tradition, we suggest that employers' efforts to promote meritocratic beliefs or cultures in organizations may ironically yield unintended negative consequences, perhaps by leading individuals to feel unbiased, fair, or objective, and as a result become more likely to express individual bias toward low-status groups of employees.
548	1	13	In the case of gender, we thus predict that managers making decisions on behalf of an organization that emphasizes meritocracy will show greater bias in favor of male employees than managers making decisions on behalf of an organization that does not emphasize meritocracy.
548	1	15	In the case of gender, we thus predict that managers making decisions on behalf of an organization that emphasizes meritocracy will show greater bias in favor of male employees than managers making decisions on behalf of an organization that does not emphasize meritocracy.

548	1	16	In particular, we identify and test this “paradox of meritocracy” effect, whereby emphasizing meritocracy has the causal effect of increasing ascriptive bias in the distribution of monetary rewards.
548	1	17	In particular, we identify and test this “paradox of meritocracy” effect, whereby emphasizing meritocracy has the causal effect of increasing ascriptive bias in the distribution of monetary rewards.
548	1	20	Hypothesis: Participants in an organization that emphasizes meritocracy as a core organizational value will show greater levels of ascriptive bias in translating employee performance evaluations into monetary bonuses than participants in an organization that does not emphasize meritocracy.
548	1	24	Hypothesis: Participants in an organization that emphasizes meritocracy as a core organizational value will show greater levels of ascriptive bias in translating employee performance evaluations into monetary bonuses than participants in an organization that does not emphasize meritocracy.
548	1	27	We conducted three experimental studies designed to test our hypothesis, the first focusing specifically on whether there is a paradox of meritocracy.
548	1	28	The next two studies further assess the paradox of meritocracy finding.
548	1	30	Because an empirical examination of the potential underlying mechanisms leading to the paradox of meritocracy effect is beyond the scope of our study, we consider them theoretically in the discussion section.

548	1	42	The study employed a 2×2 mixed factorial design that manipulated (1) the apparent extent to which a performance evaluation system was meritocratic (meritocratic or nonmeritocratic, between subjects) and (2) the gender of the person being evaluated (male or female, within subjects).
548	1	42	The study employed a 2×2 mixed factorial design that manipulated (1) the apparent extent to which a performance evaluation system was meritocratic (meritocratic or nonmeritocratic, between subjects) and (2) the gender of the person being evaluated (male or female, within subjects).
548	1	43	The study employed a 2×2 mixed factorial design that manipulated (1) the apparent extent to which a performance evaluation system was meritocratic (meritocratic or nonmeritocratic, between subjects) and (2) the gender of the person being evaluated (male or female, within subjects).
548	1	49	Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of two different sets of organizational core values, one set that emphasized meritocracy (the “meritocratic” condition) versus another (neutral) set that did not emphasize meritocracy (the “nonmeritocratic” condition).
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548	1	51		Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of two different sets of organizational core values, one set that emphasized meritocracy (the “meritocratic” condition) versus another (neutral) set that did not emphasize meritocracy (the “nonmeritocratic” condition).
549	1	8		This design allowed us to test whether believing that the organization is meritocratic increases the level of gender bias in the managerial decision-making process.
550	1	16		Following the company description was the experimental manipulation of meritocracy.
550	1	17		We manipulated the apparent level of meritocracy by providing participants with a list of “Core Company Values” that either did or did not emphasize meritocracy in the performance-reward system (see below).
550	1	19		We manipulated the apparent level of meritocracy by providing participants with a list of “Core Company Values” that either did or did not emphasize meritocracy in the performance-reward system (see below).
551	1	18		Many have defended separating performance appraisals and salary discussions into two separate stages mainly because decoupling these two processes and strengthening the tie between the performance evaluations of employees and their career outcomes are generally seen as more meritocratic.
551	1	19		Work has suggested that this decoupling encourages employees’ perception of merit, increases job satisfaction, and is motivational (Gerhart and Rynes, 2003; Martocchio, 2004; Milkovich and Newman, 2004).
551	1	29		To manipulate whether the organization was presented as meritocratic, we varied the information that participants received about ServiceOne’s company values.

551	1	34		<p>To be as realistic as possible, we drew on information from a real organization's core values introduced to emphasize meritocracy at the workplace as one of the most basic aspects of an organizational move toward achieving meritocracy and also as a cultural symbol signaling that work was to be rewarded on the sole basis of performance.</p>
551	1	36		<p>To be as realistic as possible, we drew on information from a real organization's core values introduced to emphasize meritocracy at the workplace as one of the most basic aspects of an organizational move toward achieving meritocracy and also as a cultural symbol signaling that work was to be rewarded on the sole basis of performance.</p>
551	1	40	<p>This approach also allowed us to test directly the potential causal effect of promoting a merit-based culture on employee bonuses. In the meritocratic condition, the core values emphasized fairness and compensation based on performance.</p>	
551	1	41		<p>This approach also allowed us to test directly the potential causal effect of promoting a merit-based culture on employee bonuses. In the meritocratic condition, the core values emphasized fairness and compensation based on performance.</p>
551	1	43		<p>These meritocratic core values statements were as follows: (1) "All employees are to be rewarded fairly"; (2) "whether employees deserve a raise is determined by their performance"; (3) "raises and bonuses are based entirely on the performance of the employee"; (4) "promotions are given to employees when their performance shows that they deserve it"; and (5) "ServiceOne's goal is to reward all employees equitably every year."</p>

551	1	51	In the non-meritocratic condition, the core values did not indicate meritocratic values; instead, they emphasized the regularity of evaluation and managerial autonomy.
551	1	52	In the non-meritocratic condition, the core values did not indicate meritocratic values; instead, they emphasized the regularity of evaluation and managerial autonomy.
551	1	54	We refer to this condition as the non-meritocratic condition simply because this condition does not emphasize fairness or compensation based on employee performance as the meritocratic condition did.
551	1	56	We refer to this condition as the non-meritocratic condition simply because this condition does not emphasize fairness or compensation based on employee performance as the meritocratic condition did.
551	1	57	To be conservative, the non-meritocratic condition was designed to be neutral but not explicitly antimeritocratic; thus the possibility of bias or discrimination in evaluations was not raised.
552	1	2	To be conservative, the non-meritocratic condition was designed to be neutral but not explicitly antimeritocratic; thus the possibility of bias or discrimination in evaluations was not raised.
552	1	3	The non-meritocratic core values statements were the following: (1) "All employees are to be evaluated regularly"; (2) "whether an employee deserves a raise is determined by their manager"; (3) "raises and bonuses are to be given based on the discretion of the manager"; (4) "promotions are to be given to employees when their manager decides that they deserve it"; and (5) "ServiceOne's goal is to evaluate all employees every year."
552	1	25	Following the meritocracy manipulation, participants examined the three employee profiles.

552	1	46	To test our hypothesis, it was key that the test profiles were of equivalent merit, but not so similar as to raise participants' suspicion that studying gender bias was a goal of the research.	
553	1	49		Our hypothesis predicted that people will be more likely to engage in gender bias in the translation of performance evaluations into rewards when the organization presents itself as meritocratic.
553	1	54		To determine whether other employee outcomes are also affected by perceptions of meritocracy, we asked participants to rate each employee on four additional items, using a set of 7-point Likert-type scales.
554	1	14		This included our key manipulation check questions, the extent to which ServiceOne as a company was meritocratic and fair (again using 7-point scales).
554	1	15		We expected participants to rate the company as more meritocratic and fair in the meritocratic condition than in the non-meritocratic condition.
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554	1	29	<p>We first checked whether our manipulation successfully convinced participants that ServiceOne was more meritocratic and fair in the meritocratic condition compared with the non-meritocratic condition and found that participants did rate ServiceOne as more meritocratic under the meritocratic condition than under the non-meritocratic one (meritocratic condition mean = 4.05 vs. non-meritocratic condition mean = 3.57, t-value = 2.609, significant at the .01 level).</p>
554	1	29	<p>We first checked whether our manipulation successfully convinced participants that ServiceOne was more meritocratic and fair in the meritocratic condition compared with the non-meritocratic condition and found that participants did rate ServiceOne as more meritocratic under the meritocratic condition than under the non-meritocratic one (meritocratic condition mean = 4.05 vs. non-meritocratic condition mean = 3.57, t-value = 2.609, significant at the .01 level).</p>
554	1	30	<p>We first checked whether our manipulation successfully convinced participants that ServiceOne was more meritocratic and fair in the meritocratic condition compared with the non-meritocratic condition and found that participants did rate ServiceOne as more meritocratic under the meritocratic condition than under the non-meritocratic one (meritocratic condition mean = 4.05 vs. non-meritocratic condition mean = 3.57, t-value = 2.609, significant at the .01 level).</p>

554	1	31	<p>We first checked whether our manipulation successfully convinced participants that ServiceOne was more meritocratic and fair in the meritocratic condition compared with the non-meritocratic condition and found that participants did rate ServiceOne as more meritocratic under the meritocratic condition than under the non-meritocratic one (meritocratic condition mean = 4.05 vs. non-meritocratic condition mean = 3.57, t-value = 2.609, significant at the .01 level).</p>
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554	1	33	We first checked whether our manipulation successfully convinced participants that ServiceOne was more meritocratic and fair in the meritocratic condition compared with the non-meritocratic condition and found that participants did rate ServiceOne as more meritocratic under the meritocratic condition than under the non-meritocratic one (meritocratic condition mean = 4.05 vs. non-meritocratic condition mean = 3.57, t-value = 2.609, significant at the .01 level).
554	1	36	Participants also rated the company as more fair in the meritocratic condition (meritocratic condition mean = 3.67 vs. the non-meritocratic condition mean = 3.25, t-value = 2.565, significant at the .01 level).
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554	1	39	This indicates that our manipulation of meritocracy was successful.
554	1	50	The paradox of meritocracy effect.

554	1	52	We assessed our main hypothesis by examining the bonus-amount decision for each of the test profiles by apparent meritocracy condition.
554	1	53	We expected to find greater levels of gender bias in the meritocratic condition than in the non-meritocratic condition in the form of a lower bonus for women.
554	1	54	We expected to find greater levels of gender bias in the meritocratic condition than in the non-meritocratic condition in the form of a lower bonus for women.
555	1	6	Given the known problems of using difference scores as dependent variables (Edwards, 2001), we interpreted the ANOVA results using bonus amount as the dependent variable: we hypothesized that the meritocracy manipulation would interact with the gender of the employees who were being evaluated to influence the bonus.
555	1	11	The results of our analyses are presented in figure 1. In the non-meritocratic condition, we found that women, on average, earned a bonus \$51 higher than equally performing men, significant at the .01 level.
555	1	14	By contrast, we found the opposite pattern in the meritocratic condition: men earned, on average, a bonus \$46 higher than equally performing women, significant at the .01 level.
555	1	21	Consistent with our hypothesis, this analysis yielded an interaction effect for gender and meritocracy such that women were paid less than men in the meritocratic condition, but not in the non-meritocratic condition ($F = 18.792$, $p = .000$).

555	1	22	Consistent with our hypothesis, this analysis yielded an interaction effect for gender and meritocracy such that women were paid less than men in the meritocratic condition, but not in the non-meritocratic condition ($F = 18.792$, $p = .000$).
555	1	23	Consistent with our hypothesis, this analysis yielded an interaction effect for gender and meritocracy such that women were paid less than men in the meritocratic condition, but not in the non-meritocratic condition ($F = 18.792$, $p = .000$).
555	1	25	Consequently, participants in a performance-reward system that emphasizes meritocracy significantly favored men over women in the translation of employee performance into bonus amounts.
555	1	28	There was neither a significant gender main effect ($F = .052$, $p = .82$) nor a meritocracy main effect ($F = .027$, $p = .87$) on the bonus.
555	0	Rodapé 3	We found no significant difference in the bonus amount assigned to the filler profile between the two meritocracy conditions.
555	0	Rodapé 5	The average bonus for the filler profile was \$159.23 in the meritocratic condition and \$150.07 in the non-meritocratic condition.
555	0	Rodapé 6	The average bonus for the filler profile was \$159.23 in the meritocratic condition and \$150.07 in the non-meritocratic condition.
555	0	Rodapé 10	The t-test for the bonus difference of \$9.16 was not significant ($t\text{-value} = -.739$, $p = .46$), suggesting that the meritocracy condition did not significantly affect the bonus rating of the filler profile across conditions.

556	1	2	We did not predict a tendency for participants to give women a higher bonus than men in the non-meritocratic condition.
556	1	14	The interaction effect for gender and meritocracy on the bonus was significant for male participants ($N = 163$; $F = 11.121$, $p = .001$) and female participants ($N = 64$; $F = 7.273$, $p = .01$).
556	1	20	For each participant, regardless of meritocratic condition, we computed the difference in the amount of the bonus between the male and the female test profiles and then used that difference as the dependent variable for the regression analyses.
556	1	26	In addition to examining the main effect of meritocracy, we included a number of control variables, including participants' gender, age, and years of management experience, as well as their ratings of the sources of employees' success.
556	1	30	Consistent with our main hypothesis, the meritocracy manipulation was always statistically significant and in the predicted direction for the bonus amount.
556	1	36	Although the results of study 1 support our hypothesis, one alternative explanation for our findings is that participants might have made certain gender attributions and interpreted the language in the organizational values statement differently in the meritocracy condition.
556	1	38	In particular, participants may have interpreted the emphasis on "equity" and "fairness" in the meritocratic condition as a rhetorical device actually signaling a preference for women.
556	1	44	If so, participants in the meritocratic condition might have assumed that the female test profile was held to more lenient standards and was more likely to have achieved her performance rating through help from others or some source other than her own productivity, ability, or effort.

556	0	Rodapé 5	We ran ANOVA (repeated measures for the male and female test profiles) to test for the three-way interaction of gender of the employee \times gender of the participant \times meritocracy condition.
556	0	Rodapé 8	This interaction was not significant, providing further support for the finding that the interaction effect for gender and meritocracy on the bonus does not depend on the gender of the participant ($p = .98$).
556	0	Rodapé 24	This model's interaction effect for gender and meritocracy on the bonus was still significant ($F = 17.725, p = .001$).
557	1	4	If the meritocratic condition did lead participants to believe women were evaluated according to more lenient standards, women in the meritocratic condition should be evaluated as more likely to have been successful due to factors other than ability and talent or effort and hard work.
557	1	6	If the meritocratic condition did lead participants to believe women were evaluated according to more lenient standards, women in the meritocratic condition should be evaluated as more likely to have been successful due to factors other than ability and talent or effort and hard work.
557	1	12	We found no significant gender differences in the perceptions of sources of employees' success between respondents in the meritocratic and non-meritocratic conditions.
557	1	12	We found no significant gender differences in the perceptions of sources of employees' success between respondents in the meritocratic and non-meritocratic conditions.

557	1	16	Consistent with earlier work (Pazy, 1986), we only found significant that women's success was more likely than men's to be attributed to hard work and effort, but this pattern did not differ by meritocratic condition.
557	1	18	These results suggest that participants did not perceive women to be evaluated more leniently in the meritocratic condition.
557	1	20	Our hypothesis focused on the effect of meritocratic values or beliefs on bias in the distribution of bonuses.
557	1	35	Consequently, to the extent that emphasizing meritocracy at the organizational level increases the expression of gender stereotypes, we would also expect to find greater levels of bias in favor of male employees in a variety of career outcomes.
557	1	40	Recent fieldwork suggests that the effects of emphasizing meritocracy may be greatest for salary and bonus increases.
557	1	42	Empirically, in studying a company that emphasized the meritocratic aspect of its performance-reward system, Castilla (2008) found significant penalties for women, minorities, and non-U.S. citizens in bonus amounts but not in promotions, terminations, or the binary decision of whether an employee deserves a bonus.
558	1	24	There are also practical reasons to expect that emphasizing meritocracy in organizations when implementing pay-for-performance programs will have the greatest effect for salary and bonus increases.
558	1	35	Based on these reasons presented in prior work, our ancillary prediction is therefore that participants in an organization that emphasizes meritocracy as a core organizational value will show lower levels of bias in the translation of employee performance evaluations into other more observable career decisions than monetary bonuses.

558	1	40	To test this prediction, we collected and examined four other employee ratings of the test profiles by meritocracy condition
558	1	42	Because these other career outcome variables are measured using a different metric than the bonus, we computed a standardized measure of the paradox of meritocracy effect for each rating variable (i.e., beta coefficients).
558	1	45	This approach allowed us to directly compare the effect of our meritocracy manipulation on employee bonus versus the other career variables.
558	1	47	For each participant, regardless of meritocratic condition, we computed the difference in ratings between the equally performing male and female test profiles and then used the standardized values of these differences as the main dependent variables.
559	1	3	Regardless of the method used to compare the paradox of meritocracy effect across the different variables of different scales and magnitudes collected (including ANOVA coefficients and marginal effects), we consistently found that the levels of bias (in favor of men) were larger for the bonus amount than for the other four career outcome variables.
559	1	11	Supporting our ancillary prediction, we found that the tendency for participants to express bias in favor of men in the meritocratic condition was large and highly significant for the bonus measure ($B = .278$, $p = .000$).
559	1	14	But we found smaller levels (in absolute magnitude) of gender bias in the meritocratic condition for hiring ($B = .101$, $p = .064$), promotion ($B = .082$, $p = .062$), termination ($B = -.123$, $p = .031$), and success in the future ($B = .127$, $p = .028$; all one-sided tests).

560	1	1	Once again, we also ran 2×2 factorial ANOVAs (repeated measures for the male and female profiles) and report the interaction term between the meritocracy manipulation and the gender of the employees in column 7 of table 1.
560	1	3	The only significant interaction effects for gender and meritocracy were found for the termination ($F = 3.51, p = .062$) and success ratings ($F = 3.70, p = .056$).
560	1	8	In addition, we examined whether participants were more likely to rank the male test profile first across all outcome variables, by meritocracy condition and gender.
560	1	9	We also expected that the effect of the meritocracy manipulation on gender bias would be smaller than on the bonus for the more visible measures.
560	1	12	Across all variables, men were always preferred more under the meritocratic condition than under the non-meritocratic condition.
560	1	12	Across all variables, men were always preferred more under the meritocratic condition than under the non-meritocratic condition.
561	1	7	We conducted this second experiment to rule out one important alternative explanation for our findings in study 1: the fact that our filler profile was male in study 1 may have shaped the comparisons made by the participants, leading to a preference for the male employee in the meritocratic condition.
561	1	17	In study 1, participants may have rewarded our male test profile more highly in the meritocracy condition because they implicitly compared him with Robert, our low-performing filler profile.
561	1	20	When making such a comparison, it could have seemed more fair or meritocratic to give the male test profile a larger bonus.

561	1	28	If this alternative argument is true, then changing the gender of the filler profile from male to female should reverse the results, producing a greater bonus for women in the meritocracy condition.
561	1	48	Similar to study 1, our manipulation led participants to perceive ServiceOne as more meritocratic and fair in the meritocratic condition than in the non-meritocratic condition (both significant at the .01 level).
561	1	49	Similar to study 1, our manipulation led participants to perceive ServiceOne as more meritocratic and fair in the meritocratic condition than in the non-meritocratic condition (both significant at the .01 level).
561	1	49	Similar to study 1, our manipulation led participants to perceive ServiceOne as more meritocratic and fair in the meritocratic condition than in the non-meritocratic condition (both significant at the .01 level).
561	1	50	Participants rated ServiceOne as more meritocratic (the mean difference between the two conditions is .738, t -value = 2.641, $p < .01$) and more fair (the mean difference was .708, t -value = 2.980, $p < .01$) under the meritocratic condition than under the non-meritocratic one.
561	1	53	Participants rated ServiceOne as more meritocratic (the mean difference between the two conditions is .738, t -value = 2.641, $p < .01$) and more fair (the mean difference was .708, t -value = 2.980, $p < .01$) under the meritocratic condition than under the non-meritocratic one.
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562	1	1			The paradox of meritocracy effect.
562	1	3			Consistent with study 1, in the non-meritocratic condition we found that women earn on average a bonus \$47 higher than equally performing men ($p < .01$).
562	1	5			Consistent with study 1, in the non-meritocratic condition we found that women earn on average a bonus \$47 higher than equally performing men ($p < .01$).
562	1	8			Also consistent with the analyses of study 1, this yielded an interaction effect for gender and meritocracy such that women were paid less than men in the meritocratic condition but not in the non-meritocratic condition ($F = 10.125$, $p = .001$).
562	1	9			Also consistent with the analyses of study 1, this yielded an interaction effect for gender and meritocracy such that women were paid less than men in the meritocratic condition but not in the non-meritocratic condition ($F = 10.125$, $p = .001$).
562	1	10			Also consistent with the analyses of study 1, this yielded an interaction effect for gender and meritocracy such that women were paid less than men in the meritocratic condition but not in the non-meritocratic condition ($F = 10.125$, $p = .001$).
562	1	21			The standardized coefficients were similar to those reported in table 1 : consistent with our prediction, participants also tended to rate women more favorably than men in the non-meritocratic condition and to rate men more favorably than women in the meritocratic condition on hiring, promotion, termination, and success decisions, although the effect sizes were lower than for bonuses.

562	1	22	<p>The standardized coefficients were similar to those reported in table 1 : consistent with our prediction, participants also tended to rate women more favorably than men in the non-meritocratic condition and to rate men more favorably than women in the meritocratic condition on hiring, promotion, termination, and success decisions, although the effect sizes were lower than for bonuses.</p>
562	1	26	<p>For hiring, promotion, and termination, the interaction effects of gender and meritocracy were non-significant (for hiring, $F = .762$, $p = .385$; promotion, $F = .237$, $p = .628$; and termination, $F = 1.668$, $p = .199$).</p>
562	0	Rodapé 7	<p>The average bonus for the filler profile was \$150.42 in the meritocratic condition and \$128.85 in the non-meritocratic condition.</p>
562	0	Rodapé 9	<p>The average bonus for the filler profile was \$150.42 in the meritocratic condition and \$128.85 in the non-meritocratic condition.</p>
563	1	3	<p>Our hypothesis, and by extension our study design, focused on comparing equally performing male and female employees, but another possible way of ascertaining the effect of a culture of meritocracy on merit-compensation decisions is to compare the same-gender high and low performers in the meritocratic and non-meritocratic conditions.</p>
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563	1	5	Our hypothesis, and by extension our study design, focused on comparing equally performing male and female employees, but another possible way of ascertaining the effect of a culture of meritocracy on merit-compensation decisions is to compare the same-gender high and low performers in the meritocratic and non-meritocratic conditions.
563	1	5	Our hypothesis, and by extension our study design, focused on comparing equally performing male and female employees, but another possible way of ascertaining the effect of a culture of meritocracy on merit-compensation decisions is to compare the same-gender high and low performers in the meritocratic and non-meritocratic conditions.
563	1	11	This approach allowed us to assess to what extent performance differentials are less effective at generating rewards for women than men in the meritocratic condition, compared with the non-meritocratic condition.
563	1	12	This approach allowed us to assess to what extent performance differentials are less effective at generating rewards for women than men in the meritocratic condition, compared with the non-meritocratic condition.
563	1	14	In other words, we could also examine whether greater performance translates into greater rewards in the meritocratic condition, regardless of the gender of the employees.
563	1	19	For study 1 (low-performing male filler profile), we ran an ANOVA analysis with only the two male profiles, estimating (a) the main effect of meritocracy, (b) the main effect of being the test or filler profile ("performance"), and (c) the interaction of these two.
563	1	22	The latter interaction effect tells us whether the performance effect is significantly greater in the meritocratic condition than in the non-meritocratic condition for male profiles.

563	1	23		The latter interaction effect tells us whether the performance effect is significantly greater in the meritocratic condition than in the non-meritocratic condition for male profiles.
563	1	26		Both the “performance” direct effect and the effect of meritocracy were significant for men ($p < .001$).
563	1	31		Although the “performance” direct effect was significant ($p < .001$), the effect of meritocracy was not significant for female profiles ($F = .041, p = .84$).
563	1	34		Overall, these findings are consistent with our paradox of meritocracy hypothesis and indicate that the effect of meritocracy on monetary rewards is significant for men but not women.
563	1	34		Overall, these findings are consistent with our paradox of meritocracy hypothesis and indicate that the effect of meritocracy on monetary rewards is significant for men but not women.
563	1	37		In addition, the effect of performance on rewards is significantly greater in the meritocratic condition than in the non-meritocratic condition for men, but there is no evidence of a similar boost for women in the meritocratic condition.
563	1	38		In addition, the effect of performance on rewards is significantly greater in the meritocratic condition than in the non-meritocratic condition for men, but there is no evidence of a similar boost for women in the meritocratic condition.
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563	1	42		THE FEMALE ADVANTAGE IN THE NON-MERITOCRATIC CONDITION

563	1	45		The results of studies 1 and 2 supported our prediction that women would receive smaller average bonuses than men in the meritocratic condition.
563	1	47		One unpredicted finding in both studies, however, was that women received greater average bonuses in the non-meritocratic condition.
563	1	51		One possible explanation is that the language about discretion used in the non-meritocratic condition may have signaled the possibility of bias on the part of the evaluating supervisors.
563	0	Rodapé 8		Although a direct comparison cannot be made between studies 1 and 2 because participants were not randomly assigned across studies, we can still approximate this comparison by merging both datasets in studies 1 and 2 and running an ANOVA comparing the same-gender high and low performers in the meritocratic and non-meritocratic conditions.
563	0	Rodapé 9		Although a direct comparison cannot be made between studies 1 and 2 because participants were not randomly assigned across studies, we can still approximate this comparison by merging both datasets in studies 1 and 2 and running an ANOVA comparing the same-gender high and low performers in the meritocratic and non-meritocratic conditions.

563	0	Rodapé 10	<p>We examined</p> <p>(a) the main effect of meritocracy; (b) the main effect of being the test or filler profile (“performance”); (c) the main effect of whether the compared profiles are male (study 1 data) or female (study 2 data); (d) all two-way interactions; and in particular, (e) the three-way interaction of (a), (b), and (c).</p>
563	0	Rodapé 20	<p>The estimated three-way interaction coefficient (d) indicates that the “performance” effect is significantly greater in the meritocratic condition for men than for women ($F = 4.818$, $p = .029$).</p>
563	0	Rodapé 24	<p>Though the “performance” direct effect (term b) was significant at the .001 level, the effect of meritocracy and the two-way interactions were not significant.</p>
563	0	Rodapé 26	<p>Participants in the meritocratic condition thus showed greater levels of bias in favor of men in translating employee performance differentials into bonuses (in comparison with participants in the non-meritocratic condition).</p>
563	0	Rodapé 31	<p>Participants in the meritocratic condition thus showed greater levels of bias in favor of men in translating employee performance differentials into bonuses (in comparison with participants in the non-meritocratic condition).</p>

564	1	4	In particular, the participants in studies 1 and 2 may have been responding to the language emphasizing managerial discretion in the “Core Values” statement of the non-meritocratic condition (e.g., “raises and bonuses are to be given based on the discretion of the manager”).
564	1	7	If participants perceived more managerial discretion in the non-meritocratic condition, they may have suspected that the performance evaluations they received were biased in favor of male employees and compensated for this bias by awarding a larger bonus to the female test profile.
564	1	12	If this explanation is correct, then removing the emphasis on managerial discretion in the non-meritocratic condition should result in equal bonuses for the male and female test profiles.
564	1	15	Updated non-meritocratic condition.
564	1	17	To test the effect of an emphasis on discretion, we first constructed a new non-meritocratic condition designed to be less discretionary than the non-meritocratic control condition used in studies 1 and 2.
564	1	18	To test the effect of an emphasis on discretion, we first constructed a new non-meritocratic condition designed to be less discretionary than the non-meritocratic control condition used in studies 1 and 2.
564	1	28	We refer to this as the “updated non-meritocratic condition.”
564	1	31	We next conducted a pretest of all three “core values” statements to evaluate two key assumptions: first, that the original non-meritocratic condition was perceived as more discretionary than the meritocratic condition; and second, that the updated non-meritocratic condition and the meritocratic condition would be perceived as equally discretionary.

564	1	32	<p>We next conducted a pretest of all three “core values” statements to evaluate two key assumptions: first, that the original non-meritocratic condition was perceived as more discretionary than the meritocratic condition; and second, that the updated non-meritocratic condition and the meritocratic condition would be perceived as equally discretionary.</p>
564	1	33	<p>We next conducted a pretest of all three “core values” statements to evaluate two key assumptions: first, that the original non-meritocratic condition was perceived as more discretionary than the meritocratic condition; and second, that the updated non-meritocratic condition and the meritocratic condition would be perceived as equally discretionary.</p>
564	1	33	<p>We next conducted a pretest of all three “core values” statements to evaluate two key assumptions: first, that the original non-meritocratic condition was perceived as more discretionary than the meritocratic condition; and second, that the updated non-meritocratic condition and the meritocratic condition would be perceived as equally discretionary.</p>
564	1	42	<p>As expected, participants rated managers in the original non-meritocratic condition as having significantly greater discretion than managers in the meritocratic condition (mean = 6.24 vs. mean = 3.67, $p < .01$, paired t-test, two-tailed).</p>
564	1	44	<p>As expected, participants rated managers in the original non-meritocratic condition as having significantly greater discretion than managers in the meritocratic condition (mean = 6.24 vs. mean = 3.67, $p < .01$, paired t-test, two-tailed).</p>
564	1	45	<p>Our updated non-meritocratic condition successfully reduced the perceived level of managerial discretion, being rated as significantly less discretionary than the original non-meritocratic condition (updated nonmeritocratic condition mean = 3.95, $p < .01$, paired t-test, two-tailed).</p>

564	1	48	Our updated non-meritocratic condition successfully reduced the perceived level of managerial discretion, being rated as significantly less discretionary than the original non-meritocratic condition (updated nonmeritocratic condition mean = 3.95, $p < .01$, paired t-test, two-tailed).
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564	1	50	Importantly, the updated non-meritocratic condition and the meritocratic condition were rated as equally discretionary ($p = .52$, paired t-test, two-tailed).
564	1	51	Importantly, the updated non-meritocratic condition and the meritocratic condition were rated as equally discretionary ($p = .52$, paired t-test, two-tailed).
564	0	10	Because gender discrimination is frowned upon in organizations, especially among managers (see, e.g., Dobbin, 2009), participants in the non-meritocratic condition may have awarded the female employee a larger bonus to avoid the perception that they were biased.
564	0	14	Given the language of discretion used in the non-meritocratic condition, however, we decided to first test the overcorrection explanation described above in study 3.

565	1	10	The procedure in study 3 was identical to that used for study 1, with the exception that the updated nonmeritocratic condition was used in place of the original non-meritocratic condition with the five non-discretionary core values statements, as described above
565	1	11	The procedure in study 3 was identical to that used for study 1, with the exception that the updated nonmeritocratic condition was used in place of the original non-meritocratic condition with the five non-discretionary core values statements, as described above
565	1	14	Our meritocracy manipulation was successful.
565	1	16	As in the previous two studies, we found that participants rated ServiceOne as more meritocratic (the mean difference between the two conditions was .674, t -value = 2.376, $p < .01$) and more fair (the mean difference was .635, t -value = 2.552, $p < .01$) under the meritocratic condition than under the non-meritocratic one.
565	1	19	As in the previous two studies, we found that participants rated ServiceOne as more meritocratic (the mean difference between the two conditions was .674, t -value = 2.376, $p < .01$) and more fair (the mean difference was .635, t -value = 2.552, $p < .01$) under the meritocratic condition than under the non-meritocratic one.
565	1	20	As in the previous two studies, we found that participants rated ServiceOne as more meritocratic (the mean difference between the two conditions was .674, t -value = 2.376, $p < .01$) and more fair (the mean difference was .635, t -value = 2.552, $p < .01$) under the meritocratic condition than under the non-meritocratic one.

565	1	27	In study 3 (and similar to our pretest findings), participants rated the updated non-meritocratic condition and the meritocratic condition as equally discretionary; hence, we had successfully removed any difference in perceptions of discretion across the two conditions (the difference of .275 points was not significant, $p = .39$, two-tailed).
565	1	28	In study 3 (and similar to our pretest findings), participants rated the updated non-meritocratic condition and the meritocratic condition as equally discretionary; hence, we had successfully removed any difference in perceptions of discretion across the two conditions (the difference of .275 points was not significant, $p = .39$, two-tailed).
565	1	32	The paradox of meritocracy effect.
565	1	33	Figure 4 reports the results for the bonus measure in the meritocratic and nonmeritocratic conditions.
565	1	34	Figure 4 reports the results for the bonus measure in the meritocratic and nonmeritocratic conditions.
565	1	36	As in studies 1 and 2, we found support for our hypothesis that women would be disadvantaged in the meritocratic condition.
565	1	37	On average, men in the meritocratic condition earned a bonus \$46 dollars higher than equally performing women (t -value = -2.153 , $p = .018$).
565	1	41	Most importantly for the purposes of study 3, we found no significant differences in the bonuses assigned to men and women in the updated non-meritocratic condition: the bias in favor of women found in the original non-meritocratic condition in studies 1 and 2 disappears under the updated nonmeritocratic condition in study 3.

565	1	42	Most importantly for the purposes of study 3, we found no significant differences in the bonuses assigned to men and women in the updated non-meritocratic condition: the bias in favor of women found in the original non-meritocratic condition in studies 1 and 2 disappears under the updated nonmeritocratic condition in study 3.
565	1	44	Most importantly for the purposes of study 3, we found no significant differences in the bonuses assigned to men and women in the updated non-meritocratic condition: the bias in favor of women found in the original non-meritocratic condition in studies 1 and 2 disappears under the updated nonmeritocratic condition in study 3.
565	1	45	In the updated non-meritocratic condition, women were paid \$2 more than men on average, a non-significant difference (t -value = $-.075$, $p = .94$, one-tailed).
565	1	48	The interaction effect of gender and meritocracy only approached significance, which is not surprising given the lack of significance for the gender difference in the non-meritocratic condition ($F = 1.997$, $p = .161$).
565	1	50	The interaction effect of gender and meritocracy only approached significance, which is not surprising given the lack of significance for the gender difference in the non-meritocratic condition ($F = 1.997$, $p = .161$).
565	1	52	Thus the results of study 3 replicate the finding of a penalty for women in the meritocracy condition and also demonstrate that the advantage for women in the non-meritocratic condition disappears when we remove the discretionary wording in this condition.
565	1	54	Thus the results of study 3 replicate the finding of a penalty for women in the meritocracy condition and also demonstrate that the advantage for women in the non-meritocratic condition disappears when we remove the discretionary wording in this condition.

566	1	9			Inside organizations, the use of meritocratic organizational policies and procedures, particularly pay-for-performance or merit-based reward practices, has gained great support among employers over past decades (e.g., Heneman and Werner, 2005; Noe et al., 2008).
566	1	11			Inside organizations, the use of meritocratic organizational policies and procedures, particularly pay-for-performance or merit-based reward practices, has gained great support among employers over past decades (e.g., Heneman and Werner, 2005; Noe et al., 2008).
566	1	14			Although these efforts by employers are aimed at improving equal opportunity and linking merit to employees' careers, recent empirical studies have found that workplace disparities persist even with the adoption of certain employer practices such as affirmative action and diversity policies (e.g., Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly, 2006) or merit-based pay programs (e.g., Castilla, 2008; Manning and Swaffield, 2008).
566	1	18			Although these efforts by employers are aimed at improving equal opportunity and linking merit to employees' careers, recent empirical studies have found that workplace disparities persist even with the adoption of certain employer practices such as affirmative action and diversity policies (e.g., Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly, 2006) or merit-based pay programs (e.g., Castilla, 2008; Manning and Swaffield, 2008).
566	1	23			What remains an open question, however, is whether gender and racial disparities in the distribution of rewards remain in today's organizations in spite of management's efforts to introduce merit-based reward systems or because of such efforts.

566	1	26	<p>This article advanced research on this question by empirically testing, for the first time in the literature, whether certain management efforts to promote meritocracy in the workplace may have the causal effect of increasing ascriptive bias in the translation of employee performance into rewards and other career outcomes.</p>
567	1	4	<p>Using three experimental studies with a total of 445 individuals with managerial experience, we found strong support for the novel theoretical argument that we call the paradox of meritocracy effect in managerial decisions.</p>
567	1	5	<p>Participants in the meritocratic condition showed greater preference for the male employee over an equally qualified female employee (in the same job, with the same supervisor, and the same performance evaluations) when making bonus decisions.</p>
567	1	9	<p>By contrast, participants in the non-meritocratic condition did not favor the male employee.</p>
567	1	13	<p>The effects of emphasizing meritocracy on other (more visible) employee career decisions such as hiring, promotion, and termination were also in the predicted direction, but as expected, the effect sizes were smaller.</p>
567	1	19	<p>This provides support to our ancillary prediction that less gender bias would be found in the translation of performance scores into more visible employment outcomes when comparing managers embedded in meritocratic versus non-meritocratic organizational contexts, consistent with studies of real organizations (e.g., Petersen and Saporta, 2004; Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly, 2006; Castilla, 2008).</p>

567	1	20	<p>This provides support to our ancillary prediction that less gender bias would be found in the translation of performance scores into more visible employment outcomes when comparing managers embedded in meritocratic versus non-meritocratic organizations (e.g., Petersen and Saporta, 2004; Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly, 2006; Castilla, 2008).</p>
567	1	24	<p>In addition, study 3 showed that removing the language emphasizing managerial discretion from the non-meritocratic condition eliminated the bias in favor of women found in that condition in studies 1 and 2.</p>
567	1	27	<p>The finding that the language about discretion in the non-meritocratic condition may have triggered the need to compensate for possible bias against women stresses the key role organizational cultures play in shaping ascriptive inequality at work.</p>
567	1	44	<p>Though an empirical examination of the possible underlying mechanisms is beyond the goal of our study, there are at least two mechanisms by which the paradox of meritocracy may work.</p>
567	1	53	<p>The moral credentials argument is consistent with our prediction that managers making decisions about employees on behalf of an organization will be more likely to discriminate against women when that organization explicitly promotes itself as meritocratic.</p>
567	1	54	<p>When the culture of an organization includes the strong belief that the organization is meritocratic, and particularly when managers themselves explicitly endorse this belief, this serves as a form of meritocratic moral credentialing that makes future bias more likely.</p>

567	1	56	When the culture of an organization includes the strong belief that the organization is meritocratic, and particularly when managers themselves explicitly endorse this belief, this serves as a form of meritocratic moral credentialing that makes future bias more likely.
567	1	58	An organizational culture that prides itself on meritocracy may encourage bias by convincing managers that they themselves are unbiased, which in turn may discourage them from closely examining their own behaviors for signs of prejudice.
568	1	4	In addition, if a culture that emphasizes meritocracy leads managers to feel that members of the organization consider one another to be unbiased and fair, they may feel that their motivations are not in question and that there is little risk that their actions will be interpreted as prejudiced.
568	1	14	Uhlmann and Cohen's (2007) argument that a sense of personal objectivity moderates the extent to which individuals act on their beliefs, including stereotypical beliefs, would also predict the paradox of meritocracy in employment settings.
568	1	20	In our study, the meritocratic condition gave participants the opportunity to agree that fairness and equity are important criteria for the extra compensation of employees.
568	1	30	If participants do hold gender stereotypes—and past work suggests that such stereotypes are common and automatic (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995)—then increasing participants' tendency to act on their beliefs could produce the patterns we found in the meritocracy condition.
568	1	40	To the extent that moral credentials and self-perceived objectivity provide two justifications, they both may facilitate the expression of prejudice in meritocratic settings.

568	1	48	In our particular case, managers embedded in meritocratic contexts may experience higher confidence that their decisions are impartial, leading them to be less motivated or invest less effort in avoiding the application of stereotypes.
568	1	55	Before assessing the broader implications of our study below, it is important to qualify the generality of our argument and consider the scope conditions that may delimit the paradox of meritocracy effect in organizations.
568	1	57	Doing so may contribute to our understanding of how employers can mitigate the paradox of meritocracy effect by taking steps to reduce the extent to which these conditions exist.
569	1	3	We would not expect to find the paradox of meritocracy effect in organizational settings in which evaluators harbor no gender bias.
569	1	13	A second scope condition has to do with how meritocratic organizational procedures and values are framed and articulated to the organizational members.
569	1	18	In our study, participants were simply asked to indicate whether they agreed with the organizational core values presented, as a way of endorsing certain meritocratic values, before evaluating the employees.
569	1	20	This subtle manipulation increased the relative advantage of equally performing men in the meritocratic condition.
569	1	25	In settings in which the articulation of core values is aligned with other organizational cultural elements and practices that limit the extent to which managers feel (and act on their feelings) that they are non-biased, fair, or objective (Monin and Miller, 2001; Uhlmann and Cohen, 2005), the paradox of meritocracy effect may presumably be weakened.

569	1	31	A third possible scope condition is how the presence of additional organizational procedures and routines is likely to moderate the paradox of meritocracy effect.
569	1	33	Because our focus was on the effects on employee rewards of promoting a meritocratic culture, we did not build into our study design other organizational factors shown to affect bias in the literature.
569	1	43	Consequently, the negative effects of emphasizing meritocratic values in the workplace may be less likely to occur when organizational conditions promote less managerial discretion, more accountability, and more transparency in the workplace.
569	1	56	First, our finding about the unintended effects of certain organizational efforts to promote meritocracy in the workplace provides a novel theoretical explanation for why ascriptive inequality remains despite the proliferation of merit-based policies inside organizations.
570	1	2	First, our finding about the unintended effects of certain organizational efforts to promote meritocracy in the workplace provides a novel theoretical explanation for why ascriptive inequality remains despite the proliferation of merit-based policies inside organizations.
570	1	9	In contrast to recent field studies demonstrating that workplace inequality persists in spite of meritocratic employer practices (e.g., Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly, 2006; Castilla, 2008), our study empirically shows that ascriptive inequality, particularly in the distribution of rewards, is potentially introduced because of such meritocratic efforts.

570	1	13	In contrast to recent field studies demonstrating that workplace inequality persists in spite of meritocratic employer practices (e.g., Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly, 2006; Castilla, 2008), our study empirically shows that ascriptive inequality, particularly in the distribution of rewards, is potentially introduced because of such meritocratic efforts.
570	1	24	Our study specifically demonstrates that an emphasis on meritocracy as an organizational cultural value can serve as an “environmental trigger” (DiMaggio, 1997: 279) that unleashes ascriptive biases.
570	1	40	Consistent with these studies, we found that the cultural context of meritocracy has the potential to increase bias in employment decisions.
570	1	43	In contrast, our research stresses the potential unintended (opposite) effects of certain managerial efforts aimed at promoting meritocratic cultural values in the workplace.
570	1	56	Our research extends these perspectives by demonstrating that bias can be shaped not only by an individual’s previous decisions or beliefs but also by organizational cultures that emphasize meritocracy.
571	1	12	Future research could further examine our paradox of meritocracy finding by changing the characteristics of the pool of employees being evaluated, including the number of employees and the levels of employee performance.
571	1	19	These studies could help us further explore the paradox of meritocracy.
571	1	21	The second extension involves additional testing of the relationship between different aspects of meritocracy and compensation.

571	1	23		In our study, we manipulated the presentation of a meritocratic culture, as we believe this is one of the most basic aspects of meritocracy at the organizational level.
571	1	24		In our study, we manipulated the presentation of a meritocratic culture, as we believe this is one of the most basic aspects of meritocracy at the organizational level.
571	1	25		This provided a conservative test of whether emphasizing meritocracy as a core organizational value can produce bias in employee evaluations.
571	1	31		Of course, work cultures are complex and contextual (Barley, 1983, 1991), and additional experimental research should manipulate other elements of organizational culture when continuing the investigation of the paradox of meritocracy effect.
571	1	33		We also encourage further theorizing and testing to extend our finding to other key aspects of meritocracy, including specific merit-based employment processes and routines as they are currently implemented in the workplace (see Cappelli, 1999; Dobbin, 2009).
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571	1	41	<p>Similarly, further research should examine whether the paradox of meritocracy applies to other types of evaluation procedures (such as ranking, forced distribution, the management by objectives approach, and 360-degree performance systems), merit-based reward systems (such as sales commissions, special recognitions, profit t-sharing plans, employee stock options, and deferred compensation), and to other sets of company goals and guidelines behind the performance-reward process (see Lawler and McDermott, 2003; Hale, 2004; Heneman and Werner, 2005; Rynes, Gerhart, and Parks, 2005).</p>	<p>Similarly, further research should examine whether the paradox of meritocracy applies to other types of evaluation procedures (such as ranking, forced distribution, the management by objectives approach, and 360-degree performance systems), merit-based reward systems (such as sales commissions, special recognitions, profit t-sharing plans, employee stock options, and deferred compensation), and to other sets of company goals and guidelines behind the performance-reward process (see Lawler and McDermott, 2003; Hale, 2004; Heneman and Werner, 2005; Rynes, Gerhart, and Parks, 2005).</p>	<p>Similarly, further research should examine whether the paradox of meritocracy applies to other types of evaluation procedures (such as ranking, forced distribution, the management by objectives approach, and 360-degree performance systems), merit-based reward systems (such as sales commissions, special recognitions, profit t-sharing plans, employee stock options, and deferred compensation), and to other sets of company goals and guidelines behind the performance-reward process (see Lawler and McDermott, 2003; Hale, 2004; Heneman and Werner, 2005; Rynes, Gerhart, and Parks, 2005).</p>
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571	1	52			<p>Along these lines, a productive research direction consists of examining whether the paradox of meritocracy effect interacts with organizational policies aimed at increasing transparency or accountability in the workplace, which have been shown to reduce the expression of bias both experimentally (e.g., Lerner and Tetlock, 1999) and in field studies (e.g., Castilla, 2008).</p>
572	1	1			<p>Research should also continue exploring what real companies may be doing to achieve meritocracy and diversity in the workplace beyond hiring and promotion (e.g., Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly, 2006; Dobbin, Schrage, and Kalev, 2008; Kalev, 2009).</p>

572	1	5		Such research can help us understand under which conditions meritocratic processes foster fairness and equity in organizations.
572	1	9		Finally, to continue building on our efforts to study the nexus of organizational cultures and cognition, we hope future work will investigate the extent to which cultures of meritocracy may directly shape other important organizational behaviors outside the domain of employee rewards and other career outcomes.
572	1	13		One interesting research possibility is to study whether endorsing a meritocratic culture can be viewed as a more broadly “moral” behavior, ultimately influencing the ethics of managerial decisions.
572	1	17		We also see promise in examining the extent to which the underlying mechanisms we propose in this study account for our paradox of meritocracy, with emphases on the moral credentialing and the self-perceived objectivity explanations.
572	1	24		The Risks of Rewarding Merit
572	1	26		Inside organizations, employers have often emphasized various elements of meritocracy and merit-based approaches in the workplace.
572	1	26	Inside organizations, employers have often emphasized various elements of meritocracy and merit-based approaches in the workplace.	
572	1	28	Perhaps implicit in the adoption of these merit-based practices is the presumption that they increase workplace opportunities as well as fairness and equity.	
572	1	33		Because these practices are ultimately implemented by decision makers embedded in different organizational cultures and structures, however, there are hidden risks behind the adoption of ostensibly meritocratic practices.

572	1	36		Our work reveals that bias can be triggered by attempts to reduce it, particularly in organizational contexts that emphasize meritocratic values.
572	1	37		This paradox of meritocracy is of theoretical relevance because it provides an insight into why gender and racial disparities persist within job titles and work establishments, especially given the recent shift to employer procedures emphasizing merit and pay for performance.
572	1	40		This paradox of meritocracy is of theoretical relevance because it provides an insight into why gender and racial disparities persist within job titles and work establishments, especially given the recent shift to employer procedures emphasizing merit and pay for performance.
572	1	45	It serves as a cautionary lesson about the potential unintended negative consequences of organizational efforts to reward merit.	
572	1	47		We do not mean to suggest that the pursuit of meritocracy is futile, only that it may be more difficult than it first appears.
572	1	50		The central contribution of this study is to demonstrate that the causal effect of introducing meritocratic cultures and merit-based practices cannot be taken for granted.
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Kwate, N. O. A., & Meyer, I. JH. (2010).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
1831	1	17		President Obama's election has been touted as a demonstration of American meritocracy—the belief that all may obtain the American Dream—and has instilled hope in African Americans
1831	1	24		However, we argue that in the context of racism and other barriers to success, meritocratic ideology may act as a negative health determinant for African Americans.
1831	2	21		This ideology asserts that the United States is a meritocracy and that its citizens—regardless of the social stratum from which they start—should aspire to, and in fact can attain, the height of social and economic success described as the American Dream.
1831	2	28		American meritocracy, the claim goes, has liberated its citizens from old-world confines of class and heritage.
1831	2	33		President Obama personifies the promise of American meritocracy—an African American man in a country with a long history of racism, rising from very modest means.

1831	3	5		We propose that in the context of strong social barriers to success, especially racism, belief in meritocratic ideology may be detrimental to African American health
1831	3	14		Certainly, belief in meritocracy and the possibility of success through hard work and effort undergirds American optimism and attempts to achieve
1831	3	20		Instead, we hope to problematize how public health researchers and policymakers understand meritocracy by looking at some of the less visible ways in which meritocratic ideology may jeopardize health and well-being
1831	3	22		Instead, we hope to problematize how public health researchers and policymakers understand meritocracy by looking at some of the less visible ways in which meritocratic ideology may jeopardize health and well-being
1831	3	26		We introduce our ideas about the potential pathogenic effect of meritocracy and briefly discuss two mechanisms: individual, through the impact of stress and coping on health, and structural, through the impact of beliefs and values on policies.
1831	3	33		Figure 1 depicts some mechanisms through which meritocratic ideology may lead to poor health.
1831	3	35		Meritocracy has been described as America's dominant ideology. ⁴
1831	3	41		America's history and folklore are replete with ideas related to meritocracy, suggesting that individual agency and resilience will lead to economic success

1831	4	2	Alger's stories envisioned America as a meritocratic republic where all personal and societal rewards were equitably bestowed
1831	4	14	Moreover, for African Americans, meritocratic ideology can lower perceived vulnerability to prejudice, ⁷ providing a sense of hope
1831	4	18	It is difficult to argue with the message of hope inherent in meritocratic ideology that is reflected, for example, in President Obama's message to African American schoolchildren that they can create their own destinies.
1831	4	26	Still, as Merton ⁸ noted, there is often a disjuncture between America's meritocratic values that promote aspiration for success and the opportunity structure—the social, economic, and political structures that make success possible
1831	4	34	The problem is that opportunities are not equally distributed, and they are not allotted solely by meritocratic criteria.
1831	4	39	Even if unintended, the promise of equality inherent in meritocratic ideology serves to elide racism
1831	4	42	Indeed, Geronimus and Thompson viewed meritocracy as part of a broader set of racialized ideologies that undergird health disparities.
1832	2	1	Meritocratic ideology imbricates the moral economy—the norms that govern economic activity and society's protections and privileges. ¹⁰
1832	2	18	System justification theory illuminates the relationship between meritocratic ideology and political inaction, showing why even the most disenfranchised citizens view inequalities as necessary and even fair. ¹

1832	3	12	Because meritocratic ideology promises everyone the chance to succeed, it diverts attention from structures and conditions, such as those related to racism, that make it impossible for many to succeed
1832	3	23	Meritocratic ideology can obfuscate features of the opportunity structure that erect barriers to success.
1832	4	2	A political climate guided by meritocratic ideology is related to general lack of support for social programs that assist those most in need
1832	4	6	The American public's and policymakers' belief in meritocratic ideology catalyzes opposition to policies that contradict the idea that individuals deserve what they get and get what they deserve.
1832	4	12	For example, research shows that meritocratic ideologies influence opinions about how much governmental assistance should be provided to low-income women. ¹
1832	4	24	In some studies, poor Southern African Americans were more likely than were their higher-income counterparts to endorse meritocratic notions that hard work leads to success
1832	4	30	Thus, meritocratic ideology leads to policies that advance fewer allocations to help the disadvantaged, such as health care and welfare.

1832	4	34	Indeed, meritocratic ideology is associated with the endorsement of income inequality, ¹³ which in turn is not only strongly associated with health but also associated with “the heart of problems which beset our societies and are constantly in the news.”
1832	4	43	Although meritocratic ideology may exert subtle and pervasive influence on American politics, support for social programs has varied across US history, and this variation is not necessarily coextensive with the cultural strength of meritocratic ideals.
1832	4	50	Although meritocratic ideology may exert subtle and pervasive influence on American politics, support for social programs has varied across US history, and this variation is not necessarily coextensive with the cultural strength of meritocratic ideals.
1832	4	52	Strong social programs may be implemented even in a climate in which meritocratic ideologies are salient.
1833	1	2	Often, however, in the context of meritocratic ideology, social programs reproduce extant inequalities

1833	1	22	Supposedly, the GI Bill made good on core meritocratic ideals: All those promises that brought people to our shores from the very beginning, that in this country there was opportunity to extend yourself to the limits of your ability.
1833	1	54	Resultant inequalities in African American wealth and education levels are in turn used as evidence that African Americans are unable to compete in a meritocratic system
1833	2	6	Public discourse on home ownership and neighborhood quality has been punctuated by assertions that African American residents lack appropriate values, reflecting and reinforcing meritocratic ideology.
1833	2	34	Described as the cornerstone upon which African American—White health disparities are founded, ²² racial residential segregation is a critical structural pathway through which meritocratic ideology harms health.
1833	2	49	1 Thus, meritocratic ideologies legitimize existing status differences and policies that harm health by locating the responsibility for social status within individual characteristics.
1833	3	11	Meritocratic ideology may be a source of stress.
1833	3	15	If social status tends to be attributed to individual responsibility, meritocratic ideology may be associated with adverse health outcomes among African Americans by increasing the risk of internalizing negative self-attributions for failure to obtain the American Dream.

1833	3	21	To endorse meritocratic ideology—as most Americans do—means to be at risk for the psychic toll borne from perceptions about not measuring up.
1833	3	37	This exemplifies both meritocratic ideology and related system justification.
1833	4	11	If meritocratic ideology subverts the recognition and articulation of racial inequality, rather than acting as a source of uplift, it may in fact place individuals at risk.
1833	4	17	Meritocratic ideology may also be associated with adverse health by increasing health-damaging, high-effort coping to overcome adversity.
1833	4	23	Evidence suggests that in low status groups, the endorsement of meritocratic ideology can lead to self-blame for failure to reach a goal instead of attribution of discrimination.
1833	4	36	Meritocratic ideology may be an important catalyst for John Henryism by increasing the propensity for single-minded determination to succeed and increasing self-blame and demoralization.
1833	4	44	The association of meritocratic ideologies with poor health for African Americans has implications for public health and health policy.
1834	1	15	To do that requires recognizing that societal structure is not simply the reflection of variation in individual talents and effort, as suggested by meritocratic ideologies.

Marks, G. (2010).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
275	1	3		During the early post-war period the major impetus for reform of education systems in industrialized countries was based on meritocratic ideology
275	2	11		Ideally, in a largely meritocratic society educational and occupational outcomes would be largely based on ability and effort, and socioeconomic background and other social characteristics, such as, gender, race and ethnicity would be of little or no importan
276	1	9		The meritocracy debate is about the importance of individual merit versus ascribed characteristics.
276	1	10	The meritocracy debate is about the importance of individual merit versus ascribed characteristics.	
276	1	11	Although merit is usually understood as ability plus effort, operationalization of the concept 'effort' is uncertain, so meritocracy debates center on 'ability' almost invariably measured by test scores.	
276	1	13		Although merit is usually understood as ability plus effort, operationalization of the concept 'effort' is uncertain, so meritocracy debates center on 'ability' almost invariably measured by test scores.
287	1	44		A strong version of the meritocracy thesis is not supported by these analyses since socioeconomic background has significant effects on the occupational status of students' expected occupation
287	2	1	If performance in the tests of literacy, numeracy and science is considered a good indicator of merit (ability plus effort) a weaker version is supported since test scores have relatively strong effects on occupational expectations.	

Chua, V. (2011).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
2	1	16		Singapore is an excellent case study because it is located at one ideal-typical extreme of a scale of meritocracy (Evans and Rauch, 1999).
2	1	19		In their innovative paper, Evans and Rauch (1999) devised a “Weberianness scale” to measure the extent to which a group of 35 countries had strong state bureaucracies characterized by meritocratic recruitment and predictable career ladders.
2	2	33		In the Singapore CME, education alone makes for all kinds of efficient matches, particularly in highly meritocratic jobs (MacDougall and Chew, 1976; Tan, 2004).
2	2	53		Because an administrative state is technocratic, its mode of leadership renewal is informed by an elitist and meritocratic selection process based on academic achievement rather than personal charisma (Barr, 2006).
3	1	10		In the Singapore developmental state, human capital development, technocratic planning and political stability (arising from a meritocratic ideology that reasons that inequalities between individuals are due to differences in innate ability and personal effort rather than personal networks) are cited as fundamental engines of economic growth (Castells, 1988).
3	1	15		The eviction of Singapore from Malaysia in August 1965 (due primarily to Singapore’s intransigent stand on meritocracy and its subsequent refusal to accede to Malaysia’s racial politics), allowed the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) to propagate an ideology of survivalism (Chan, 1971).
3	1	46		By enforcing meritocracy within the state bureaucracies, political elites get to select the most talented individuals (Quah, 1998).

3	2	36	A prevailing institutional rule of education-based meritocracies is that jobs are allocated based on “what you know” rather than “who you know.”
3	2	41	In meritocratic markets, criteria other than human capital will interfere with the selection of the most competent workers (Reskin and McBrier, 2000).
3	2	44	To the extent that developmentalism is sustained in a meritocracy, we should expect to see job seekers more reliant on educational resources than personal contacts.
3	2	46	In a highly meritocratic society like Singapore, where educational credentials are sought after by employers, job seekers are less likely to use personal contacts.
3	2	49	As credentials are highly valued in a meritocratic society, we should expect to see well-educated job seekers relying on their hard-earned credentials.
3	2	62	Assuming that well-educated job seekers are more likely to enter meritocratic jobs than lower-educated job seekers, and that meritocratic jobs are likely to value credentials over personal contacts, I hypothesize that well-educated job seekers are less likely than lower-educated job seekers to experience added returns from using job contacts.
4	1	1	Assuming that well-educated job seekers are more likely to enter meritocratic jobs than lower-educated job seekers, and that meritocratic jobs are likely to value credentials over personal contacts, I hypothesize that well-educated job seekers are less likely than lower-educated job seekers to experience added returns from using job contacts.
4	1	13	While the meritocratic ideology came from Lee, its implementation was often entrusted to his Finance Minister, Dr Goh Keng Swee.
4	1	15	Goh's version of meritocracy was at times even more exacting than Lee's.

4	1	24	This “best man” policy was recently reiterated by current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, in a conversation with Charlie Rose (Straits Times, 16 April 2010): “The whole of our system is founded on a basic concept of meritocracy.
4	1	27	Based on Singapore’s strongly meritocratic state structure, we would expect the following two patterns:
4	1	30	Job contacts are less likely to facilitate entry into the meritocratic state sector.
4	1	31	Job contacts are less likely to pay off in the meritocratic state sector.
4	1	48	I hypothesize that if a social system is highly meritocratic, then high-status contacts (even though they embody better resources) should not provide additional advantages.
4	1	58	In a highly meritocratic society like Singapore, the payoffs to social capital should tend to be lower for people with educational advantages.
5	2	54	The third interaction term (c) tests Proposition 4, which predicts that payoffs of contact use are lower for individuals working in highly meritocratic jobs (i.e. the state sector).
7	1	16	Job contacts are less likely to pay off in meritocratic job sectors (i.e. the state sector)
9	1	38	My results have suggested that in labour markets that stress the tight bureaucratic link between educational signals and labour markets, personal contacts are less prevalent and effective in job searches, especially among the well-educated and those working in the highly meritocratic state sector.
9	2	1	While Singapore is a broadly meritocratic society and may have a strongmeritocratic system in government, this power of themeritocracy is less pervasive in the private sector.
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9	2	2	While Singapore is a broadly meritocratic society and may have a strong meritocratic system in government, this power of the meritocracy is less pervasive in the private sector.
9	2	5	This may soon change: the Singapore state is encouraging private sector firms to emulate the meritocratic practices of government sector jobs.
9	2	30	We both have meritocracies.
9	2	30	Yours is a talent meritocracy, ours is an exam meritocracy.
9	2	31	Yours is a talent meritocracy, ours is an exam meritocracy.
10	1	3	The pattern of increased educational attainment in Singapore is often compounded by the exceptional importance on credentials in “meritocratic” Singapore... there is probably no other place in the world where formal qualifications represent as much economic or social capital.
10	1	15	This invites the question: what makes it so difficult to move away from an exam-based meritocracy?
10	1	23	Indeed, a discourse of meritocracy enables the wealthy to attribute their success to personalized attributes such as “effort” and “ability” rather than having to evoke structural issues such as class standing (Young, 1958).
10	1	27	In an exam-based meritocracy, education contributes indirectly to political stability by serving as the only (in principle) legitimate means of upward mobility.
10	1	29	The motif of meritocracy spawns the often unquestioned belief that individuals from humble backgrounds are as likely as individuals from privileged backgrounds to succeed if they are willing to work hard.
10	1	32	Meritocracy upholds the myth of equal educational opportunities for all, and conceals the fact that kindergartens and elementary schools continue to vary greatly in quality.

10	1	35		The logical end of a meritocracy is an elitist system whereby class privileges are reproduced through education, even as schools continue to be at least, partly, social levellers of inequality (Bowles and Gintis, 1976).
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Domanski, H. (2011).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
400	1	1		This analysis depicts the rise of meritocracy in the course of the market transition in Poland.
400	1	13		Based on this assumption, a close association between rewards and individual productivity—as reflected in education and occupational position—is among the leading indicators of economic effectiveness, modernization, and meritocracy.
401	1	39		According to the prevailing interpretation the consolidation of the market institutions will enhance meritocratic allocation of rewards and will result in a growing gap between managers/professionals and other categories.
401	2	53		A continued rise in monetary benefits for education can be interpreted as a relentless change in structure of opportunities toward economic effectiveness, meritocracy, and fair distribution all equated with allocation of rewards according to investments.
403	1	14		At the same time, existing literature is consistent on that efficiently operating market mechanism has to be based on meritocratic distribution of incomes that requires positive returns to managers and professionals.
408	2	10	This article examines whether social stratification in Poland follows the conceptual framework developed by theorists of the market transition in post-communist countries regarding returns to human capital and merits related to occupational achievements.	

409	1	4	To summarize, these findings provide further support for hypotheses that market-like reform changes the mode of allocating rewards in favour of greater incentives to meritocracy and individual attainments.
409	1	5	First, in Poland the rise of meritocracy began in the 1980s and continued until 2005, indicated by a steady increase in returns to university education.
409	1	52	Comparative studies of post-communist stratification are still scarce; however, it seems likely that the fate of meritocratic distribution of incomes depends not only on economic efficiency, but also on the solid political ground that secure governance of firms in the new markets.
409	2	7	Ultimately, lack of political stability tends to impede rise of the meritocratic distribution.

Hing, L. S. S., Bobocel, D. R., Zanna, M. P., Garcia, D. M., Gee, S. S., & Oraziatti, K. (2011).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
433	1	23		The term meritocracy was coined in the book <i>The Rise of Meritocracy</i> (Young, 1958); in it, a future social system was envisioned in which outcomes such as wealth, jobs, and power are distributed on the basis of merit (i.e., intelligence and effort).
433	1	24		The term meritocracy was coined in the book <i>The Rise of Meritocracy</i> (Young, 1958); in it, a future social system was envisioned in which outcomes such as wealth, jobs, and power are distributed on the basis of merit (i.e., intelligence and effort).
433	1	26	The term meritocracy was coined in the book <i>The Rise of Meritocracy</i> (Young, 1958); in it, a future social system was envisioned in which outcomes such as wealth, jobs, and power are distributed on the basis of merit (i.e., intelligence and effort).	
433	1	27	Today, the definition of merit is broader and includes ability, training, and experience. Meritocracy is considered by many to be an ideal justice principle, because only relevant inputs (e.g., abilities) should be considered and irrelevant factors (e.g., ethnicity, gender) should be ignored when distributing outcomes. Thus, meritocracy is bias free and can be seen as creating social mobility; this is the American dream.	
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433	1	32		Today, the definition of merit is broader and includes ability, training, and experience. Meritocracy is considered by many to be an ideal justice principle, because only relevant inputs (e.g., abilities) should be considered and irrelevant factors (e.g., ethnicity, gender) should be ignored when distributing outcomes. Thus, meritocracy is bias free and can be seen as creating social mobility; this is the American dream.
433	2	25	In practice, merit-based outcome allocations might be enacted in a manner that reinforces the status quo and favors dominant groups because the latter tend to control the evaluation process (Fischer & Smith, 2003; Haney & Hurtado, 1994).	
433	2	30	addition, factors such as inheritance, social advantages, and discrimination interfere with true merit-based outcome allocations (McNamee & Miller, 2004; Roithmayr, 1997).	
433	2	31		Thus, meritocracy can be seen as a form of hegemony where supporters of meritocracy, knowingly or unknowingly, help to maintain and legitimize social inequality.
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433	2	34		So, what does it mean to endorse meritocracy?
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433	2	37		So, what does it mean to endorse meritocracy? On the one hand, the social psychological literature has long conceptualized meritocracy as a principle of distributive justice.
433	2	39		On the other hand, more recent evidence points to a conceptualization of meritocracy as an ideology that can serve to legitimize inequality in society.

433	2	51	<p>The notion that, to be fair, outcomes should be allocated on the basis of merit relates to the distributive justice principle of equity, which states that the ratio of people's inputs to outcomes should be equivalent to the ratio of relevant comparison others (Adams, 1965; Deutsch, 1975; Lerner, 1977).</p>
434	1	26	<p>Thus, there is a vast literature that supports the notion that meritocracy is an important justice principle.</p>
434	1	29	<p>A competing, more recent perspective is that meritocracy is an ideology that serves to legitimize a hierarchical society (McCoy & Major, 2007).</p>
434	1	31	<p>According to this perspective, beliefs in meritocracy are associated with various hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies, three of which we review in this section: system justification beliefs, prejudice, and social dominance orientation.</p>
434	1	35	<p>First, beliefs about meritocracy are framed as system justification beliefs (Jost & Hunyady, 2005).</p>
434	1	40	<p>Believing that the current system is a meritocracy can lead to support for the status quo (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003).</p>
434	1	45	<p>Beliefs that the current system is a meritocracy correlate with other system justification beliefs: the beliefs that income inequality is legitimate and one's economic situation is satisfactory (Jost, Pelham, et al., 2003), as well as conservatism (Federico & Sidanius, 2002), rightwing authoritarianism (authoritarian submission, aggression, and conventionalism), and the Protestant work ethic (i.e., the belief that people who work hard succeed; Lalonde, Doan, & Patterson, 2000).</p>
434	1	55	<p>Consistent with the notion that people conceptualize fairness in a manner that legitimizes their social reality, the more hierarchical a society's culture, the more its people prefer equity—the basis of meritocracy—to equality as a distribution rule (Fischer & Smith, 2003).</p>

434	1	57	Finally, the more that high-status individuals believe the system is a meritocracy, the greater their well-being, suggesting that rationalizing the status quo reduces discomfort (Foster, Sloto, & Ruby, 2006; Napier & Jost, 2008; O'Brien & Major, 2005).
434	2	4	Second, the belief in meritocracy is related to prejudice. For instance, Whites higher (vs. lower) in old-fashioned racism are more likely to believe that meritocracy exists (Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Sidanius, Devereux, & Pratto, 1992).
434	2	6	Second, the belief in meritocracy is related to prejudice. For instance, Whites higher (vs. lower) in old-fashioned racism are more likely to believe that meritocracy exists (Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Sidanius, Devereux, & Pratto, 1992).
434	2	8	Moreover, beliefs about meritocracy are a defining feature of symbolic racism (Henry & Sears, 2002), modern racism (McConahay, 1986), and modern sexism (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995) in that their measures specifically tap the belief that discrimination is no longer a problem.
434	2	16	In support of modern prejudice theories, the more that Whites believe the current system is a bias-free meritocracy, the more likely they are to make negative, internal attributions for the status of disadvantaged groups (Fraser & Kick, 2000; Haney & Hurtado, 1994) and to make positive attributions (e.g., intelligent, hardworking) for the status of advantaged groups (Jost, 2001).
434	2	21	In support of modern prejudice theories, the more that Whites believe the current system is a bias-free meritocracy, the more likely they are to make negative, internal attributions for the status of disadvantaged groups (Fraser & Kick, 2000; Haney & Hurtado, 1994) and to make positive attributions (e.g., intelligent, hardworking) for the status of advantaged groups (Jost, 2001).
434	2	24	Thus, beliefs that meritocracy exists can serve to legitimize prejudice.

434	2	26		Third, according to social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), meritocracy is a hierarchy-enhancing ideology that serves to maintain inequality across social groups: Those who have status, wealth, and power deserve their rewards and the poor deserve their fate due to a lack of hard work.
434	2	32	People who more strongly desire group-based dominance—those with a higher social dominance orientation (SDO)—are more likely to endorse beliefs associated with merit: a belief in a just world (people get what they deserve in life), the Protestant work ethic, the belief that equal opportunity exists for all groups, and the notion that income reflects people's competence (Haley & Sidanius, 2006; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).	
434	2	40		Thus, support for group-based hierarchy is linked to beliefs that the current system is a meritocracy.
434	2	44		From the above, it is clear that the concept of meritocracy can be a hierarchy-legitimizing ideology reflected in (a) system justification, (b) prejudice, and/or (c) SDO.
434	2	46		However, is meritocracy always hierarchy legitimizing, or can it also genuinely reflect a justice principle?
434	2	49		We suggest that a critical distinction lies in whether one endorses meritocracy as a descriptive belief or a prescriptive belief (see also Major, Kaiser, O'Brien, & McCoy, 2007).
434	2	51		Among those who believe meritocracy reflects current outcome distributions in society—that is, those for whom meritocracy is a descriptive belief—meritocracy can function as a hierarchy-legitimizing ideology.
434	2	52		Among those who believe meritocracy reflects current outcome distributions in society—that is, those for whom meritocracy is a descriptive belief—meritocracy can function as a hierarchy-legitimizing ideology.

434	2	53		Among those who believe meritocracy reflects current outcome distributions in society—that is, those for whom meritocracy is a descriptive belief—meritocracy can function as a hierarchy-legitimizing ideology.
434	2	56		However, among those who believe that outcomes in society ought to be distributed on the basis of merit—that is, those for whom meritocracy is a prescriptive belief—meritocracy can function as a justice principle.
434	2	56		However, among those who believe that outcomes in society ought to be distributed on the basis of merit—that is, those for whom meritocracy is a prescriptive belief—meritocracy can function as a justice principle.
434	2	57		However, among those who believe that outcomes in society ought to be distributed on the basis of merit—that is, those for whom meritocracy is a prescriptive belief—meritocracy can function as a justice principle.
434	2	58		Thus, we hypothesized that prescriptive beliefs about merit are distinguishable from the hierarchy-legitimizing ideology that meritocracy exists.
435	1	1		Thus, we hypothesized that prescriptive beliefs about merit are distinguishable from the hierarchy-legitimizing ideology that meritocracy exists.
435	1	4		In Study 1, we examined whether people's preference for the merit principle (a prescriptive belief) is distinct from people's beliefs that the current system is a meritocracy (a descriptive belief).
435	1	5		In Study 1, we examined whether people's preference for the merit principle (a prescriptive belief) is distinct from people's beliefs that the current system is a meritocracy (a descriptive belief).

435	1	6			In addition, we examined how beliefs about meritocracy relate to hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies (i.e., system justification beliefs, prejudice, SDO).
435	1	9			We predicted that descriptive— but not prescriptive— beliefs about meritocracy should relate to hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies.
435	1	11		How might prescriptive beliefs about merit predict reactions to practices (i.e., policies or decisions) involving outcome allocations to “haves” versus “have-nots” that affect the status quo?	
435	1	14		We hypothesized that the effect of prescriptive beliefs about merit should depend (a) on whether practices violate, uphold, or restore merit and (b) on people’s hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies.	
435	1	16		We hypothesized that the effect of prescriptive beliefs about merit should depend (a) on whether practices violate, uphold, or restore merit and (b) on people’s hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies.	
435	1	19		We hypothesized that the effect of prescriptive beliefs about merit should depend (a) on whether practices violate, uphold, or restore merit and (b) on people’s hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies. In particular, when people weakly endorse hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies (e.g., when respondents are nonsexist), prescriptive beliefs about merit should have their strongest influence on reactions.	
435	1	20		We hypothesized that the effect of prescriptive beliefs about merit should depend (a) on whether practices violate, uphold, or restore merit and (b) on people’s hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies. In particular, when people weakly endorse hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies (e.g., when respondents are nonsexist), prescriptive beliefs about merit should have their strongest influence on reactions.	

435	1	23	We hypothesized that the effect of prescriptive beliefs about merit should depend (a) on whether practices violate, uphold, or restore merit and (b) on people's hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies. In particular, when people weakly endorse hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies (e.g., when respondents are nonsexist), prescriptive beliefs about merit should have their strongest influence on reactions.	
435	1	26	A stronger prescriptive preference for merit should lead to relatively more opposition to practices that violate the merit principle, fail to predict reactions to practices that uphold merit, and lead to relatively more support for practices that restore merit.	
435	1	27	A stronger prescriptive preference for merit should lead to relatively more opposition to practices that violate the merit principle, fail to predict reactions to practices that uphold merit, and lead to relatively more support for practices that restore merit.	
435	1	28	A stronger prescriptive preference for merit should lead to relatively more opposition to practices that violate the merit principle, fail to predict reactions to practices that uphold merit, and lead to relatively more support for practices that restore merit.	
435	1	29	A stronger prescriptive preference for merit should lead to relatively more opposition to practices that violate the merit principle, fail to predict reactions to practices that uphold merit, and lead to relatively more support for practices that restore merit.	
435	1	31	In contrast, when people strongly endorse hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies (e.g., when respondents are sexist), prescriptive beliefs about merit should not influence reactions to practices that affect the status quo.	

435	1	35	This is because people who more strongly endorse hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies should be motivated to maintain the status quo, regardless of their preference for the merit principle.		
435	1	42			We tested the moderating role of various hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies: system justification beliefs (e.g., meritocracy exists, evaluations of women and ethnic minorities are bias free), prejudice (explicit and implicit sexism), rightwing authoritarianism, and SDO.
435	1	47	Finally, we hypothesized that the hierarchy-legitimizing ideology that is most relevant to the context (see Study 3) would be most likely to moderate the effects of prescriptive preferences for the merit principle.		
435	1	52	Our purpose in the current study was to test how people's preference for merit-based outcomes—which reflect concerns about how outcomes ought to be distributed—is related to hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies.		
435	1	55	We investigated four systemjustifying beliefs: that outcomes in society currently are merit based, political conservatism, support for authority figures, and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). We investigated two other hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies: prejudice and SDO.		
435	1	60	Davey, Bobocel, Son Hing, and Zanna (1999) created the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale to assess people's prescriptive belief that in work and academic settings, outcomes should be distributed on the basis of merit (vs. need or equality).		
435	1	62	Davey, Bobocel, Son Hing, and Zanna (1999) created the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale to assess people's prescriptive belief that in work and academic settings, outcomes should be distributed on the basis of merit (vs. need or equality).		

435	1	63	A preference for the merit principle has been found to be either unrelated or weakly, positively related to comparable descriptive beliefs, such as beliefs in a just world, beliefs in individual mobility, and Protestant work ethic (Davey et al., 1999; Major et al., 2007).	
435	2	6		Although these data are informative, many conceptual and methodological differences exist between the measures of prescriptive and descriptive beliefs regarding meritocracy, making the relation between the two difficult to evaluate.
435	2	9	To test, in the strongest manner possible, the relation between people's prescriptive and descriptive beliefs about merit, we developed parallel measures that differed only in whether the items referred to how outcomes are allocated or to how outcomes ought to be allocated.	
435	2	13	We hypothesized that prescriptive and descriptive beliefs about merit are distinct constructs.	
435	2	14	People can believe that outcomes ought to be distributed on the basis of merit and yet vary in their perceptions of whether this is how society currently operates.	
435	2	17	Yet through motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990), people who desire a merit-based society could come to endorse the belief that the current system is a proper meritocracy.	
435	2	18		Yet through motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990), people who desire a merit-based society could come to endorse the belief that the current system is a proper meritocracy.
435	2	19	In addition, perceiving merit-based outcome allocations to be typical could lead people to believe that such allocations are desirable (Eidelman, Crandall, & Pattershall, 2009).	
435	2	22	Therefore, we predicted that people's preference for merit-based outcomes should be weakly and positively related to people's belief that the current system is a meritocracy.	

435	2	23		Therefore, we predicted that people's preference for merit-based outcomes should be weakly and positively related to people's belief that the current system is a meritocracy.
435	2	25	Furthermore, we predicted that people should endorse prescriptive beliefs more strongly than descriptive beliefs about merit (e.g., believing that career progression should be determined by job performance but recognizing that success and failure can depend on chance or bias).	
435	2	30	Our second goal was to test that prescriptive and descriptive beliefs about merit demonstrate differential prediction with hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies (i.e., system justification beliefs, prejudice, and SDO).	
435	2	32		Given that people's beliefs that meritocracy exists reflect a system justification belief but people's preference for the merit principle does not, we hypothesized that only the former should correlate positively with other hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies.
435	2	34	Given that people's beliefs that meritocracy exists reflect a system justification belief but people's preference for the merit principle does not, we hypothesized that only the former should correlate positively with other hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies.	
435	2	42		Previous research has demonstrated that people who more (vs. less) strongly believe that society is a meritocracy (e.g., believe that hard work brings success) are more politically conservative and higher in RWA (Garcia, Desmarais, Branscombe, & Gee, 2005; Napier & Jost, 2008). In contrast, preference for the merit principle is unrelated to political conservatism and RWA (Davey et al., 1999).

435	2	45	<p>Previous research has demonstrated that people who more (vs. less) strongly believe that society is a meritocracy (e.g., believe that hard work brings success) are more politically conservative and higher in RWA (Garcia, Desmarais, Branscombe, & Gee, 2005; Napier & Jost, 2008). In contrast, preference for the merit principle is unrelated to political conservatism and RWA (Davey et al., 1999).</p>	
435	2	47	<p>Therefore, we predicted that descriptive—but not prescriptive—beliefs about merit should relate positively to political conservatism, support for authority figures, and RWA.</p>	
435	2	51	<p>To explore prejudice, we assessed racism and sexism. Previous research has shown that the belief that merit determines success in society relates positively to old-fashioned racism (Federico & Sidanius, 2002) and to sexism (Garcia et al., 2005; Garcia, Desmarais, Jackson, & Pancer, 2001).</p>	
435	2	55	<p>In contrast, individual differences in people's preference for the merit principle are unrelated to racism and are inversely related to sexism (Bobocel, Son Hing, Davey, Stanley, & Zanna, 1998; Brodisha, Brady, & Devine, 2008; Davey et al., 1999).</p>	
436	1	1	<p>Therefore, we predicted that descriptive—but not prescriptive—beliefs about merit should relate positively to racism and sexism</p>	
436	1	4	<p>In addition, we investigated SDO. People's beliefs that achievement depends on individual merit have been linked to SDO (Haley & Sidanius, 2006).</p>	
436	1	5	<p>In contrast, people's preference for the merit principle is unrelated to SDO (Davey et al., 1999). Therefore, we predicted that descriptive—but not prescriptive—beliefs about merit should relate positively to SDO.</p>	

436	1	8	In contrast, people's preference for the merit principle is unrelated to SDO (Davey et al., 1999). Therefore, we predicted that descriptive—but not prescriptive—beliefs about merit should relate positively to SDO.	
436	1	10	Our third goal was to test how prescriptive and descriptive beliefs about merit relate to desirable responding (Paulhus, 1984). Neither was expected to relate to social desirability	
436	1	19	There were 209 participants in Sample 2, who ranged in age from 17 to 49 (M = 19.11 years, SD = 2.89). In Sample 2, roughly half of the participants (54 men, 48 women) completed the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale and half (48 men, 59 women) completed the Perceptions That Meritocracy Exists Scale.	
436	1	20		There were 209 participants in Sample 2, who ranged in age from 17 to 49 (M = 19.11 years, SD = 2.89). In Sample 2, roughly half of the participants (54 men, 48 women) completed the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale and half (48 men, 59 women) completed the Perceptions That Meritocracy Exists Scale.
436	1	25	The Preference for the Merit Principle Scale always preceded the Perceptions That Meritocracy Exists Scale. Other researchers' scales separated all our measures.	
436	1	26		The Preference for the Merit Principle Scale always preceded the Perceptions That Meritocracy Exists Scale. Other researchers' scales separated all our measures.
436	1	31	Participants in Sample 2 completed the Modern Sexism Scale and an assessment of political conservatism in mass testing. Two to 8 weeks later, they came into the lab to complete either the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale or the Perceptions That Meritocracy Exists Scale.	

436	1	32		Participants in Sample 2 completed the Modern Sexism Scale and an assessment of political conservatism in mass testing. Two to 8 weeks later, they came into the lab to complete either the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale or the Perceptions That Meritocracy Exists Scale.
436	1	37		The Preference for the Merit Principle Scale consists of 15 items tapping beliefs that outcomes in work and academic settings ought to be allocated on the basis of merit.
436	1	39		The Preference for the Merit Principle Scale consists of 15 items tapping beliefs that outcomes in work and academic settings ought to be allocated on the basis of merit.
436	1	40		The Perceptions That Meritocracy Exists Scale was exactly parallel in form to the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale except that items refer to the belief that outcomes currently are distributed on the basis of merit. Sample items are “Success [ought to be/is] possible for anyone who works hard enough” and “In organizations, people who do their job well [ought to] rise to the top” (1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree).
436	1	41		The Perceptions That Meritocracy Exists Scale was exactly parallel in form to the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale except that items refer to the belief that outcomes currently are distributed on the basis of merit. Sample items are “Success [ought to be/is] possible for anyone who works hard enough” and “In organizations, people who do their job well [ought to] rise to the top” (1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree).

436	1	43	The Perceptions That Meritocracy Exists Scale was exactly parallel in form to the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale except that items refer to the belief that outcomes currently are distributed on the basis of merit. Sample items are “Success [ought to be/is] possible for anyone who works hard enough” and “In organizations, people who do their job well [ought to] rise to the top” (1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree).	
436	2	32	Preference for the merit principle and perceptions that meritocracy exists.	
436	2	32		Preference for the merit principle and perceptions that meritocracy exists.
436	2	34		In Sample 1, the reliability analysis for the Perceptions That Meritocracy Exists Scale revealed that three items had corrected item–total correlations below .10.
436	2	38	To be consistent, we dropped the same three items from the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale, which also improved the internal consistency (Cronbach’s α .58 \rightarrow .71).	
436	2	41	Participants rated the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale moderately to strongly (M = 5.64, SD 0.55, min = 3.25, max = 7.00).	
436	2	43		As predicted, ratings on the Perceptions That Meritocracy Exists Scale, though moderate, were significantly lower (M = 4.66, SD = 0.83, min = 1.92, max = 6.17), $t(157) = 13.79$, $p < .001$, Cohen’s $d = 1.39$.
436	2	48		For Sample 1, confirmatory factor analyses were conducted to test the relation between descriptive and prescriptive beliefs about meritocracy.

436	2	48	In Model 1, preference for the merit principle and perceptions that meritocracy exists were treated as a single latent construct and parallel manifest items from each scale were allowed to correlate, 2(240) 605.33, p .001, normed fit index .475, goodness-of-fit index .700, comparative fit index .583, root-mean-square error of approximation .104.	
436	2	49	In Model 1, preference for the merit principle and perceptions that meritocracy exists were treated as a single latent construct and parallel manifest items from each scale were allowed to correlate, 2(240) 605.33, p .001, normed fit index .475, goodness-of-fit index .700, comparative fit index .583, root-mean-square error of approximation .104.	
436	2	54	In Model 2, preference for the merit principle and perceptions that meritocracy exists were treated as separate latent constructs and parallel manifest items from each scale were allowed to correlate, 2(239) 422.34, p .001, normed fit index .634, goodness-of-fit index .806, comparative fit index .791, root-mean-square error of approximation .074.	
436	2	54	In Model 2, preference for the merit principle and perceptions that meritocracy exists were treated as separate latent constructs and parallel manifest items from each scale were allowed to correlate, 2(239) 422.34, p .001, normed fit index .634, goodness-of-fit index .806, comparative fit index .791, root-mean-square error of approximation .074.	
437	1	9	Thus, the confirmatory factor analysis supports the hypothesis that prescriptive and descriptive beliefs about merit are separate constructs.	
437	1	12	The reliabilities for the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale (Cronbach's .77) and the Perceptions That Meritocracy Exists Scale (Cronbach's .78) were good.	

437	1	13		The reliabilities for the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale (Cronbach's .77) and the Perceptions That Meritocracy Exists Scale (Cronbach's .78) were good.
437	1	15	The descriptive statistics for the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale (M 5.15, SD 0.56, min 3.00, max 6.67) and the Perceptions That Meritocracy Exists Scale (M 4.41, SD 0.72, min 1.92, max 6.08) were comparable to those for Sample 1.	
437	1	16		The descriptive statistics for the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale (M 5.15, SD 0.56, min 3.00, max 6.67) and the Perceptions That Meritocracy Exists Scale (M 4.41, SD 0.72, min 1.92, max 6.08) were comparable to those for Sample 1.
437	1	20		We tested the differential relations of the Perceptions That Meritocracy Exists Scale and the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale with hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies (see Table 1).
437	1	21	We tested the differential relations of the Perceptions That Meritocracy Exists Scale and the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale with hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies (see Table 1).	
437	1	23	For Sample 1, to test the unique relations of these merit scales with other constructs, we conducted semipartial correlations removing any effect of the alternative merit scale.	
437	1	24	For Sample 1, to test the unique relations of these merit scales with other constructs, we conducted semipartial correlations removing any effect of the alternative merit scale.	
437	1	27	For Sample 2, it was possible to examine only zero-order correlations (participants completed only one merit scale).	

437	1	29		As predicted, the more participants perceived the current system to be a proper meritocracy, the more conservative they were, the more favorable their attitudes were toward police officers and politicians, and the higher they scored in RWA (see Table 1).
437	1	32	In contrast, participants' preference for the merit principle was unrelated to their political orientation, attitudes toward authority figures, and RWA.	
437	1	35		In addition, as predicted, the more strongly participants perceived meritocracy to exist—but not the more they preferred merit-based outcomes—the higher they scored in racism toward ethnic minorities and SDO. The predicted relation between beliefs that meritocracy exists and modern sexism did not achieve significance, $r(105) = .16$, $p = .10$.
437	1	36	In addition, as predicted, the more strongly participants perceived meritocracy to exist—but not the more they preferred merit-based outcomes—the higher they scored in racism toward ethnic minorities and SDO. The predicted relation between beliefs that meritocracy exists and modern sexism did not achieve significance, $r(105) = .16$, $p = .10$.	
437	2	1		In addition, as predicted, the more strongly participants perceived meritocracy to exist—but not the more they preferred merit-based outcomes—the higher they scored in racism toward ethnic minorities and SDO. The predicted relation between beliefs that meritocracy exists and modern sexism did not achieve significance, $r(105) = .16$, $p = .10$.
437	2	4		Follow-up analyses revealed that for women, the higher they scored in modern sexism, the more they perceived meritocracy to exist in society, $r(57) = .40$, $p = .002$; however, for men, there was no relation, $r(46) = .03$, $p = .84$.
437	2	6		Thus, only the belief that meritocracy exists—and not preference for the merit principle—was related to other hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies.

437	2	7	Thus, only the belief that meritocracy exists—and not preference for the merit principle—was related to other hierarchy/legitimizing ideologies.	
437	2	8		Finally, neither beliefs that meritocracy exists nor preference for the merit principle predicted participants' levels of self-deception or impression management.
437	2	9	Finally, neither beliefs that meritocracy exists nor preference for the merit principle predicted participants' levels of self-deception or impression management.	
437	2	15	We found strong evidence (a) that the prescriptive belief that outcomes should be allocated on the basis of merit is a separate construct from the belief that, in society, rewards go to those who are most worthy and (b) that only the latter is a hierarchy/legitimizing ideology.	
437	2	20		The confirmatory factor analysis revealed that the two constructs are independent yet weakly, positively related. This could reflect that desiring a meritocracy influences people's perceptions of reality through motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) or that perceiving meritocracy to exist influences people's beliefs of the desirability of a merit-based system (Eidelman et al., 2009).
437	2	22		The confirmatory factor analysis revealed that the two constructs are independent yet weakly, positively related. This could reflect that desiring a meritocracy influences people's perceptions of reality through motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) or that perceiving meritocracy to exist influences people's beliefs of the desirability of a merit-based system (Eidelman et al., 2009).

437	2	23	The confirmatory factor analysis revealed that the two constructs are independent yet weakly, positively related. This could reflect that desiring a meritocracy influences people's perceptions of reality through motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) or that perceiving meritocracy to exist influences people's beliefs of the desirability of a merit-based system (Eidelman et al., 2009).	
437	2	29		As predicted, participants more strongly believed that the system should be a meritocracy than they believed that the system operates as a meritocracy.
437	2	30		As predicted, participants more strongly believed that the system should be a meritocracy than they believed that the system operates as a meritocracy.
437	2	31		Moreover, there is strong evidence that participants' beliefs that the current system is a meritocracy—but not their preference for merit-based outcomes—are related to hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies: political conservatism, support for authority figures, RWA, racism, sexism (among women), and SDO.
437	2	32	Moreover, there is strong evidence that participants' beliefs that the current system is a meritocracy—but not their preference for merit-based outcomes—are related to hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies: political conservatism, support for authority figures, RWA, racism, sexism (among women), and SDO.	
437	2	40	Consistent with earlier findings (Jost & Thompson, 2000; McCoy & Major, 2007), those who are motivated to legitimize existing group-based dominance structures were more likely to believe that outcome allocations in society are determined on the basis of people's deservingness. In contrast, people who more (vs. less) strongly prefer merit-based outcome allocations did not tend to more strongly endorse system justification beliefs (i.e., political conservatism, support for authority figures, RWA), nor did they tend to be more prejudiced or higher in SDO.	

437	2	44	Thus, prescriptive and descriptive beliefs about merit are weakly related, differentially endorsed, and differentially related to hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies, as assessed in the current research.	
437	2	53		The fact that modern sexism is significantly related to beliefs that meritocracy exists for women but not for men could indicate that modern sexism primarily reflects system justification for women and antipathy for men. More broadly, there is evidence that system justification processes are particularly robust among disadvantaged group members (Jost, Pelham, et al., 2003).
437	2	58	Neither prescriptive nor descriptive beliefs about merit were related to social desirability. This allowed us to test our second central hypothesis: People's preference for the merit principle interacts with people's hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies to predict reactions to the status quo, without concerns of confounds with impression management.	
438	1	1	Neither prescriptive nor descriptive beliefs about merit were related to social desirability. This allowed us to test our second central hypothesis: People's preference for the merit principle interacts with people's hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies to predict reactions to the status quo, without concerns of confounds with impression management.	
438	1	9	We hypothesized that the effect of people's prescriptive beliefs about merit should be moderated by people's hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies, such that prescriptive beliefs about merit would have a stronger influence on reactions when hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies were weak than when hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies were strong.	
438	1	10		We hypothesized that the effect of people's prescriptive beliefs about merit should be moderated by people's hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies, such that prescriptive beliefs about merit would have a stronger influence on reactions when hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies were weak than when hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies were strong.

438	1	14	In the current study, we tested the interactive effect of people's preference for the merit principle with the system justification belief that society operates as a proper meritocracy.		
438	1	16		In the current study, we tested the interactive effect of people's preference for the merit principle with the system justification belief that society operates as a proper meritocracy.	
438	1	35		It is only when participants experience system threat that beliefs that meritocracy exists should motivate rationalizations of the hiring decision as fair.	
438	1	38	Thus, we predicted that our hiring manipulation (man hired over [woman/man]) should interact with participants' preference for the merit principle and beliefs that meritocracy exists to produce reactions to the hiring decision		
438	1	39		Thus, we predicted that our hiring manipulation (man hired over [woman/man]) should interact with participants' preference for the merit principle and beliefs that meritocracy exists to produce reactions to the hiring decision	
438	1	41	In the experimental condition, a less qualified man is hired over a more qualified woman; thus, merit is violated, gender discrimination occurs, and outcomes are allocated in a manner consistent with the status quo (i.e., an advantaged-group member is favored).		
438	1	44	In this case, people's preference for the merit principle should interact with their belief that meritocracy exists to produce evaluations of the hiring decision.		
438	1	45		In this case, people's preference for the merit principle should interact with their belief that meritocracy exists to produce evaluations of the hiring decision.	
438	1	46		We expected that among participants who strongly endorsed the belief that meritocracy exists, preference for the merit principle should be unrelated to judgments of the hiring decision.	

438	1	47	We expected that among participants who strongly endorsed the belief that meritocracy exists, preference for the merit principle should be unrelated to judgments of the hiring decision.	
438	1	49	This is because, regardless of their preference for the merit principle, people who more strongly endorse the belief that society is a proper meritocracy should be motivated to rationalize as fair a hiring decision that maintains a sexist status quo.	
438	1	50		This is because, regardless of their preference for the merit principle, people who more strongly endorse the belief that society is a proper meritocracy should be motivated to rationalize as fair a hiring decision that maintains a sexist status quo.
438	1	53		In contrast, among participants who weakly endorsed the belief that meritocracy exists (i.e., who are open to seeing biases in the system), the more strongly they believe outcomes ought to be distributed on the basis of merit, the more unfair they should judge the inequitable hiring decision because the candidate who is less qualified (on three of four criteria) is hired.
438	1	55	In contrast, among participants who weakly endorsed the belief that meritocracy exists (i.e., who are open to seeing biases in the system), the more strongly they believe outcomes ought to be distributed on the basis of merit, the more unfair they should judge the inequitable hiring decision because the candidate who is less qualified (on three of four criteria) is hired.	
438	2	1	In the control condition, merit is violated but there is no gender discrimination and the hiring decision has no consequence for the status quo.	
438	2	5	Because system justification motives should not be activated, we did not expect an interaction between people's preference for the merit principle and beliefs that meritocracy exists.	

439	1	18	Also, again, participants more strongly endorsed the belief that outcomes ought to be based on merit ($M = 5.64$, $SD = 0.58$) than the belief that outcomes are distributed on the basis of merit ($M = 4.61$, $SD = 0.87$), $t(103) = 11.49$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 1.39$. Similar results were found with the larger mass-testing sample.	
439	1	21	Men and women did not differ in their preference for the merit principle, beliefs that the current system is a meritocracy, or perceptions of the fairness of the hiring decision ($ps > .21$).	
439	1	22		Men and women did not differ in their preference for the merit principle, beliefs that the current system is a meritocracy, or perceptions of the fairness of the hiring decision ($ps > .21$).
439	1	39		We found significant effects of Condition: Perceptions Meritocracy Exists and of Preference for the Merit Principle: Perceptions Meritocracy Exists. However, they were qualified by the predicted Condition: Preference for the Merit Principle: Perceptions Meritocracy Exists interaction ($B = 0.45$, $SE B = 0.21$, $p = .04$, $sr^2 = .04$; see Figure 1). No other effects were significant.
439	1	40	We found significant effects of Condition: Perceptions Meritocracy Exists and of Preference for the Merit Principle: Perceptions Meritocracy Exists. However, they were qualified by the predicted Condition: Preference for the Merit Principle: Perceptions Meritocracy Exists interaction ($B = 0.45$, $SE B = 0.21$, $p = .04$, $sr^2 = .04$; see Figure 1). No other effects were significant.	
439	1	40		We found significant effects of Condition: Perceptions Meritocracy Exists and of Preference for the Merit Principle: Perceptions Meritocracy Exists. However, they were qualified by the predicted Condition: Preference for the Merit Principle: Perceptions Meritocracy Exists interaction ($B = 0.45$, $SE B = 0.21$, $p = .04$, $sr^2 = .04$; see Figure 1). No other effects were significant.

439	1	42	We found significant effects of Condition Perceptions Meritocracy Exists and of Preference for the Merit Principle Perceptions Meritocracy Exists. However, they were qualified by the predicted Condition Preference for the Merit Principle Perceptions Meritocracy Exists interaction (B 0.45, SE B 0.21, p .04, sr2 .04; see Figure 1). No other effects were significant.	
439	1	42	We found significant effects of Condition Perceptions Meritocracy Exists and of Preference for the Merit Principle Perceptions Meritocracy Exists. However, they were qualified by the predicted Condition Preference for the Merit Principle Perceptions Meritocracy Exists interaction (B 0.45, SE B 0.21, p .04, sr2 .04; see Figure 1). No other effects were significant.	
439	2	3	As predicted, in the experimental condition in which a less qualified man was hired over a more qualified woman, the Preference for the Merit Principle Perceptions Meritocracy Exists interaction was significant (B 0.92, SE B 0.32, p .006, sr2 .07).	
439	2	3	As predicted, in the experimental condition in which a less qualified man was hired over a more qualified woman, the Preference for the Merit Principle Perceptions Meritocracy Exists interaction was significant (B 0.92, SE B 0.32, p .006, sr2 .07).	
439	2	6	As expected, among participants who did not perceive the current system to be a meritocracy (i.e., those who were open to recognizing bias in the system), the stronger their preference for the merit principle, the less fair they perceived the hiring decision to be (B 0.88, SE B 0.35, p .01, sr2 .06).	
439	2	7	As expected, among participants who did not perceive the current system to be a meritocracy (i.e., those who were open to recognizing bias in the system), the stronger their preference for the merit principle, the less fair they perceived the hiring decision to be (B 0.88, SE B 0.35, p .01, sr2 .06).	

439	2	10		In contrast, among participants who perceived the current system to be a meritocracy, preference for merit was not significantly related to evaluations of the hiring decision (B 0.72, SE B 0.39, p .07, sr2 .03).
439	2	10		In contrast, among participants who perceived the current system to be a meritocracy, preference for merit was not significantly related to evaluations of the hiring decision (B 0.72, SE B 0.39, p .07, sr2 .03).
439	2	14		Those who more strongly endorsed the system justification belief that current society is a proper meritocracy tended to rate the hiring decision as more fair, regardless of their preference for the merit principle.
439	2	15		Those who more strongly endorsed the system justification belief that current society is a proper meritocracy tended to rate the hiring decision as more fair, regardless of their preference for the merit principle.
439	2	17		As predicted, in the control condition, the Preference for the Merit Principle Perceptions Meritocracy Exists interaction did not emerge (B 0.02, SE B 0.27, p .94).
439	2	17		As predicted, in the control condition, the Preference for the Merit Principle Perceptions Meritocracy Exists interaction did not emerge (B 0.02, SE B 0.27, p .94).
439	2	20		No other effects were significant, including the predicted main effect of preference for the merit principle (B 0.11, SE B .23, p .64).
439	2	22		The results of Study 2 support the hypothesis that a preference for the merit principle does not reflect a hierarchy/legitimizing ideology.
439	2	24		First, replicating Study 1, we found that people's prescriptive preference for the merit principle was only weakly positively related to people's descriptive beliefs that current society is a proper meritocracy.

439	2	26		First, replicating Study 1, we found that people's prescriptive preference for the merit principle was only weakly positively related to people's descriptive beliefs that current society is a proper meritocracy.
439	2	27	More important, we found that people's prescriptive beliefs about the merit principle interact with their descriptive beliefs that meritocracy exists to produce reactions to a hierarchy-enhancing hiring decision.	
439	2	28		More important, we found that people's prescriptive beliefs about the merit principle interact with their descriptive beliefs that meritocracy exists to produce reactions to a hierarchy-enhancing hiring decision.
439	2	32	Consistent with the notion that system justification motives are activated only when one's belief in a just system is threatened (Kay et al., 2010), prescriptive and descriptive beliefs about merit interacted only in the experimental condition.	
439	2	41		With regard to the experimental (gender discrimination) condition, among people who endorsed the system justification belief that the current system is a meritocracy, preference for the merit principle did not significantly predict evaluations of the hiring decision, as everyone rated the decision as more fair.
439	2	41	With regard to the experimental (gender discrimination) condition, among people who endorsed the system justification belief that the current system is a meritocracy, preference for the merit principle did not significantly predict evaluations of the hiring decision, as everyone rated the decision as more fair.	
440	1	9		In contrast, among those open to seeing bias in the system (i.e., people who do not strongly endorse the hierarchy-legitimizing belief that meritocracy exists), a stronger preference for the merit principle predicted more negative evaluations of a sexist hiring decision that bolsters the status quo.

440	1	9	In contrast, among those open to seeing bias in the system (i.e., people who do not strongly endorse the hierarchy-legitimizing belief that meritocracy exists), a stronger preference for the merit principle predicted more negative evaluations of a sexist hiring decision that bolsters the status quo.	
440	1	13	In the control condition, in which a less qualified man is hired over a more qualified man, people's preference for the merit principle was unrelated to judgments of the hiring decision, regardless of people's beliefs that meritocracy exists.	
440	1	15		In the control condition, in which a less qualified man is hired over a more qualified man, people's preference for the merit principle was unrelated to judgments of the hiring decision, regardless of people's beliefs that meritocracy exists.
440	1	17	It appears that the selection context was sufficiently ambiguous that participants did not perceive it to be clearly merit violating; thus, their preference for the merit principle did not predict reactions.	
440	1	18	It appears that the selection context was sufficiently ambiguous that participants did not perceive it to be clearly merit violating; thus, their preference for the merit principle did not predict reactions.	
440	1	19	The degree of merit violation should be varied systematically to determine when people's preference for the merit principle predicts reactions in the selection context.	
440	1	20	The degree of merit violation should be varied systematically to determine when people's preference for the merit principle predicts reactions in the selection context.	
440	1	25	How might people's preference for the merit principle and hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies predict reactions to programs that have the power to disrupt the status quo and reduce inequalities between disadvantaged and advantaged group members?	

440	1	32		The competing perspectives on meritocracy figure prominently in the AA discourse.
440	1	34	On the one hand, justice-based arguments for opposition to AA could truly reflect principled concerns that merit has been violated because qualifications are not the sole decision criteria (Bobocel et al., 1998; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997).	
440	2	4		We investigated modern sexism precisely because it includes the denial of discrimination as a core component, is blended with conservatism (Sears & Henry, 2003), and is positively related to the belief that meritocracy exists (Study 1).
440	2	6	Thus, by testing the unique effects of people's preference for the merit principle on people's opposition to AA while controlling for modern sexism, we can account for potential confounds with multiple system justification beliefs.	
440	2	46	If prescriptive beliefs about merit reflect a genuine justice principle, they should predict opposition to AA only when a program violates this principle (Bobocel et al., 1998).	
440	2	50	Thus, we had participants evaluate an equal treatment (ET) program that was by design merit upholding and a preferential treatment (PT) program that was by design merit violating.	
440	2	51	Thus, we had participants evaluate an equal treatment (ET) program that was by design merit upholding and a preferential treatment (PT) program that was by design merit violating.	
440	2	52	Preference for the merit principle should interact with program type to produce opposition.	
441	1	1	That is, people with a stronger (vs. weaker) preference for the merit principle should be more opposed to a potentially meritviolating PT program; however, preference for merit should not predict opposition to a merit-upholding ET program.	

441	1	1	That is, people with a stronger (vs. weaker) preference for the merit principle should be more opposed to a potentially meritviolating PT program; however, preference for merit should not predict opposition to a merit-upholding ET program.	
441	1	2	That is, people with a stronger (vs. weaker) preference for the merit principle should be more opposed to a potentially meritviolating PT program; however, preference for merit should not predict opposition to a merit-upholding ET program.	
441	1	2	That is, people with a stronger (vs. weaker) preference for the merit principle should be more opposed to a potentially meritviolating PT program; however, preference for merit should not predict opposition to a merit-upholding ET program.	
441	1	3	That is, people with a stronger (vs. weaker) preference for the merit principle should be more opposed to a potentially meritviolating PT program; however, preference for merit should not predict opposition to a merit-upholding ET program.	
441	1	7	Finally, we predicted that preference for the merit principle should interact with hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies and with the type program to produce opposition.	
441	1	11	We expected that among people who strongly endorsed hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies, prescriptive beliefs about merit should not influence reactions.	
441	1	12	This is because, regardless of their preference for the merit principle, people who more strongly endorse hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies should be motivated to oppose AA due to its potential redistributive power.	
441	1	17	In contrast, among people who weakly endorsed hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies, a stronger prescriptive preference for merit should lead to relatively more opposition to programs that violate the merit principle (i.e., the PT program).	
441	1	18	In contrast, among people who weakly endorsed hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies, a stronger prescriptive preference for merit should lead to relatively more opposition to programs that violate the merit principle (i.e., the PT program).	

441	1	20	We predicted that modern sexism and implicit sexism were most likely to moderate the effects of preference for the merit principle, given that they are most pertinent to the situational context (because women are the most typical beneficiaries of AA).	
441	1	24	However, we also explored the moderating roles of SDO and RWA on preference for the merit principle.	
441	1	37	In Phase 1, as part of mass testing, participants completed the 15-item Preference for the Merit Principle Scale (Davey et al., 1999), as well as the same Modern Sexism, SDO, and RWA Scales as in Study 1.	
441	2	23	Participants' perceptions of the programs as merit violating were assessed with the questions "What is the likelihood that a less qualified target-group member (woman or visible minority) would be hired or promoted before a more qualified white male" and "What is the likelihood that the most deserving (or meritorious) candidate would be hired or promoted (R)?" (1 extremely unlikely to 7 extremely likely).	
441	2	27		Participants' perceptions of the programs as merit violating were assessed with the questions "What is the likelihood that a less qualified target-group member (woman or visible minority) would be hired or promoted before a more qualified white male" and "What is the likelihood that the most deserving (or meritorious) candidate would be hired or promoted (R)?" (1 extremely unlikely to 7 extremely likely).
441	2	49	As shown in Table 3, preference for the merit principle was unrelated to modern sexism, $r(158) = .06$, $p = .44$; implicit sexism, $r(158) = .09$, $p = .28$; and RWA, $r(158) = .01$, $p = .94$.	
441	2	53	It is of interest that the more strongly participants endorsed the merit principle, the lower they scored in SDO, $r(158) = .16$, $p = .04$.	
441	2	54	Thus, people who more strongly endorsed merit did not have stronger hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies.	

442	1	7	Because gender did not significantly predict preference for the merit principle, $t(158) = 0.33, p = .74$; opposition to the ET program, $t(158) = 1.82, p = .07$; or the PT program, $t(158) = 1.90, p = .06$, it was not included in further analyses. ⁴	
442	1	11	As intended, participants perceived the PT program ($M = 4.93, SD = 1.28$) to be more merit violating than the ET program ($M = 3.19, SD = 1.09$), $t(159) = 12.01, p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 1.46$.	
442	1	19	In a second block, the continuous, centered, between-subjects factors were tested: preference for the merit principle, modern sexism, implicit sexism, SDO, RWA, Preference for the Merit Principle Modern Sexism, Preference for the Merit Principle Implicit Sexism, Preference for the Merit Principle SDO, and Preference for the Merit Principle RWA.	
442	1	20	In a second block, the continuous, centered, between-subjects factors were tested: preference for the merit principle, modern sexism, implicit sexism, SDO, RWA, Preference for the Merit Principle Modern Sexism, Preference for the Merit Principle Implicit Sexism, Preference for the Merit Principle SDO, and Preference for the Merit Principle RWA.	
442	1	21	In a second block, the continuous, centered, between-subjects factors were tested: preference for the merit principle, modern sexism, implicit sexism, SDO, RWA, Preference for the Merit Principle Modern Sexism, Preference for the Merit Principle Implicit Sexism, Preference for the Merit Principle SDO, and Preference for the Merit Principle RWA.	

442	1	22	In a second block, the continuous, centered, between-subjects factors were tested: preference for the merit principle, modern sexism, implicit sexism, SDO, RWA, Preference for the Merit Principle Modern Sexism, Preference for the Merit Principle Implicit Sexism, Preference for the Merit Principle SDO, and Preference for the Merit Principle RWA.	
442	1	23	In a second block, the continuous, centered, between-subjects factors were tested: preference for the merit principle, modern sexism, implicit sexism, SDO, RWA, Preference for the Merit Principle Modern Sexism, Preference for the Merit Principle Implicit Sexism, Preference for the Merit Principle SDO, and Preference for the Merit Principle RWA.	
442	1	23	In a second block, the continuous, centered, between-subjects factors were tested: preference for the merit principle, modern sexism, implicit sexism, SDO, RWA, Preference for the Merit Principle Modern Sexism, Preference for the Merit Principle Implicit Sexism, Preference for the Merit Principle SDO, and Preference for the Merit Principle RWA.	
442	1	32	In addition, there was a significant effect of preference for the merit principle, $F(1, 149) = 6.79, p = .01, 2 \times .044$, such that participants with a stronger preference for the merit principle were more opposed to the AA programs.	
442	1	34	In addition, there was a significant effect of preference for the merit principle, $F(1, 149) = 6.79, p = .01, 2 \times .044$, such that participants with a stronger preference for the merit principle were more opposed to the AA programs.	
443	1	2	Thus, preference for the merit principle predicted opposition only to a merit-violating program and only among less sexist participants.	

443	1	3	Thus, preference for the merit principle predicted opposition only to a merit-violating program and only among less sexist participants.	
443	1	10	The results of Study 3 support our hypothesis that reactions to redistributive policies are driven by people's hierarchy/legitimizing ideologies and prescriptive beliefs about merit:	
443	1	19	Regardless of whether programs are merit violating or upholding, people who are more explicitly or implicitly sexist are more opposed to AA than are their less sexist counterparts.	
443	2	25	As hypothesized, prescriptive beliefs about merit interacted with a salient hierarchy-legitimizing ideology.	
443	2	27	Among those lower in modern sexism, the more participants endorsed the merit principle, the more they opposed the potentially merit-violating PT program. In contrast, those higher in modern sexism were relatively opposed to the PT program, regardless of their preference for the merit principle.	
443	2	28	Among those lower in modern sexism, the more participants endorsed the merit principle, the more they opposed the potentially merit-violating PT program. In contrast, those higher in modern sexism were relatively opposed to the PT program, regardless of their preference for the merit principle.	
443	2	30	Among those lower in modern sexism, the more participants endorsed the merit principle, the more they opposed the potentially merit-violating PT program. In contrast, those higher in modern sexism were relatively opposed to the PT program, regardless of their preference for the merit principle.	
443	2	31	Thus, merit-based opposition to AA was evident only among those who failed to endorse the hierarchy-legitimizing ideology of modern sexism. It should be noted that implicit sexism, SDO, and RWA were controlled.	

443	2	36	The results of Study 3 support the notion that prescriptive beliefs about merit are independent of hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies.	
443	2	38	People who more strongly (vs. weakly) endorse the notion that outcomes ought to be allocated on the basis of merit were no more likely to hold sexist attitudes toward women at the explicit level, hold implicit biases concerning women's versus men's competence (a novel finding), or be authoritarian.	
444	1	1	It is of course still possible that preference for the merit principle is related to implicit prejudice toward other specific groups that could benefit from AA, something that we did not assess.	
444	1	5	Further, supporting the notion that opposition to AA can be due to genuine concerns about merit violation, the effect of prescriptive beliefs about merit was contingent on the specifics of the AA program.	
444	1	6	Further, supporting the notion that opposition to AA can be due to genuine concerns about merit violation, the effect of prescriptive beliefs about merit was contingent on the specifics of the AA program.	
444	1	8	Participants with stronger (vs. weaker) prescriptive beliefs about merit were more opposed to the PT program (which was perceived to be merit violating).	
444	1	9	Participants with stronger (vs. weaker) prescriptive beliefs about merit were more opposed to the PT program (which was perceived to be merit violating).	
444	1	10	The same was not true for the ET program (which was perceived to be merit upholding).	
444	1	12	Together, the findings of Study 3 support the notion that a preference for the merit principle does not reflect hierarchy/legitimizing motives.	

444	1	14	Yet, it is possible that those with stronger (vs. weaker) prescriptive beliefs about merit are particularly opposed to the PT (vs. ET) program because only the former is likely to result in a substantive redistribution of jobs to disadvantaged group members.	
444	1	19	Therefore, in Study 4, we examined whether participants with stronger (vs. weaker) prescriptive beliefs about merit can in fact be more supportive of programs that threaten the status quo by distributing outcomes to disadvantaged groups (e.g., women, ethnic minorities).	
444	1	26	Our goal in Study 4 was to test whether, among people with weak hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies, preference for the merit principle can predict greater support for programs that disrupt the status quo by redistributing outcomes to disadvantaged groups.	
444	1	29	If such programs are seen as merit restoring and if prescriptive beliefs about merit reflect a genuine justice principle, the stronger people's preference for the merit principle, the greater support people should express.	
444	1	30	If such programs are seen as merit restoring and if prescriptive beliefs about merit reflect a genuine justice principle, the stronger people's preference for the merit principle, the greater support people should express.	
444	1	31	If such programs are seen as merit restoring and if prescriptive beliefs about merit reflect a genuine justice principle, the stronger people's preference for the merit principle, the greater support people should express.	
444	1	33	This would be a powerful demonstration that a prescriptive belief about merit is not a hierarchy-enhancing ideology aimed at maintaining a hierarchical status quo.	

444	1	39	A new strong program was designed that could be seen as potentially merit restoring.	
444	1	45	We reasoned that if people infer that group differences reflect a culturally biased test, the program should be seen as merit restoring because differential cutoff scores correct for beneficiary groups' underestimated cognitive abilities (Smith-Winkelman & Crosby, 1994; Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002).	
444	2	3	We hypothesized that the effect of preference for the merit principle on reactions to diversity initiatives should depend on the degree to which people ascribe to the system justification belief that organizational evaluation practices are bias free.	
444	2	7	Thus, we predicted a Preference for the Merit Principle Beliefs About Bias interaction.	
444	2	11	Thus, for these individuals, preference for the merit principle should not predict opposition to the diversity initiatives because everyone should be relatively opposed to these "unnecessary programs."	
444	2	17	In contrast, among people who believe that biases operate against women and ethnic minority groups in the assessment of their qualifications and performance, the diversity initiatives might be seen as counteracting test bias and thus restoring merit-based selection.	
444	2	19	Therefore, for these individuals, the stronger their preference for the merit principle, the more they should support the diversity initiatives and perceive them to be more merit restoring.	
444	2	20	Therefore, for these individuals, the stronger their preference for the merit principle, the more they should support the diversity initiatives and perceive them to be more merit restoring.	
444	2	22	Finally, given the results of Study 3, the PT program might be seen as less merit restoring overall than the DT program.	

444	2	23	Therefore, we explored whether a Program Preference for the Merit Principle Beliefs About Bias interaction would emerge such that the earlier predicted two-way interaction is stronger for the DT (vs. PT) program.	
444	2	39	In Phase 1, as part of mass testing, participants completed the same Preference for the Merit Principle Scale (Davey et al., 1999) as in Study 3.	
444	2	42	They also completed a 12-item Beliefs About Bias Scale, which measures beliefs about how women's and ethnic minorities' merit is evaluated in selection, promotion, and performance evaluations in the workplace. Some items refer to bias-free evaluations ("Currently, selection systems recognize the full potential of visible minority candidates because cultural diversity, language skills, and different perspectives are appropriately valued by organizations"), and others refer to biased evaluations ("Currently, women are disadvantaged by biases in selection because selection tools fail to take into account less traditional skills and abilities such as emotional intelligence and interpersonal skills"; 1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree).	
445	1	7	We assessed perceptions of the programs as restoring merit-based selection with two items: "This program would correct for biases that exist in the assessment of candidates' qualifications" and "This program will help administrators at Cochrane hire and promote deserving target-group members" (1 strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree).	
445	1	27	Reliability analyses revealed that one item of the Preference for the Merit Principle Scale had a corrected item-total correlation below .10.	
445	1	31	Preference for the merit principle was unrelated to beliefs that evaluations in organizations are bias free, $r(83) = .13$, $p = .25$.	

445	1	33	Thus, people with a stronger preference for merit were no more likely than others to endorse this system justification belief. Similar results were found with the larger mass-testing sample.	
445	1	39	However, men and women did not differ in their level of preference for the merit principle or opposition to the DT and PT programs (ps .82).	
445	2	4	Surprisingly, participants perceived the DT program (M 4.02, SD 1.26) and the PT program (M 3.87, SD 1.11) as equally likely to promote merit-based selection, $t(84) = 0.97$, $p = .34$.	
445	2	6	Criterion-scaled regression analyses were used to test the effects of people's preference for the merit principle, beliefs about bias, program, and their interactions on opposition to the diversity initiatives.	
445	2	13	However, the predicted Preference for the Merit Principle Beliefs About Bias interaction was significant, $F(1, 81) = 6.48$, $p = .01$, $2 = .074$.	
445	2	18	Simple effects tests revealed that, as predicted, among participants who believed that evaluations are biased, the stronger their prescriptive preference for merit-based outcomes, the less they opposed (and the more they supported) the diversity initiatives ($B = 0.63$, $SE B = 0.28$, $p = .03$, $sr^2 = .059$).	
445	2	22	In contrast, among participants who strongly believed that evaluations are bias free, the effect of people's preference for merit principle on opposition to the programs was nonsignificant ($B = 0.45$, $SE B = 0.30$, $p = .14$, $sr^2 = .025$).	
445	2	31	Thus, the Preference for the Merit Principle Beliefs About Bias interaction was consistent across the two programs.	

445	2	38	The results of Study 4 indicate that people with a stronger (vs. weaker) preference for the merit principle do not always align themselves with dominant-group interests or support the status quo.	
445	2	41	As expected and consistent with the findings of Son Hing et al. (2002), people's preference for the merit principle interacts with people's beliefs about bias in organizational evaluation practices to produce reactions to strong programs that would help to hire and promote beneficiary groups.	
446	1	2	Among those who believed that evaluations are biased, the more strongly (vs. weakly) participants preferred merit-based outcome allocations the more they supported diversity initiatives involving differential and preferential treatment.	
446	1	5	This is the first demonstration that, under some conditions, people's prescriptive beliefs about merit can motivate greater support of programs that will promote the interests of disadvantaged groups. In contrast, we found that, among participants who believed that organizational evaluations are bias free, endorsement of the merit principle did not predict reactions to diversity initiatives.	
446	1	9	This is the first demonstration that, under some conditions, people's prescriptive beliefs about merit can motivate greater support of programs that will promote the interests of disadvantaged groups. In contrast, we found that, among participants who believed that organizational evaluations are bias free, endorsement of the merit principle did not predict reactions to diversity initiatives.	
446	1	13	Perhaps because bias in evaluations is not seen as a problem, diversity initiatives are not seen as necessary, and so people tend to oppose such initiatives regardless of their preference for the merit principle.	
446	1	15	Unlike Study 3, program type (i.e., DT vs. PT) did not moderate the effect of people's preference for the merit principle on reactions.	

446	1	17	This is likely because participants viewed the two programs as equivalently—and moderately—merit restoring.	
446	1	22	For instance, Whites associate quotas with AA, which leads to greater perceptions of merit violation (Reyna, Tucker, Korfmacher, & Henry, 2005).	
446	1	24	People's preference for merit-based outcomes was unrelated to their beliefs regarding the existence of bias in organizational evaluations of women and ethnic minorities: The constructs are orthogonal. Recall that the denial of discrimination against subordinate groups is a core component of system justification and of modern forms of prejudice (Jost et al., 2004; McConahay, 1986).	
446	1	30	Thus, we again found evidence that prescriptive beliefs about merit operate independently of hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies.	
446	2	5	The current research shows that laypeople who recognize that biases exist against such groups intuit these processes, and if they have strong prescriptive beliefs about merit, they will be more supportive of corrective programs.	
446	2	12	First, our findings support the notion that prescriptive beliefs about merit do not reflect system justification beliefs, prejudice, or social dominance orientation (SDO).	
446	2	15		This is important, given that researchers have recently linked descriptive beliefs that current society is a proper meritocracy to other system justification beliefs, prejudice, and antiegalitarianism (Federico & Sidanius, 2002; McCoy & Major, 2007).
446	2	19	We found that, even with parallel wording in the measures, prescriptive and descriptive beliefs about merit-based outcome allocations are separate and only weakly related constructs.	
446	2	21		The belief that meritocracy exists is related to other hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies, such as political conservatism, racism, SDO, and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA).

446	2	24	Preference for the merit principle is unrelated to these ideologies, to explicit and implicit sexism, and to beliefs about bias in the workplace for evaluations of women and ethnic minorities.	
446	2	27	Thus, whereas descriptive beliefs about merit can reflect motivations to legitimize a hierarchical status quo, prescriptive beliefs about merit do not.	
446	2	29	Thus, whereas descriptive beliefs about merit can reflect motivations to legitimize a hierarchical status quo, prescriptive beliefs about merit do not.	
446	2	31	Second, hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies and prescriptive beliefs about merit each uniquely predict reactions to organizational practices that benefit disadvantaged group members, but they do so in different ways. ⁶	
446	2	36	On the other hand, the effect of preference for the merit principle depends on the nature of the program.	
447	1	3	When we controlled for hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies (i.e., modern and implicit sexism, SDO, and RWA), people with stronger prescriptive beliefs about merit were more opposed to a merit-violating program (the PT) but were no more opposed to a merit-upholding program (the ET) than were people who weakly endorsed the merit principle	
447	1	4	When we controlled for hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies (i.e., modern and implicit sexism, SDO, and RWA), people with stronger prescriptive beliefs about merit were more opposed to a merit-violating program (the PT) but were no more opposed to a merit-upholding program (the ET) than were people who weakly endorsed the merit principle	
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447	1	6	When we controlled for hierarchy/legitimizing ideologies (i.e., modern and implicit sexism, SDO, and RWA), people with stronger prescriptive beliefs about merit were more opposed to a merit-violating program (the PT) but were no more opposed to a merit-upholding program (the ET) than were people who weakly endorsed the merit principle	
447	1	9	Thus, it appears that implicit and explicit sexists oppose AA in principle (regardless of the program specifics), whereas people with a strong preference for the merit principle oppose AA only when practices violate merit.	
447	1	10	Thus, it appears that implicit and explicit sexists oppose AA in principle (regardless of the program specifics), whereas people with a strong preference for the merit principle oppose AA only when practices violate merit.	
447	1	12	Third, for all the organizational practices investigated, whether preference for the merit principle predicts reactions depends on people's motives to legitimize inequality.	
447	1	15		Among people who strongly endorse hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies (i.e., those high in modern sexism, those who believe that meritocracy exists, and those who believe that organizational evaluations are bias free), preference for the merit principle does not predict reactions to organizational practices.
447	1	17	Among people who strongly endorse hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies (i.e., those high in modern sexism, those who believe that meritocracy exists, and those who believe that organizational evaluations are bias free), preference for the merit principle does not predict reactions to organizational practices.	
447	1	24	Thus, for people motivated to benefit advantaged groups versus disadvantaged groups, the degree to which they endorse the merit principle is not relevant.	

447	1	27			In contrast, among people who weakly endorse hierarchy/legitimizing ideologies (i.e., those low in modern sexism, those who do not believe that meritocracy exists, and those who believe that organizational evaluations are biased), preference for the merit principle predicts responses to organizational practices that affect the status quo.
447	1	28			In contrast, among people who weakly endorse hierarchy/legitimizing ideologies (i.e., those low in modern sexism, those who do not believe that meritocracy exists, and those who believe that organizational evaluations are biased), preference for the merit principle predicts responses to organizational practices that affect the status quo.
447	1	30			When organizational practices involve merit violation, the stronger people's preference for the merit principle, the more negatively people respond, regardless of whether practices uphold the status quo (i.e., sexism in selection) or challenge the status quo (i.e., preferential treatment in selection).
447	1	31			When organizational practices involve merit violation, the stronger people's preference for the merit principle, the more negatively people respond, regardless of whether practices uphold the status quo (i.e., sexism in selection) or challenge the status quo (i.e., preferential treatment in selection).
447	1	35			But, when organizational practices are merit restoring (i.e., diversity initiatives), the stronger people's preference for the merit principle, the more positively they respond to programs that challenge the status quo.
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447	1	40	But, when organizational practices are merit restoring (i.e., diversity initiatives), the stronger people's preference for the merit principle, the more positively they respond to programs that challenge the status quo. Thus, for those not motivated to uphold a hierarchical system, preference for the merit principle drives reactions depending on whether practices violate or restore merit and not depending on whether practices uphold or challenge the status quo.	
447	1	45	On the one hand, some argue that conservatives oppose AA only when practices are merit violating, which is a principled objection because it is race neutral (Sniderman & Piazza, 1993).	
447	1	48	On the other hand, others argue that conservatives are biased to view beneficiaries as less meritorious (Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher, & Tucker, 2006).	
447	1	51	The current research indicates clearly that the reactions of people with a strong preference for the merit principle are principled.	
447	1	52	Their reactions depend on whether organizational practices are merit violating, upholding, or restoring—not on whether practices benefit advantaged or disadvantaged groups.	
447	1	55	Preference for the merit principle is unrelated to political conservatism and to authoritarianism more generally (Study 1).	

447	1	58	This suggests that conservatives are more likely than liberals to hold the belief that AA is merit violating because they see beneficiaries as less deserving (Reyna et al., 2005); however, conservatives and liberals should have similar attitudes toward cases in which merit is violated.	
447	2	2	This suggests that conservatives are more likely than liberals to hold the belief that AA is merit violating because they see beneficiaries as less deserving (Reyna et al., 2005); however, conservatives and liberals should have similar attitudes toward cases in which merit is violated.	
447	2	3		Therefore, whereas the principle of meritocracy on which conservatives draw on is race neutral, conservatives' beliefs about deservingness are not race neutral.
447	2	22	With a more educated sample, SDO could play a stronger role in opposition to AA, but we assert that prescriptive beliefs about merit would still be unrelated to hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies.	
447	2	27	However, we consistently measured people's prescriptive beliefs about merit and people's hierarchy/legitimizing ideologies so as to examine how these beliefs and ideologies are related.	
447	2	31	Although correlational data present problems for interpreting causality, the findings of Study 1 eliminate potential concerns that preference for the merit principle is confounded with political conservatism, racism, sexism, RWA, and SDO.	
447	2	35	In addition, concerns about common method variance are minimized because (a) we tested for higher order interactions and (b) preference for the merit principle and hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies were unrelated. The one exception to the latter was the weak positive relation between prescriptive and descriptive beliefs about merit.	

447	2	38	In addition, concerns about common method variance are minimized because (a) we tested for higher order interactions and (b) preference for the merit principle and hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies were unrelated. The one exception to the latter was the weak positive relation between prescriptive and descriptive beliefs about merit.	
447	2	46		A strength of the research is that we explored a variety of hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies and organizational practices that uphold or challenge the status quo. With different selection practices (gender discrimination, AA, diversity initiatives) and across multiple hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies (i.e., modern sexism, beliefs that meritocracy exists, beliefs about bias), we found the same pattern of results:
447	2	47	Preference for the merit principle predicts reactions to organizational practices only among people with weak hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies.	
447	2	51	However, not all of the hierarchy-legitimizing ideologies moderated the effects of preference for the merit principle.	
447	2	57	What is the merit of meritocracy?	
447	2	57		
447	2	58		Our findings indicate that, for theory and research on the construct of meritocracy to have continued value, social scientists must distinguish between descriptive and prescriptive beliefs about meritocracy, both conceptually and empirically
448	1	1		Our findings indicate that, for theory and research on the construct of meritocracy to have continued value, social scientists must distinguish between descriptive and prescriptive beliefs about meritocracy, both conceptually and empirically
448	1	2		Beliefs that meritocracy ought to exist are independent of beliefs that meritocracy does exist.

448	1	3		Beliefs that meritocracy ought to exist are independent of beliefs that meritocracy does exist.
448	1	4		The latter— beliefs that meritocracy does exist—can serve as a hierarchy-legitimizing ideology that justifies current societal inequality.
448	1	6		In contrast, the former beliefs—that meritocracy ought to exist—reflect a preference for a particular norm of distributive justice and can in fact drive support for policies that challenge the status quo.
448	1	46		The paradox of meritocracy in organizations.
448	1	56	Preference for the Merit Principle Scale: An individual difference measure of distributive justice preferences.	
448	1	25		Responding to discrimination as a function of meritocracy beliefs and personal experiences: Testing the model for shattered assumptions.
448	1	36	Meritocratic ideology and resistance to equity programs: Principled objection or rationalized prejudice?	
449	1	7		The jurisprudence of race and meritocracy: Standardized testing and “race neutral” racism in the workplace.
449	2	37		Priming meritocracy and the psychological justification of inequality.
449	2	48		The meritocracy myth.
450	1	33	Deconstructing the distinction between bias and merit.	
450	1	18		Meritocracy and opposition to affirmative action: Making concessions in the face of discrimination.
450	1	44		The rise of the meritocracy
450	1	46		Down with meritocracy: The man who coined the word four decades ago wishes Tony Blair would stop using it.

Liu, A. (2011).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
384	1	3		However, if colleges and universities are to serve as instruments for creating and expanding opportunity, then higher education must be more profound than simply being reduced to “defensive necessity,” and it is important for researchers to examine more closely the underlying theoretical concerns of meritocracy and their higher education implications.
384	1	5		In a meritocracy, social status becomes increasingly dependent upon an individual’s level of education (Moore 2004).
384	1	9		Framed by historical and contemporary discussions, I review the principal foundations of meritocracy and use the public University of California system as a point of departure for examining the connection between meritocracy and higher education within the context of the United States.
384	1	11		Framed by historical and contemporary discussions, I review the principal foundations of meritocracy and use the public University of California system as a point of departure for examining the connection between meritocracy and higher education within the context of the United States.
384	1	13		An insightful and nuanced consideration of the issues herein is important because conventional wisdom suggests that meritocracy is a positive system in which society functions.
384	1	14		Individuals may believe they are members of the meritocracy because of their level of educational attainment.
384	1	17		The reality of meritocracy is that it is not so unambiguous.

384	1	18		<p>A troubling effect of an uncritical view of meritocracy is that by not acknowledging there are greater structural social inequalities at play, there may be a tendency to view students who do not reach higher levels of educational attainment as having failed on their own terms (Karabel 2005; McNamee and Miller 2004; Young 2001).</p> <p>Therefore, it is necessary to interrogate the notion of meritocracy to better understand how higher education functions within it.</p>
384	1	22		
384	1	23	<p>I do so through consideration of the dimensions of merit, distributive justice, equality of opportunity, and social mobility, elements that largely inform the concept of meritocracy.</p>	
384	1	24		<p>I do so through consideration of the dimensions of merit, distributive justice, equality of opportunity, and social mobility, elements that largely inform the concept of meritocracy.</p>
385	1	10		<p>In undertaking an examination of meritocracy, I begin with its origin.</p>
385	1	11		<p>In his seminal 1958 book <i>The Rise of the Meritocracy</i>, Michael Young introduced the word “meritocracy” into the public lexicon.</p>
385	1	11		<p>In his seminal 1958 book <i>The Rise of the Meritocracy</i>, Michael Young introduced the word “meritocracy” into the public lexicon.</p>
385	1	12		<p>In the book, meritocracy is a pejorative term used to describe a social system that develops based on intelligence testing and educational attainment.</p>
385	1	14		<p>In today’s vernacular, meritocracy is often referenced as a positive concept that should be aspired to in various aspects of society.</p>

385	1	16	The belief that institutions should be governed by people chosen on the basis of merit, perhaps as defined by education and ability, rather than other factors, such as wealth or social class, is one that seems to resonate with the public.	
385	1	18		However, there are a few factors embedded within the concept of meritocracy that we ought to elucidate.
385	1	20		For a clearer understanding, we also need to consider the basic root of meritocracy.
385	1	21	The fundamental idea is that status in society is determined by merit, but what exactly is “merit”?	
385	1	22	The fundamental idea is that status in society is determined by merit, but what exactly is “merit”?	
385	1	22	The etymology of merit indicates it is a neutral term worthy of good or bad, praise or punishment (see e.g., Oxford English Dictionary).	
385	1	23	Merit is intangible, an abstract quality that can only be defined and determined contextually.	
385	1	26	Wealth, lineage, age, gender, economic efficiency, artistry, technical knowledge, speed, strength, and so forth can be considered merit depending on the circumstances.	
385	1	27	Sen (2000) suggests that the notion of merit is “undefined” and “normative” (p. 6).	
385	1	28		Despite the lack of a concrete definition, in a meritocracy there is generally a positive connotation of merit as something good, something that should be rewarded in a good way.
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385	1	29	Merit is perhaps most often generally associated with talent, skill, intelligence, ability, and effort.	
385	1	32	Within the context of higher education, college and university admissions is one area where the issue of merit and the challenges of defining it are most apparent.	
385	1	33	Baez (2006) argues that opinions of merit can be rather divisive when the focus concerns access to scarce societal resources, such as entry to highly selective collegiate institutions.	
385	1	35	From a narrow and restrictive perspective of merit, grade point averages and test scores might be the only driving factors; whereas, a wider and more holistic view might consider special talents, leadership potential, and family background as aspects of merit.	
385	1	37	From a narrow and restrictive perspective of merit, grade point averages and test scores might be the only driving factors; whereas, a wider and more holistic view might consider special talents, leadership potential, and family background as aspects of merit.	
385	1	38	Depending on a particular institution's needs and priorities, conceptions of merit may vary	
385	1	Rodapé 1		When Young (1958) introduced the term meritocracy, he offered a succinct definition of merit in the form of an equation.
385	1	Rodapé 1	When Young (1958) introduced the term meritocracy, he offered a succinct definition of merit in the form of an equation.	
385	1	Rodapé 2	He stated that “intelligence and effort together make up merit (1 ? E = M)” (p. 252).	
385	1	Rodapé	Therefore, he claimed the “lazy genius” is not someone who has	

		3	merit.		
386	1	4	How administrators define and assess merit can make a significant difference in the composition of the student body.		
386	1	6	Articulations of merit generally serve to create and legitimize difference for the purpose of selecting students.		
386	1	7	Baez (2006) notes that merit is “an institutional construct and that it does not—indeed, it cannot—exist outside the institutions that use it” (p. 997).		
386	1	9	Karabel (2005) contends that battles over merit reflect larger struggles amongst status-groups.		
386	1	10	He suggests that the definition of merit “always bears the imprint of the distribution of power in the larger society” (p. 550).		
386	1	18			Essentially, the primary provocation stems from the prefix of meritocracy.
386	1	18	Merit is fundamentally subjective and any attempt to demarcate it inevitably renders it vulnerable to critique.		
386	1	20	The debate about what constitutes merit is an ongoing one that will confound any conversation about admissions.		
386	1	29	Since that time and amidst an enduring belief in student diversity, supported by research attesting to its importance (Antonio et al. 2004; Chang 1999; Gurin 1999; Gurin et al. 2002; Milem 2003; Pike and Kuh 2006; Smith et al. 1997), administrators and faculty have sought continuing efforts to capture a multifaceted notion of merit with the implementation of comprehensive and/or holistic admissions review (Bartlett 2006; UCOP 2001b).		
386	1	31	Most recently, campus leadership again addressed the question of merit with the		

				elimination of certain exam requirements (UCOP 2009).	
386	1	32		As the UC case illustrates, merit is not and cannot be a static concept.	
386	1	35		With all the emphasis on merit, however, it is not surprising that the focus on the suffix of the word has virtually disappeared.	
386	1	37			According to Lemann (1999), the original idea of an American meritocracy was to create an elite class of civil servants to administer and govern our modern bureaucratic state, much like the French and Japanese civil-service systems.
386	1	39		Over time, however, the “-ocracy” aspect of meritocratically selected public servants for civil and government service “evolved into a more general way of distributing opportunity to millions of people, fitting them into places in a highly tracked university system that leads to jobs and professions” (Lemann 1999, p. 344).	
386	1	42			The idea of meritocracy as a form of governance has seemingly yielded to a structure of distribution, perhaps breeding a greater sense of entitlement among those who believe they have earned whatever rewards they have come to possess (e.g., acceptance to one’s college of choice).
386	1	Rodapé 1		For an extended discussion of affirmative action and challenges to conventional conceptions of merit, see Lapenson (2009).	
387	1	4		The second dimension to consider concerns the notion that rewards should be given in relation to merit.	
387	1	5		In an article about quota versus merit systems, Conrad (1976) provides a set of principles for what he considers the essence of a meritocracy (pp. 141–143):	

387	1	6			In an article about quota versus merit systems, Conrad (1976) provides a set of principles for what he considers the essence of a meritocracy (pp. 141–143):
387	1	7			Merit should be the sole determinant of an unequal share.
387	1	8			The test of merit should be individual talent.
387	1	17			Setting aside the assumptions within these statements and the obvious issues concerning notions of equality and inequality for the moment, what we can ascertain from the above rubric is that a principle of distribution underlies the notion of meritocracy.
387	1	18			Notwithstanding the fairness or unfairness of such a system, the key is that rewards in a meritocracy, whether in the form of jobs, power, money, or authority, are distributed on the basis of individual merit.
387	1	20			Notwithstanding the fairness or unfairness of such a system, the key is that rewards in a meritocracy, whether in the form of jobs, power, money, or authority, are distributed on the basis of individual merit.
387	1	21			According to Daniels (1978), if we narrow the principle of distribution further to a distribution of income, varying forms of meritocracy can develop dependent upon the desired reward schedule: unbridled meritocracy, desert meritocracy, utilitarian meritocracy, maximin meritocracy, strict egalitarian meritocracy, and socialist meritocracy.
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387	1	24	<p>According to Daniels (1978), if we narrow the principle of distribution further to a distribution of income, varying forms of meritocracy can develop dependent upon the desired reward schedule: unbridled meritocracy, desert meritocracy, utilitarian meritocracy, maximin meritocracy, strict egalitarian meritocracy, and socialist meritocracy.</p>
387	1	24	<p>Although these different meritocracies refer to income distribution, we can also consider them in relation to higher education.</p>
387	1	37	<p>Consequently, the decision to accept students on the basis of unbridled, utilitarian, or egalitarian admissions policies demonstrates that the different types of meritocracy Daniels (1978) presents also embody competing ideas of social justice.</p>
387	1	39	<p>Beyond the factor of merit, Sen (2000) argues it is essential that the distribution of social benefits also take into account principles of equality and justice.</p>
388	1	1	<p>In simple terms, meritocracy places primary importance on merit and talent, but at its core, meritocracy is also a reward schedule with larger social ramifications.</p>
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388	1	1	<p>In simple terms, meritocracy places primary importance on merit and talent, but at its core, meritocracy is also a reward schedule with larger social ramifications.</p>
388	1	9	<p>This argument appears to align with Daniels' (1978) definition of maximin meritocracy.</p>

388	1	11		Nozick, instead, embraces a more libertarian stand, contending that any resulting reward differentials are acceptable, independent of others' situations (e.g., unbridled meritocracy).
388	1	12		These are pertinent deliberations to consider with regard to the role that social institutions, such as colleges and universities, occupy in a meritocracy.
388	1	18	In a meritocracy, the admissions process is just one of the ways in which colleges and universities play a significant role in the distribution of rewards.	
389	1	5		Such a contention would seem to challenge equality of opportunity, which is a central tenet of meritocracy.
389	1	9	The third dimension examines an underlying imperative in a system of distribution based on merit—equality of opportunity.	
389	1	17		Sandel (1998) views this as “liberal equality,” wherein the goal is to achieve a “fair meritocracy,” in which social and cultural inequalities are mitigated by equal educational opportunities, certain redistributive policies, and other social reforms” (p. 68).
389	1	20		Indeed, a meritocracy is not generally understood to be strictly egalitarian as it tends to be driven by an unequal distribution of rewards.
390	1	47		It seems that while equality of opportunity is generally a strong basis for the widespread acceptance of meritocracy as a valued system, it appears to be an elusive principle in the pursuit of higher education.
391	1	4		Although it seems doubtful there can ever be true equality of opportunity for access to higher education, a final dimension of meritocracy to consider is how higher education might serve as the mechanism for providing an equal opportunity for social mobility.

391	1	6		According to Moore (2004), a meritocratic system allows people to ‘‘achieve social status by virtue of their actual abilities and contributions rather than having it merely ‘ascribed’ by accident of birth’’ (p. 39).
391	1	16	Aptitude and talent will undoubtedly vary and not everyone will be capable of climbing the social ladder, but assuming that higher education is a means by which meritorious traits can be cultivated or signaled, one’s success in life is ostensibly limitless.	
391	1	18		Although meritocracy enables social mobility, it also upholds the status quo of a stratified society.
391	1	19		Bell (1973) writes, ‘‘In social fact, the meritocracy is thus the displacement of one principle of stratification by another, of achievement for ascription’’ (p. 426).
391	1	22		Meritocracy does not aim to create a classless society, but it legitimizes the given hierarchical structure and empowers people to be socially re-classified.
391	1	35	If we acknowledge the proposition that stratification can be a means of maintaining societal stability and that social inequality is an unavoidable consequence of a complex society, then the argument is that it is more acceptable for educational merit to be the arbiter of social status and to serve as an enabler for social mobility.	
392	1	1	Educational attainment is not always the most appropriate determination of merit, but in a meritocracy it serves as a signaling tool and having a college degree can greatly improve the chances of moving up the income ladder (Baum and Ma 2007; Haskins 2008).	

392	1	2	Educational attainment is not always the most appropriate determination of merit, but in a meritocracy it serves as a signaling tool and having a college degree can greatly improve the chances of moving up the income ladder (Baum and Ma 2007; Haskins 2008).
392	1	29	Bell (1973) suggests that a meritocracy predicated on educational attainment creates “a ‘credentials society’ in which certification of achievement—through college degree, the professional examination, the license—becomes a condition of higher employment” (p. 414).
392	1	40	Although there may be other theories to explain the relationship between educational credentials and socioeconomic attainment (Bills 2003), the more important point to bear in mind is that in a meritocracy, credentials may not be an equitable signifier of achievement.
392	1	43	The perception of the US system of higher education as a meritocratic one that also holds firm to ideals of universal access is a powerful impression that serves to reify higher education’s significance in a meritocracy.
392	1	45	The perception of the US system of higher education as a meritocratic one that also holds firm to ideals of universal access is a powerful impression that serves to reify higher education’s significance in a meritocracy.
393	1	5	The belief in meritocratic ideals and the democratization of access, however, is supposed to empower mobility between institutional types (Trow 2001).

393	1	8	Karabel (2005) argues that a prominent reason for the symbiosis of meritocracy and higher education is because “the legitimacy of the American social order depended in good part on the public’s confidence that the pathways to success provided by the nation’s leading universities were open to individuals from all walks of life” (p. 543).
393	1	12	The rhetoric of meritocracy can be persuasive and it holds much allure, but it is also a myth that serves to detract from the work of social justice.
393	1	14	McNamee and Miller (2004) suggest that American higher education “is not governed by strict principles of meritocracy, but instead, reflects, legitimizes, and reproduces class inequalities” (p. 112).
393	1	17	Criticisms concerning preferences for children of alumni (legacies) or powerful and wealthy donors diminish the perception that institutions are meritocratic (Golden 2006).
393	1	19	Early admissions policies that disproportionately “advantage the already advantaged” also serve to undermine the ideals of meritocracy (Karabel 2005, p. 551).
393	1	22	Even programs that have been implemented to mitigate social disadvantages and foster liberal equality, such as affirmative action, can be spun in ways that suggest the policy is either antithetical or imperative to meritocracy.
393	1	24	Opponents of affirmative action claim that considerations of racial diversity lower academic standards and therefore cannot be any kind of reflection of merit.
393	1	28	A commitment to social justice therefore requires that we carefully consider all the underlying facets of meritocracy, including the definition of merit, distributive justice,

					equal opportunity, and social mobility.
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393	1	31			Karabel (2005) and Lemann (1999) both note that Young's (1958) dystopic vision of a meritocratic society stemmed from his belief that widespread acceptance of meritocracy would extinguish the cause of social justice.
393	1	31			Karabel (2005) and Lemann (1999) both note that Young's (1958) dystopic vision of a meritocratic society stemmed from his belief that widespread acceptance of meritocracy would extinguish the cause of social justice.
393	1	32			Meritocracy is a justification for inequality, which did not sit well with Young's egalitarian views.
393	1	35			In 1958, Young wrote a social science fable to capture what he believed would happen to a society enthralled with meritocracy.
393	1	37			Over 40 years later in a 2001 Guardian newspaper article, Young wrote that much of what he predicted had come about, and he was particularly wary about the casual overuse of the word meritocracy, especially by politicians.
393	1	38			In the 2001 article, the late Young claimed that meritocracy breeds "insufferably smug" meritocrats who feel entitled to whatever rewards "they arrogate to themselves" because they believe they advanced on their own merit and achievement.

393	1	38		In the 2001 article, the late Young claimed that meritocracy breeds “insufferably smug” meritocrats who feel entitled to whatever rewards “they arrogate to themselves” because they believe they advanced on their own merit and achievement.
393	1	40		In the 2001 article, the late Young claimed that meritocracy breeds “insufferably smug” meritocrats who feel entitled to whatever rewards “they arrogate to themselves” because they believe they advanced on their own merit and achievement.
393	1	40		The meritorious become so self-assured as to “actually believe they have morality on their side.”
393	1	42		The others are left “morally naked” having been judged as not having merit and having been “looked down on so woundingly by people who have done well for themselves.”
394	1	1		This may sound extreme, but if our recent history of lower taxes for the wealthy, widening income inequality, and skyrocketing salaries and bonuses for top corporate executives despite their gross abuses of power are potential indications of meritocracy run amok, then Young’s views are perhaps not quite so polemic.
394	1	3		In the present day it seems largely taken for granted that meritocracy is a positive and preferred system in which society functions.
394	1	9		It also contributes to the tension between what Sen (2000) argues is “the inclination to see merit in fixed and absolute terms and the ultimate instrumental character of merit” (p. 5).

394	1	10	It also contributes to the tension between what Sen (2000) argues is “the inclination to see merit in fixed and absolute terms and the ultimate instrumental character of merit” (p. 5).	
394	1	12		One of the strongest arguments for meritocracy is that it subverts factors of heredity and substitutes achievement for ascription.
394	1	15		This proposition is an overreaching one as Bell (1973) so simply notes, “There can never be a pure meritocracy because, invariably, high-status parents will seek to pass on their positions either through the use of influence or simply by the cultural advantages their children would possess.
394	1	17		Thus, after one generation a meritocracy simply becomes an enclaved class” (p. 427).
394	1	20		As I believe I have shown through the arguments presented, we should exercise caution in extolling the virtues of meritocracy.
394	1	22		Given that higher education can play a substantial role in the adjudication of future jobs and material rewards, as well as transform or reproduce the social structure, more thoughtful reflection of all the facets of meritocracy is essential in order to better understand what its underlying foundations entail within the context of higher education.
394	1	26		Most importantly, we cannot allow the myth of meritocracy to overshadow the cause of social justice for those who have faced discrimination and have systemically accumulated disadvantages.

Knowles, E. D., & Lowery, B. S. (2002).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
202	1	1		In the United States, few prescriptive norms are as sacrosanct as that of meritocracy—the notion that individuals ought to be allocated social goods in proportion to their individual abilities and efforts (Hochschild, 1995; McNamee & Miller, 2004; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993).
202	1	5		At the same time, well-documented patterns of racial stratification in the USA raise the possibility that the demands of meritocracy—fair treatment and equality of opportunity—are not being met (Bourg & Stock, 1994; Brown et al., 2003; Kozol, 1991; Loury, 2002; Massey & Denton, 1993; Oliver & Shapiro, 1995; Shapiro, 2004; Smedley, Stith, & Nelson, 2003).
202	1	14		Yet, despite the fact that African Americans experience markedly worse economic, judicial, and health outcomes than do European Americans, Whites are generally sanguine about the health of the meritocracy (Kluegel & Smith, 1983).
203	1	8		The present work examines another possible source of Whites' tendency to deny inequity—namely, embrace of the meritocratic norm itself.
203	1	9		The more importance Whites place on meritocracy as a distribution rule, we propose, the less able or willing they are to see the rule as having been violated.
203	1	10		We argue that the link between meritocratic-norm endorsement and inequity denial is driven by Whites' self-concerns.

203	1	12		According to this account, Whites who endorse meritocracy seek to see themselves as personally possessing merit (i.e., talent and diligence), and deny the existence of racial inequities—specifically, unearned White privilege—that challenge this desired view of self.
203	1	13		According to this account, Whites who endorse meritocracy seek to see themselves as personally possessing merit (i.e., talent and diligence), and deny the existence of racial inequities—specifically, unearned White privilege—that challenge this desired view of self.
203	1	15		The four studies reported here document the effect of the meritocratic norm on Whites' perceptions of inequity, and provide converging evidence that self-concerns account for this impact.
203	1	20		The meritocratic norm prescribes that individuals' "inputs" into the social system (i.e., talent and effort) determine the system's "output" to individuals (i.e., economic resources).
203	1	24		On our account, the causal influence of meritocratic-norm endorsement on privilege perceptions is mediated by Whites' adoption of merit (talent and work ethic) as a desired self-view.
203	1	25		On our account, the causal influence of meritocratic-norm endorsement on privilege perceptions is mediated by Whites' adoption of merit (talent and work ethic) as a desired self-view.
203	1	38		In the present context, individuals who believe the system ought to reward others based on individual merit should also to want their own rewards to be a function of

			merit.		
203	1	39	In the present context, individuals who believe the system ought to reward others based on individual merit should also to want their own rewards to be a function of merit.		
203	1	40	This proposition alone does not, however, entail that individuals will seek to see themselves as talented and hard working (i.e., meritorious), but rather only that they will want their outputs to match their inputs.		
203	1	42			One additional assumption is required to complete the proposed link between preference for meritocracy and merit as desired self-view—that people, all else equal, wish to regard themselves as successful.
203	1	42	One additional assumption is required to complete the proposed link between preference for meritocracy and merit as desired self-view—that people, all else equal, wish to regard themselves as successful.		
		48			Consequently, if one has internalized the meritocratic norm and seeks to regard oneself as successful within the context of this norm, then if follows that endorsement of meritocracy will be accompanied by a desire to see oneself as talented and hard-working.
204	1	1			Consequently, if one has internalized the meritocratic norm and seeks to regard oneself as successful within the context of this norm, then if follows that endorsement of meritocracy will be accompanied by a desire to see oneself as talented and hard-working.
204	1	10			Therefore, because unearned racial privilege is antithetical to meritocracy, Whites ought to deny the existence of privilege to the extent that they

					support—and therefore are likely to have internalized—the meritocratic norm.
204	1	11			Therefore, because unearned racial privilege is antithetical to meritocracy, Whites ought to deny the existence of privilege to the extent that they support—and therefore are likely to have internalized—the meritocratic norm.
204	1	17		While this finding implies that Whites deny inequity because they regard merit as a personal ideal, it falls to the present research to show that endorsement of meritocracy as a distribution rule is a source of this effect.	
204	1	18			While this finding implies that Whites deny inequity because they regard merit as a personal ideal, it falls to the present research to show that endorsement of meritocracy as a distribution rule is a source of this effect.
204	1	23			The most basic datum of evidence for the present account would consist in a relationship between Whites' affinity for meritocracy and their denial of racial privilege.
204	1	24			However, if the meritocratic norm is part and parcel of American identity, as many researchers have argued (e.g., Hochschild, 1995; McNamee & Miller, 2004; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993), then it may be questioned whether individuals vary meaningfully in their endorsement of the norm.
204	1	30			This concern is allayed by the fact that there exist alternative distribution rules (e.g., humanitarian—egalitarian; Katz & Hass, 1988), and that individuals have been shown to vary in their endorsement of meritocracy (Davey, Bobocel, Son Hing, & Zanna, 1999).

204	1	31		Consequently, while researchers ought to expect generally strong support for the meritocratic norm among White Americans, “preference for the merit principle” (PMP; Davey et al., 1999) remains an important individual difference dimension.
204	1	32		Consequently, while researchers ought to expect generally strong support for the meritocratic norm among White Americans, “preference for the merit principle” (PMP; Davey et al., 1999) remains an important individual difference dimension.
204	1	36		Even if PMP predicts the denial of racial privilege, we sought more compelling evidence that this link is mediated by Whites’ self-concerns—specifically, their desire to view themselves as possessing merit.
204	1	37		We therefore identified factors that should be expected to qualify the relationship between affinity for meritocracy and privilege denial—if, as we theorize, self-concerns mediate this link.
205	1	7		Such a finding would, in turn, provide nuanced evidence for the importance of self-concerns in binding meritocratic-norm endorsement to perceptions of societal inequity.
205	1	10		We have argued that Whites with a strong affinity for meritocracy—and who therefore value merit as a personal ideal—experience self-threat when contemplating the possibility that their group is unfairly advantaged; this threat, in turn, leads high-PMP Whites to downplay the existence of White privilege.
205	1	11		We have argued that Whites with a strong affinity for meritocracy—and who therefore value merit as a personal ideal—experience self-threat when contemplating the possibility that their group is unfairly advantaged; this threat, in turn, leads high-PMP

			Whites to downplay the existence of White privilege.	
205	1	16		If this account of the PMP–privilege link is correct, then interventions that increase or decrease individuals’ current need to bolster the self ought, respectively, to strengthen or weaken the link between endorsement of the meritocratic norm and perceived privilege.
205	1	21	Therefore, if selfconcerns mediate the relationship between PMP and perceived privilege, threatening Whites’ sense of their own merit should strengthen the relationship between PMP and privilege perceptions, whereas affirming Whites’ merit ought to attenuate this link.	
205	1	22	Therefore, if selfconcerns mediate the relationship between PMP and perceived privilege, threatening Whites’ sense of their own merit should strengthen the relationship between PMP and privilege perceptions, whereas affirming Whites’ merit ought to attenuate this link.	
205	1	25		Even if a White person strongly endorses the meritocratic norm, and hence values merit as a personal ideal, she or he will not necessarily experience self-threat when considering the possible existence of White privilege.
205	1	26	Even if a White person strongly endorses the meritocratic norm, and hence values merit as a personal ideal, she or he will not necessarily experience self-threat when considering the possible existence of White privilege.	
205	1	29	Rather, only those individuals who see membership in the White group as self-relevant—that is, who are subjectively identified with the group—will regard White privilege as impugning	

			personal merit.		
205	1	41			Such a pattern would lend credence to our claim that concern for the self mediates the impact of Whites' affinity for meritocracy on their perceptions of racial inequity.
205	1	44			On our account, the belief that the world ought to function as a meritocracy causes Whites to deny racial inequity.
205	1	46	This "ought/is" link, in turn, is mediated by Whites' self-concerns—specifically, Whites' desire to see themselves as personally meritorious.		
205	1	48	Study 1 examined the relationship between preference for the merit principle (PMP; Davey et al., 1999) and Whites' perceptions of racial inequity framed either as in-group advantage (White privilege) or out-group disadvantage (anti-Black discrimination).		
206	1	6	Study 2 examined the relationship between PMP, adoption of merit (ability and work ethic) as a personal ideal, and Whites' perceptions of racial privilege.		
206	1	8	In line with our model, we predicted that Whites' personal idealization of merit would mediate a negative association between their affinity for meritocracy and their perceptions of privilege.		
206	1	9			In line with our model, we predicted that Whites' personal idealization of merit would mediate a negative association between their affinity for meritocracy and their perceptions of privilege.

206	1	13	<p>Finally, Study 4 had two purposes: (1) to address the issue of causality by manipulating the salience of the meritocratic norm and examining subsequent changes in Whites' acknowledgement of in-group privilege; and (2) to examine whether White identity moderates this effect in a manner consistent with the involvement of the self.</p>	<p>As a first test of our model, we examined the relationship between Whites' endorsement of the meritocratic norm, as operationalized by PMP, and their perceptions of racial inequity, framed either as White privilege or anti-Black discrimination.</p> <p>We hypothesized that Whites' affinity for meritocracy would be associated with the denial of in-group privilege. Moreover, because Whites find privilege more self-threatening than discrimination (Lowery et al., 2007; Powell et al., 2005), we predicted that the PMP–privilege association would be stronger than any negative association between PMP and perceived discrimination.</p> <p>Preference for meritocracy.</p> <p>In order to measure participants' endorsement of the meritocratic norm, we administered Davey and colleagues' (1999) 15-item Preference for the Merit Principle (PMP) Scale.</p>
206	1	23		
206	1	25		
206	1	41		
206	1	42		
206	1	43	<p>In order to measure participants' endorsement of the meritocratic norm, we administered Davey and colleagues' (1999) 15-item Preference for the Merit Principle (PMP) Scale.</p>	
206	1	45	<p>The PMP Scale gauges the degree to which participants believe that outcomes should be distributed on the basis of personal merit (i.e., ability and work ethic) rather than need and group membership.</p>	

207	1	38	<p>In the first model, we observed a significant negative association between preference for meritocracy and perceptions of White privilege, $r^{1/4}.18$, $p5.001$, a smaller but nonetheless significant relationship between PMP and perceived discrimination, $r^{1/4}.11$, $p5.01$, and a large association between perceptions of privilege and discrimination, $r^{1/4}.75$, $p5.001$.</p>
207	1	48	<p>The results of Study 1 provide initial evidence for our account of the relationship between belief in the meritocratic norm (as operationalized by PMP) and the denial of social inequity.</p>
208	1	3	<p>PMP was negatively correlated with perceptions of White privilege, thus providing an empirical demonstration of the notion that endorsement of the meritocratic norm is associated with the denial of societal inequity.</p>
208	1	8	<p>In light of previous research suggesting that White privilege is more self-threatening to Whites than is anti-Black discrimination (Lowery et al., 2007; Powell et al., 2005), this finding suggests that self-defensive motives intervene between affinity for meritocracy and perceptions of privilege.</p>
208	1	10	<p>The next three studies provide more direct evidence for the role of self-concerns in mediating a causal link between endorsement of the meritocratic norm and denial of racial inequity.</p>
208	1	13	<p>Study 1 demonstrated a relationship between Whites' embrace of meritocracy and their denial of racial privilege; Study 2 provided a first test of our explanation for this relationship—that Whites who embrace meritocracy as a distribution rule or norm (i.e., high-PMP Whites) desire to see themselves as high in merit.</p>

208	1	15			Study 1 demonstrated a relationship between Whites' embrace of meritocracy and their denial of racial privilege; Study 2 provided a first test of our explanation for this relationship—that Whites who embrace meritocracy as a distribution rule or norm (i.e., high-PMP Whites) desire to see themselves as high in merit.
208	1	16			Study 1 demonstrated a relationship between Whites' embrace of meritocracy and their denial of racial privilege; Study 2 provided a first test of our explanation for this relationship—that Whites who embrace meritocracy as a distribution rule or norm (i.e., high-PMP Whites) desire to see themselves as high in merit.
208	1	18			In Study 2, we predicted that the association between PMP and perceptions of White privilege would be mediated by Whites' incorporation of merit—that is, a combination of aptitude and work ethic (Hochschild, 1995; Lemann, 1999; McNamee & Miller, 2004)—into the ideal self (Higgins, 1987).
208	1	22			In light of evidence that perceptions of anti-Black discrimination are unrelated to Whites' self-regard, discrimination perceptions were not expected to be mediated by the idealization of merit.
208	1	24			It may be that the Preference for Merit Scale proxies individuals' levels of systemjustification (Jost & Banaji, 1994) or just-world motives (Lerner, 1980), and therefore that the observed relationship between PMP and denial of White privilege stems not from self-concerns but, rather, from the desire to view the system or world as fair.
208	1	42			An additional measure tapped Whites' incorporation of merit into the ideal self.

208	1	44	Idealization of merit.		
208	1	44	Our measure of Whites' idealization of merit was adapted from Hardin and Leong (2005).		
209	1	5	The first two qualities—intelligent/smart and hard-working/industrious—represent aptitude- and effort-related dimensions of merit.		
209	1	5	Scores reflecting participants' idealization of the individual merit dimensions were computed by subtracting the average rank given to non-merit dimensions from the rank given to intelligent/smart or hard-working/industrious.		
209	1	6	Scores reflecting participants' idealization of the individual merit dimensions were computed by subtracting the average rank given to non-merit dimensions from the rank given to intelligent/smart or hard-working/industrious.		
209	1	10	The resulting "idealization of merit" scores represent the degree to which participants consider merit to be a central component of their ideal selves.		
209	1	11	The resulting "idealization of merit" scores represent the degree to which participants consider merit to be a central component of their ideal selves.		
209	1	16	After linking to the survey, participants completed measures of PMP and idealization of merit in fixed sequence.		
209	1	23	We hypothesized that Whites who prefer merit as a distribution rule for society come to internalize merit as a personal ideal.		
209	1	23	We hypothesized that Whites who prefer merit as a distribution rule for society come to internalize merit as a personal ideal.		
209	1	25			These individuals should, in turn, downplay the existence of unearned racial privilege, since privilege implies that Whites are living in breach of

					meritocracy.	
209	1	27			Thus, we predicted that the relationship between PMP and perceptions of privilege would be mediated by Whites' incorporation of merit into the ideal self.	
209	1	31			Replicating the results of Study 1, Whites who endorse merit as a distribution rule for society tended also to downplay the existence of racial inequity framed as in-group privilege.	
209	1	33			Next, we regressed the proposed mediator—endorsement of merit as a personal ideal—on PMP.	
209	1	34			As hypothesized, high-PMP Whites tended to identify merit as a central component of the ideal self.	
209	1	37			Inclusion of idealization of merit in this model attenuated the relationship between PMP and perceived privilege to below significance.	
210	1	2			A Sobel test revealed that idealization of merit significantly mediated the PMP–privilege relationship, $z = 2.08$, $p = .05$.	
210	1	3			We next sought to examine whether the idealization of merit might mediate a relationship between PMP and Whites' perceptions of anti-Black discrimination.	
210	1	10				Study 2 tested whether the link between Whites' endorsement of the meritocratic norm and their denial of unearned White privilege is due to Whites' internalization of merit as a personal ideal.
210	1	12			Study 2 tested whether the link between Whites' endorsement of the meritocratic norm and their denial of unearned White privilege is due to Whites' internalization of merit as a personal ideal.	

210	1	13		Mediation analysis indicated that, as predicted, Whites who endorse meritocracy as a distribution rule for society (i.e., high-PMP Whites) tend also to regard merit as a desired self-view.
210	1	14		Mediation analysis indicated that, as predicted, Whites who endorse meritocracy as a distribution rule for society (i.e., high-PMP Whites) tend also to regard merit as a desired self-view.
210	1	15		Providing evidence for the role of self-concerns in linking meritocratic-norm endorsement to perceptions of White privilege, the idealization of merit mediated the link between PMP and acknowledgement of privilege.
210	1	16		Providing evidence for the role of self-concerns in linking meritocratic-norm endorsement to perceptions of White privilege, the idealization of merit mediated the link between PMP and acknowledgement of privilege.
210	1	19		Also consistent with our perspective, we failed to observe a significant relationship between PMP and perceived anti-Black discrimination; thus, idealization of merit could not have mediated a link between these constructs.
210	1	28		Study 3 focuses on the second component of our explanation for the PMP–privilege link—that the potential existence of in-group racial privilege threatens Whites’ sense of their own merit.
210	1	31		If we are correct that selfconcerns underlie the relationship between endorsement of meritocracy and the denial of racial privilege, then Whites who experience self-threat should deny privilege to the extent that they also endorse the meritocratic norm.
210	1	33		If we are correct that selfconcerns underlie the relationship between endorsement of meritocracy and the denial of racial privilege, then Whites who experience self-threat should deny privilege to the extent that they also endorse the meritocratic norm.

210	1	34		In contrast, Whites whose selves have been affirmed ought to exhibit little or no meritocracy–privilege association.
212	1	29		We have argued that the relationship between Whites’ embrace of the meritocratic norm and their denial of racial inequity stems (in part) from Whites’ self-defensive denial of in-group racial privilege.
212	1	33	The potential existence of racial privilege is presumed to threaten high-PMP Whites because it implies that they are failing to live up to their desired view of self as meritorious	
212	1	44		To this point, our analyses of the relationship between Whites’ embrace of meritocracy and denial of inequity have been correlational in nature. For instance, it could be the case that the observed PMP–privilege relationship is due to a causal effect of inequity perceptions on endorsement of the meritocratic norm.
212	1	48		Study 4 attempted to clarify the issue of causality by manipulating the salience of the meritocratic norm.
212	1	49		Findings in which raising the salience of PMP renders Whites less willing to acknowledge the existence of racial privilege would provide evidence that embrace of the meritocratic norm causes White to downplay privilege.
213	1	2		
213	1	6	Any tension between unearned privilege and high-PMP Whites’ internalized merit goals is contingent upon identification with the White in-group; absent some degree of group identity, beliefs concerning the group’s privileges are irrelevant to individuals’ sense of personal merit (Lowery et al., 2007).	

213	1	8	Any tension between unearned privilege and high-PMP Whites' internalized merit goals is contingent upon identification with the White in-group; absent some degree of group identity, beliefs concerning the group's privileges are irrelevant to individuals' sense of personal merit (Lowery et al., 2007).	
213	1	10		It is important to note that other potential explanations for the relationship between embrace of the meritocratic norm and denial of racial inequity—such as system justification theory and the just world hypothesis—attribute perceptions of inequity to motives unrelated to self-concerns or social identity. The present study examined the causal impact of the meritocratic norm on perceptions of racial inequity.
213	1	15		We primed Whites with norms reflecting different rules for the distribution of societal resources: a meritocratic norm (according to which resources are to be allocated according to individuals' talents and efforts) versus a humanitarian norm (according to which resources are to be apportioned according to individuals' needs).
213	1	21		Consistent with the hypothesized causal influence of the meritocratic norm on perceptions of racial inequity, we predicted that Whites exposed to the meritocratic prime would perceive less in-group privilege than those exposed to the humanitarian prime.
213	1	22		Consistent with the hypothesized causal influence of the meritocratic norm on perceptions of racial inequity, we predicted that Whites exposed to the meritocratic prime would perceive less in-group privilege than those exposed to the humanitarian prime.

214	1	40	For instance, these researchers' participants were equally willing to endorse a social order governed by meritocratic norms or by humanitarian mandates—despite the inherent contradiction between these values.
214	1	49	Following Katz and Hass (1988), we examined the causal impact of the meritocratic norm on Whites' perceptions of racial inequity by having participants rate statements strongly evoking either meritocracy or a contrasting resource-distribution principle (i.e., humanitarianism).
215	1	1	Following Katz and Hass (1988), we examined the causal impact of the meritocratic norm on Whites' perceptions of racial inequity by having participants rate statements strongly evoking either meritocracy or a contrasting resource-distribution principle (i.e., humanitarianism).
215	1	4	Meritocratic prime.
215	1	4	The prime of meritocratic norms consisted of three items drawn from the PMP Scale (Davey et al., 1999).
215	1	22	Participants were first administered the White identity measure, before being randomly assigned to receive one of the two primes (meritocratic or humanitarian).
215	1	30	We hypothesized that Whites exposed to the meritocracy prime would perceive less in-group racial privilege than would those exposed to the humanitarian prime.
215	1	37	In accordance with procedures outlined by Aiken and West (1991), we mean-centered White identity, effects-coded norm prime (such that 71 and 1 corresponded to the humanitarian prime and meritocracy prime, respectively), and multiplied these factors to create a White Identity 6Norm Prime interaction term.

215	1	44	<p>Inspection of Figure 2 reveals that, among highly identified Whites, exposure to the meritocracy prime decreased acknowledgement of White privilege; this was confirmed by simple slope analysis, $B \frac{1}{4} 70.30$, $SE B \frac{1}{4} 0.14$, $b \frac{1}{4} 70.17$, $t(312) \frac{1}{4} 72.11$, $p5 .05$.</p> <p>However, as predicted, among weakly identified Whites, the meritocracy prime did not reduce privilege perceptions; indeed, simple slope analysis revealed no significant effect of prime on these Whites' ratings of racial privilege, $B \frac{1}{4} 0.12$, $SE B \frac{1}{4} 0.14$, $b \frac{1}{4} 0.07$, $t(312) \frac{1}{4} 0.84$, $p \frac{1}{4} .40$.</p> <p>The present study examined the causal influence of the meritocratic norm on perceptions of racial inequity, as well as the role of White racial identity in linking endorsement of meritocracy to perceptions of inequity.</p> <p>The present study examined the causal influence of the meritocratic norm on perceptions of racial inequity, as well as the role of White racial identity in linking endorsement of meritocracy to perceptions of inequity.</p> <p>As predicted, priming meritocracy decreased White participants' acknowledgement of racial privilege, but only among those highly identified with the White in-group.</p> <p>In addition to clarifying the causal connection between meritocratic norms and perceptions of inequity, these findings provide further evidence that this link is self-defensive in nature.</p> <p>The present studies suggest that Whites' belief in the health of the meritocracy is motivated largely by self-concerns stemming from endorsement of meritocracy as a distribution rule for society.</p> <p>The present studies suggest that Whites' belief in the health of the meritocracy is motivated largely by self-concerns stemming from endorsement of</p>
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					meritocracy as a distribution rule for society.
216	1	18			Study 1 demonstrated that endorsement of meritocracy predicts the denial of racial inequity—especially inequity framed as in-group privilege.
216	1	21		Providing further evidence for the role of self-concerns, Study 2 showed that Whites' desire to see themselves as high in merit mediated the association between PMP and perceived privilege.	
216	1	26			Finally, Study 4 used a norm-priming manipulation to confirm the causal role of meritocratic-norm endorsement in Whites' perceptions of in-group racial privilege.
217	1	1			In sum, there is good reason to believe that self-concerns spawned by the embrace of the meritocratic norm cause Whites' to deny to the existence of in-group racial privilege.
217	1	8		On this account, the prospect of in-group privilege threatens to undermine Whites' desired view of self as meritorious.	
217	1	15		In this study, idealization of individual merit was found to mediate the association between the preference for meritocracy and the denial of privilege.	
217	1	16			In this study, idealization of individual merit was found to mediate the association between the preference for meritocracy and the denial of privilege.
217	1	18			In this study, we found that priming the meritocratic norm decreased privilege perceptions only among highly in-groupidentified Whites.
217	1	26		Whether or not White people regard their race as an abstractly important part of the self, they undoubtedly know they are White, and therefore that in-group privilege threatens to impugn their	

			personal merit.		
217	1	32	For Whites who perceive low levels of common fate with the White group as a whole, the prospect of in-group privilege has little bearing on individual merit, thus rendering it unnecessary to deny privilege.		
219	1	18			The current work belies these assumptions. In Study 4, exposure to statements evoking the meritocratic norm only reduced perceptions of White privilege among those scoring high on a measure of White identity.
220	1	1			It may also be the case that meritocratic norm endorsement mediated the relationship between idealization of merit and privilege beliefs.
220	1	2	It may also be the case that meritocratic norm endorsement mediated the relationship between idealization of merit and privilege beliefs.		
220	1	3	To test this, we ran another mediation analysis, this time with merit idealization as the predictor and norm endorsement as the mediator.		
220	1	4	When privilege beliefs were regressed onto merit idealization and norm endorsement, the relationship between merit idealization and privilege was significant, $B = .18$, $SE = .07$, $t(208) = 2.60$, $p = .05$, whereas the relationship between norm endorsement and privilege was not, $B = .19$, $SE = .14$, $t(208) = 1.50$, $p = .14$.		

220	1	5	<p>When privilege beliefs were regressed onto merit idealization and norm endorsement, the relationship between merit idealization and privilege was significant, $B \frac{1}{4} 70.18$, $SE B \frac{1}{4} 0.07$, $b \frac{1}{4} 70.18$, $t(208) \frac{1}{4} 72.60$, $p 5.05$, whereas the relationship between norm endorsement and privilege was not, $B \frac{1}{4} 70.29$, $SE B \frac{1}{4} 0.19$, $b \frac{1}{4} 70.10$, $t(208) \frac{1}{4} 71.50$, $p \frac{1}{4} .14$.</p>	
220	1	10	<p>The corresponding Sobel test failed to reach significance, $z \frac{1}{4} 1.38$, $p \frac{1}{4} .17$, casting doubt on the idea that norm endorsement mediated a relationship between merit idealization and privilege beliefs.</p>	

Tacconelli, E., Poljak, M., Cacace, M., Caiati, G., Benzonana, N., Nagy, E., & Kortbeek, T. (2012).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
2	1	22	In particular, in medical professional settings, discrimination is harder to address because medical science itself (as science in general) is considered to be objective and an area where personal success is only based on scientific merit. ²	
2	1	45	Most important factors reported to contribute to the so-called 'chilly climate' for women and minority groups in science are the following: exclusion from informal networks and the existence of 'hidden quotas' for women's and minority groups' presence in high-level positions, 12 pay gap, 6 access to resources for research and early-stage career development ¹³ and evaluation of scientific merit.	
7	1	2	However, previous studies documented that productivity is affected by a number of factors which are unrelated to scientific merit.	
7	2	6	In this sense, productivity appears as a function of one's position in the communication system in a discipline rather than personal scientific merits.	
7	1	23		Meritocracy: It is a system of government or other administration (such as business administration) wherein appointments and responsibilities are objectively assigned to individuals based upon their 'merits', namely intelligence, credentials and education, determined through evaluations or examinations.
7	1	26	Meritocracy: It is a system of government or other administration (such as business administration) wherein appointments and responsibilities are objectively assigned to individuals based upon their 'merits', namely intelligence, credentials and education, determined through evaluations or examinations.	

7	1	31	Discrimination: The treatment or consideration of, or making a distinction in favour of or against, a person based on the group, class or category to which that person belongs rather than on individual merit.	
9	1	44		Our final common goal should be to move from science without meritocracy towards science only based on meritocracy in a very near future.
9	1	45		Our final common goal should be to move from science without meritocracy towards science only based on meritocracy in a very near future.

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
171	1	4		The national story of immigration is tied to meritocracy, or the American dream: the idea that immigrants and their children can improve their lot through hard work (Hochschild, 1995).
171	1	10		In this research we examine relationships between meritocracy beliefs, ethnic identity, and support for collective action among two groups that differ in their experience in the U.S. social hierarchy—first- and second-generation Latino immigrants.
171	1	16		Our main contention is that the more extensive experience of second-generation immigrants with the consequences of their lower group status makes them dubious about the existence of meritocracy and, in turn, increases their identification with their ethnic group and their endorsement of actions to improve its position in society.
171	2	2		Meritocracy is one of the dominant belief systems in the United States (Katz & Hass, 1988; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Weber, 1958); it is a core component of the “American Dream” (Hochschild, 1995) and also plays an important role in the national story of immigration.
171	2	9		People who believe that society is meritocratic perceive that there are few systematic barriers to success aside from their own efforts and abilities.
171	2	11		In contrast, people who reject meritocracy perceive that extraneous factors, such as group memberships, can limit one’s chances in life (Major, Kaiser, O’Brien, & McCoy, 2007).
171	2	14		As a belief about the way society ought to be organized, meritocracy supports a message of fairness and equal opportunity (Son Hing et al., 2011).
171	2	17		In this article, we use meritocracy to refer to people’s descriptive beliefs about whether people can succeed in society on the basis of their own efforts and abilities

171	2	21	Belief in the operation of meritocracy can be an incentive for those who choose to leave a country where outcomes are seen as predetermined by custom or class.
171	2	24	At the same time, substantial evidence indicates that believing that meritocracy exists while at the same time being part of a disadvantaged group can encourage members of those groups to accept their position in society.
172	1	4	Few studies, however, have examined whether the alternative of rejecting the existence of meritocracy can encourage members of disadvantaged groups to challenge their position in society.
172	1	8	People who perceive that their group has low status or is disrespected are less likely to believe in meritocracy; Black and Latino college students, for example, perceive that society is less meritocratic than do higher-status Asians and Whites (Levin et al., 1998; Major et al., 2002).
172	1	10	People who perceive that their group has low status or is disrespected are less likely to believe in meritocracy; Black and Latino college students, for example, perceive that society is less meritocratic than do higher-status Asians and Whites (Levin et al., 1998; Major et al., 2002).
172	1	14	What are the consequences of this lowered belief that meritocracy exists for intergroup behavior, specifically the endorsement of collective action?
172	1	16	The first aim of this study is to examine the possible relationship between belief in meritocracy and collective action, or any action taken as a group member to improve the group's position in society (Wright & Tropp, 2002).
172	1	21	One reason to expect a relationship between rejecting meritocracy and collective action is that both are tied to ethnic identification among members of low-status groups in the United States.
172	1	25	From a social dominance (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) or system justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994) perspective, meritocracy represents a legitimizing (or system-justifying) ideology.

172	1	33	Supporting this relationship, Levin et al. (1998) found that perceptions of the United States as a meritocratic society were negatively linked to ethnic identification among Blacks and Latinos.
172	1	42	A similar relationship between meritocracy and collective action via ethnic identity can be argued from a social identity perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
172	1	45	According to social identity theory, meritocracy represents an individual mobility belief.
172	1	55	These theoretical perspectives converge on a negative relationship between meritocracy and ethnic identification and a positive relationship between ethnic identity and collective action.
172	1	57	Consequently, we expect that rejecting the existence of meritocracy will have an indirect effect on collective action via ethnic identity.
172	2	2	Ethnic identity will be stronger for members of a low-status group who reject the existence of meritocracy.
172	2	5	Several studies offer preliminary support for our idea that identity may link meritocracy to collective action.
172	2	11	Second, Deaux et al. (2006) found that ethnic identification mediated the link between acceptance of social inequality, a variable that has been linked to meritocracy (e.g., Son Hing et al., 2011), and collective action orientation among native-born Blacks and Latinos (a category that combined second-generation immigrants with subsequent generations).
172	2	16	In this research, we attempt to extend this effect to one of the dominant ideologies in the United States, namely meritocracy.
172	2	24	Further, no research has considered the role of meritocracy in collective action, in general, or among immigrants, in particular.
172	2	29	Beliefs about meritocracy and its link to ethnic identity are presumed to be forged through experiences near the bottom of a group-based hierarchy (Sidanus & Pratto, 1999).

172	2	46	<p>These two generations of immigrants represent groups who both occupy relatively low positions in terms of the ethnic group membership in the U.S. social hierarchy (Fiske & Lee, 2011), but whose ethnic identities and beliefs about meritocracy were developed in different contexts</p> <p>Accordingly, second-generation immigrants may be less inclined to perceive that meritocracy exists than do the first generation.</p>
173	1	17	<p>Although both first- and second generation immigrants recognize barriers to their advancement, members of the first generation believe that they can overcome those barriers with hard work—that is, they endorse meritocracy.</p>
173	1	22	<p>The second-generation immigrants, in contrast, see such barriers as systemic, that is, they reject meritocracy (Waters, 1999).</p>
173	1	24	<p>We expect that second-generation Latinos will endorse meritocracy less than do those in the first generation (H1).</p>
173	1	27	<p>Although it may be influenced by intragroup factors, such as parental socialization and trips to the country of origin, it is also likely to be influenced by beliefs about meritocracy, as it is for native-born Blacks and Latinos (Levin et al., 1998).</p>
173	1	40	<p>As a result, generation is expected to moderate the relationship between meritocracy and ethnic identity, such that there will be a negative relationship between the two variables in the second generation, but no relationship in the first generation (H2).</p>
173	1	42	<p>Hypothesis 2 allows us to make one additional prediction regarding the relationship between meritocracy and collective action: We expect that ethnic identity will forge an indirect link between meritocracy and collective action, but only for second-generation immigrants (H3).</p>

173	2	4	Hypothesis 2 allows us to make one additional prediction regarding the relationship between meritocracy and collective action: We expect that ethnic identity will forge an indirect link between meritocracy and collective action, but only for second-generation immigrants (H3).
173	2	6	Specifically, we expect that lower beliefs in meritocracy will be related to stronger ethnic identification in the second generation, which, in turn, will predict greater support for collective action.
173	2	9	In the first generation, we expect no relationship between meritocracy and ethnic identity and thus, no indirect link to collective action.
173	2	11	Finally, there is some reason to believe that meritocracy itself may hold different implications for first- and second-generation immigrants.
173	2	13	Recent work has acknowledged that meritocracy—and more specifically, the Protestant work ethic—has at least two associations (Levy, West, & Ramirez, 2005; Levy, West, Ramirez, & Karafantis, 2006).
173	2	16	On one hand, believing that meritocracy exists implies that any individual can get ahead through hard work, regardless of extraneous factors such as one's group memberships.
173	2	19	Based on this definition one might expect that meritocracy would increase both attempts at individual mobility and collective action among members of low-status groups.
173	2	24	Both working hard to get a better job and working to place qualified members of one's group in high positions in government and business would seem more effective in a meritocratic system.
173	2	24	But, as we have argued, meritocracy can also have an additional implication: that members of low-status groups deserve their position.

173	2	30	Having been born and/or raised in the context of the U.S. racial hierarchy, second-generation immigrants are likely to be well acquainted with this additional implication of meritocracy.
173	2	39	In addition, the Protestant work ethic has been positively linked to egalitarianism (not acceptance of inequality) in at least one Latin American country, Colombia (Ramirez, Levy, Velilla, & Hughes, 2010), offering some reason to believe that the meaning of meritocracy may be seen only in its more positive form in other countries and cultures where first-generation immigrants formed their beliefs.
173	2	42	Accordingly, we tentatively expect meritocracy to be positively related to support for collective action in the first generation (H4).
173	2	44	We speculate that the first generation may not see meritocracy as an ideology that implies that low-status groups deserve their position in society given their experiences in the country of origin and their lack of experience in the U.S. social hierarchy.
174	2	1	Meritocracy was measured with an 8-item scale used in Major et al. (2007), who adapted it from Levin et al. (1998).
174	2	40	We conducted an analysis of covariance to see whether the generations differed in their endorsement of meritocracy, public regard, the importance of ethnic identity, and support for collective action goals.
174	2	43	As predicted in H1 and in initial support of H1a, second-generation immigrants endorsed meritocracy less and perceived lower public regard than did first-generation immigrants, even after including age, education, ethnic group, gender, and questionnaire language as covariates (see Table 1).
175	1	4	Dominicans were more likely to endorse meritocracy (M = 4.03, SD = 1.05) than Mexicans (M = 3.80, SD = 1.25), F(1, 177) = 9.83, p = .002.

175	1	8	Also in support of H1a, public regard partially mediated the relationship between generation and belief in meritocracy, as expected.
175	1	10	Following the guidelines of Preacher and Hayes (2008), we tested for an indirect effect of immigrant generation on meritocracy via public regard using bootstrapped confidence intervals (see Figure 1).
175	1	13	There was a significant indirect effect of generation on meritocracy via public regard.
175	1	14	After accounting for this effect, the direct effect of meritocracy on generation was reduced, signifying partial mediation.
175	1	21	As expected, simple correlations reveal divergent patterns for first- and second-generation immigrants in the relationship between ethnic identity, meritocracy and collective action support (see Table 2).
175	1	24	We conducted hierarchical multiple regression analyses following Aiken and West (1991) to examine whether immigrant generation moderated the relationship between meritocracy and ethnic identity (H2).
175	1	27	Even after accounting for covariates and main effects, there was a significant interaction between meritocracy and generation on ethnic identity (see Table 3).
175	2	1	Meritocracy was negatively related to ethnic identity for second-generation immigrants, $\beta = -.45$, $t(51) = -2.31$, $p = .05$ after accounting for covariates, but not for those in the first generation, $\beta = .16$, $t(118) = .98$, $p = .33$.
175	2	6	To further Test H3, concerning the role of ethnic identity in forging an indirect link between meritocracy and collective action support in the second generation, and H4, concerning the potential positive direct relationship between the variables in the first generation, we conducted a two-group comparison analysis of a mediation model using structural equation modeling (SEM) in Mplus 6 (Muthén & Muthén, 2010).

175	2	14	<p>This approach utilizes model fit statistics to test the moderating role of generational status on each path in the mediation model and compare the size of the indirect effect of meritocracy beliefs on collective action goals across first and second-generation immigrants.</p>
176	1	1	<p>We tested for mediation by estimating and comparing the indirect effects of meritocracy beliefs on collective action support across the groups.</p>
176	1	13	<p>Pathways between meritocracy, ethnic identity and collective action support operated differently in first and second-generation immigrant groups, supporting H3.</p>
176	1	17	<p>Figure 2 summarizes the results for the unconstrained model. Again, in line with H2, meritocracy predicted the level of ethnic identity in the second generation but not in the first generation.</p>
176	1	21	<p>Finally, in support of H4, the direct path from meritocracy beliefs to collective action support was positive and significant in the first generation but not significantly different from zero in the second generation.</p>
176	1	25	<p>As a follow-up test, we examined the moderating role of generation on the relationship between meritocracy beliefs and collective action support when ethnic identity was removed from the model.</p>
176	2	8	<p>In further support of H3, the confidence interval around the indirect effect of meritocracy on collective action support excluded zero among second-generation immigrants but included zero for first-generation immigrants.</p>
176	2	11	<p>Meritocracy was thus negatively associated with collective action goals through their negative association with ethnic identity for second-generation immigrants only.</p>
176	2	18	<p>The present study investigated the relationship between believing in meritocracy, ethnic identity, and support for collective action among two groups of immigrants—first- versus second-generation Latinos—who differ in what they experience as a result of their ethnic group's position in the U.S. social hierarchy.</p>

176	2	22	We first established that the generations perceived meritocracy to different degrees.
176	2	38	Second, as predicted, meritocracy had divergent links to ethnic identity and collective action across immigrant generations.
176	2	40	In the second generation, meritocracy beliefs and ethnic identity were negatively related.
176	2	42	Paralleling results among other native-born low-status groups, the rejection of meritocracy, an ideology that can justify inequality, was tied to stronger ethnic identification (Deaux et al., 2006; Levin et al., 1998).
177	1	2	Extending these results, we also found that increased ethnic identification served as an indirect link between meritocracy and collective action for the second generation, although the initial direct relationship between meritocracy and collective action support was only marginally significant.
177	1	3	Extending these results, we also found that increased ethnic identification served as an indirect link between meritocracy and collective action for the second generation, although the initial direct relationship between meritocracy and collective action support was only marginally significant.
177	1	8	Among the first generation, in contrast, meritocracy and ethnic identity were unrelated and thus, no indirect route to collective action support was observed.
177	1	11	This finding offers new evidence that the link between meritocracy and ethnic identity is influenced by experience and socialization in the U.S. social hierarchy.
177	1	13	Existing research has shown that believing in meritocracy can make members of low-status groups more likely to accept inequality (e.g., Major et al., 2002; Major et al., 2007; McCoy & Major, 2007).

177	1	17	Our study adds to this research, showing that rejecting meritocracy can make people more likely to support collective action; specifically, doubts about the existence meritocracy can make people more likely to identify with their ethnic group and to support efforts to change its position in society.
177	1	18	Our study adds to this research, showing that rejecting meritocracy can make people more likely to support collective action; specifically, doubts about the existence meritocracy can make people more likely to identify with their ethnic group and to support efforts to change its position in society.
177	1	21	Thus, the present findings extend our understanding of meritocracy from conditions of social stability to social change as well.
177	2	4	Thus, in our results, first-generation immigrants' initial optimism about their ability to succeed in the United States may serve to keep perceptions of meritocracy high, even in the face of disadvantage.
177	2	8	Doubts about the operation of meritocracy were linked to increased ethnic identity and collective action only for second-generation immigrants who had more experience as part of a group near the bottom of the U.S. social hierarchy and who, perhaps, had more reason to expect better, given their birthright status as U.S. citizens.
177	2	25	It is also possible that second-generation immigrants who do endorse meritocracy may have become aware that meritocracy does not only mean that people with disadvantaged backgrounds can persist and succeed or "pull themselves up by their bootstraps" against all obstacles through hard work, but that it can also imply that those who have not "pulled themselves up" deserve their position (Levy et al., 2005; 2006).

177	2	26	<p>It is also possible that second-generation immigrants who do endorse meritocracy may have become aware that meritocracy does not only mean that people with disadvantaged backgrounds can persist and succeed or “pull themselves up by their bootstraps” against all obstacles through hard work, but that it can also imply that those who have not “pulled themselves up” deserve their position (Levy et al., 2005; 2006).</p>
177	2	35	<p>For first-generation immigrants, the direct relationship between meritocracy and collective action was positive, though not particularly strong.</p>
177	2	37	<p>One possible explanation for this association is that meritocracy offers these new immigrants an index of opportunity</p>
177	2	39	<p>First-generation immigrants’ strong focus on achievement may attune them primarily to the core definition of meritocracy as a belief that anyone can get ahead in society through hard work, while being less attentive to the implication that members of low-status groups deserve their position.</p>
177	2	44	<p>Thus, first-generation immigrants do not eschew ethnic identification and collective action goals when they perceive that society is meritocratic.</p>
177	2	49	<p>Additional research is required to directly examine the meanings of meritocracy for firstand second-generation immigrants.</p>
178	1	20	<p>One alternative explanation would be that ethnic identity influences the endorsement of both meritocracy and collective action support.</p>
178	1	26	<p>Immigrant groups that occupy higher positions in the social hierarchy and benefit from it are unlikely to perceive low public regard or to reject meritocracy in either the first or second generation.</p>
179	1	38	<p>With regard to ethnic group differences, we found that Mexican and Dominican groups differed only in their support for meritocracy.</p>
179	1	40	<p>Mexican immigrants were slightly less likely to support meritocracy than Dominican immigrants.</p>

179	1	45	Some members of the Dominican community may have had more opportunity to accrue some degree of social capital, and thus, would provide a larger number of exemplars suggesting that meritocracy might work.
179	1	48	Although level of meritocracy beliefs differed, it is important theoretically to note that the groups did not differ significantly with respect to the mediating relationship of immigrant generation on meritocracy via public regard.
179	1	50	Although level of meritocracy beliefs differed, it is important theoretically to note that the groups did not differ significantly with respect to the mediating relationship of immigrant generation on meritocracy via public regard.
179	1	52	Our sample size did not permit ethnic group comparisons in analyses of meritocracy, ethnic identity, and collective action, although we note that the effects held when including ethnic group as a covariate.
179	1	58	This study aimed to demonstrate that immigrant generation influences Latinos' endorsement of meritocracy and its relationship to ethnic identity and collective action.
179	2	6	A promising direction for future research would be to understand the specific processes by which socialization in the United States influences immigrants' perceptions of meritocracy and public regard.
179	2	37	Yet, as our results suggest, the welcoming attitude needs to extend to those born in the United States, whose experience seems to be most likely to counter the meritocratic American dream.

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Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
24	2	10		In light of research illustrating the self-promoting nature of pride (e.g., Fiske, 2011; Tracy & Robins, 2004a, 2007a), we propose that pride displays will reliably evoke inferences that the expresser endorses meritocracy over egalitarianism, mediated by perceptions of the target's heightened self-interest.
25	2	56		Broadly speaking, most distribution systems can be characterized as meritocratic or egalitarian.
25	2	57		Within meritocratic systems, people receive resources according to criteria of merit like performance, contribution, or ability.
26	1	12		Studies of distributive justice have traditionally focused on personal ideological systems and documented different conditions that give rise to personal support for meritocracy versus egalitarianism.
26	1	13		To name a few, meritocratic systems are favored when people assume that anyone can succeed through hard work and when people believe that productivity is enhanced by rewarding high achievement.
26	1	25		Nevertheless, meritocracy and egalitarianism can be deployed strategically to advance individual or group interests.

26	1	29	Critical to our purposes, prior studies have found that high-performing members of a group are more likely to advocate a meritocratic division of resources, precisely because it guarantees them a greater share of resources.
26	1	33	Similarly, people with higher status are happier when they believe that their current system is meritocratic.
26	1	35	Because pride displays are viewed as signals of success, status, and competence, it stands to reason that meritocracy will be perceived as satisfying the self-interests of people who express pride.
26	1	38	Our central hypothesis states that people who nonverbally express pride will be perceived as likely to advocate meritocracy over egalitarianism and that these perceptions will be mediated by attributions of higher self-interest to those who display pride.
26	1	46	Across four studies, we tested the predictions that nonverbal expressions of pride imply heightened self-interest, and as a result, heightened support for meritocracy as opposed to egalitarianism.
26	1	54	Comparing pride to neutral expressions enables us to determine how much pride (versus joy) influences observer inferences of self-interest and meritocracy.

26	2	23	We hypothesized that that observers would attribute stronger support for meritocracy (as opposed to egalitarianism) to targets when the targets expressed pride, relative to expressions of joy.
26	2	39	Participants estimated the target's level of support for meritocracy and egalitarianism, then rated the target's emotions.
27	1	3	We created two scales to assess perceptions of targets' general beliefs about the value of meritocracy and egalitarianism in society.
27	1	5	The meritocracy scale items were (1) "It is okay for some people to have better lives if they earned it," (2) "Scholarships should be based more on merit than on need," (3) "It is to everyone's benefit—not just some people's benefit—that highly capable people have more power and influence than less capable people," and (4) "Society should be structured so that people who are successful, competent or accomplished gain social status and power."
27	1	21	Data from an independent pilot sample of adults recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 26) confirmed that meritocracy items were viewed as representing an ideology of meritocracy whereas the egalitarian items were viewed as representing an ideology of egalitarianism.

27	1	26	Specifically, these participants rated the extent to which each statement reflected the view “that society should distribute resources and power according to merit, so people’s outcomes are determined by what they have earned” (meritocracy score) and the view “that society should distribute resources and power to create equality, so all people have equal outcomes” (egalitarianism score) on scales ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely).	
27	1	31		All four meritocracy items received significantly higher meritocracy scores (M 5.87) than egalitarianism scores (M 2.57).
27	1	34		All four egalitarian values statements received higher egalitarianism scores (M 5.45) than meritocracy scores (M 3.22), and the differences of three out of four of these items reached statistical significance.
27	1	38		In the main study, participants rated the extent to which targets would likely agree or disagree with each of the four meritocracy statements (alpha .70) and each of the four egalitarianism statements (alpha .70) on a 7-point scale (1 Strongly disagree, 7 Strongly agree).
27	2	5		To test our central hypothesis that participants would perceive proud (versus joyful) targets as more likely to endorse meritocratic (versus egalitarian) ideology, we conducted a 2 (Expression: Pride, Joy) 2 (Ideology: Meritocratic, Egalitarian) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA).

27	2	10	A main effect of ideology emerged: All targets were judged as more likely to support meritocracy (M 3.47) than egalitarianism (M 3.32), $F(1, 234) = 4.29$, $p = .04$.
27	2	16	To interpret the interaction, we conducted one-way ANOVAs to test the effect of expression condition on perceived support for meritocracy, and separately, perceived support for egalitarianism.
27	2	18	As predicted, targets were perceived as more likely to support meritocracy when they expressed pride compared to joy, $F(1, 236) = 21.305$, $p = .001$.
27	2	24	Study 1 yields evidence that nonverbal pride displays lead to stronger inferences of meritocratic ideology, as opposed to egalitarian ideology.
27	2	29	Study 2 examined whether targets described as high in self-interest would be judged as more likely to support meritocracy over egalitarianism.
27	2	38	Study 2 experimentally tested whether people intuitively link self-interest to enhanced support for meritocracy and decreased support for egalitarianism.
27	2	41	Specifically, we hypothesized that targets described through words as high in self-interest would be judged as particularly likely to endorse meritocratic but not egalitarian values, whereas targets described as low in self-interest would be judged as particularly likely to endorse egalitarian but not meritocratic

				values.
28	1	7		Specifically, participants estimated the target's level of support for meritocracy and egalitarianism, embedded among filler traits (e.g., dependable).
28	1	22		Participants rated the extent to which the target likely "has meritocratic beliefs—believes that resources and power should be distributed according to merit and performance, so that people get what they have earned" (1 Not at all, 7 A whole lot).
28	1	30		Meritocracy and egalitarianism ratings of each target were negatively correlated, although the correlation reached statistical significance for the high self-interest target ($r = .39$, $p = .001$) and low self-interest target ($r = .17$, $p = .03$) but not the control target ($r = .13$, $p = .12$).
28	1	40		The order in which participants rated the high and low self-interest targets did not influence ratings of perceived support for meritocracy and egalitarianism with one exception: Low self-interest targets were seen as more likely to support egalitarianism if participants had rated the high self-interest target beforehand (Ms = 5.40 and 4.92, respectively), $F(1, 153) = 4.09$, $p = .05$.

28	2	11	<p>To test our hypothesis that participants would perceive high self-interest targets (versus low self-interest or control targets) as more likely to endorse a meritocratic versus egalitarian ideology, we conducted a 3 (Self-Interest: Control, High, Low) \times 2 (Ideology: Meritocratic, Egalitarian) repeated-measures ANOVA.</p> <p>A main effect of ideology emerged: Across targets, perceived support for meritocracy scores ($M = 4.53$) were significantly higher than perceived support for egalitarianism scores ($M = 3.72$), $F(1, 150) = 71.49$, $p < .001$.</p> <p>We next tested and found a significant linear contrast effect for meritocratic ideology scores, $F(1, 152) = 67.77$, $p < .001$, such that perceived support for meritocracy was highest for high self-interest targets and lowest for low self-interest targets, while control targets fell in the middle.</p> <p>Study 2 illustrated that people associate high self-interest with increased support for meritocracy as opposed to egalitarianism.</p> <p>We therefore return in Study 3 to the question of nonverbal emotion expressions and examine whether perceived self-interest mediates the effects of pride displays on inferences of support for meritocracy and egalitarianism.</p>
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29	1	7	Study 3 tested whether targets who display pride would be viewed as more self-interested and, as a result, more likely to support meritocracy as opposed to egalitarianism.
29	1	9	If mediation is detected, it suggests that pride leads to inferences of support for meritocracy (but not egalitarianism) because meritocracy is perceived as a self-benefitting ideology.
29	1	23	It is possible that proud targets are assumed to be self-interested and meritocratic because they are perceived as high status.
29	1	41	Participants estimated the target's level of support for meritocracy and egalitarianism, estimated the target's level of self-interest and status, and then rated the target's emotions.
30	1	9	Second, we examined the influence of expression condition on perceptions of target support for meritocracy and egalitarianism. First, we conducted a 3 (Expression: Pride, Neutral, Joy) ² (Ideology: Meritocracy, Egalitarian) mixed ANOVA.
30	1	17	We followed this analysis by testing condition differences in perceived support for meritocracy followed by perceived support for egalitarianism.
30	1	19	First, we determined that perceived support for meritocracy did not significantly differ between the joy and neutral

				conditions, F 1.
30	1	22		Therefore, we used the orthogonal contrast codes described above to test whether participants who rated the pride target inferred greater support for meritocracy, relative to participants who rated the joy and neutral targets.
30	1	32		Altogether, findings illustrate that pride displays increase support for meritocracy and decrease support for egalitarianism, relative to neutral and joy displays.
30	1	36		Next, we performed mediation analyses testing whether proud targets are perceived as supportive of a meritocratic but not egalitarian ideology because they are judged to be self-interested.
30	1	40		As shown in the top panel, the positive association between expressions of pride (in contrast to joy and neutral displays) and support for meritocracy dropped to nonsignificant when perceived self-interest was included in the model.
30	2	4		This technique yielded a 95% bias-corrected confidence interval that did not include zero (.02 to .08), suggesting that perceived self-interest mediated the effect of target expression on inferences of perceived support for meritocracy.

30	2	37	<p>Bootstrapping analyses showed that the indirect effect of pride displays on perceptions of heightened support for meritocracy remained significant when status judgments were controlled (CI: .01 to .06).</p> <p>To conclude, Study 3 replicated Study 1's finding that pride expressions lead to inferences of increased support for meritocracy as opposed to egalitarianism.</p> <p>The pride contrast remained significantly associated with self-interest after controlling for perceived meritocratic values, $F(1, 297) = 13.58, p = .001$, and after controlling for perceived egalitarian values, $F(1, 297) = 11.79, p = .01$.</p> <p>However, a bootstrapping analysis testing the indirect effect of nonverbal display on self-interest judgments via perceived meritocratic beliefs was significant (CI: .01 to .09).</p> <p>Instead of manipulating expressions, we measured observers' perceptions of target pride and joy and used these to predict observer inferences of support for meritocracy and egalitarianism.</p> <p>We used two different measures of inferred support for meritocracy and egalitarianism: estimates of how targets would allocate a specific resource between self and other as well as estimates of targets' justice-related beliefs using the same 4-item scales as Studies 1 and 3.</p>
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31	1	30		We hypothesized that observers would attribute greater support for meritocracy over egalitarianism to targets perceived as more strongly expressing pride through nonverbal channels.
31	2	28		. Observers rated every target on scales assessing perceived support for meritocracy and egalitarianism, perceived self-interest, and perceived pride and joy.
32	1	9		We used two different types of measures of support for meritocracy and egalitarianism.
32	1	11		The first type of measure assessed general meritocratic and egalitarian beliefs. F
32	1	12		For this we used the same two 4-item scales as Studies 1 and 3 (meritocracy alpha .90, egalitarianism alpha .89).
32	1	14		Means and standard deviations of the perceived meritocratic and egalitarian belief scales were 4.58 (.28) and 4.42 (.36), respectively. Scale scores were negatively correlated, $r = .70$, $p = .001$.
32	1	23	Observers then rated the likelihood with which the target participant would advocate dividing the money according to merit, that is, performance in the interview (i.e., a merit-focused allocation).	
32	1	28	Both ratings were made on a 7-point scale (1 Highly Unlikely, 7 Highly Likely; merit-focused allocation alpha .60, equality-focused allocation alpha .54).	
32	1	30	Means and standard deviations of the merit-focused and equality-focused allocation items were 4.34 (.44) and 4.98 (.34), respectively.	

32	2	7		Two target gender effects emerged: Women were viewed as significantly less proud, less selfinterested, and less meritocratic than men (all ps .05) but more joyful and egalitarian (ps .05).
33	1	3		We next assessed whether participants who are rated as displaying more pride (but not joy) are perceived as more likely to endorse meritocratic but not egalitarian beliefs.
33	1	4		Four separate APIM analyses tested this hypothesis with respect to scores on the general meritocracy and egalitarianism beliefs items, followed by the merit-focused and equality-focused allocation scores.
33	1	9		Perceptions of nonverbal pride displays were positively associated with scores on the items assessing general meritocracy beliefs and with the merit-focused allocation scores.
33	1	16		For perceived nonverbal displays of joy, perceived joy was associated positively associated with general egalitarian beliefs and with the equality-focused allocation scores and negatively associated with meritocracy beliefs and merit-focused allocation scores.
33	1	18		Partner expressions of pride were unrelated to scores on the general egalitarian beliefs items, the merit-focused and equality-focused allocation scores.
33	1	20		Unexpectedly, ratings of partner joy were positively associated with scores on the general meritocracy beliefs items.
33	1	23		One could speculate that joyful partners influenced targets' nonverbal cues in a fashion that led to higher ratings of general meritocracy beliefs.

33	1	27	Finally, we test whether inferences of self-interest mediated the association of emotion expression and observer inferences of support for meritocracy and egalitarianism.
33	1	28	We began by assessing mediation of the general meritocracy beliefs.
33	1	30	Having already shown that perceived pride predicts both perceived self-interest and meritocracy beliefs, we tested a model in which perceived self-interest (the mediator) as well as actor and partner pride and joy were used as predictors of the meritocracy beliefs score.
33	1	34	Results showed that perceived self-interest was a significant predictor of the meritocracy beliefs score (b = .22, p = .001).
33	1	36	Moreover, the association between perceived pride and perceived meritocratic beliefs had dropped, although it remained significant (b = .14, p = .01).
33	1	38	To test the statistical significance of the indirect effect of perceived pride on meritocracy beliefs via perceived self-interest, we implemented the Monte Carlo Method for Assessing Mediation using the interactive web utility created by Selig and Preacher (2008).

33	1	48		<p>The analysis yielded a 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect that did not include zero (.05 to .17), which supports the assertion that perceived self-interest partially explains the tendency to view pride-expressing targets as likely to advocate meritocracy.</p>
33	1	55		<p>Similarly, we found that the association between perceived pride and merit-focused allocation scores dropped when perceived self-interest was included as a predictor, although it remained significant ($b = .43$, $p = .001$), and the confidence interval for the indirect effect did not include zero (.04 to .22).</p>
33	2	12		<p>Targets who were perceived as displaying stronger nonverbal signs of pride as they expounded on their personal strengths were viewed by observers as more likely to be self-interested and, as a result, more likely to support meritocracy rather than egalitarianism.</p>
33	2	15		<p>By contrast, targets perceived as displaying stronger nonverbal signs of joy were judged as less self-interested and therefore more likely to support egalitarianism rather than meritocracy.</p>
33	2	27		<p>We address this topic in the present research by demonstrating that observers use pride as a nonverbal cue of enhanced support for meritocracy over egalitarianism, mediated by perceptions of self-interest.</p>
33	2	30		<p>More specifically, observers in Study 1 judged an unfamiliar target who expressed pride as more likely to favor meritocracy as opposed to egalitarianism.</p>

33	2	31	Study 2 demonstrated that observers intuitively infer support for meritocracy over egalitarianism from the attribute of self-interest.
33	2	34	Study 3 showed that judgments of self-interest account for the link between pride displays and inferences of support for meritocracy over egalitarianism.
33	2	38	Finally, in Study 4, targets who were perceived as expressing greater pride while recounting their personal strengths were judged as more self-interested and consequently more likely to support meritocracy as opposed to egalitarianism.
33	rod	3	The indirect effect was significant when the mediator was general meritocracy beliefs (CI: .06 to .23), general egalitarian beliefs (CI: .31 to .12), merit-focused allocation scores (CI: .04 to .13) or equality-focused allocation scores (CI: .27 to .10).
34	1	24	On the other hand, perceptions of joy in Study 4 were associated with perceptions of greater egalitarian and reduced meritocratic beliefs.
34	2	1	We anticipate that receiving information that implies authentic pride—for instance, a woman is pleased that she worked hard to earn a high SAT score—would weaken expectations of self-interest and, potentially, support for meritocracy.

34	2	5		. Similarly, observers may be less likely to infer self-interest or meritocratic beliefs if a target's pride is deemed justified and appropriate, such as after a sports victory.
34	2	9		However, perceiving pride displays as unwarranted (e.g., showing pride for no reason) would probably enhance trait attributions of self-interest and support for meritocracy.
34	2	12		In other future research, researchers would do well to determine the validity of pride cues in signaling self-interest and meritocratic beliefs.
34	2	15		That is, do people who express pride more frequently or intensely also behave in a more self-interested manner and hold meritocratic beliefs?
34	2	17		Successful individuals—that is, those who are more likely to express pride—actually do prefer meritocratic resource divisions.

McCoy, S., Wellman, J., Cosley, B., Saslow, L., & Epel, E. (2013).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
307	1	27		The goals of the current work are as follows: (i) to provide evidence that endorsement of a specific system justifying ideology in the USA, the belief in meritocracy, benefits the self-esteem of both high and low status groups and (ii) to demonstrate the mechanism through which the belief in meritocracy exerts its palliative effect for both high and low status groups: through the association with perceptions of personal control.
307	2	6		The core of the “dominant ideology” (Kleugel & Smith, 1986) in the USA revolves around the belief in meritocracy, that status differences are merit based.
307	2	11	n the USA, the belief in a just world (i.e., that people get what they deserve; Lerner, 1980; BJW), the belief in a secularized Protestant work ethic (e.g., hard work gets you ahead; PWE), and status permeability (e.g., advancement is possible) suggest that status differences are based on merit.	
307	2	12		Our focus is on the belief in meritocracy as a hierarchy-enhancing descriptive belief rather than a prescriptive justice principle (e.g., Ledgerwood, Mandisodza, Jost, & Pohl, 2011; McCoy & Major, 2007; Son Hing et al., 2011).
307	2	19		While other beliefs may be hierarchy-enhancing (e.g., stereotypes, Jost et al., 2004; status-legitimacy; O’Brien & Major, 2005; opposition to equality; Jost & Thompson, 2000), the belief in meritocracy suggests that even the lowest among us have the opportunity to rise.
307	2	20		Meritocracy beliefs serve a legitimizing function in US society by fostering the perception that outcomes are commensurate with the effort and ability of the individual and are thus “deserved” (Jost & Hunyady, 2002).

307	2	25		By influencing assumptions about the relative deservingness of high and low status groups, meritocracy beliefs preserve the status hierarchy and the interests of high status groups.
308	1	2		The more members of high status groups endorse meritocracy beliefs the more legitimate their advantage, the more meritorious their group, and the more personally responsible they are for their success.
308	1	9		Not too surprisingly given these many benefits, previous research has demonstrated positive associations between meritocracy beliefs and well-being for high status groups (e.g., Jost & Thompson, 2000; O'Brien & Major, 2005; Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007).
308	1	12		The more novel proposition, however, is that meritocracy beliefs are protective of self-esteem even for those who are disadvantaged by the status hierarchy.
308	1	17		The more individuals endorse meritocracy beliefs, the more they blame low status groups for their misfortune and lack of achievement (e.g., Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001).
308	1	24		When meritocracy beliefs are salient, women are more likely to endorse stereotypes that hold women responsible for their low status relative to men (McCoy & Major, 2007).
308	1	27		Thus, endorsing meritocracy beliefs encourages the internalization of inequality.
308	1	43		Among nonoverweight women, endorsement of the Protestant work ethic (a meritocracy belief) was positively associated with self-esteem (Quinn & Crocker, 1999).
308	1	45		Meritocracy beliefs were also found to be positively associated with well-being among women following a personal failure (Foster & Tsarfati, 2005).

308	1	50		We propose that the belief in meritocracy may pose a benefit to the self-esteem of members of low status groups because it is consistent with the perception that advancement is possible.
308	1	56		Although there are many costs associated with endorsing the belief in meritocracy for members of low status groups, there is one benefit that might be available to individuals both high and low in status: perceived control.
308	2	1		Meritocracy beliefs encourage the perception that outcomes in life are fair and deserved.
308	2	19		For example, the more individuals low in economic success locate the responsibility for economic outcomes internally, the more satisfied they report being (e.g., Kleugel & Smith, 1986; For these reasons, meritocracy beliefs may provide an indirect benefit to self-esteem by encouraging the perception that future outcomes remain under personal control.
308	2	23		Thus, despite many costs for members of disadvantaged groups, there may be a benefit for self-esteem from endorsing the belief in meritocracy.
308	2	26		This hypothesis is consistent with a number of theoretical perspectives that propose that cultural worldviews, such as meritocracy beliefs, function in part to reduce threat associated with uncertainty by increasing perceptions of control (e.g., Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Jost et al., 2004; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002).
308	2	29		Meritocracy beliefs may manage uncertainty by providing clear guidelines for the allocation of the rewards and burdens of life.
308	2	45		From these perspectives, meritocracy beliefs may assuage the threat of uncertainty by fostering perceptions of fairness, predictability, and internal control for both high and low status groups.

308	2	48	While there are many benefits of endorsing meritocracy beliefs for members of high status groups (e.g., hubristic pride in being high status), we propose that meritocracy beliefs benefit the personal self-esteem of both high and low status groups through the positive association with perceived control.
309	1	57	We hypothesize that for both high and low status groups, one benefit of the belief in meritocracy may be the extent to which it preserves the perception that future outcomes are under personal control.
309	1	7	In both studies, we tested the hypothesis that the belief in meritocracy is protective of self-esteem for members of low status groups primarily due to the association with perceived control.
309	1	13	We hypothesized that meritocracy beliefs would be positively associated with self-esteem for both men and women (significant total effect).
309	1	17	We further proposed that perceived control is an important mechanism for the palliative function of meritocracy beliefs.
309	1	19	Thus, we predicted that perceived control would significantly mediate the positive association between meritocracy and self-esteem for both men and women (significant indirect effects).
309	1	23	On the basis of prior research suggesting that members of high status groups benefit in multiple ways from endorsing meritocracy beliefs (e.g., Jost & Hunyady, 2002), one might expect that meritocracy remains beneficial to men's self-esteem (significant direct effect) even after accounting for the variance due to the association with perceived control.
309	1	27	In contrast, meritocracy beliefs may provide little direct benefit to members of low status groups once the association with perceived control is accounted for.

309	1	31	Consistent with that perspective, one might predict no direct effect of meritocracy for women's self-esteem (i.e., constraining direct path to 0 will not impair model fit) or even a negative direct effect (i.e., meritocracy acts as a suppressor).
309	1	43	Participants completed measures of meritocracy beliefs, self-esteem, perceived control, group identification, ² and public regard for their gender group in a large classroom setting during the psychology department's prescreening sessions.
309	1	53	We assessed meritocracy beliefs with three measures used in previous research (e.g., O'Brien & Major, 2005): the belief in a just world for others (BJW, $\alpha = .85$; eight items, e.g., "I feel that people earn the punishments and rewards they get"; Rubin & Peplau, 1975), the Protestant work ethic (PWE, $\alpha = .60$; four items, e.g., "If people work hard they almost always get what they want."; Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, & Federico, 1998), and the belief in status permeability (PERM, $\alpha = .85$; four items, e.g., "America is an open society where all individuals can achieve higher status."; Levin et al., 1998).
309	2	46	As a first step, and to replicate the analysis strategy used by O'Brien and Major (2005), we used hierarchical regression (Step 1: Meritocracy Beliefs (average of all three scales, $\alpha = .84$, centered at the mean) and Status (0 = Men), Step 2: Meritocracy X Status interaction) to predict self-esteem.
309	2	49	Meritocracy beliefs were positively related to self-esteem ($b = .24$, $p < .01$) and this relationship did not vary by gender (Interaction: $b = .03$; $\Delta R^2 = .00$, $p > .70$; $b_{\text{women}} = .20$, $p < .01$; $b_{\text{men}} = .29$, $p < .01$).
309	2	53	The same effects are observed when examining each meritocracy belief separately (all $\Delta R^2 = .00$, $p > .40$).
310	rod	1	We replicate the finding that meritocracy is positively associated with global self-esteem for both high and low status groups in Study 2.

310	rod	3	<p>We conducted the same moderated regression analysis (Step 1: Meritocracy Beliefs composite centered at the mean, Status (0 = low status; Step 2: Interaction) predicting global self-esteem.</p>
310	rod	5	<p>The main effect of meritocracy was always positive and significant, and the interaction was not significant whether low status was operationalized as low objective SES, non-White women, or low subjective SES (interactions: $bs \leq .07$, $\Delta R^2 \leq .002$, $F_s \leq 1.21$, $ps \geq .27$).</p>
310	rod	9	<p>We do not find that the belief in meritocracy is more beneficial for the global self-esteem of high or low status groups.</p>
310	rod	12	<p>We find the same effects when the data are analyzed with observed variables (i.e., the means for: the meritocracy composite, perceived control, and self-esteem) using methods described by Preacher and Hayes (2008).</p>
310	2	30	<p>It was also not the case that the relationships between meritocracy, self-esteem, and perceived control differed by gender as the structural paths were also invariant ($w2(3) = 2.85$, $p = .42$) supporting our hypothesis that meritocracy poses benefits for both high and low status groups.</p>
310	2	41	<p>The model fit the data well and accounted for 39% of the variance in self-esteem ($w2(17) = 18.22$, $p = .38$; CFI= 0.99, RMSEA=0.02 (CI: 0.00, 0.06); SRMR=0.03; AIC= 56.23; Model comparison: $\Delta AIC_{saturated} = 15.76$; $\Delta AIC_{independence} = 890.76$). The total effect of meritocracy on self-esteem was positive ($b = .26$, $p < .01$).</p>
310	2	42	<p>Perceived control mediated the positive relationship between meritocracy beliefs and self-esteem (indirect effect point estimate = 0.21; BC 95% CI: 0.12, 0.37; see middle panel Figure 1).</p>
310	2	45	<p>With perceived control in the model, meritocracy beliefs were unassociated with self-esteem ($b = .05$, $p = .49$).</p>

310	2	52		For women, the more parsimonious model without a direct path from meritocracy to self-esteem is preferred.
310	2	60		The total effect of meritocracy on self-esteem was positive ($b = .37, p < .01$; see bottom panel, Figure 1).
311	1	3		Although the indirect effect was significant indicating mediation by perceived control (point estimate = 0.18; BC 95% CI: 0.09, 0.30), meritocracy remained a significant positive predictor of men's self-esteem as evidenced by the direct effect ($b = .19, p < .05$).
311	1	9		Thus, although the multigroup analysis demonstrates that the direct path between meritocracy beliefs and self-esteem does not differ significantly by gender ($b_{men} = .19$ vs $b_{women} = .05$), our model fit analyses suggest the best fitting model for women omits the direct path, whereas the model for men retains it.
311	1	16		As predicted, we found that meritocracy beliefs were positively associated with self-esteem for members of a high and a low status group.
311	1	20		For women, no significant direct benefit of endorsing meritocracy remained after controlling for the indirect effect of perceived control.
311	2	2		In fact, constraining this direct path to 0 (no association at all between meritocracy and self-esteem) did not harm model fit.
311	2	4		While there is always the possibility of suppressor relationships and measurement error, this lack of a direct benefit of endorsing meritocracy is consistent with the perspective that there are likely limited benefits to self-esteem from endorsing system justifying beliefs for members of low status groups (e.g., Jost & Hunyady, 2002).

311	2	12	Consistent with this perspective, our higher status group, men, retained a direct positive benefit for self-esteem from meritocracy.
311	2	15	Constraining this direct relationship to 0 significantly impaired model fit suggesting that variance in the positive relationship between meritocracy beliefs and self-esteem remains to be explained by variables not assessed in our model.
311	2	21	In the current research, we focused on demonstrating a significant indirect effect of meritocracy on self-esteem because of the association with perceived control.
312	1	2	Future research could seek to identify additional mediators of the positive association between meritocracy beliefs and the self-esteem of higher status groups, and possible suppressors for the relationship between meritocracy and self-esteem for lower status groups.
312	1	6	These results provide initial evidence for our argument that meritocracy beliefs are beneficial to self-esteem for members of high and low status groups.
312	1	27	Accordingly, meritocracy beliefs, because of the association with perceived control, may be beneficial for both self-esteem and physical health.
312	1	30	We hypothesized that meritocracy beliefs would be positively associated with self-esteem, health, and control for women.
312	1	33	We predicted that perceived control would mediate the relationship between meritocracy beliefs and self-esteem, and the relationship between meritocracy beliefs and health.
312	1	56	We used the same three measures described in Study 1 (BJW, $a = 0.88$; PERM, $a = 0.79$; PWE, $a = 0.71$) as separate indicators of our latent meritocracy beliefs variable.
313	1	51	To examine whether the effect of meritocracy beliefs on self-esteem and physical health differed for women lower and higher in SES, we split the file at 0 on our standardized measure of SES.

314	1	27	<p>The total effects of meritocracy on self-esteem ($b = .21, p < .001$) and health ($b = .13, p < .05$) were positive and significant, as were the indirect effects of perceived control on self-esteem (point estimate = 0.16; BC 95% CI: 0.01, 0.23) and health (point estimate = 0.10; BC 95% CI: 0.06, 0.16; see Figure 2).</p>
314	2	5	<p>The absence of significant direct effects of meritocracy beliefs on self-esteem ($b = .05, p > .22$) and health ($b = .02, p > .64$) are consistent with our findings for women in Study 1.</p>
314	2	9	<p>An alternative model (health and self-esteem as mediators between meritocracy beliefs and control) did not fit the data as well as our theoretical model ($w2(39) = 113.99, p < .001$; RMSEA = 0.06 (CI: 0.05, 0.07); CFI = 0.96; AIC = 189.99).</p>
314	2	13	<p>A second alternative model (control predicting health and self-esteem with meritocracy as a mediator) fit as well as our proposed model.</p>
314	2	16	<p>Consistent with the non significant paths from meritocracy beliefs to the outcome variables in our proposed model, the indirect effect of control on the outcome variables via meritocracy beliefs was not significant for self-esteem (point estimate = .01; BC 95% CI: 0.01, 0.04) or health (point estimate = 0.006; BC 95% CI: 0.02, 0.3), indicating that meritocracy beliefs are not a mediator of the effect of control on either outcome variable.</p>
314	2	29	<p>Surprisingly, the structural paths were found to differ across groups ($w2 \text{ diff}(23) = 37.28, p < .05$); in particular, the direct path between meritocracy beliefs and self-esteem differed significantly by SES group ($Z = 2.68, p < .01$).</p>
315	1	4	<p>The total effects of meritocracy were positive, but only significant for self-esteem ($b = .13, p < .05$; Health: $b = .09, p = .21$).</p>

315	1	6	Perceived control mediated the positive relationship between meritocracy beliefs and self-esteem (indirect effect point estimate = 0.20; BC 95% CI: 0.09, 0.31) and between meritocracy beliefs and health (indirect effect point estimate = 0.12; BC 95% CI: 0.05, 0.21; see Figure 3).
315	2	2	With perceived control in the model, meritocracy beliefs were unassociated with self-esteem ($b = .05$, $p = .35$) and health ($b = .03$, $p = .67$).
315	2	4	For lower SES women, the belief in meritocracy may only be beneficial to self-esteem and health through the association with perceived control.
315	2	7	In fact, consistent with Study 1, eliminating the direct paths from meritocracy beliefs to self-esteem and health does not adversely affect model fit ($w2\ diff(2) = 3.83$, $p = .15$, $\Delta AIC = 0.15$; $w2(40) = 54.15$, $p = .07$; CFI = 0.99; RMSEA = 0.04 (CI: 0.00, 0.05); SRMR = 0.03; AIC = 128.15).
316	1	12	The model accounted for 41% of the variance in self-esteem and 18% in health. The total effects of meritocracy beliefs on self-esteem ($b = .30$, $p < .001$) and health ($b = .18$, $p < .05$) were positive.
316	1	15	Consistent with the model for lower SES women, perceived control mediated the effect of meritocracy beliefs on health (indirect effect point estimate = 0.09; BC 95% CI: 0.03, 0.16; see Figure 4), and there was no direct benefit of meritocracy beliefs for health ($b = .10$, $p = .20$).
316	1	20	While the indirect effect of meritocracy beliefs on self-esteem was significant (indirect effect point estimate = 0.13; BC 95% CI: 0.05, 0.22) the significance of the direct effect of meritocracy beliefs on self-esteem ($b = .17$, $p < .01$) could suggest additional benefits of endorsing meritocracy beliefs for higher SES women.

316	1	26	In fact, removing the direct path from meritocracy beliefs to self-esteem significantly reduces model fit ($w2\ diff(1) = 8.23$, $p < .01$; $\Delta AIC = 6.32$), whereas removing the direct path to health does not ($w2\ diff(1) = 1.54$, $p = .21$; $\Delta AIC = 0.38$).
316	1	30	As a result, for higher SES women the model omitting the direct path from meritocracy beliefs to health and retaining the direct path from meritocracy to self-esteem is preferred ($w2(40) = 54.15$, $p = .07$; CFI = 0.99; RMSEA = 0.04 (CI: 0.00, 0.05); SRMR = 0.03; AIC = 128.15).
316	1	37	In Study 2, we tested our hypothesis that meritocracy beliefs are beneficial for self-esteem and health in a diverse community sample of women.
316	1	40	Replicating our findings from Study 1, we found that the belief in meritocracy was positively associated with self-esteem and physical health for women (total effects, collapsed across SES).
316	1	43	Further, we found some evidence that the benefits of endorsing meritocracy may be limited to the association with perceived control, particularly for women lower in SES.
316	1	46	Once the indirect effect of perceived control was accounted for, no direct benefit of endorsing meritocracy was observed for health or self-esteem for women lower in SES (although we cannot rule out suppressor relationships and measurement error).
316	1	52	Yet, through the association with perceived control, we observed a positive relationship between the belief in meritocracy and both self-esteem and physical health.
316	1	55	While there are many costs to endorsing beliefs that legitimize relative disadvantage for members of low status groups, the belief in meritocracy may provide a benefit to self-esteem through this association with perceived control.

316	1	57	This benefit may make meritocracy a particularly “plausible and attractive” legitimizing ideology for members of low status groups (Eagleton, 1991, p. 15).
316	2	3	Ironically, for lower status groups, this “benefit” may facilitate both the endorsement of the belief in meritocracy, and defense of a social system in which they are relatively disadvantaged (e.g., Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003).
316	2	28	Surprisingly, women higher in SES, consistent with men in Study 1, maintained a direct benefit for self-esteem from endorsing the belief in meritocracy, as well as, an indirect benefit via perceived control.
316	2	30	For higher SES women, constraining the path from meritocracy to self-esteem significantly decreased model fit suggesting that variance remains in the positive association between meritocracy beliefs and self-esteem that is not explained by the association with perceived control.
316	2	37	It remains an interesting question for future research to consider the role of SES as a possible moderator of the effects of meritocracy beliefs on self-esteem among other low social status groups that are often studied (e.g., minority groups, women).

316	2	53	<p>Accordingly, we pursued an alternative analysis testing our model separately for White and Non-White respondents.⁸ Consistent with our hypotheses are the following: (i) the measurement models were invariant across race; (ii) the models fit the data well for both groups (White women: $N = 348$; $w2(38) = 42.72$, $p = .28$; CFI = 0.99, RMSEA = 0.02 (CI: 0.00, 0.04); SRMR = 0.03; AIC = 120.71); non-White women: $N = 245$; $w2(38) = 41.13$, $p = .34$; CFI = 0.99, RMSEA = 0.02 (CI: 0.00, 0.05); SRMR = 0.03; AIC = 119.13); and (iii) meritocracy exerted a significant and positive total effect on self-esteem (White women: $b = .21$, $p < .001$; non-White women: $b = .18$, $p < .05$) and a marginal positive total effect on health (White women: $b = .12$, $p = .07$; non-White women: $b = .16$, $p = .06$).</p>
317	1	9	<p>We also observed significant indirect effects on self-esteem (White women: point estimate = 0.14, BC 95% CI: 0.05, 0.22; non-White women: point estimate = 0.22, BC 95% CI: .12, .33) and health (White women: point estimate = 0.08, BC 95% CI: 0.03, 0.15; non-White women: point estimate = 0.17, BC 95% CI: 0.09–0.28) via perceived control and no direct relationship between meritocracy beliefs and self-esteem or health for non-White women (self-esteem: $b = .04$, $p = .55$; health: $b = .01$, $p = .88$).</p>
317	1	14	<p>Thus, whether we conceptualized low status as “women”, “lower SES women”, or “women of color”, we found a positive relationship between endorsing the belief in meritocracy and self-esteem that was well accounted for by perceived control.</p>

317	1	27	<p>For example, in contrast to our findings with meritocracy beliefs, Rankin and colleagues (2009) found that endorsement of general system justification (e.g., eight items including: "In general, I find society to be fair"; "Our society is getting worse every year", reverse scored) was negatively associated with both perceived control and performance self-esteem among low income African-Americans (N = 27, nationally representative sampling strategy).</p>
317	1	41	<p>Thus, it remains a question for future research to examine whether the benefits of endorsing legitimizing beliefs for the self-esteem of low status groups are limited to those beliefs, such as the belief in meritocracy, that are positively associated with perceived control.</p>
317	1	43	<p>Second, evidence that the system is not merit based, garnered through exposure or repeated experience, may undermine perceived control and the benefits of meritocracy beliefs for low status groups.</p>
317	1	47	<p>Consistent with this idea, endorsing meritocracy is not beneficial to self-esteem among members of low status groups who read about pervasive prejudice toward their group (Major, Kaiser, O'Brien, & McCoy, 2007) or report repeated experience with discrimination (Foster, Sloto, & Ruby, 2006).</p>
317	1	54	<p>Among those very low in status, perceptions of control over future outcomes are likely to also be low, and the costs associated with endorsing meritocracy may outweigh the potential benefits.</p>
317	2	8	<p>It may be no mistake that political figures in the USA have emphasized America's belief in meritocracy in an effort to convince members of low status groups to vote seemingly against their own interests (i.e., against social "safety net" programs; Jost & Hunyady, 2005).</p>

317	2	21		Not all status legitimizing beliefs may serve this function, but we propose that endorsement of meritocracy beliefs encourage “have nots” to view themselves as “soon to haves.”
317	2	24		Through the association with perceived control, the belief in meritocracy may foster the perception that members of low status groups will be “joining” high status groups “soon.”
317	2	26		Because meritocracy beliefs are positively associated with both the acceptance of relative disadvantage and self-esteem, efforts to reduce inequality may face a tremendous obstacle.

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Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
341	1	11		Specifically, it identifies four common majoritarian stories, or normative narratives that promote racist and linguist outcomes, that are both challenged and endorsed throughout the research literature: there is no story about race, difference is deficit, meritocracy is appropriate, and English-is-all-that-matters.
342	1	16		The overarching tenets of CRT centralize race; challenge meritocracy, objectivity, neutrality, and ahistoricism; emphasize experiential knowledge; and support interdisciplinality (Matsuda et al. 1993).
344	1	28	Further the research suggests that the English-Only movement is merely a way to mask racism behind discussions of equal opportunity and merit (Bratt 2007), and that policies like 'No Child Left Behind' (NCLB) hide racism and classism behind seemingly neutral discourse around the use of English in schools (Lapayese 2007).	
351	1	20		Within the majoritarian story of meritocracy as being appropriate, public schools are positioned as the great equalizers in this country, providing equal opportunity for all students thus supporting meritocracy.
351	1	23		Yet much of the scholarship documents how the story of meritocracy is a myth.
351	1	36		Language of instruction is another issue in terms of meritocracy and schools providing equal opportunity for students.

352	1	3		<p>The majoritarian story of meritocracy as appropriate overlooks many issues of inequity that fundamentally undermine any actualization of equality when it comes to schooling.</p>
352	1	7		<p>A significant component of the majoritarian story about the appropriateness of meritocracy is the positioning of standardized test scores as valuable information about the success of teaching and learning efforts that should be used to guide policy decisions.</p>
352	1	10		<p>The literature took varying stances on this aspect of the majoritarian story about meritocracy.</p>
352	1	42		<p>Highlighting low scores as a cause for concern perpetuates the majoritarian story of meritocracy as appropriate and that such test scores are meaningful in discussions of the education of multilingual learners.</p>
353	1	31		<p>If researchers continue to draw on data from the entire aggregate of the multilingual learner subgroup as if it had something meaningful to explicate, the majoritarian story of meritocracy being appropriate will strongly persist.</p>
359	1	1		<p>The majoritarian stories about race, difference, meritocracy, and English both promoted and challenged in the literature accurately describe current contemporary thought and practice relating to the concepts of race, culture, and language in US schools and expose troubling issues and practices.</p>

Nahai, R. N. (2013).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
681	1	3		In response, these universities profess to uphold meritocratic principles in admissions (cf. Meyer & Rowan, 1977), that is, to select the most academically talented students without regard for their possession of social and cultural capital (Zimdars, 2007).
682	1	2		However, the regular public criticisms of elite admissions and demands for stronger public accountability (cf. Alexander, 2000; Schwartz Commission, 2004) suggest that many stakeholders do not believe that elite admissions are meritocratic, but are rather predicated on principles that favour the socially privileged.
682	1	40		Since its rise in the postwar era, the meritocratic approach to selecting individuals for sought-after positions has become so embedded in the opportunity structure of Anglo-American societies (Haveman & Smeeding, 2006; Themelis, 2008) that it has become, in the public mind, synonymous with fairness.
682	1	44		Yet, fairness—whether operationalised through meritocratic principles or quota systems, affirmative action or other means—is impossible to achieve fully in the face of entrenched structural inequalities in the broader social and economic environment.
683	1	3		Further, depending on the political motives of those formulating its definition, fairness-as-meritocracy might feasibly result in distinct injustice.
683	1	9	Admissions staff solved the 'Jewish problem' by changing merit criteria to include indicators of 'character', resulting in a dramatic decrease in Jewish student numbers (Karabel, 1984; Karabel, 2005).	

683	1	19		It is within this context that elite universities, proffering a limited number of places for which an overabundance of qualified candidates compete every year, act as one of the most public arenas in which meritocratic selection is put to the test.
683	1	20		Widespread belief in meritocracy's appropriateness as a guiding framework in elite admissions persists despite its uneven record in this realm; as Carey (2011) writes, '[c]ollege admissions season is a time of myth ... [allowing] us to indulge our cherished notions of meritocracy'.
683	1	24		In the public mind, the perception is that unmeritocratic admissions must certainly be unfair, and possibly vice versa.
683	1	27		However, the stakeholders shaping the fair admissions conversation—government, the media, the public and the academy itself—continue to convey uncertainty about what exactly meritocracy is, and thus about whether admissions are fair.
683	1	36		In contrast, Phillips (2011) argues that UK Minister for Universities and Science, David Willetts, in a 2011 university funding proposal, 'has ... dumped meritocracy and social justice in pursuit of ... equality of outcomes'.
683	1	38		That the arguments framing the debate so fundamentally contradict one another is unsurprising given meritocracy's wide-ranging permutations, throughout the 20th century and today (cf. Karabel, 2005; Lemann, 1999; Liu, 2011; Soares, 2007; Young, 1958).
683	1	44	As Sen (1999) reasons, merit, on whose elaboration a meritocracy depends in order to function, is contingent on our notions of a good society.	

684	1	3	In mass democratic societies, the legitimacy accorded to competing claims of what is good results in ongoing disagreement over merit's precise content, as well as its appropriate weight relative to other normative social concerns.	
684	1	5		Deeply contingent on these and other notions, meritocracy is not at all assured to be synonymous with fairness.
684	1	6		For Young (2001), who invented the term 'meritocracy' as part of a social critique, meritocracy was always meant to denote an educational and labour market system that is distinctly unfair.
684	1	15		principles the Commission thinks characterises fair admissions in higher education. Although it does not use the term meritocracy, its proposals are couched in meritocratic language:
684	1	29		Moreover, any consideration of applicants' social contexts is nevertheless likely to be subject to the meritocratic first principle.
684	1	41		Such recommendations are not meritocratic in the traditional sense; the Commission is clearly attempting to merge a meritocratic approach with a more contemporary conception of fairness underpinned by social justice concerns.
684	1	45		In Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System, the government's 2011 higher education White Paper for England, the move away from meritocracy is even more marked in establishing that admissions outcomes, more than processes, are what matters:
685	1	6		Unlike meritocracy's focus on 'right processes', this approach emphasises 'right outcomes' (Miller, 1999) concerning access and outreach initiatives.

685	1	12	Indeed, it is this cautious attempt to blend outcomes-focus with process-focus, or social justice with meritocracy, that characterises the 'nouveau meritocracy' in admissions.
685	1	15	. It is not only that meritocracy, in order to be operational, requires precise definition of the factors on which it is contingent.
685	1	17	The attempt to define meritocracy has a long history (cf. Daniels, 1978) that has turned up little progress, the effort merely perpetuating the belief that meritocracy itself ought to evolve in line with changing societal values.
685	1	20	Yet this approach confounds the real issue: that the nature of the discussion about meritocracy today, with its focus on equity and justice, has moved so far beyond the concept's basic principles (Sen, 1999) that we may no longer be talking about meritocracy at all (I return to this idea in the conclusion).
685	1	24	In order to progress, we need to see and discuss clearly what the issues are, and tangling up meritocratic mechanisms with equity-based ones hinders rather than helps the fair admissions cause.
685	1	33	Soares (1999), in his study of The University of Oxford's transformation from an enclave of privilege to a meritocratic institution, delineates three social perspectives into which most stakeholders in the University's reform years (postwar through the 1980s) could be grouped.
685	1	37	These categories remain valuable in today's admissions context for their pointed emphasis on the conceptual ambiguity of the meritocratic concept.
685	1	38	They also provide a way to think about what we mean by calling for admissions that are 'meritocratic' as well as 'fair', and can help us assess whether elite admissions mechanisms are meritocratic in practice; as

				well as whether it is even meritocracy we are after, or perhaps something else.
686	1	10		In 1958 Michael Young's critical satire gave democratic elitism, rapidly rising in use and popularity in the postwar years, a more familiar name: 'meritocracy' (cf. Young, 1958).
686	1	11		In theory, meritocracy refers to a social system in which achievement, not social origins, determines one's <u>progression</u> in life.
686	1	18		In other words, it looked a lot like the contemporary conception of meritocracy, but it maintained an optimism about the ease of levelling the playing field that today, having accumulated much evidence to the contrary, we have largely abandoned.
686	1	32		This study employs these categorisations to explore the values frameworks, meritocratic or otherwise, that University of Oxford admissions tutors—those directly responsible for admitting students—apply when sorting and selecting candidates.
686	1	38		As argued earlier, Oxford's admissions processes are of deep interest in British society at large, because they represent a symbolic terrain where the meaning of meritocracy and of fairness—not only for admissions, but for society as a whole—are applied, debated and revised over time.

688	1	25	Substantively, participants were invited to discuss issues including concepts of merit and fairness in Oxford admissions, their own approach to selecting students, and how the selection process works in their faculty and college.	
690	1	40		In contrast, democratic elitism, or meritocracy, emerged as the strongest driving force behind admissions tutors' decision-making.
692	1	7		Finally, all ten tutors themselves believe, with caveats, that Oxford admissions are meritocratic.
692	1	9		I think we have a meritocratic admissions process.
692	1	19		Their addition of caveats, employed to decrease ambiguity and facilitate shared meaning, demonstrates in part the usefulness of the democratic elitism concept as a conceptual demarcation of the meritocratic idea.
692	1	20		Most importantly, perhaps, these caveats emphasised meritocracy's limitations and over-simplifications.
692	1	23		I think in terms of the actual process by which we select from the pool of candidates who apply to us, I think that is meritocratic. (Tutor 2)
692	1	25		Objectively, it's meritocratic in the sense that the candidates who get in deserve to because they tick all the boxes next to our admissions criteria. (Tutor 10)
694	1	10	A second form of intervention, mentioned by one tutor, involves giving very good candidates from less-privileged backgrounds slightly higher scores than their performance merits relative to competitors.	
695	1	5	As with organic conservatism, it does not conform quite enough to merit the title.	

695	1	38	<p>Applying the categorisations of organic conservatism, democratic elitism and social democracy, it is possible to move on from, for instance, arguing over the too-narrow question of whether an institution is elitist or meritocratic.</p> <p>The framework helps disentangle social from academic elitism, reminding us that meritocracy is in fact elitist insofar as it prioritises excellence, even at the expense of social justice.</p> <p>What meritocracy is not is social democracy, a distinction often confounded by the media and government officials when they concomitantly call for meritocratic admissions and pronounce democratic elitist admissions unfair in practice.</p> <p>Sen (1999) captures this commonplace misunderstanding when he writes, '[w]hat are often taken to be "meritocratic" demands have moved, in many ways, so far away from their incentive-based justification that they can scarcely be defended on the classic incentive grounds.</p> <p>The conclusion that Oxford admissions are an academic meritocracy, while simple, profoundly challenges the basis of the debate and clears the way for a more relevant discussion.</p> <p>To begin, when 42.5% of Oxford undergraduates come from private schools which represent only 7% of UK secondary school students (University of Oxford, 2012), the question inevitably arises: if, in unequal societies, academic achievement correlates with social class and family wealth (Coleman & Bekhradnia, 2011), is meritocracy in fact what we are after?</p>
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696	1	30		Meritocracy's failure in elite universities is driven not by the concept of admitting students based on academic excellence, which in a broadly equal society ought to work reasonably well, but by government policy that fails adequately to address inequality at its roots.
697	1	9	Throughout their histories, elite universities have changed their conceptions of what makes applicants meritorious, often explicitly to fulfil political or financial objectives.	
697	1	17		Such an approach might be called 'outcomes-based meritocracy' for the way it systematically and fundamentally attempts to combine meritocracy and social democracy.
697	1	23		It differs from the Oxford approach in that Oxford sets its primary admissions criteria and then considers how social background can be adjusted for at the margins; as well as from the government's approach, as conveyed in this paper's introduction, which half-heartedly advocates for social democratic admissions while staunchly defending meritocracy.
697	1	23		Outcomes-based meritocracy, in contrast, is characterised by a strong focus on uniting excellence with equity from the point of laying the admissions groundwork on through each stage of the admissions process.
698	1	26	This makes sense in the context of highly competitive admissions wherein, as the tutors in this study described, the bell curve of applicant merit throws up a minority who are 'too good not to take', but the large middle majority are similar enough that it is difficult to distinguish between them.	

699	1	4		The data presented in this paper indicate that admissions at the University of Oxford are a rigorous academic meritocracy, that is, ‘democratic elitist’.
699	1	6		Great disparities persist in admissions outcomes between different social groups not because Oxford is ‘unfair’, where unfairness stands in for a breach of meritocracy, for instance through explicitly favouring socially-privileged applicants.
699	1	10	Rather, the underlying cause of the disparity is the deep inequality that characterises British society, which leads to academic achievement—Oxbridge’s dominant criterion of merit—correlating with social class and family income.	
699	1	21		Thus, it goes beyond outreach work and decentralised contextual data use, which have clear limits in a meritocracy based on unequal competitor starting points, and in which merit is continuously defined and redefined in ways that favour the dominant social groups.

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Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
141	1	5		Among the many principles that shape these rules, one of the most important today is the notion of meritocracy.
141	1	6		Despite its importance, scholars have neglected to study the Asian context of meritocracy.
141	1	9		First of its kind, this article fills that gap by providing an analysis of how meritocracy is used in several Asian countries compared to the United States.
141	1	11	There are at least three issues about the concept of merit that can differentiate Asia and the United States.	
141	1	12		First, on one hand, Asia's meritocracy is much less about democratic values and is less concern about social inequality than in contemporary United States.
141	1	17	Yet it is as much about building a class of capable bureaucrats that can efficiently and effectively work alongside elected leaders as envisioned in the beginning of the United States. In the United States, democratic principles laid the foundation for a merit system.	
141	1	17	On the other hand, in Asia the idea of merit was introduced much earlier than the notion of democracy.	
141	1	19	Second, in conjunction to the goal of building strong bureaucracies, Asia's merit systems are less concerned about political ties and political preferences but more concerned about family, patron ties, and corruption in appointing unqualified civil servants.	
141	1	21		Third, meritocracy in Asia focuses on giving equal opportunities to all to enter the public sector.

141	1	23	At the same time, paradoxically, Asian governments struggle to target only those of certain merit (i.e., education qualification) to enter the civil service.		
141	1	28		Having this in mind, this study provides a first cut at how scholars can study meritocracy in diverse systems.	
141	1	30	The study starts off by asking several key questions such as what merit means in different countries, how is it used, who gains, and for what reason.		
141	1	33	To answer these questions, the authors suggest having an analytical framework that can draw out the differences, similarities, and nuances of how merit is practiced in different countries.		
141	1	34	The study has divided the elements of the merit system into five aspects: (a) recruitment criteria; (b) corruption in recruitment and promotion; (c) political affiliation and influence; (d) level of centralization of recruitment and promotion processes; and (e) merit-protection regimes.		
141	1	38	The aim is to highlight recurring challenges to the notion of a merit-based civil service system.		
141	1	39	Specifically the authors ask whether the concept of merit is defined and practiced differently in Asia compared to the United States.		
142	1	2	In the survey, government officials were asked about their recruitment and promotion processes, definitions of the merit system, and its evolution throughout the years.		
142	1	11	The interview questions focused on the definition, general practice of merit, and challenges in the respective governments.		
142	1	16	The concept of merit has been used extensively to guide modern civil service management around the world.		

142	1	17	Merit principle in recruitment and promotion was advocated in the influential Report on the Organization of the Permanent Civil Service (Northcote & Trevelyan, 1854) that was instrumental in introducing merit in Britain.	
142	1	22	The Report suggested dividing between “intellectual” and “mechanical” work in the bureaucracy; to recruit through open competitive examination; and to promote civil servants solely on merit rather than seniority (Fry, 1995; Pypier, 1995).	
142	1	23	In the United States, the call for merit-based appointments echoed clearly in the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 (Ingraham, 1995). In addition, Woodrow Wilson’s 1887 essay, The Study of Administration, helped set the intellectual grounds for the politics–administration dichotomy debate.	
142	1	32		Later on, the exact term “meritocracy” was first used in 1958 by the British sociologist Michael Young.
142	1	36		Young described “meritocracy” as a competing society that accepts inequitable gaps of income, wealth, and social position taking into consideration talents, merit, competencies, motivation, and effort (Young, 2008).
142	1	39		Since its inception, literature on meritocracy has focused on various issues such as merit and economic inequality (Arrow, Bowles, & Durlauf, 2000); meritocracy in education (Klitgard, 1986; McNamee & Miller, 2004); the extent of a society being meritocratic (Krauze & Slomezynski, 1985); and merit versus patronage in the public sector (Ingraham, 1995; Mosher, 1982; Peters, 1995).
143	1	1		Overall we can infer that meritocracy is a policy that reinforces the notion of equality and competence as it rejects patronage, nepotism, corruption, and incompetence for entering the civil service.
143	1	6		Today, meritocracy in recruitment processes is often associated with having education qualifications, passing general exams, and

					satisfying position qualifications.
143	1	9			For promotion processes, meritocracy is associated with performance-based assessments of individuals with clear performance expectations and indicators to measure actions and results of work.
143	1	12			However, having said the above, there are great variations in the choice of instruments and the reasons to install merit systems among governments.
143	1	14			Before discussing the variations in detail, we will first describe a brief history of meritocracy
143	1	18			There is evidence that the idea of meritocracy first emerged in Asia, prior to being practiced in Europe and then transferred back to Asia in modern times.
143	1	20			Hobson (2004) indicates the concept of merit travelled from China to the West through translations of Confucius texts in the era of European Enlightenment.
143	1	41			In 1806, the British decided to set up East India College at Haileybury to train Indian civil servants (Teng, 1943, p. 302). Trevelyan, who advocated for merit-based selection in the U.K. civil service in the famous Northcote-Trevelyan 1854 report, spent the early part of his career in the Indian civil service (Pyper, 1995).
144	1	6			After the British, the United States made meritocracy into policy in the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 after a disappointed office seeker assassinated President Garfield 2 years earlier.
144	1	27			After many years, the merit-based civil service system in Europe and the United States has come full circle back to China.
144	1	28			A form of merit system was already developed in China in the 1930s by Nationalists (ruling China from the 1930s to 1948) that transplanted the system to Taiwan after the Second World War.

144	1	41	Despite long histories of Confucianism in East Asia and the practice of entrance exams, many governments other than China only adopted formal civil service laws, which specify the definition and scope of merit, in less than 30 years ago.	
145	1	1		Meritocracy in contemporary Asia is closely associated with Weberian principles of an ideal bureaucracy coupled with Confucianism (especially in East Asia and perhaps less so in India) together with the Emperor's paradigm of merit and/or the colonial master's paradigm of merit.
145	1	5	For example, based on its historical development and the absence of democracy defined by U.S. experiences, the definition of merit in China has a strong leaning toward party affiliation, which stems from the tradition of loyalty to the Emperor.	
145	1	9	The notion of merit was introduced in 1928 in the first Civil Service Act that promoted the principles of competence, fairness, and merit (Sivaraks, 2011).	
145	1	14	It may also be argued that the merit system came along with the educational system installed by the colonizers; after all it was the level of education and intelligence of individuals that predicated the concept of meritocracy to avert "elitism" in societies and pursue equality	
145	1	18	Singapore is a case in point where its merit system was part of the legacy of British colonialism bundled with the intent to select only the best and brightest in the Confucius paradigm. Macao under the Portuguese also adapted from the West and Confucius models.	
145	1	23	For example, in the Philippines the merit system was first included in the Malolos Constitution 1899, the first of its kind in Southeast Asia, to have competitive	

				examinations.	
145	1	26		The Philippine Civil Service Act was passed in 1900 with the objective of ensuring and promoting merit and fitness in the bureaucracy (Sto. Tomas, 1991, pp. 4-6).	
145	1	27		Under American rule since 1902, the foundation of merit was further enforced and institutionalized (Mangahas & Tiu Sonco, 2011; Reyes, 2011), especially since the United States had also just passed the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 to eliminate its spoils system (Reyes, 2011).	
145	1	33		The first public administration school in the Philippines was set up by the Americans with the aim of setting the foundation for the establishment of a professional civil service system with bureaucrats recruited and promoted on the basis of merit and fitness insulated from politics.	
145	1	36		In this regard, the system served to link civil servants with the political power in place, which has influenced how the merit system has been used to strengthen political power today.	
145	1	38			Differences aside, meritocracy systems in Asia face similar criticisms to systems in the United States and the United Kingdom.
145	1	39			Factors that hinder a true meritocratic system include inheritance, social capital, cultural capital, luck, unequal access to education, and discrimination based on race, gender, age, sexual orientation, religion, physical disability, and physical appearance (McNamee & Miller, 2004).
146	1	1		Based on the above discussions of the historical evolutions of merit systems in Asia, this section suggests a framework to investigate five aspects of merit systems.	

146	1	5	Second we look into how the problem of corruption in recruitment and promotion is tied to the merit system.	
146	1	5	Is the merit system helping to solve corruption?	
146	1	11	Lastly we explore the idea of merit-protection regimes or in other words the combination of tools to ensure merit is upheld in all aspects of human resource management.	
146	1	17	We acknowledge that merit systems are fluid and do change over time.	
147	1	3	There is no one right way to interpret “merit” and no one right instrument to use.	
147	1	4	There are various tensions and contradictions in how governments operationalize the merit concept.	
147	1	6	On the choice of whether to have entry-level exams, all Asian countries favor this instrument to ensure meritocracy as opposed to the United States (see table 1).	
147	1	14	This appears to show that South Korea strictly interprets merit as open for all and heavily relies on exams for recruitment.	
147	1	24	Despite having examinations, it does not necessarily mean that employees across Asia will feel that their departments uphold merit principles in hiring and promotion.	
147	1	29	For example in the cases of South Korea and Taiwan, where there are stringent exams to enter the service, only about 35% of survey respondents agreed that merit principles are used in the actual hiring.	
147	1	33	More than 80% of respondents from Malaysia and China also confirmed that exams were crucial to pass, but 49.1% of respondents from Malaysia and 55.9% from China agreed that their departments practice merit principles in hiring.	

147	1	35	One exception is the Philippines where a high percentage (71.7%) of respondents felt their departments upheld merit principles in hiring.	
147	1	36	In the United States, 47.9% of the respondents or slightly less than half agreed that the departments uphold merit principles in hiring.	
147	1	42	In a separate survey conducted in 2008 by the OCSC in Thailand (Sivaraks, 2011, p. 132) 75% of the respondents were satisfied with their work but less than half thought that the performance appraisal was merit-based and only 30% support the outcomes of promotion decisions of their departments (Sivaraks, 2011, p. 132). Also in 2009, OCSC asked public officials at the departmental level whether they agreed that the organization applies merit concepts in operations (The Office of Civil Service Commission, 2009).	
148	1	20		Thus having entrance exams does not translate into employees feeling that meritocracy is practiced.
148	1	21		This debunks the myth that having central exams alone can help to ensure the sense of meritocracy in the recruitment process.
148	1	23	These findings suggest that entry-level exams and competitive exams are not the only tools for effective merit-based recruitment.	
148	1	26	For example in Thailand, merit-based recruitment refers to selecting candidates based on their knowledge and competency; and having selection processes that ensure equality, fairness, and government interests (Civil Service Act of 2008).	
149	1	12	On the other hand, in both Thailand and the Philippines the issue of merit has shifted to find ways to attract the best and brightest to join the public sector as well as the need to curb corruption and nepotism.	

149	1	20	. According to the Civil Service Act 2008, recruitment must be based on merit through competitive exams unless otherwise exempted due to special circumstances.	
149	1	25		They were sued in the administrative court by a group of law students for being not meritocratic.
149	1	28	This case depicts how OCSC faces challenges in trying to attract talented individuals to join the public sector, which needs a targeted approach, while the definition of merit in Thailand at large still values an open-for-all approach.	
150	1	8		Although some in Asia see this move as being nonmeritocratic and would rather continue an open-for-all approach, obviously there is no one right way.
150	1	10	The bottom line is that merit systems are operationalized differently in different countries depending on the principles valued.	
150	1	13	We should always question what it actually means in practice and which instruments are used to measure merit.	
151	1	34	Aside from the outright patron–client problem, there is an inherent tension with merit when selection processes favor internal candidates.	
151	1	40		No doubt from outsiders’ point of view, this practice would be seen as nonmeritocratic and perhaps a form of corruption.
151	1	41		In Asia, it is an open debate whether this is considered nonmeritocratic or a smart way to support internal employees’ career advancement.
152	1	3	There is a danger in using merit system to legitimize the ruling class.	
152	1	5		As warned in Young’s (2008) satire writing when he quoted Rawls’ reminder that fair opportunity could lead to “a callous meritocratic society.”

152	1	7	Societies can become comfortable and social status and prestige preserved through the rationale that those in power came up through the ranks by merit.	
152	1	8	The irony is that those in power are often reluctant to rebalance the society by examining faults or biases in the established merit system of their society.	
152	1	11	Thus in many countries, despite having a merit-based entry to the civil service, the promotion and rotation opportunities are still very much tied to political loyalty.	
152	1	14	When the United States reformed its spoils system to the merit system in 1883, it was to reduce political appointees who were loyal to superiors in government but did not have the right qualifications.	
152	1	16		Meritocracy in the United States was about limiting political intervention in the civil service for the bureaucracy to be more efficient and effective.
152	1	20		Young popularized “meritocracy” in reaction to the rising “elitism” whom he referred to as those with the belief that their advancement comes from their own merits while many others viewed them as beneficiaries of nepotism (Young, 2008).
152	1	23		The main paradox in the United States was how to make sure that neutral-meritocratic civil servants were responsive to the democratically elected political leaders (Ingraham, 1995).
152	1	28	In Asia there is a stronger sense of using merit to build an elite class of civil servants than in the United States.	

152	1	30	<p>The issue in Asia has been hardly about this tension between democratic politics and the merit system; it was simply about how to get the best people to serve the government and do away with patronage—client relations in the appointment of civil servants, that is, how to make the system fair for all and corruption free.</p>	
152	1	38	<p>In contrast, many Asian countries went through democratization processes much later than when they adopted merit systems for the civil service.</p>	
153	1	1	<p>Some countries use a merit-based process to select the best into the regime or to join the ruling party (e.g., on Singapore, see Tan, 2008).</p>	
153	1	4		<p>While most systems do not explicitly state this conditionality, as it would be considered nonmeritocratic from the public's point of view but in practice it can be accepted as a hidden norm.</p>
153	1	36	<p>Arguably in one-party political systems, the definition of merit—in the sense of civil service neutrality—does not fit comfortably with practice.</p>	
154	1	9	<p>At the same time, Section 42 states that “consideration of merit, promotion, and conferment of benefits must be carried fairly through work products, capacities and behaviours, and political views or political affiliations shall not be taken into consideration” (Office of the Civil Service Commission, 2009).</p>	
154	1	40	<p>While most CES officers, now, go through the examination process, a handful of career executive positions are still freely appointed by the President. In the United States, this is desirable because presidential control over the merit system is part of democratic politics (Ingraham, 1995).</p>	

155	1	11	Thus reducing politicization of both the CES and the noncareer executives is the key to the Philippines' civil service merit reforms (Mangahas & Tiu Sonco, 2011, p. 450).	
155	1	13	In sum, in countries such as China and Singapore, merit systems emerged from the need to find the best and brightest to serve the ruling party and be part of the elite class	
155	1	15	The debate in the Philippines is centered on injecting a merit system to get rid of patronage and corruption.	
155	1	16	In Thailand, the merit system has been used to help ensure civil service independence from political control.	
155	1	20	In places where it is seen as undesirable, it might be for very different reasons compared to merit system in the United States.	
155	1	21	The important point is that each country has differing objectives for using the merit system.	
156	1	11		As mentioned in the previous section, in Thailand, it is considered nonmeritocratic to be too specific on educational qualifications.
156	1	16	This goes back to the argument about the definition of merit that Thailand is using.	
156	1	28	However, having said the above, when we unpack the small negative correlation number we find that whether a merit system is centralized or decentralized employees might feel that they still cannot hire as quickly as they would like.	
156	1	41	Overall, we can infer that most governments do want to speed up the recruitment process, while maintaining the accepted norms of merit.	
156	1	44	But it must do so by clearly knowing the capacity of the central agency, capacity of the line ministries, and the demand from the public to take the exams, in addition to the definition of merit that the public agrees	

				with.		
157	1	20		The findings from our study show that merit systems are upheld and protected through a variety of channels.		
157	1	21		The combination of the various channels is referred to as merit-protection regimes, which constitutes institutions, rules, and norms.		
157	1	23		In some countries merit-protection regimes are well designed and are strong while in others are weak and fragmented.		
157	1	24		To have a good merit-protection regime, it is insufficient to only have entrance exams.		
157	1	26		And a case like the United States demonstrates that exams might not be necessary at all if there is a good merit-protection regime in place.		
157	1	26		Merit is protected in the United States by having qualification standards in job advertisements.		
157	1	33		But this allows for discretionary power for recruiters that might compromise the merit system.		
157	1	35		Aside from qualification standards in job advertisements, complaint channels and whistle-blower protection laws are important components to ensure that a merit system is protected.		
157	1	39		The Philippines has a merit system and promotion board at various levels.		
157	1	41		They address many concerns and receive complaints and grievances pertaining to merit selection.		
158	1	23		Thailand's Merit System Protection Commission (MSPC) is an example of an institution part of the merit-protection regime.		
158	1	25		Thailand adopted the MSPC model from the United States's Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).		

158	1	28	The MSPB is an independent, quasi-judicial agency with responsibility for deciding Federal employee appeals from personnel actions taken against them, protecting the integrity of the civil service and other federal merit systems, and conducting studies of the civil service and other merit systems in the Executive Branch.	
158	1	34	MSPC can also ask agencies to change rules and guidelines that are not based on merit principles.	
158	1	34	In addition to MSPC, the mechanism to protect merit is enhanced through the judiciary—the administrative courts.	
158	1	39	Whether these new institutes will be able to protect merit in Thailand is to be seen.	
158	1	41	But these institutes are examples of how governments are beginning to compliment entrance exams with other channels to protect the merit system.	
158	1	43	In addition to setting up independent commission bodies, performance-based management systems can also help to protect the merit system.	
159	1	7	Lastly we found that the understanding of merit depends on training, which many governments do not appear to be doing enough of.	
159	1	9	Whatever definition and methods governments choose to use for merit, what is important is continuous training to make sure employees understand the meaning of merit in their context.	
159	1	15	Very few U.S. respondents thought that the standards of merit and acceptable behavior were unclear (23.0%), whereas in Asia all had higher percentages (see Table 4).	
159	1	17	This survey result can mean either the standard of merit is unclear or the acceptable behavior is unclear or both.	

159	1	19	This shows that training on merit can also be an important activity to fill the gap between laws and its actual enforcement.	
159	1	21	In sum, there are many ways to protect and uphold merit systems, such as having transparent job advertisements, setting up of merit-protection boards, involving the judiciary in merit-related cases, installing performance-based management schemes, and continuous training on merit for employees.	
159	1	25	These are all considered components of the merit-protection regime.	
159	1	27		This aspect, as compared to the other four aspects of the framework discussed above, reminds policy makers the importance of looking at meritocracy as a system that requires a comprehensive design rather than solely focusing on certain instruments such as examinations.
159	1	29	The U.S. government seems to rely on merit-protection regimes rather than only exams.	
159	1	31	While many Asian civil servants in this survey do not know about whistle blower protection schemes in their systems and are not well-trained in merit, some governments are making progresses in setting up independent bodies to monitor and regulate merit principles.	
159	1	33	Overall, Asian governments are slowly developing their merit-protection regimes.	
159	1	34	This might well be the key to better merit systems in the region.	
159	1	38	This study has described and analyzed the Asian merit system by drawing on qualitative data from Thailand and the Philippines and quantitative data from surveys of public officials in China, the United States, India, Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines.	
159	1	41	By using a framework of five aspects of the merit system, it has provided an analysis of the most prominent issues pertaining to	

				meritocracy.	
159	1	44		First, every country has its own concept and definition of merit and each uses differing policies and tools to operationalize the system.	
160	1	5			Many employees do not see their own systems as being meritocratic.
160	1	11			Governments are pressured to use more diverse sets of recruitment criteria but not without resistance and debate that threaten to redefine what is considered meritocratic for the country.
160	1	12		Second most Asian governments aim to use the merit system to select the best into government to be part of the regime or the ruling party	
160	1	21		In contrast to the United States, where democratic processes began and took root before the merit system, in Asia the merit systems began long before democratic processes filtered into political systems.	
160	1	24		In some countries democratic processes are still quite premature, while merit-based selection and recruitment has taken off.	
160	1	27			Third, civil service systems that are centralized in the name of being meritocratic can be inefficient but not always.
160	1	32			Also there is always tension between regulatory bodies such as civil service commissions that wish to protect meritocracy and ministries that wish to have autonomy in hiring and selection to stay competitive.
160	1	34		Most importantly having a holistic merit-protection regime can solve these problems.	
160	1	40			It is within this context, as shown in this study, that there have been ongoing efforts in Asia to reform civil service systems to integrate the fundamental principles of meritocracy into the operations of local politico-administrative systems and bureaucracies taking into consideration the specific social, cultural, political, and

					administrative contexts.
160	1	44			Lastly, this study emphasizes that one should never accept their system as being meritocratic without asking the essential questions: What does it mean exactly, what tools are being used, who is benefitting from the system, what are the trade-offs, and has the system solved the problem it is meant to solve?
161	1	3			Although this study provides an understanding of meritocracy in Asia, it only gives an overview of the issues with limited examples.
161	1	6			
161	1	7			It is actually misleading to say that there is an Asian merit system. However, we do hope to generate debates regarding the general claims surrounding the issues of how merit is defined and operationalized in Asia.
161	1	11			Each of the five aspects presented in the analytical framework should be investigated more extensively in each country by rigorously operationalizing the various dimensions of the merit system.
161	1	13			Robust theories on merit can be built subject to further improvement by more research.

Walton, G. M., & Spencer, S. J., & Erman, S. (2013).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
1	1	1		We argue that in important circumstances meritocracy can be realized only through a specific form of affirmative action we call affirmative meritocracy.
1	1	12		In such environments, admitting or hiring more members of devalued groups would promote meritocracy, diversity, and organizational performance. Evidence for this bias, its causes, magnitude, remedies, and implications for social policy and for law are discussed.
1	1	16		“[A]ffirmative action has to be made consistent with our highest ideals of personal responsibility and merit.”—President Bill Clinton, National Archives, Washington DC, 1995.
2	1	2		A fundamental problem in public life involves the perceived tension between diversity and meritocracy.
2	1	9		People tend to perceive hiring and admissions decisions based on applicants’ potential to accomplish tasks as meritocratic and thus as fair and just (Bobocel, Son Hing, Davey, Stanley, & Zanna, 1998).
2	1	11		Put differently, people advocate meritocracy, which we define as the systematic use of measures of potential to accomplish tasks in decision making.
2	1	18		We argue that the perceived conflict between diversity and meritocracy is, in part, false.
2	1	20		This conflict rests on a critical assumption: that measures of potential (i.e., merit) are fair and unbiased.

2	1	28	We review evidence that, as commonly assessed, common measures of “merit” are flawed in a way that perpetuates bias despite people’s best intentions.	
3	1	3	If measures of merit are assessed in biased settings, hiring and admissions decisions based on them are not meritocratic.	
3	1	6	If group-based distortions infect such measures, only with remedies that mitigate this group bias can these measures become the basis of a meritocracy.	
3	1	7		In these cases, affirmative action and meritocracy entail some of the same principles of decision making.
3	1	9	This reasoning challenges common understandings of affirmative action, which typically assume unbiased assessments of merit.	
3	1	11	Many people oppose affirmative action because they believe that promoting diversity means degrading merit (Bobocel et al., 1998; Crosby, 2004; Crosby et al., 2003), a relationship presumed as well by the Supreme Court (e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 2000, p. 517, where the Court argues that racial classifications cause “a person to be judged by ancestry instead of . . . merit”).	
3	1	14	But if measures of merit underestimate the potential of members of devalued groups, correcting this bias should promote both merit and diversity.	
3	1	19	Following past scholars (e.g., Bowen & Bok, 1998; Crosby, 2004; Crosby et al., 2003; Guinier & Strum, 2001), we review the evidence that common academic settings cause systematic bias in common performance measures and discuss the affirmative steps organizations that value merit may need to take to admit, hire, pay, and promote people in unbiased ways.	
3	1	21		This approach to affirmative action we call “affirmative meritocracy.”
3	1	30	These procedures should promote both merit and diversity.	
3	1	34	Several lines of research show that assessing a wider range of abilities than is typical can promote both merit and diversity.	
11	1	31		In preventing people from performing to their potential, psychological threats undermine meritocracy.

11	1	31			The first step to restore meritocracy is to create stereotypesafe environments that minimize such threats.
22	1	42		Each offers different advantages and drawbacks, and reasonable people may disagree about their relative merits in different circumstances.	
23	1	3			We emphasize that, when bias is observed, organizations must consider these alternatives (and potentially others) to make meritocratic, nondiscriminatory selection decisions.
23	1	17		When indicators of merit are biased generally—for instance, as a result of bias in common performance contexts—this remedy may seem to preclude the use of any performance measure in selection decisions.	
25	1	2		Score corrections differ from other score modifications in that they are justified specifically by merit—they are score corrections.	
25	1	3		To ensure that they promote merit, score corrections are grounded in local empiricism—by the finding of latent ability of a specific size in a specific group in a specific organization on a specific performance measure.	
25	1	6		In this context, correcting scores would increase the diversity of selection decisions by promoting merit and would also thereby raise organizational performance.	
27	1	12		Sex classifications face an equally or more forgiving standard and so are as or more likely to pass legal muster. Mechanical race-based score corrections to promote merit pose special doctrinal problems.	
27	1	14			The Supreme Court has strongly disfavored mechanical race-based score adjustments based upon suppositions that, inter alia, they (1) are antimeritocratic, (2) stigmatize, (3) promote racial hostility, and (4) perpetuate the salience of race (Gratz v. Bollinger, 2003; Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003; Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist.

					No. 1, 2007; Primus, 2003).
27	1	19		They promote merit.	
27	1	21		Indeed, people willingly endorse racial classifications that promote merit (Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002).	
27	1	22		To the extent that merit-based score corrections generate popular resentment, the Court must decide how much credence to give complaints by nonstereotyped individuals that a meritocratic policy deprives them of benefits they do not merit.	
28	1	3		Taking this bias into account, those officers would then select candidates on the merits of their entire applications.	
28	1	8			The Court has not decided whether meritocratic decision making—the aim of the proposed approach—may also justify differentiating people by race or sex.
28	1	10		Its opinions in related cases, however, emphasize the importance of merit (Gratz v. Bollinger, 2003; Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003; Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 2007 [plurality opinion]; Rice v. Cayetano, 2000).	
28	1	12		If merit does justify limited racial or sex classifications, then this policy, because it resembles the individualized selection process that the Court approved in Grutter, is the approach more likely to be upheld.	
28	rod	8			Racial classifications in affirmative meritocracy serve a different end—to promote merit.
28	rod	9		As the Court has not addressed merit systematically, it is not known whether it would recognize merit as an interest that can justify differentiating individuals based on race.	
28	rod	11		But its reasoning is protective of merit.	

28	rod	11			The Court has criticized racial classifications as antimeritocratic, writing, “it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by . . . merit” (Rice v. Cayetano, 2000, p. 517, quoted in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 2007, p. 39 [plurality opinion]).
28	rod	17		In rare cases when the Court recognizes that the absence of racial classifications would undermine merit (e.g., if a school chose to promote diversity by admitting students using a lottery) it instead allows schools to promote diversity using limited racial classifications (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003, p. 334).	
28	rod	19		The Court’s solicitude for merit suggests that merit itself could justify limited racial classifications. If so, organizations could likely implement an individualized selection process like that described in the main text.	
28	rod	22		Further, unlike the similar process the Court upheld in Grutter, where the Court evinced concern that affirmative action had no end point, the racial classifications of affirmative meritocracy are, as noted, self-extinguishing.	
29	1	2		But we emphasize that, in the face of compelling evidence that measures of merit underestimate the ability and potential of members of stereotyped groups, the choice to do nothing is highly problematic: It would sanction discrimination against people from disadvantaged groups.	
29	1	32		Further, in making admissions and hiring decisions, organizations should interpret measures of merit in ways that accurately index the ability and performance potential of all candidates.	
29	1	34			In taking these affirmative steps, organizations can promote meritocracy and diversity at once.

Borondo, J., Borondo, F., Rodriguez-Sickert, C., & Hidalgo, C. A. (2014).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
1	1	18		<p>We solve the model analytically and show that as networks become sparser, the model transitions from the</p> <p>meritocratic regime of Arrow-Debreu to what we call a topocratic regime, where the position of an individual in a</p> <p>network becomes the most important factor determining the compensation it receives.</p>
2	1	15		<p>To distinguish between these two payoff distribution regimes, we label the outcome of the system as meritocratic, when the</p> <p>distribution of payoffs is determined primarily by an agent's ability to</p> <p>produce quality content, and topocratic when the distribution of an agent's payoffs is determined primarily by her position in the network.</p>
2	1	22		<p>In general, we find that the critical connectivity required to transition from topocracy to meritocracy goes as a root of the size of the network (N^a), with $a \approx 1$.</p>
2	1	30		<p>In this case an</p> <p>$N^{1/2}$ rule implies that meritocracy kicks in for connectivities above 17,320 links per node.</p>
2	1	35		<p>Hence, when the transition from meritocracy to topocracy is mediated by an $N^{1/4}$ rule the implications for the U.S. would be that</p>

				this is likely to be meritocratic.
2	1	38		The fact that in our model the transition between meritocracy and topocracy depends predominantly on the density of the network has two important implications. The first one is that the strong dependence of meritocracy on density makes the results of the model robust to different network formation mechanisms.
2	1	41		Yet, when the density of the network is bounded—due for instance to the high cost of links—differences between link formation mechanisms, whether endogenous or not, should not introduce substantial changes to the meritocratic properties of the system.
2	1	54		In other words, when the density of the network is the main feature determining whether the markets embedded in them are meritocratic or not, the forces of endogenous network formation will only be able to modify this outcome slightly (we note that this is not true for an endogenous network formation process with full information.
2	1	64		The second implication that we would like to highlight is that the model predicts that meritocracy increases in societies that become better connected.
2	2	5		Our results suggest that this technological change might also have important long term effects on the meritocracy of

				economies.
2	2	11		Nevertheless, in the light of this model, changes in communication technology should increase the meritocracy of markets—when holding population size constant.
2	2	13		So the good news is that recent changes in technology should help make our society more meritocratic.
2	2	61		Hence, individuals have two sources of income: one that depends on talent, which we call meritocratic, and one that depends on their position in the network, which we call topocratic.
3	1	8		Hence, when the network is fully connected, the model describes a system that is perfectly meritocratic, i.e., payoffs are perfectly correlated with talent.
4	2	4		Since the model is perfectly meritocratic for a fully connected network, and highly topocratic for a star network, the natural question to ask is when does the transition between meritocracy and topocracy takes place.
4	2	7		We define the regime as meritocratic when the fraction of payoffs paid for the creation of content is larger than the fraction of payoffs paid for their distribution (see Methods for an alternative definition based on the correlation

				between talent and payoffs).
4	2	15		For an ER network, the regime will be meritocratic if the following condition holds for the relationship between average connectivity and network size (see Methods for derivation): The transition point from topocracy to meritocracy ($\approx 5 N^{1/2}$) is indicated with a dashed vertical line.
4	2	22		With these assumptions, the payoff of a Rockstar is given by which yields the following conditions for the regime to be meritocratic (see Methods for derivation): When a is small, the transition to meritocracy takes place at low connectivities.
5	1	5		For instance, when $a = 0.1$ the transition to meritocracy takes place at $\approx 5 N^{0.13}$.
5	1	11		For a network with $N = 107$ nodes this implies a threshold connectivity of just ≈ 5.8 , meaning that very little connectivity is required for the system to become meritocratic.
5	1	12		For large percentages, however, the transition to meritocracy is not that easy. When $a = 1/2$ the transition is once again at $\approx 5 N^{1/2}$.
5	1	15		
5	1	16		

5	2	22	<p>Hence a thorough understanding of the meritocracy of market mechanisms cannot be achieved without understanding the effects of an individual's position in a network and its relative effect with respect to other forms of advantage where field leveling policies do exist.</p> <p>Our model predicts that these changes should increase the meritocracy of society since they help reduce the long chain of intermediations that consume valuable payoffs in a poorly connected society.</p> <p>Making such a judgement would require weighing the effects that network density has on meritocracy with its effect on other social and economic outcomes. Therefore, making a judgement on whether a denser or sparser network is more beneficial for society in general, is a matter that cannot be answered easily, since it requires weighing the effects of the network structure on meritocracy and cooperation, but also, on other relevant outcomes, from the preservation of cultural diversity to the spread of disease.</p> <p>The ability of such a dynamic process to restore the meritocracy of the system, will be limited whenever the maximum connectivity of nodes is bounded.</p>
5	2	32	
5	2	37	
6	1	10	
6	1	18	

6	1	22	<p>This is likely to be true due to time constraints and the limited cognitive capacities of individuals, but it would nevertheless be interesting to explore the strategies that can help balance meritocracy in a limited setting.</p>
6	1	27	<p>In particular, one could venture that the organization of society around small social groups might be a way for large groups of people to form structures that can ensure meritocracy in the local context of a group of peers.</p>
6	1	30	<p>More research will be required to answer these questions and help us elucidate the role that networks play in defining the boundaries between meritocracy and topocracy</p>
6	1	58	<p>Hence, the fraction of the payoff collected by the Rockstars through the meritocratic channel can be obtained similarly than before as:</p>
6	2	5	<p>Here, we present an statistical method to estimate the meritocracy M and topocracy T of the model</p>
6	2	9	<p>Formally, we define meritocracy in terms of Pearson's correlation as:</p>
6	2	13	<p>By definition, when the network is fully connected, the system is perfectly meritocratic, since in that limit $\pi_5(N, 2, 1)T_i$ and hence $M \sim T$, $\delta P_N \{1 \sim T$</p>

				h i~1.
7	1	1		<p>The last two expressions are illustrated in Figure 5, and show that the meritocracy of</p> <p>the system, M, decreases (from 1 to 0) as the network becomes sparse and s_2</p> <p>p_M</p> <p>increases, while the opposite is true for the topocracy, T, which approaches one for</p> <p>s_2</p> <p>$p_M \geq C/2$</p> <p>12.</p>
7	1	5		<p>We note, however, that there is a decrease in topocracy at low</p> <p>connectivities that is not accompanied by an increase in meritocracy.</p>
7	1	10		<p>Do prices have an effect on the connectivity</p> <p>threshold separating the meritocratic and topocratic regime of the system that was</p> <p>discussed in Meritocratic and topocratic regimes - general case.</p>
7	1	19		<p>Hence, the threshold condition $PR/P \leq C/(N-2)$ is identical to the one found</p> <p>when the prices are equal for all individuals. This means that the threshold separating</p> <p>the meritocratic and topocratic regimes ($k \leq N/2$) is valid for an arbitrary vector of</p> <p>prices, and is therefore true even for a system where prices are not in equilibrium.</p>

Clycq, N., Ward Nouwen, M.A., & Vandenbroucke, A. (2014).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
3	1	8		This refers to the general idea that the (supposedly) meritocratic educational system itself is not to blame and the denial that it (un)consciously hinders social mobility, as it is the individual (or specific subgroups) that does not succeed within the system.
3	1	32		Moreover, social and ethnic inequalities in educational outcomes are rationalized and legitimated through the liberal rhetoric of a meritocratic school system, in which individual merit is coined as the main determinant for educational success (Augoustinos et al., 2005; Fasset & Warren, 2007; Hirtt et al., 2007).
3	1	35		By combining these, at first sight conflicting, notions of meritocracy (considering individual merit) and deficit thinking (which relates to socio-ethnic group membership), structural inequalities within the educational system and the broader society are ignored.
7	1	41		Three factors are closely linked to the meritocracy discourse, two have strong affiliation with deficit thinking and the last one grasps a luck or fate factor.
7	1	43		The latent concepts linked to meritocratic thinking are 'failure ascribed to a lack of effort', 'failure attributed to a lack of competence' and 'success attributed to individual merit'.
8	1	11	The qualitative fieldwork shows a strong support for the dominance of the discourse of individual merit that stresses the importance of the pupils' 'agency' in achieving well.	

8	1	37		Based on the literature about the meritocracy discourse, we can expect that those pupils in the most prestigious educational tracks are most convinced that being in the general track is due to their own individual merit, and not following this track is attributed more to a lack of competence and/or effort.
8	1	41		Concerning gender, SES and ethnicity, the hypotheses are less clear: on the one hand meritocratic and individualistic values are expected to be universal values in a modern democracy (Savage, 2000), on the other hand the most privileged groups construct hegemonic discourses as they have the most interest in upholding meritocratic values to justify their privileged position and to disguise structural inequalities (DiAngelo, 2010).
8	1	46		Therefore we can expect either no significant effects of SES and ethnicity, or more meritocratic values for ethnic majority and middle class pupils.
10	1	27	Minorities in general attribute their results more (than natives) to a lack of individual effort (in case of bad results) or individual merit (in case of good results).	
10	1	31	Pupils in the general track do attach more importance to the idea that good results are the outcome of their personal merit, and that bad results are more often 'their own fault'	
11	1	25		Overall, the meritocratic ideal of the individual being in control of his/her own success is strongly supported by our quantitative and qualitative data.
11	1	28		Yet, a more in-depth analysis of the data shows that the narrative on individualism and meritocracy goes hand in hand with a focus on the socio-ethnic context of pupils, more specifically their family and ethno-cultural background.

11	1	33		Although the primacy of the individual and the meritocratic ideal determines the dominant discourse, the narratives at the same time show focus on the nonschool related contexts the individuals find themselves in.
16	1	2		Interestingly, the discourses on meritocracy and deficit thinking seem to stress two contradictory representations of educational success and failure. We elaborate on this argument in the discussion.
16	1	9		It also reveals the tenacity of the meritocratic ideal of individual agency in teacher, parent and even pupil discourses.
17	1	17		One general tendency apparent in the narratives and contrary to the idea of meritocracy and the preponderance of individual agency, is the (implicit) victimization of individuals as being determined by socio-cultural or even mental structures (Gillies, 2005; Valencia & Black, 2002; Ratner, 2000).

Park, J. J., & Liu, A. (2014).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
37	1	41		We argue that Asian Americans exemplify why narrow, “objective” conceptualizations of meritocracy and critical mass—two concepts central to affirmative action—are flawed and thus why revised, more holistic conceptualizations are needed.
38	1	3		In our analysis, we use the Critical Race Theory tools of interest convergence and divergence to explain how (re)definitions of meritocracy and critical mass are key to understanding the multi-faceted relationship between Asian Americans and affirmative action.
38	1	7		First, we encourage fellow Asian American readers to consider how the concepts of “meritocracy” and “critical mass” have been (mis)applied to our community.
38	1	14		Second, we write for the broader community of educators, researchers, and policy makers to help them understand how consideration of Asian Americans experiences begs for more nuanced, holistic conceptualizations of meritocracy and critical mass, underscoring the relevance of Asian Americans to the affirmative action debate.
38	1	19		We then introduce the Critical Race Theory constructs of interest convergence and divergence and use both tools to critique dominant conceptualizations of meritocracy

					and critical mass.
40	1	32			In the next section, we introduce the analytic tools we will use to advance our argument for redefining meritocracy and critical mass as they apply to the affirmative action debate.
42	1	14			As we will show, the current state of interest divergence shows how revised conceptualizations of meritocracy and critical mass would better serve the interests of Asian Americans and the broader college-going population.
42	1	21			American colleges and universities pride themselves on meritocratic values.
42	1	25		That pattern eventually gave way to the ideal that only the most qualified and talented (i.e., the meritorious) should be allowed entry to selective higher education institutions, not the richest and most connected (Cohen, 1998).	
42	1	29		Despite espousing commitments to merit-based admission, institutions can stray from their ideals.	
42	1	35			The continued debate over legacy admissions is another example that offends meritocratic sensibilities.
42	1	36		Valorizing the concept of merit suggests that everyone admitted to an institution “deserves” to be there because of her or his own	

				accomplishments.		
42	1	38		It also implies that standards of merit can be objective, narrowly defined, and consistent.		
43	1	8		The apparent fluidity of what constitutes “merit” is an issue that confounds any conversation about admissions policies.		
43	1	10		A narrow and restrictive view of merit might heavily privilege SAT scores.		
43	1	14		Conceptions of merit vary from institution to institution. In a study of admissions policies at 17 elite colleges, Killgore (2009) found that students’ academic and extracurricular accomplishments merely serve as a baseline for admissions consideration		
43	1	21		More holistic considerations of merit align with the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger (2003).		
43	1	32		The Grutter decision serves as testament to an inclusive, holistic conception of merit, particularly vis-à-vis efforts to attain a critical mass of URM students, a concept we dissect later.		
43	1	35		The battle over merit can also be viewed as a struggle among status groups and organizational interests (Karabel, 2005).		

43	1	37	When admission by merit, however defined, does not converge with institutional interests, a general course of action is to redefine the manner of assessing students.	
43	1	41	The early 20th century changes to admissions practices at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton that curtailed Jewish enrollment is an example of the institutional management of merit (Karabel, 2005).	
43	1	42	Indeed, Karabel (2005) has suggested that the definition of merit “always bears the imprint of the distribution of power in the larger society” (p. 550)	
44	1	4	In the 1930s, James Bryant Conant, the president of Harvard introduced standardized testing as a means of “objectively” assessing student aptitude, thereby ushering in a new era of testing as a way to measure merit.	
44	1	10	The establishment of the SAT and the growing influence of the Educational Testing Service created a strong perceptual link between test scores and merit that has been difficult to disassociate (Lemann, 1999).	
44	1	11	Such narrow conceptions of merit work to cloak the reproduction of inequality in supposedly scientific, objective terminology (Baez, 2004).	

44	1	19	Baez (2004) has argued that the same dynamic is at work in standardized, high-stakes testing, where the public assumes that standardized tests capture a pure, untainted conception of merit.	
44	1	31	To describe the scenario bluntly, a historically dominant White society has set the terms of the game through the objectification of merit and valorization of standardized tests, and many Asian Americans are trying to play by what they perceive to be the rules.	
44	1	39		Acknowledging the premium that many Asian Americans place on standardized test performance, the anti-affirmative action movement has used the case of Asian Americans to argue in favor of a narrow view of meritocracy.
45	1	8	When narrow conceptions of merit are prioritized, the alliance between some Asian Americans and the anti-affirmative action movement is a case of interest convergence: Opponents of affirmative action happily annex Asian Americans to their cause when Asian Americans are angered that high test scores and GPAs do not automatically guarantee admission into highly selective institutions.	

45	1	36	<p>While anti-affirmative action advocates are quick to lament that non-standardized measures of merit hurt Asian Americans and favor URMIs, they have yet to meaningfully acknowledge how holistic review can favor Whites in the selective admissions process.</p>	
45	1	39	<p>Defenders of standardized conceptions of merit may decry efforts to curb Asian American enrollment as an injustice to Asian Americans, but we suspect they are more prone to view such practices as unjust when framed as a byproduct of affirmative action—in the interests of URMIs—versus negative action, in the interests of Whites.</p>	
46	1	40	<p>Ironically, the latter case of divergence should challenge opponents of affirmative action to reassess whether a narrow and standardized framing of merit is really advantageous, but we find that anti-affirmative action advocates will play both sides when it comes to merit.</p>	
46	1	42	<p>They want quantifiable standards of merit when they keep out supposedly unqualified URMIs but appear willing to dismiss such rigidity if it works against their self-interest.</p>	
47	1	4	<p>In a compelling example, a recent study found that White adults are more likely to support flexible, holistic versions of merit when they are reminded that Asian Americans in the UC system make up more than double their proportional representation in the state</p>	

				of California.	
47	1	11	Asian Americans complicate the affirmative action debate by providing evidence that merit is actually a highly flexible, subjective, and dynamic concept tied to the interests of various stakeholders.		
47	1	15	When the demographic shifts of the 1980s led to increasing numbers of Asian Americans participating in higher education, admissions debates abounded regarding narrow conceptions of merit vis-a-vis the virtues of selecting a diverse or balanced body of students.		
47	1	19	The lower admission rates for Asian Americans at highly selective institutions compared to other applicant groups led to questions about Asian Americans being held to different standards of merit (Nakanishi, 1989).		
47	1	20	Asian American admissions trends demonstrate that the idea of merit is neither concrete nor transparent; rather, it is a contextually defined and determined concept.		
47	1	23	In the case of what constitutes merit, standardized measures of excellence are a double-edged sword for Asian Americans.		

47	1	31	We believe narrow definitions of merit neither meet the interests of Asian Americans nor the goals of colleges and universities.	
47	1	33	Yet, we recognize that a legitimate danger of more holistic and dynamic notions of merit is that such practices can open the door to admissions officers stereotyping Asian Americans or holding them to a higher standard of excellence than other racial/ethnic groups, even on non-standardized measures of achievement (e.g., co-curricular involvement and leadership).	
47	1	38	Historically, admissions personnel used holistic assessments of merit to justify formal and informal quotas on Jews and Asian Americans rooted in stereotypes about these populations (Karabel, 2005; Takagi, 1992).	
48	1	3	Opponents of affirmative action might retort that using “objective” standards of merit like test scores prevents such stereotyping and allows admissions officers to judge each applicant independently of subjective attitudes and bias	
48	1	18	White Asian Americans as an aggregate group are known for consistently meeting certain standards of merit valued by the dominant culture (primarily standardized measures of academic achievement), we urge admissions counselors and policy makers to remember that Asian American students bring far more to the	

			table than test scores that boost U.S. News and World Report rankings.	
48	1	24	Further, Asian Americans themselves need to consider that test scores are not the sole way to demonstrate merit and that an admissions system that overprivileges test scores does not serve their long-term interests. In addition to complicating notions of meritocracy, Asian Americans further confound the affirmative action debate by challenging understandings of critical mass. Institutions also benefit from admitting numerical critical masses of Asian American students because doing so preserves the façade of SAT scores as a substantive indicator of merit.	
56	1	14	However, we argue that Asian Americans are not just passively affected by affirmative action but that they actually affect the policy itself by challenging traditional conceptions of meritocracy and critical mass and offering support for more holistic measures of both.	
56	1	17	We add to the conversation by using the CRT tenet of interest convergence to demonstrate how the dominant narratives of meritocracy and critical mass appear to represent the interests of Asian Americans and may do so in the short term.	

56	1	22	<p>In fact, a deeper investigation reveals that interest divergence is more powerfully at work in both cases.</p> <p>Asian Americans are evidence that mainstream conceptualizations of merit and critical mass do a disservice to students, Asian American and otherwise, thus necessitating broader, more holistic understandings of these two concepts.</p>	
56	1	38	<p>Third, our work shows how Asian Americans are highly relevant to how the theoretical constructs of merit and critical mass are defined and measured, lending support for more holistic conceptualizations of both.</p>	
57	1	4		<p>By showing how Asian Americans demonstrate a case for a broadened understanding of meritocracy and critical mass, we show the continued necessity of affirmative action as a tool that can help enroll a talented and multi-faceted class.</p>
57	1	26		<p>Our discussion of meritocracy and critical mass demonstrates that it is misguided and counterproductive to box Asian Americans into conventional narratives.</p>
57	1	32	<p>If the basic premise of interest convergence holds firm, then advocates of holistic conceptions of merit and critical mass are unlikely to gain mainstream backing unless Whites view such notions as being advantageous to them.</p>	

Phillips, P. C. B. (2014).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
3	1	22		These societal structures form a meritocracy in which some members occupy elevated positions relative to others, at least for a time.
4	1	4		Such fellowships offer status and lead to a stratified structure of membership within a society that becomes a distinguishing characteristic of its meritocracy.
4	1	5	Fellowship in a leading international society is generally considered to be a singular honor. As a public endorsement of merit and accomplishment, it can have a lasting effect on a career and remuneration.	
4	1	8	Assessment of merit necessarily involves human judgment about the contributions of individual candidates.	
4	1	12		Part of our goal is to confront the analytic challenge of combining relevant information and opinions in a way that assists the overall assessment of candidates in a meritocracy vote.
5	1	10	How, in such a system, can the merit that underlies a meritocracy be fairly determined, or even defined?	
6	1	5	How, in short, may weaknesses in the democratic voting system be attenuated in societal decisions on merit?	
6	1	18		For instance, in meritocracy voting where there are thresholds and quotas for election, individual elector decisions to support, abstain, or rank candidates can end up having a major impact on outcomes.

7	1	22	The goal, in short, is to assist the process of voting on merit by measuring merit — measuring the unmeasurable—by widening the effective electorate that enters the decision process with a broad additional class of objective and subjective elements.	
7	1	26	These elements involve a comprehensive (i.e., electorate wide) peer evaluation component that is combined with bibliometric measures to determine an explicit merit threshold (a vote percentage) that is needed for election.	
9	1	17	In effect, the number is a voting merit threshold for fellowship which relies directly on inner sanctum views of exclusivity and indirectly on views of past election results.	
9	1	21	The mechanism suggested in the present article seeks to bring further information to bear on this critical merit threshold, to provide a flexible data-based method for the determination of , and to make individual specific.	
9	1	26	The credentials that define merit are subjective and inevitably rely on personal judgment.	
9	1	30	We therefore propose that the merit threshold be determined to explicitly incorporate such information—both objective and judgmental—and to do so in a way that reflects a wide body of base knowledge in the profession arising from published research and its adjudged merit.	
10	1	2	The goal, in effect, is a mechanism that assists in measuring the “unmeasurable” element of merit in a meritocracy.	
10	1	8	As indicated, we seek to make individual specific so that its value may reflect the merits of an individual candidate as measured by the information set that is used in its determination.	

10	1	11	The resulting distribution differentiates candidates according to their revealed merit, but it leaves to voters the ultimate task of determining election.	
10	1	25	The starting point is to make the merit threshold individual specific.	
10	1	26	In particular, for each nominee a personal threshold of voting support—the merit threshold for that individual—is determined for this person's election.	
10	1	27	The merit threshold depends on accomplishment and is measured by an accomplishment factor $X \in [0, 1]$.	
10	1	rod n 8	To be measured a quantity must first be defined, a task of longstanding relevance in economics whether the quantity in question is the price level, utility, happiness, or merit.	
10	1	rod n 8	In all such cases the inherent multidimensional nature of the quantity (and in the present case the subjective elements involved in defining merit) must be addressed even when a single index proxy variable is used in the accounting process.	
16	1	18	Thus, voters influence the election of each candidate by transporting their personal information and subjective assessment of a candidate into a score that affects the merit threshold of the candidate as well as by a direct Yes/No vote on the candidate.	
16	1	29	In order to control the influence of the additional information embodied in X on electorate voting, parameters may be set to determine upper (U) and lower (L) merit thresholds for election.	
16	1	34	With these settings and given the additional information X , the formula for the merit threshold has the form	

17	1	1	For each candidate (i) in the election, the corresponding merit threshold i is computed using formula (4) together with the component information $X_i = X_{ai} + X_{bi}$ for that individual.	
17	1	5	The decision rule in the election of candidate i then depends on the actual voting percentage (V_i) supporting that candidate in the election. If $V_i \geq i$ so that the percentage of actual votes meets or exceeds the candidate's merit threshold (i), then the candidate is elected. Symbolically, $E_i = 1$ if $V_i \geq i$ gives the election outcome (1 = success; 0 = failure).	
17	1	11	When the merit threshold bound parameters are equal, i.e., $L = U =$, the datum X has no effect on the outcome which is then determined solely by some specified threshold level for election (i), as commonly occurs in current societal practice (e.g., in fellowship elections of the Royal Society and the Econometric Society—see Section A.4 of the Appendix).	
17	1	20	The merit threshold for a candidate (again omitting the index i) then has the following explicit form:	
18	1	3	One likely effect of the introduction of evidence-based merit thresholds is a reduction of the distortion bias that can arise from cluster voting for less (materially) qualified candidates.	
18	1	10	The presence of such candidates at pre-eminent institutions might itself be regarded as an endogenous indicator of quality and may therefore, in some formulae, enter into the merit threshold calculation—for example, in the case of the mechanism described above, it may enter through the peer review factor X_b by way of the individual quality assessment j .	

18	1	13	However, we can expect that to be elected when an evidence-based merit threshold is used, such candidates will generally require a greater percentage of the votes cast in the election if their quantitative merit score X is below the threshold	
18	1	16	Another mitigating effect in the use of an evidence-based merit threshold is the reduction of bias arising from invisible college coalition voting for candidates within certain fields.	
18	1	23	These factors end up determining the merit threshold that is needed for a candidate's election and this broad basis of extra information on the candidate will tend to dilute the impact of coalition voting in the election.	
18	1	31	The latter is the main focus and reveals how various degrees of component information affect the perception of merit and drive the threshold level.	
23	1	7	The subjective assessment data submitted in the election returns by each voter are aggregated to produce the subjective component X_b and combined with the objective data X_a to produce X and compute the merit threshold for each nominated candidate.	
23	1	9	Actual votes for candidate i are expressed as a percentage (V_i) of all valid votes cast and compared with the candidate's merit threshold i .	
23	1	22	For instance, in an election system where only votes count, the merit threshold for election must still be determined.	

25	1	12	Just as peer review is considered an essential element in academic merit assessment, human judgment is an important factor in most other areas of quality assessment.	
25	1	22		Combining these dual sources of objective and subjective data, accounting for the differential background information that is inevitably involved in human assessment, and understanding the statistical implications of the averaging process involved in index construction from high-dimensional sources of data is the much broader arena within which the task of meritocracy assessment resides.
25	1	28		While many of the issues we have raised have broader import in the general area of quality assessment, they are particularly relevant to the Econometric Society (ES) which has been an honor society with a meritocracy of fellows from its inception.
29	1	34		The focus of the present contribution is the appraisal of credentials, the operational use of available quantitative information and the pooling of human judgment across a population of voters in the process of electing new members to a meritocracy.
30	1	8		This research in economic theory is relevant in the current setting of meritocracy voting because it focuses on the evolution of the voting franchise over time and the effects of this endogeneity on institutional structure and reform.
30	1	11		On the other hand, none of this work addresses the issue of appraisal that is fundamental to meritocracy.
30	1	12	The goal of 'measuring merit' is undoubtedly elusive.	

30	1	19			It surely befits such disciplines and particularly economics, so often regarded as the queen of the social sciences, to pioneer a way of bringing the “theory quantitative” and “empirical quantitative” into societal decision making on matters as fundamental to a meritocracy as fellowship elections.
30	1	21		The formulae given here are a first step in addressing these issues. The specific rule (4) is designed to assist in the merit selection process by explicitly taking into account subjective assessments of individual candidates for election as well as direct quantitative measures of quality such as publication numbers in learned journals, rankings or citations.	
30	1	32		The import in both cases is that a wider body of views and material evidence comes into consideration when the information is embodied in a merit threshold for election.	
31	1	8		This component then combines with material information about the candidate to determine the candidate’s merit threshold.	
31	1	20		The present article will have achieved its immediate goal if it stimulates further thinking on these issues and on the general problem of quantifying the assessment of merit.	
31	1	22			The longer term and more ambitious goal of this research is to assist learned societies in the complex task of sensibly utilizing wider information sets in critical decision making on meritocracy elections, so that these elections more accurately mirror research accomplishment in the discipline.

31	1	25	Research on this topic is important not only for learned societies but for the many other instances in academic life where merit assessment is a critical matter in the careers and lives of our colleagues.	
33	1	15	We work with continuous distributions and simple parameterizations so that it is convenient to explore how different distributional shapes in the primitives impact the merit threshold distribution.	
34	1	6	The parameters can be classified as follows: (i) density parameters $\beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3$, that govern accomplishment and peer assessment; and (ii) control parameters M, u that implement policy concerning winsorizing bibliometric data via the upper bound M and the upper u and lower limits to the overall assessment factor X which determine the merit thresholds.	
34	1	24	The merit threshold distribution of θ is computed using the rectified (double spike and smooth) density $p(\theta)$ given in (5) and (6).	
34	1	26	Table 2 presents summary statistics calculated for this merit threshold distribution, showing the probability $P(\theta \geq U)$ of exceeding the upper threshold U , the probability $P(\theta \leq L)$ of exceeding the lower threshold L , and the mean threshold level $\bar{\theta}$.	
36	1	13	Table 2 provides a selection of other cases, showing how mixtures of high and low levels of accomplishment and peer reviews affect the merit threshold.	

38	1	4	Qualification for fellowship requires “demonstrated distinction in research in statistics or probability by publication of independent work of merit” or “well-established leadership whose contributions to the field of statistics or probability or the application of statistics or probability shall be judged of equal value.”	
38	1	7	Royal Statistical Society: No merit assessment is required.	

Reynolds, J., & Xian, H. (2014).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
121	1	1		Social scientists have a long-standing interest in meritocracy.
121	1	4		Indeed, generations of authors have studied countries around the world looking for objective measures of how open and meritocratic societies are.
121	1	6		In this paper, we examine a related but rarely studied issue: whether people believe they live in a meritocratic society.
121	2	7		Beliefs about meritocracy even seem to influence the behavior of the U.S. Supreme Court (DeSario, 2003).
121	2	9		American beliefs about meritocracy are particularly interesting because of the contrast between what Americans believe and what they experience (McNamee & Miller, 2009).
121	2	12		The belief in meritocracy is described as part of the dominant American ideology (Marger, 2008: 216; Rothman, 2005: 71), and Americans are more likely than people in other countries to think mobility is tied to effort and skills and less likely to think it is tied to family wealth (Isaacs, Sawhill, & Haskins (2008).
122	1	2		Actual mobility patterns, however, suggest that non-meritocratic factors may actually be more important in the U.S. than in other countries.
122	1	11		American beliefs about meritocracy are also interesting because there are good reasons to suspect that they may have changed in recent years.
122	1	26		Events like these may convince Americans that the U.S. is becoming more meritocratic.
122	1	27		Studies that examine beliefs in meritocracy, however, are relatively rare.

122	1	28		The most recent peer reviewed studies of meritocracy in the U.S. rely on data that are more than twenty years old (see Barnes, 2002; Shepelak, 1989).
122	1	31		Consequently, it is not clear if Americans see the U.S. as a largely meritocratic country or how unified they are in their beliefs.
122	1	36		We examine the importance Americans attribute to both meritocratic and non-meritocratic elements and their overall assessment of how meritocratic the United States is.
122	1	41		We also examine how Americans layer beliefs about meritocratic and non-meritocratic elements on top of each other.
122	1	43		Finally, we examine how beliefs about meritocracy vary by race, gender, class, and age.
122	1	48		The connotation of the word meritocracy has become strikingly more positive since its creation in 1958.
122	1	51		Michael Young coined the term in his book, Rise of the Meritocracy, and defined it as a society in which merit = IQ + effort. He argued that attempts to create a meritocracy could lead to undesirable outcomes; most notably, a demoralized underclass whose relative disadvantage would be seen as deserved (1958).
122	2	5		To Young, meritocracy was something we should fear. Today, however, much to Young's chagrin (2001), the pursuit of meritocratic ideals is typically seen as unambiguously good, fair, and desirable (Allen, 2011; Breen & Goldthorpe, 2001), especially in the United States (Kunovich & Slomczynski, 2007).
122	2	11		Given the enthusiasm for meritocratic ideals, it is not surprising that researchers have looked for objective criteria to assess how meritocratic different societies actually are.

122	2	44	<p>Researchers have also examined how transitions from communism to capitalism influence people's beliefs about inequality (Kluegel, Mason, & Wegener, 1995) and the extent to which people think rewards should be distributed according to merit (Kunovich & Slomczynski, 2007; Smith & Mateju, 2012).</p>	
123	1	12		<p>Furthermore, studies of explanations for wealth and poverty rely on a conceptual framework that focuses on the distinction between individual and structural factors, and those concepts do not map neatly onto the notion of meritocracy.</p>
123	1	14		<p>Indeed, although some individual factors such as hard work and talent are meritocratic, individual factors like a person's willingness to lie, cheat, or steal are non-meritocratic.</p>
123	1	17		<p>Likewise, although structural explanations of economic status are often non-meritocratic (e.g., racism, sexism), structural factors can also be meritocratic (e.g., anti-discrimination laws).</p>
123	1	22		<p>. With few exceptions, studies of beliefs about wealth and poverty do not consider whether individual or structural factors are meritocratic.</p>
123	1	25		<p>For these reasons, research on beliefs about poverty and wealth can only be used as a rough guide for understanding beliefs about meritocracy.</p>
123	1	28		<p>We found only a few studies that examine the extent to which people believe their position in life is determined by meritocratic and/or non-meritocratic factors. Shepelak (1989) examined the American belief in meritocracy using a single item from the 1984 General Social Survey.</p>

123	rod	3	Kluegel, Csepeli, Kolosi, Örkény, and Neményi (1995) crossclassified the individual/structural factors with a “positive” and “negative” dimension. Kreidl even refers to “merited” and “unmerited” wealth and poverty (2000).
123	rod	6	n both cases, however, the retention of the individual/structural framework obscures respondent’s beliefs regarding meritocracy as does the focus on wealth and poverty rather than mobility more generally.
123	2	18	The most recent examinations of beliefs about meritocracy in the U.S. are in reports describing national surveys conducted for the Pew Charitable Trusts’ Economic Mobility Project (see Economic Mobility Project, 2009, 2011).
123	2	36	The dark bars in Fig. 1 show the percentage of respondents who gave each item top marks in 2011 by indicating that it was “one of the most important factors” or “very important” factors in determining whether Americans “get ahead” or “fall behind.” The highest rated factors were those typically associated with meritocracy (e.g., hard work, ambition).
123	2	43	ce were considered the least important. These survey items indicate that Americans strongly believe economic success depends on meritocratic elements.
123	2	45	At least some respondents acknowledge the importance of non-meritocratic elements such as family and social connections, but these elements are generally regarded as less important.
123	2	47	The belief that meritocratic elements matter more than non-meritocratic elements is also conveyed by another piece of data from the 2011 survey (Economic Mobility Project, 2011).

124	2	1	<p>Finally, we found one study outside the U.S. that examines whether people believe they live in a meritocracy. Using Polish and Hungarian data from the 1987 and 1992 International Social Survey Program, Locklear (1998) examines beliefs about the importance of ambition, effort, and education for “getting ahead,” and makes comparisons for each component over time and between the two countries.</p>
124	2	13	<p>Together, the studies described above provide some insights into beliefs about meritocracy, but the information they provide is incomplete.</p>
124	2	15	<p>First, it is unclear how American beliefs about meritocracy have changed over time.</p>
125	1	7	<p>Second, none of the studies provides an overall assessment of American’s beliefs in meritocracy or an examination of how individuals combine beliefs in meritocratic and non-meritocratic elements.</p>
125	1	10	<p>If Americans believe that the U.S. is a fairly perfect meritocracy, they would believe that mobility depends on meritocratic elements and reject the idea that it depends on non-meritocratic elements.</p>
125	1	15	<p>The results from the Economic Mobility Project (2009, 2011) suggest that the overall beliefs in meritocracy is not that strong: Americans believe in both meritocratic and non-meritocratic elements, at least at the aggregate level.</p>
125	1	19	<p>The unanswered question is what accounts for these aggregate level findings. It is possible that some Americans believe the U.S. is a meritocracy while others do not.</p>
125	1	21	<p>Alternatively, many Americans may simultaneously believe in the importance of both meritocratic and non-meritocratic elements.</p>

125	1	28	Finally, existing studies provide some puzzling findings and contrasting explanations of why beliefs in meritocracy vary from one person to the next. Barnes (2002) and Shepelak (1989) concluded that beliefs regarding meritocracy do not vary much by gender or race.
125	1	32	Shepelak found that more educated respondents tended to question meritocratic beliefs, but Barnes found that they placed less (rather than more) weight on ascription.
125	1	35	Furthermore, Shepelak found that age did not predict people's beliefs in meritocracy, but Barnes concluded that age was strongly and positively associated with a belief in ascription.
125	1	38	To extend research on beliefs in meritocracy, we focus on three goals.
125	1	40	First, we examine how Americans' beliefs about meritocracy have changed over time.
125	1	42	eliefs Americans have about meritocratic and non-meritocratic elements.
125	2	2	First, using the same logic as Kluegel and Smith (1986), we expect that because the notion of meritocracy is so central to U.S. culture, people will believe strongly in the importance of meritocratic elements (hard work, ambition, and education) and at the aggregate level, those beliefs will remain fairly stable over time.
125	2	7	Beliefs about the importance of non-meritocratic factors, in contrast, may be weaker and change more over time.
125	2	19	Second, we expect that Americans will vary in the combinations of beliefs they hold about meritocratic and non-meritocratic elements.

125	2	23		Some significant percentage of Americans will probably agree with the dominant ideology and see the United States as a country where meritocratic elements are very important for getting ahead and non-meritocratic elements are not.
125	2	26		Other people, however, are likely to layer a belief in non-meritocratic elements (e.g., discrimination) on top of the dominant ideology thus creating a “dualconsciousness.”
125	2	28		Others may believe in meritocratic elements while doubting the importance of meritocratic elements.
125	rod	7		uired to explain, for instance, why an individual may think society ought to be both meritocratic and non-meritocratic.
125	rod	13		Less work is required to understand why people might believe society is actually both meritocratic and non-meritocratic.
126	1	5		In short, we expect that although the dominant ideology will lead many Americans to emphasize meritocratic elements, Americans will also depart from this perspective in a variety of ways.
126	1	32		We suggest that exposure is crucial for explaining beliefs about the way a stratification system actually works and self-interest is crucial for explaining attitudes about the way a stratification system ought to work. Exposure to non-meritocratic elements (or inequalities) encourages a belief in their existence.
126	1	34		Once people believe that non-meritocratic elements (or inequalities) exist, self-interest influences what people think ought to be done about it.

126	2	15	<p>We argue that because of their exposure to situations where non-meritocratic elements matter, minorities, women, older respondents, and members of the lower class will believe strongly in the importance of non-meritocratic elements for getting ahead.</p>
126	2	23	<p>one's lived experience is free from the influence of nonmeritocratic elements, and older people have had more time than younger people to see non-meritocratic factors at work.</p>
126	2	25	<p>Previous research on meritocracy also suggest this effect of age (Barnes, 2002).</p>
126	rod	26	<p>Also, self-interest arguments would not suggest (as we do) that age will be associated with a belief in the importance of non-meritocratic elements.</p>
127	1	2	<p>Finally, like minorities and women, people in the lower class are likely to have considerable experience with situations where non-meritocratic elements matter.</p>
127	1	4	<p>Given the strength of the dominant ideology, we suspect that exposure to non-meritocratic elements will lead to the layering of a belief in those elements on top of a belief in meritocratic elements, but it is possible that the exposure could also reduce the belief in meritocratic elements.</p>
127	1	10	<p>This second possibility seems especially likely for the lower class. While being in the lower class exposes people to non-meritocratic elements, a low economic status also carries the message that meritocratic elements (e.g., their own hard work) do not help people get ahead. Kluegel and Smith made a similar prediction (1986: 29–30), and Shepelak (1989) found some support for it: people with lower income were less likely to believe that achievement depends on education and ability rather than family background.</p>
127	2	18	<p>We measure beliefs about meritocracy using ten items (see Table 1).</p>

128	1	1	Three items measure the perceived importance of meritocratic elements for getting ahead (hard work, ambition, and education), and seven measure the perceived importance of non-meritocratic elements.
128	1	4	Conceptually, the measures of non-meritocratic elements could be subdivided into two groups: those related to discrimination and those related to family and friends.
128	1	11	The results support the creation of three measures that conform to our conceptual grouping of the items above: one for meritocratic elements, one for discrimination, and one for friends and family.
128	1	17	Furthermore, when the number of factors is restricted to two, the discrimination and friends & family items are combined into one factor, thus supporting our theoretical rational for combining these items into one measure of non-meritocratic factors.
128	1	19	They measure the importance respondents place on (1) meritocratic items, (2) friends and family, (3) discrimination, and (4) non-meritocratic items (i.e., friends, family, and discrimination).
128	1	23	The fifth scale measures respondent's overall assessment of how meritocratic they think the United States is, taking into account both meritocratic and non-meritocratic elements.
128	1	30	The overall belief in meritocracy is calculated by subtracting respondents' scores on the non-meritocratic scale from their score on the meritocratic scale, thus generating a measure that ranges from -100 to +100, where -100 means the respondent thinks only nonmeritocratic elements are important for getting ahead, and 100 means the respondent thinks only meritocratic elements are important for getting ahead.

128	1	38	A score of zero indicates that the respondent thought meritocratic and non-meritocratic factors are equally important (or none of the factors were important) for getting ahead.
128	1	46	This overall measure is useful because it provides a summary assessment of how strongly people believe that the United States is meritocratic.
128	1	47	Finally, although measuring beliefs in meritocracy on a continuum is useful, additional insights can be gained by examining the combinations of beliefs people hold.
128	1	52	Our overall measure does not clearly identify people with a dual consciousness or those who doubt the importance of both meritocratic and non-meritocratic factors.
128	2	2	Both types of respondents would have scores near zero on our overall measure of meritocracy.
128	2	5	Consequently, we construct one final measure that divides respondents into four groups corresponding to the strength of their beliefs in meritocratic and nonmeritocratic elements relative to other respondents in that year.
128	2	9	Compared to other respondents, their belief in meritocratic elements is stronger than average and their belief in non-meritocratic elements is weaker.
128	2	12	Those with a “dual-consciousness” believe at least as strongly as average in both meritocratic and nonmeritocratic elements.
128	2	15	A third group of respondents are “cynics,” who believe more strongly than their peers in non-meritocratic elements and less strongly in the meritocratic elements.
128	2	17	Finally, “discouraged” respondents are less convinced than their peers that meritocratic or non-meritocratic elements are important for getting ahead.

128	2	34		Because beliefs about meritocracy may reflect factors besides race, gender, class, and age, we control for other personal characteristics and experiences.
128	rod	3		We also created a variable based on medians and a variable where respondents were placed in a fifth “centrist” category if their beliefs in both meritocratic and non-meritocratic elements were near the average.
129	1	2		Below, we provide a brief justification of how these control variables may matter for beliefs about meritocracy.
129	1	50		Then we examine subgroups (e.g., the items about discrimination) and our overall measure of meritocracy.
129	2	3		The second step in our analysis is to examine the combinations of beliefs people have about meritocracy.
129	2	7		We use ordinary least squares regressions to show how and why the overall belief in meritocracy is related to our explanatory variables.
129	2	19		Descriptive statistics show very clearly that Americans believe in the importance of meritocratic elements for getting ahead.
129	2	20		The individual meritocratic items in the top rows of Table 1 (columns 1 and 2) all have means of at least 3.20 (out of 4).
129	2	30		Americans believe very strongly in meritocratic elements.
129	2	31		Furthermore, while at least some Americans believe in non-meritocratic elements, those items are considered less important, on average, especially when they focus on discrimination.

129	2	36	<p>By comparing the results from 1987 and 2010, we can see that there was considerable stability in Americans' beliefs regarding the importance of meritocratic elements.</p>
128	2	37	<p>Our three-item scale of meritocratic elements, which included respondents' beliefs about the importance of education, hard work, and ambition did not change significantly between the two surveys.</p>
130	1	1	<p>Americans' beliefs about non-meritocratic elements, in contrast, did change between years.</p>
130	1	4	<p>While there was little change in respondents' beliefs about the overall importance of non-meritocratic elements between 1987 and 2010 (39.00 vs. 38.67) there were significant changes between the two years on all seven of the items in the scale.</p>
130	1	15	<p>Ultimately, despite all the changes in Americans' beliefs regarding what it takes to get ahead, our overall measure of the belief in meritocracy did not change significantly between 1987 and 2010.</p>
130	1	19	<p>Apparently, Americans believed just as strongly that the U.S. was meritocratic in 2010 as they did in 1987.</p>
130	1	30	<p>The results are also consistent with the idea that many Americans perceive the U.S. stratification system as simultaneously rewarding meritocratic and non-meritocratic elements.</p>
130	1	33	<p>To better understand the combinations of beliefs Americans hold, we examine respondents' scores on the scales of meritocratic and non-meritocratic elements simultaneously.</p>

130	1	39	Fig. 2 reveals considerable diversity in American's beliefs about meritocracy, and combinations of beliefs beyond the dual-consciousness emphasized in the literature.
130	2	1	The limited vertical variation indicates that Americans are fairly united in the belief that meritocratic elements are at least somewhat important for getting ahead.
130	2	10	Scores on the horizontal non-meritocratic axis are more varied, signaling less agreement about the importance of non-meritocratic elements.
130	2	13	To better understand what drives the variation in beliefs about meritocracy, we turn to a series of regressions.
130	2	20	We begin with two general comments about the models in Table 2, which examine the overall belief in meritocracy using linear regression.
130	2	23	Because the dependent variable in Model 1 is the difference between respondents' scores on the scales of meritocratic and non-meritocratic elements, the coefficients in Model 1 can be reproduced by subtracting the coefficients in Model 3 from those in Model 2.
130	2	34	Second, the size of the R ² varies, and the nonsignificant variables can tell an important story. Model 2, in particular, examines respondents' belief in meritocratic elements.
131	1	3	The R ² for this model is the smallest in the table, reflecting the relatively low degree of variance in respondents' beliefs about the importance of meritocratic elements.
131	1	4	This is expected given the emphasis American culture places on meritocracy and the results from previous studies of meritocracy (see: Barnes, 2002; Locklear, 1998; Shepelak, 1989).
131	1	13	The only variable associated with a weaker belief in meritocratic elements is age.

131	1	15	Turning to the primary results, we find that minorities have a weaker belief in meritocracy than Whites because minorities believe more strongly in the importance of non-meritocratic elements.
131	1	21	The negative and significant coefficient in Model 1 shows that on average, the overall belief in meritocracy is weaker among minorities than among Whites.
131	1	24	The non-significant coefficient in Model 2 reveals that this difference in the overall assessment of meritocracy is not due to doubts among minorities about the importance of meritocratic elements. Rather, minorities perceive the U.S. as less meritocratic overall because compared to Whites, they believe more strongly in the importance of non-meritocratic elements (family and friends, and discrimination) for getting ahead.
131	2	8	It hints that minorities may also have a greater propensity to have a dual-consciousness regarding meritocracy.
131	2	11	Gender differences in the overall belief in meritocracy reflect a somewhat different and unexpected dynamic.
131	2	14	Women tend to score higher than men on the overall scale of meritocracy.
131	2	15	Models 2 through 5 show that women's overall belief in meritocracy is higher than men's because women believe more strongly in the importance of meritocratic elements (Model 2) and less strongly in the importance of family and friends (Model 4).
132	1	6	Members of the working, middle, and upper class all have a slightly stronger overall belief in meritocracy than members of the lower class.

132	1	11	Furthermore, we expected that compared to people in other classes, members of the lower class would have both a weaker belief in meritocratic elements and a stronger belief in non-meritocratic elements.
132	1	19	This difference, however, is not large enough to create class differences in the overall belief in meritocracy examined in Model 1.
132	1	22	Finally, we find strong support for our prediction that the overall belief in meritocracy would weaken with age.
132	1	24	Furthermore, although part of this age effect is due to a weakening of the belief in meritocratic elements (Model 2), most of the effect is driven by a positive association between age and the belief in the importance of non-meritocratic elements, particularly discrimination.
132	2	9	For minorities, and older respondents, this translated into a weaker overall belief in meritocracy.
132	2	12	For members of the lower class, however, the stronger belief in discrimination was not enough to significantly lower the overall belief in meritocracy.
132	2	14	The results for gender did not support our predictions. Compared to men, women have a stronger overall belief in meritocracy because they believe more strongly in meritocratic elements and less strongly in non-meritocratic elements.
132	rod	2	Some authors have suggested that people who came of age in the 1960s might believe more strongly in non-meritocratic elements because of that experience (Davis and Robinson, 1991).
132	rod	6	o examine the possibility that the effect of age in our models reflects this type of cohort effect rather than the accumulation of experiences with nonmeritocratic elements, we added a squared term for age.

132	rod	7		It was not a significant predictor of the belief in non-meritocratic elements or the overall belief in meritocracy.
133	1	7		To examine combinations of beliefs in meritocratic and non-meritocratic elements that cannot be examined with OLS, we turn to a multinomial logistic regression.
133	rod	2		Cech and Blair-Loy (2010) suggested that women are exposed to non-meritocratic elements through employment.
133	2	5		Minorities are also 3.13 times as likely as Whites to be cynical: people who believe less strongly than average in meritocratic elements and more strongly than average in non-meritocratic elements.
133	2	8		It appears then that minorities not only layer beliefs on top of the dominant ideology of meritocracy, they also believe less strongly than Whites in the importance of meritocratic elements.
133	2	19		Table 3 provides strong evidence that lower class respondents have different combinations of beliefs about meritocracy than members of other classes.
133	2	24		These same groups, however, are also more likely than lower class respondents to be discouraged (i.e., doubt the importance of both meritocratic and non-meritocratic elements).
134	1	11		This pattern of results is consistent with our argument that beliefs about meritocracy are driven by exposure to non-meritocratic elements.
134	2	1		In this paper, we extend research on stratification beliefs by examining how strongly Americans believe in the existence of meritocracy.
134	2	3		We also examine how those beliefs have changed, how Americans combine beliefs in meritocratic and non-meritocratic elements, and why people differ in their beliefs.

134	2	9		Using data from the 1987 and 2010 General Social Survey, we found that Americans believe the United States is a very meritocratic society.
134	2	10		Beliefs about the importance of meritocratic elements for getting ahead were just as strong in 2010 as they were in 1987.
134	2	12		This strong and stable belief in meritocracy is consistent with the claim that American beliefs about the stratification system are heavily influenced by a dominant ideology. In this way, our findings echo research on beliefs about the causes of poverty and wealth (Kluegel & Smith, 1986).
134	2	18		Americans, however, do not completely discount the role non-meritocratic factors play in getting ahead.
134	2	19		In fact, the non-meritocratic elements Americans consider important have changed over time.
134	2	26		We show that people's beliefs about the importance of non-meritocratic elements reflect their location in the social hierarchy.
134	2	28		Minorities and older respondents tend to believe less strongly that the U.S. fits meritocratic ideals.
134	2	33		Older respondents emphasize discrimination too, but they also believe less strongly in the importance of meritocratic elements.
134	2	34		We also found that women believe more strongly in meritocracy overall.
134	2	36		This is because compared to men, they believe more strongly in meritocratic elements and less strongly in non-meritocratic elements.

134	2	41		Our analysis also reveals that beliefs about meritocratic and non-meritocratic elements can be layered on top of each other in a variety of ways.
134	2	45		About one quarter of Americans have a dual-consciousness that is formed by layering beliefs in non-meritocratic elements on top of a belief in the importance of meritocratic elements.
134	2	50		They are even more likely, however, to be cynics: recognizing the importance of non-meritocratic elements while simultaneously discounting the importance of meritocratic elements.
135	1	5		Young, upper class, White respondents, in contrast, are the most likely to be true believers, who emphasize meritocratic elements but discount the importance of non-meritocratic factors.
135	1	9		Surprisingly, lower class respondents are less likely than others to be discouraged, i.e., to doubt that getting ahead is related to meritocratic or non-meritocratic elements.
135	1	13		Our results are fairly consistent with the claim that exposure to non-meritocratic elements influences beliefs about meritocracy.
135	1	16		As predicted, minority status, age, and to some extent being lower class were associated with a belief in non-meritocratic elements and thus a weaker overall belief in meritocracy.
135	1	18		Because we have not directly examined exposure to non-meritocratic elements, we cannot know for certain if respondents' beliefs reflect exposure rather than self-interest.

135	2	4	<p>Research with more direct measures is thus required to confirm our argument that selfinterest is a powerful predictor of how people think the stratification system ought to work, but exposure to non-meritocratic elements is a more important determinant of people's beliefs about the stratification system actually works.</p>
135	2	15	<p>Why do women believe more strongly than men in meritocracy?</p>
135	2	18	<p>Why do members of the lower class have more faith in the importance of meritocratic and non-meritocratic elements than members of other classes?</p>
135	2	21	<p>Furthermore, there is much to be learned by contrasting American beliefs about meritocracy with beliefs about meritocracy in other countries (for one cross-national study, see Isaacs et al., 2008).</p>
136	2	7	<p>Finally, it would be useful to examine how people's beliefs about meritocracy are formed and modified over their lives.</p>
136	2	10	<p>At this point, however, several things seem clear. First, American beliefs about meritocracy are not static.</p>

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
551	1	8		In a country in which the majority of its inhabitants are poor, young telenovela viewers saw telenovelas as dramatizing the ideology of meritocracy in Brazilian society.
552	1	2	While the middle-class viewers were more likely to accept these messages unproblematically, members of the working class were more likely to wrestle with their lack of realism in comparison with their own lives. However, given the strength of existing beliefs regarding merit, none of the viewers I spoke to could imagine social alternatives to the parables that television shows produced—that is, alternatives that could become a key factor in articulating political resistance to the status quo.	
552	1	33		This is the first text elaborated within the field of communication studies to apply the above-mentioned perspective to a study of the role of television in the reproduction of meritocratic ideology.
553	1	6		Yet the ideology of meritocracy blames working-class Brazilians for their own poor living conditions, lack of social status, and limited opportunities for the future.
553	1	7		ouza argues that meritocratic ideology has become the dominant force behind Brazil's imbalanced modernization strategies.
555	1	2		Thus, a rejection of ideology, either by declaring the falsity of meritocracy or personalism as legitimate rationales for the production of social class, could be seen as a first step toward an oppositional stance in political terms.
556	1	14		It is worth noting that the telenovela has always been a hybrid text (Garcia Canclini 1997), fusing the aesthetics and themes associated with high, mass, and popular cultures. Nevertheless, its narrative tends to hide or obscure class inequalities, through investment in the ideology of meritocracy.
556	1	30		The present study is no exception in this regard, insofar as the young viewers who participated in it overwhelmingly identified with the meritocratic ideology encoded within the telenovelas they watched.

556	1	34		Our findings support Souza's assertions about the power of meritocratic ideology in explaining social class, although some critical comments made by working-class interviewees also suggest that they were more likely to question the structural determinants of Brazilian social inequality than were members of the middle classes.
556	1	39	Regardless of their own social class positions, interviewees talked about the merit of different telenovela characters in relation to class mobility	
557	1	17		In articulating the ideology of meritocracy, interviewees framed merit in terms of individual effort.
558	1	11	This helps us to understand why our interviewees drew upon fatalistic and personalist ideologies. Supernatural and personal relations worked together with characters' talents and efforts to make their own merits materialize.	
558	1	44		In carrying out our research, it became clear that youth not only legitimated the ideology of meritocracy but also read meritocracy in conjunction with other justifications for social inequalities and class division.
559	1	21		The power of meritocratic ideology to justify inequality works across classes, yet members of the popular classes are more attuned to the structural determinants of social hierarchy: perhaps because they believe that while it is true that merit participates in constructing more or less privileged positions within the capitalist system, it works as a rule for those who have access to cultural, social, and economic resources and as an exception for those to whom the former resources have been denied.

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Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
1	1			In his 1958 dystopia <i>The Rise of Meritocracy</i> , Michael Young used the term ‘meritocracy’ in a pejorative sense, warning against the inequalities that a meritocratic system produces and perpetuates.
1	1			This positive assessment and taken-for-grantedness of meritocratic rules have had a strong effect on the logic governing organizations in Western societies, and in particular in the UK, in that the policies addressing staff recruitment and progression have been developed in line with meritocratic premises.
2	1	3		Currently, these premises are rarely challenged, despite the fact that the spread of meritocratic principles has not brought about greater equality of opportunities and/or outcomes.
2	1	8		It has now been over a decade since, on the pages of this journal, Scully (2002) called for scrutinizing errors existing within meritocratic organizational systems, especially universities and within them schools of management/business.
2	1	12		Responding to this call we address the question of how meritocracy is, or is not, contested in business schools in the UK.
2	1	13		We also ask what effects the contestation of meritocracy, and the absence thereof, have on power relations within the organizations and on the situation of individuals who, while potentially being disadvantaged by the processes of reproduction of inequalities, are the target of meritocratic policies.
2	1	15		We also ask what effects the contestation of meritocracy, and the absence thereof, have on power relations within the organizations and on the situation of individuals who, while potentially being disadvantaged by the processes of reproduction of inequalities, are the target of meritocratic policies.

2	1	18	<p>We see the rise of this group of workers as an opportunity to problematize meritocratic premises, since the experiences of this group may provoke a new awareness of how inequality distorts opportunity structure in organizations.</p>
2	1	24	<p>Throughout the analysis, we approach meritocracy as a discourse which is invoked by our research participants when they speak about the system within which they construct their careers.</p>
2	1	29	<p>In this context, studying meritocracy as a discourse constitutes a previously under-explored approach and another contribution of our research.</p>
2	1	32	<p>In this context, studying meritocracy as a discourse constitutes a previously under-explored approach and another contribution of our research. Recently, Van den Brink and Benschop (2012), in their discussion of gender inequality and gender equality practices in relation to professorial appointments in Dutch universities, described meritocracy as a 'hegemonic discourse' used by appointment committee members to 'veil the practice of inequality' and the fact that the meritocratic policies are in reality 'routinely ignored' (2012: 81).</p>
2	1	35	<p>However, the authors do not develop a more systematic analysis of meritocracy in discursive terms.</p>
2	1	39	<p>Our findings reveal that meritocracy is a dominant discourse in the narratives of foreign women academics.</p>
2	1	40	<p>Where meritocracy is explicitly contested, this can lead either to a feeling of discouragement or the possibility of dissent.</p>
2	1	44	<p>First, it de-essentializes the concept of meritocracy, showing how it is socially constructed and how extant power relations always imbue the definitions and application of meritocratic principles.</p>
2	1	46	<p>Second, through this study of minority workers we demonstrate how meritocracy has</p>

				become a paradigm for understanding the way organizations function.
3	1	1		Moreover, the conceptual critiques that are available to contest the meritocratic system, such as intersectionality, are insufficient for the unsettling of its paradigmatic status.
3	1	3		We therefore show that one of the possible consequences of contesting meritocracy by those who feel disadvantaged by the meritocratic system is, paradoxically, its perpetuation and even its further strengthening.
3	1	6		In the remaining parts of this article, we first offer an overview of the concept and the mainstream discourse of meritocracy with an emphasis on its place in academic staff recruitment and progression in UK higher education.
3	1	8		We then outline a number of critiques that have been put forward in relation to meritocracy.
3	1	10		We also explain why studying discourses is important for organizational scholars, and in particular, why it is relevant to our research, before moving on to the discussion of contestation, or the lack thereof, of meritocracy in the narratives of our research participants.
3	1	18		While often being traced back to Confucian principles and Plato's notion of the ideal state, the concept of meritocracy saw more widespread use with the aforementioned publication of Young's (1958) classic political satire <i>The Rise of the Meritocracy</i> , which illustrated the dangers of applying meritocratic principles within society.
3	1	20		Historically, the emphasis on merit in Western societies emerged in the climate of rationalism propagated by the philosophy of Enlightenment and in response to the demands posed by the industrial revolution for competent individuals to be employed in the increasingly complex organizations.
3	1	24		In modern societies, merit-based achievement was to enable the efficient allocation of occupational positions (Jackson, 2007).

3	1	26	Meritocratic systems, to quote Davis and Moore (1945: 242), convey ‘the best reward’ and ‘the highest rank’ to those positions which ‘(a) have the greatest importance for the society and (b) require the greatest training or talent’.
3	1	28	A key element of the mainstream discourse of meritocracy, as Allen (2011) points out, is the positive way in which it frames the reproduction of inequalities, stemming from the notion that meritocracy generates a justly unequal distribution of rewards.
3	1	33	Meritocracy thus is presented as a desirable, transparent system facilitating social mobility.
3	1	35	The discourse of meritocracy which portrays it in positive terms has influenced public sector employment in the UK since the mid-19th century (Pellew, 1982).
3	1	37	Higher education constitutes no exception in that it reflects broader societal meritocratic principles through implementing equal opportunities policies and procedures, that is, through ‘[importing] equity and social justice agendas from the wider society and, in common with other large organizations, looks at ways of improving its performance in these respects’ (Brennan and Naidoo, 2008: 287–288).
3	1	42	The presence of the notion of performance and its improvement within the mainstream discourse of meritocracy in organizations points to an important aspect of it, i.e. the criteria for measuring merit.
2	1	43	As Jackson (2007: 368) explains, the concept of ‘merit’ is understood to denote both ‘those formal qualifications that an individual has achieved—outward demonstrations of inner capacities and skills’ as well as ‘a measure of the specific inner capacities of individuals’ (Jackson, 2007: 368).
3	1	46	The application of meritocratic systems, then, relies on an agreement as to what constitutes merit and how to measure it.

4	1	3	At present, among those UK universities that consider themselves research intensive, generation of research outputs within 'market-framed research competitions' (Kim, 2009: 396) is seen as the major criterion of merit, measured through the Research Excellence Framework (REF)1 evaluation system which stipulates the degree of meritoriousness of various types of outputs.	
4	1	5	The term 'excellence' is of importance here, since there is a close link between the idea of merit and that of excellence.	
4	1	6		As Van den Brink and Benschop (2011: 509) explain, 'in a meritocracy, the label of excellence should be reserved for scholars of the greatest merit'.
4	1	8		Hence, the rhetoric of research excellence and quality constitutes an inherent feature of the current discourse of meritocracy in UK academia.
4	1	9	Other recognized areas of merit against which the performance of academics is measured include teaching, income generation, public engagement and the fulfilment of leadership and management roles within the organization	
4	1	12		Another important aspect of the discourse of meritocracy, which can be discerned both in relation to the more abstract discourse of a meritocratic social system and with reference to the specific UK academic context, is the centrality of the individual.
4	1	18		Overall, the discourse of meritocracy in UK higher education reflects the way in which the majority of academic literature and everyday discourse refer to meritocracy at the level of society: as an abstract, timeless ideal, resting on the principles of justice, objectivity, social cohesion, progress, fairness and transparency (Allen, 2011).

4	1	25		Despite its generally positive connotations and appraisal, the mainstream discourse of meritocracy has also attracted criticisms, partly due to the problematic conceptual issues associated with it, and partly as a result of empirical evidence that counters the promises contained within this discourse.
4	1	28		Below, we outline the major points found in critiques of meritocracy.
4	1	30		While it is necessary to be aware of the interconnections between these points—for example, there is a link between the individualistic and the gendered nature of meritocracy (see Bagilhole and Goode, 2001)—for the purposes of analytical clarity, we present them in several separate sub-sections.
4	1	36	Amartya Sen (2000: 6) argues that ‘there is some elementary tension between (1) the inclination to see merit in fixed and absolute terms, and (2) the ultimately instrumental character of merit—its dependence on the concept of “the good” in the relevant society’.	
4	1	38	The instrumentality of the notion of merit as applied in practice leads to definitions of merit always being contextual and subjectively established (Goldthorpe, 1996).	
4	1	39	There is, in this sense, nothing intrinsically meritorious about possessing particular abilities.	
4	1	40	Rather, merit constitutes a dynamic, relative, socially constructed phenomenon (Tomei, 2003).	
4	1	41	As a consequence of viewing merit as socially constructed, the place of power in the appraisal of certain abilities as meritorious should be acknowledged.	
4	1	43	Therefore, the portrayal of merit within the mainstream discourse as objective and absolute is inaccurate, as is the absence within it of consideration of power in defining and rewarding merit—a second point of critique, on which we elaborate below.	
5	1	3		What is also absent from the mainstream discourse of meritocracy—and what, by contrast, its critics highlight—is consideration of power within a meritocratic system.

5	1	4	Constructions of merit, i.e. what abilities are seen as desirable and worthy of reward in a given context can be attributed to those in positions of power who determine what counts as merit based on their own interests and achievements (MacKinnon, 1987; McNamee and Miller, 2004).	
5	1	9	When viewed as rooted in notions of merit as defined by powerful elites, merit-based employment practices have been considered to discriminate against minority groups, hence not creating the equal opportunities that are hailed as generated by a meritocratic system (Roemer, 2000).	
5	1	12		While the mainstream discourse of meritocracy portrays merit as identity-blind, definitions of merit have been criticized as gendered (Burton, 1987; Riley, 2002; Webb, 1997), classed and racialized, and the very possibility and desirability of meritocracy have been questioned on the basis of it glossing over causes of inequality (McNamee and Miller, 2004).
4	1	17		Below we present several more specific critiques pointing to the sources and consequences of unequal power relations within meritocratic systems.
5	1	21		Problematic for the critics of meritocracy is the notion of individualism inherent in the discourse of meritocracy, whereby 'your problems are all your fault ... your privileges are all your own achievement' (Brennan and Naidoo, 2008: 290).
5	1	24		As Riley (2002) and Augoustinos et al. (2005) argue, this individualist flavour of meritocracy functions to make invisible the material benefits generated by a meritocratic system to the dominant group, thus contributing to perpetuation of the status quo.
5	1	26	Whereas the assessment of academic merit takes place at the level of an individual, its achievement depends on belonging to and taking advantage of networks of academics.	

5	1	37		In this context, the critical voices regarding the supposed individualism of meritocratic systems is yet another point of critique of meritocracy, one which questions the assumed gender-blindness of meritocratic principles.
5	1	44		In the workplace, the application of meritocracy as a system in which access and progression are open to all based on achievement can be examined conceptually through Acker's (1990) well-known analysis of organizational hierarchies and jobs as inherently gendered processes.
5	1	47		Here, the absence of the body from the discourse of organizational meritocracy is brought to the surface.
6	1	2		Underpinned by the assumption that an individual is recruited for a job, and that the hierarchical progression of the job-holder occurs regardless of, for example, gender, class, race, nationality or ableness, organizational principles and procedures based on meritocracy frame workers as disembodied subjects, and jobs and hierarchies as abstract categories with no human bodies attached to them.
6	1	10		In this way, seemingly neutral merit-based measurement systems such as performance evaluations are underpinned by, and produce, gendered differences (Jonnergård et al., 2010).
6	1	18		Altogether, the achievement of merit as defined within UK higher education is less likely for women than for men (Currie et al., 2000; Knights and Richards, 2003).
6	1	27		The academic discourse of intersectionality is characterized by those elements that are absent from the discourse of meritocracy in that it frames individuals as embodied human beings, entangled in power relations exactly because of processes associated with the multiple effects of, for example, gender, race, class, age or ableness.

6	1	32		<p>The term ‘intersectionality’ was introduced by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989, 1991) as a conceptual opposition to the flaws inherent in the premises of meritocracy, specifically to contest the assumed ‘colour-blindness, neutrality and objectivity’ (Nash, 2008: 1) of the legal system in relation to the employment experiences of black women, and violence against women of colour.</p>
6	1	46		<p>The very concept of intersectionality encompasses assumptions exactly opposite to those of meritocracy.</p>
6	1	46		<p>In contrast to the discourse of meritocracy, which takes for granted the possibility of developing a social structure in which, for example, gender, race and class will be irrelevant for the location of an individual within this structure, intersectionality stresses the simultaneous effects of such categories, framing them as ‘interlocking systems of oppression’ (Collins, 1990: 225).</p>
7	1	3	While the notion of merit assumes a disembodied subject, intersectionality brings embodied human experiences to the fore.	
7	1	6		<p>Unlike the discourse of meritocracy, which disregards power relations underlying definitions of merit and shaping the outcomes of applying meritocratic principles, within the academic discourse of intersectionality individuals are portrayed as located within specific power structures and relations.</p>
7	1	9		<p>Moreover, whereas the meritocracy is considered as serving to stabilize and normalize social and organizational inequalities and the processes of their reproduction (Allen, 2011), intersectionality—through the critical way it appraises the mechanisms and effects of power—provides discursive resources that open up the possibilities of emancipation and transformation (Dhamoon, 2011).</p>
7	1	13	Finally, unlike the individualistic emphasis of merit, intersectionality covers both the level of the individual and the collective (Hankivsky and Christoffersen, 2008).	

7	1	15		As the discussion above shows, central to the mainstream discourse of meritocracy in general and in UK academia in particular are notions of social justice, transparency, equality of opportunities, fair and free competition, social progression, objective measurement criteria and individual achievement.
7	1	19	What is absent from the discourse, as its critics point out, is the recognition of the context-dependency of the notion of merit functioning in a given system, the role of power in defining merit and the way it is measured, the place of the collective in the achievement of merit by an individual, as well as the effects produced by the multiple bases for inequality, such as gender, class, age, nationality, race and ableness.	
7	1	26		Therefore, the above sub-sections discussing extant critiques of the mainstream discourse of meritocracy, especially the last two, should be of particular relevance to them
7	1	28		These critiques could possibly offer foreign women academics a way of making sense of their professional experiences and open up an avenue for challenging the underlying meritocratic principles and practices operating within the organizations they work for.
7	1	42		Key to our discussion of meritocracy in UK higher education is Foucault's (1978: 100) idea about discourse's capacity to not only reinforce but also to unsettle extant power relations, since discourse can constitute both 'an instrument and an effect of power' as well as 'a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy'.
7	1	46		In this sense, while we consider the mainstream discourse of meritocracy to produce a particular type of reality, we also believe that an alternative, critical discourse could create a breakthrough and a possibility of change.

8	1	8		Bearing the above in mind, we are interested in the reproduction and contestation of meritocracy in the narratives of foreign women academics.
8	1	29		In our exploration of the experiences of this growing but hitherto under-researched category of workers we focus on how the discourse of meritocracy is drawn upon and contested in the narratives of foreign women academics making sense of their working lives trajectories.
8	1	31		Within the contestation of meritocracy by our research participants we point to them mobilizing other discourses, which we identify as belonging to the language of critiques of meritocracy.
10	1	17		In this article, our analysis focused on how the participants invoked elements of the discourse of meritocracy and its critiques when speaking about their experiences of working in UK academia.
10	1	18		In this context, we view meritocracy as an identity-regulating discourse (Zanoni and Janssens, 2007) which can be discerned in the self-positioning by employees (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002), and also in the way that social actors 'attempt to shape their identities and relations with others' (Thomas and Hewitt, 2011: 1374).
10	1	24		Working with the transcripts, we sought to locate elements of the meritocratic discourse as observable in statements (see McKenna, 2011).
10	1	25		As previously outlined, the meritocratic discourse is characterized by notions of achievement, individualism and just rewards, for example.
10	1	32		This enabled us to see emerging themes which reflected the presence of a meritocratic discourse (cf. McKenna, 2011).
10	1	45	Underlying assumptions embedded in the talk, for example regarding individual agency and responsibility, and subscribing to notions of merit-based achievement, indicate how power operates through the	

			meritocratic discourse: by constituting subjects that produce—or challenge—the meritocratic system.	
11	1	4	Our discussion identifies the presence of individualizing discourses that privilege personal agency and the principles of merit in foreign women academics' accounts of their work experiences.	
11	1	8		However, the discourses mobilized by the participants also construct, for example, gender, nationality and race as potentially disadvantageous in the workplace, and offer articulation of arguments that challenge the 'paradigm of individual achievement' (West and Fenstermaker, 2002) which underpins meritocratic ideals.
11	1	10		First, we outline how participants draw on a discourse of meritocracy to explain success and achievement.
11	1	11		We then explore whether and in what way the belief in meritocracy is unsettled when confronted with experiences suggesting that a meritocratic system does not necessarily produce beneficial outcomes for all in an identity-blind manner.
11	1	13		Finally, we discuss what happens when, rather than drawing on the discourse of meritocracy, individuals refer to the often intersecting processes associated, for example, with the simultaneous effects of gender and race, to make sense of their experiences within the UK academic system.
11	1	20		We start by considering examples from interviews where participants draw on the discourse of meritocracy in support of existing opportunities for progression.
11	1	21		Here, we observe how references to meritocracy serve to construct individuals' identities in positive terms, casting them as actual or potential achievers with good prospects of career progression.
11	1	23		In such accounts, academia emerges as a meritocratic system in which qualifications and hard work determine the distribution of rewards in a just manner (Allen, 2011):

11	1	32		In the extract above, the discourse of meritocracy is exemplified, in the first place, by reference to the notion of quality, whereby quality is framed as a universal, objective criterion, defined and operating independently of, for example, gender, nationality or race of the individual.
11	1	39		Diana frames this kind of discrimination as only affecting workers with low qualifications, hence distancing herself from it. Moreover, qualifications—another element of the discourse of meritocracy mentioned by her—are presented as not dependent on gender, race, age or ableness.
11	1	40		The meritocratic discourse thus appeals to Diana as it creates an advantage for her and identification with it mitigates the possible effects brought about by nationality, race, gender and age which she sees as a potential source of disadvantage for low-qualified workers.
11	1	44		Diana's adoption of such paradigmatic view of meritocracy as the organizing principle of academia has a dual outcome for her situation.
11	1	46	On the one hand, it motivates her belief and hope that if she fulfils the merit criteria stipulated by the organization, she will be able to progress.	
12	1	3		Diana's example provides an illustration of the belief in the meritocratic principles being broadly held by those at the bottom of organizational power structures, even if they themselves have not yet progressed within the organization, and how this leaves these structures uncontested and intact.
12	1	9		The discourse of meritocracy also tends to be drawn upon in discussing one's achievements, thus allowing successful individuals to narrate their career progression and to position themselves in stable and positive terms within the organization.

12	1	12	As Sealy (2010: 187) argues, ‘women often express strong commitment to the notion of meritocracy, particularly in relation to their own selection and promotion’.
12	1	23	Here, we find references to the underlying assumptions of the meritocracy discourse: the job itself becomes abstracted from the person who performs it (cf. Acker, 1990).
12	1	31	Such conceptualization of a CV recurs in many of the interviews, whereby the CV emerges as a seemingly objective testimony of ‘outward demonstration’ (Jackson, 2007: 368) of the individual’s capabilities, and therefore provides a measure of merit.
12	1	43	Such accounts contribute to meritocracy remaining an uncontested system within which jobs are seen as carried out and objectively assessed by ‘disembodied’ individuals, even if, as Van den Brink and Benschop (2011: 12) tell us, in academia ‘standards of merit are constructed by powerful academics who stand to benefit from a construction that is presented as a precise, objective and univocal measure of excellence’ and that in reality, this ‘claim of neutral, objective and precise measurement does not hold’.
13	1	2	Some participants draw on the idea of equal opportunities and fairness of treatment, ensured within a meritocratic system (Brennan and Naidoo, 2008), for example as a shield against the possibility of suffering discrimination:
13	1	10	In her narrative, Laila refers to hard work—an element of the meritocracy discourse—as a guarantor of non-discriminatory treatment.

13	1	16		Here, again, meritocracy emerges as a paradigm for understanding the organization of academic work and the distribution of rewards, against the previously discussed idea that what exactly counts as valuable work and therefore the extent to which specific tasks are assigned merit depends on the interests of powerful actors (Tomei, 2003).
13	1	22	Throughout Laila's narrative, the qualitative and quantitative differences—such as those regarding the proportion of time allocated to teaching versus research—in workload levels between, for example, a junior lecturer and a professor are not mentioned. Similarly, the differences between the degrees of merit attributed to different types of work outputs, reflected, in the case of research-intensive institutions, in the privileged position given to research over teaching, are also unaddressed.	
13	1	25		Laila, like many other participants, also draws on the individualist aspect of meritocracy: an individual's responsibility for her own progression (Allen, 2011; Brennan and Naidoo, 2008).
13	1	28	An emphasis on the role of the individual in shaping her own career outcomes glosses over the dependency of the achievement of academic merit on belonging to a network of support, which, as Bagilhole and Goode (2001) point out, is much more likely to be secured by men than women.	
13	1	30	Therefore, again, it leaves uncontested the power structures within which merit is defined, achieved and assessed.	
13	1	32		At the same time, for the specific individual, it creates space for feeling comfortable within the meritocratic structures of academia.

13	1	36		We now move on to examine instances where the meritocratic discourse, represented by the abstract notions of 'quality', 'research excellence' and 'hard work' intertwines in the narratives of our participants with them referring to themselves as embodied workers, and bringing in the impact on their careers of, for example, gender, nationality, religion and race.
13	1	40		In the first place, inserting the body into the meritocratic discourse makes visible the power structures underlying the definition and application of meritocratic principles:
14	1	4	Magdalena, initially, draws on an abstract notion of being 'good' in professional terms, before pointing to the implications of the organizational power structures for her situation at work. First, she presents decisions about 'getting involved' or conversely being 'set aside from' activities as made by others rather than herself. She also admits that local norms of merit, i.e. what counts as 'the right way' of being and acting, are defined and applied by the British majority.	
14	1	15	Claiming that merit is defined and assessed by representatives of the dominant gender and nationality, however, does not automatically mean that the functioning of meritocracy itself is contested in terms of its outcomes.	
14	1	21	Hence, even if the processes of assigning tasks considered as meritorious are perceived as dependent on judgements made by British men, career outcomes are still framed in the context of performance achieved due to an individual's effort and talent.	
14	1	24		Regardless of the recognition of inequalities existing within the organizational hierarchy, the application of meritocracy remains unchallenged
14	1	25		This, again, points to the paradigmatic status of meritocracy as the model of thinking about the principles governing employment and career progression in higher education.

14	1	29	While bringing in the simultaneous impact of gender, motherhood and religion as reasons behind her lack of merit in the area of academic publication, she does not question the power structures within which merit is defined and meritorious performance achieved in UK academia:	
14	1	47		While Patricia points to the principle of particular types of jobs being linked to suitable bodies (Acker, 2006), she reproduces the discourse of meritocracy as currently defined within UK academia.
15	1	1		Patricia's example confirms Allen's (2011: 10) argument that nowadays, 'the principles of meritocracy ... became internalised'.
15	1	3	In her narrative, gender and religion emerge as obstacles to the achievement of merit by an individual, but not in structural terms, only in reference to herself: it is still the individual who holds responsibility for meeting the criteria of merit, and the fact that the very way merit is defined and assessed puts certain categories of workers in an advantageous position while discriminating against others remains unquestioned.	
15	1	15		In line with the mainstream discourse of meritocracy, Patricia emphasizes her own duty to build her network of collaborators, even though she suspects others might not readily wish to collaborate with her.
15	1	19		Despite noticing that, in her own case, the functioning of the academic system is not identityblind, she adopts an unquestioning stance towards the meritocratic premises and the progression rules of UK academia.
15	1	24		The interplay of meritocracy and invocation of, for example, gender and nationality of the individual can, however, also lead to an effect of empowerment.
15	1	26		Below we return to Petra who, in talking about the way she first entered UK academia, draws on the discourse of meritocracy while simultaneously referring to her particular position on the intersection of gender and region of origin, i.e. the fact of being a woman from Eastern Europe, in positive terms:

15	1	44	However, while she explicitly mentions her gender and region of origin as important factors in enabling her to commence her career in the UK, she simultaneously draws on the discourse of academic merit as identity-blind.	
15	1	46	In framing her academic skills as independent of her gender and nationality, Petra is able to legitimize her entry into the UK academic system solely on the basis of merit.	
16	1	5		This, again, points to the paradigmatic status of meritocracy in the narratives of our research participants.
16	1	9		Sealy (2010: 187) contends that 'whilst the ideology of meritocracy may be attractive, the reality of organizational life suggests it does not lead to appointments and responsibilities being based solely on talent and ability'.
16	1	12	In the narratives we find examples of those realities not being framed as shaped based on merit.	
16	1	13		Below, two examples taken from the interview with Maya show how narrating one's career without references to meritocracy but rather, as influenced by, for example, gender, nationality or religion, can have significant disempowering effects on individuals:
16	1	28		Her lack of belief in the identityblindness of meritocratic principles tends to influence the actual choices she makes in relation to getting involved in activities that contribute to the attainment of merit as currently defined in UK academia.
16	1	35	Through not applying for external examinerships or not supervising doctoral students from Arab countries, she contributes to reproducing the 'inequality regimes' (Acker, 2006) whereby certain merit-granting activities remain carried out mainly by the powerful majority.	

16	1	36		In this sense, the (in)actions resulting from her personal critical appraisal of meritocracy within UK academia contribute not to challenging, but to perpetuating extant power relations.
16	1	38		Two of the participants speak about how their lack of belief in meritocracy has resulted in deliberate resistance towards the structures of power within which academic merit is defined.
17	1	4		
17	1	6	She also questions the way merit is defined in universities. In her case, the realization that, for example in the lecturing context, being 'male, possibly oldish, possibly pretty tall, and with a posh voice' constitutes the meritorious 'norm' has led to personal micro- emancipation.	
17	1	12		Another example of practices of resistance associated with the contestation of meritocratic principles and their application is provided by the narrative of Lisa who, first of all, stresses the precarity of her position as a foreign woman within the organization she works for:
17	1	26		In her narrative, terms such as 'double jeopardy', 'disadvantage' and 'oppression' serve to construct her location at the bottom of the power hierarchy within the organization and, in contrast to the mainstream discourse of meritocracy, to frame the distribution of rewards in her organization as unjustly unequal (see also Allen, 2011).
17	1	35	However, she also expresses doubt about her promotion prospects within the current regime of definitions of merit because, as she sees it, the work she does 'counts for nothing here'.	
17	1	39	Both Zarah's and Lisa's strategies of resistance, if applied on a larger scale, might stand the chance to unsettle and contribute to redistributing the power structures of defining and applying merit in UK academia.	

17	1	43	In this article, we have explored the contestation—and its absence—of meritocracy in business schools in the UK.
17	1	44	We have also asked what effects the contestation of meritocracy, or the lack thereof, has on the situation of individuals and the power relations within the organizations.
18	1	3	In particular, it provides insights into the role of minority employees in reproducing and challenging the mainstream discourse of meritocracy in organizations.
18	1	4	The work of other researchers has pointed out how the ‘ideology of meritocracy’, reflected in the language of official managerial rhetoric, ‘conceals practices of inequality that have nothing to do with merit’ (Van den Brink and Benschop, 2011: 518).
18	1	13	Through our analysis, we add to this body of work by focusing on the perpetuation of, and also challenge posed towards, the unequal power relations in academia by the way in which foreign women academics invoke the discourse of meritocracy and its critiques in making sense of their working lives trajectories.
18	1	15	Our findings resonate with Allen’s (2011) argument that contemporarily, the belief individuals have in meritocracy constitutes an important feature of a meritocratic system.
18	1	15	Here, meritocracy emerges as a paradigm for making sense of the way academia is organized.
18	1	17	To start with, this belief in the university as a meritocratic institution is widely shared as an internalized, taken-for-granted assumption by those of our research participants in the early stages of their careers who have not yet had first-hand experience of whether, indeed, academic progression takes place according to meritocratic principles.

18	1	22	Second, our analysis reveals that even where individuals have experienced either career advancement or discrimination due to reasons not associated with merit, this does not tend to disrupt the hegemony of the meritocratic discourse in their narratives and thus does not lead them to questioning the application of meritocratic rules.	
18	1	24		Moreover, meritocratic principles remain unquestioned also where individuals have observed and been affected by the definitions of merit as being produced by the dominant majority within the organization.
18	1	27		The generally uncritical reproduction of the discourse of meritocracy, as illustrated by our study, can be seen as a positive phenomenon in relation to its consequences for the way an individual feels about and acts in the workplace.
18	1	29		Subscribing to the mainstream discourse of meritocracy leads individuals to becoming 'colluded selves' (Casey, 1995, 1996) and as such it opens up for them the opportunity to develop a proactive and optimistic approach to their career prospects and achievement.
18	1	32		What needs to be noted, however, is that when meritocracy is invoked exclusively in positive terms, participants often construct themselves as 'disembodied' workers, operating within 'disembodied' organizations, and portray the academic environment as one in which hierarchies, jobs and organizational processes are not influenced by, for example, gender, race or nationality of those who work in and manage them (cf. Acker, 1990).
18	1	39		Further, even if the locus of power in UK universities is, sometimes explicitly and sometimes by implication, identified as residing with white British men, the paradigmatic status given to meritocracy still contributes to the perpetuation of extant power relations.

18	1	43	In cases where individuals acknowledge that the systems of progression within their institutions are not gender- or nationality- blind, this does not necessarily become a reason for them to critique and challenge the principles and application of meritocracy or the power structures in their organizations.
19	1	1	The paradigmatic position of the discourse of meritocracy is at present so strong that it renders extant critiques of meritocracy, both conceptual and empirically-based ones, insufficient for unsettling it.
19	1	3	How, then, is meritocracy contested and what outcomes does this bring about for the individuals and for the organizational power relations?
19	1	5	As we have shown, those participants who narrate their careers without invoking the discourse of meritocracy, tend to mobilize a vocabulary that is absent from it, especially when they refer to their own position on the intersection of, for example, gender, nationality and religion.
19	1	7	One direct effect of a discursive critique of and mistrust in meritocracy is self-exclusion from getting involved in merit-accruing activities.
19	1	10	Considering what has been said previously about how the discourse of meritocracy is invoked, when looked at from the point of view of outcomes, both the affirmation and contestation of meritocracy can contribute to its reproduction.
19	1	19	While we consider meritocracy to be a better system than, for example, nepotism or arbitrary managerialism, we believe that the principles and application of meritocracy in universities should be contested, and space should be created for a more open use of critiques of meritocracy and for unsettling the currently dominant discourse.

19	1	23		Conducting academic research along the lines of the present study constitutes a step towards revealing how powerful the discourse of meritocracy is in contemporary organizations, and why this is problematic from the perspective of the situation of groups such as foreign women academics.
19	1	26		However, to counter the effects of the hegemony of the discourse of meritocracy on the reproduction of inequalities in organizations, research alone is insufficient.
19	1	27	We see the need for definitions of merit as applied in UK academia to be scrutinized and modified, with an active participation of minority groups in these processes of redefinition.	
19	1	33		Groups such as foreign women academics can play an important role in creating the climate for this change to be instigated. Against the individualizing tendencies of meritocratic systems, we call for collective action in the form of support groups and associations that would engage in mentoring and sharing experiences, in order to develop an awareness of organizational 'bases for inequalities' (Acker, 2006) and the mechanisms through which these inequalities are reproduced.
19	1	38	Such associations could also act as spaces for propagating and raising the profile of practices which are currently not attributed a high degree of merit in academic institutions, such as conducting research and publishing work in outlets outside the context of highly ranked US- and UK-based journals.	
19	1	40		They would provide a forum for appraising and influencing the functioning of meritocracy at the level of particular institutions, and for challenging the definition and outcomes of the meritocratic principles as currently applied in UK academia.

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Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
699	1	2		Meritocracy—a system in which rewards are distributed based on individual merit rather than, for example, inheritance or payment—serves to legitimate the status hierarchy in modern industrial democracies, in contrast to the inherited and coercive dominance of elites in traditional societies (Young, 1958; Weber, 1968; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977).
699	1	12		Michael Young, in the book that coined the term ‘meritocracy’ (1958), warned against a system in which elites use notions of ‘merit’ to reproduce status and hence to sustain inequality in society.
700	1	1		The education system is a key site through which meritocracy is legitimated while simultaneously status is reproduced (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977).
700	1	10	Overall, we also know that adults’ levels of education are correlated with the degree to which they perceive social rewards to be fairly distributed on the basis of merit; those with higher levels of education are more likely to believe that their country is a meritocracy (Duru-Bellat & Tenret, 2012).	
701	1	17		The findings demonstrate how the perspectives of elite actors can serve to legitimate and, consequently, perpetuate a system of meritocracy whose outcomes are stratified by race, class and school type.
701	1	26		First, most students describe the admissions process as meritocratic and reject the tradition of inherited status.

701	1	30		Second, those who acknowledge the dearth of state school graduates and minority students either suggest that underrepresented students are choosing not to apply or matriculate, or else they define meritocracy as being constituted not only by intelligence but also by skills that are best cultivated in private school settings, accounting for the overrepresentation of private school graduates.
701	1	37	This second rationale conceptualizes the university as static, such that prospective students must conform to the cultural and academic expectations there, rather than a dynamic one that responds to the needs of a changing student body comprised of a diverse set of meritorious students.	
702	1	44		(1) Would you say Oxford is a meritocracy in terms of its admissions?
703	1	23		We expected to observe differences between children of immigrants and those with UK-born parents and between state and private school graduates with respect to perspectives on meritocracy, given their lack of history at Oxford and the overrepresentation of private school graduates at the university.
703	1	33		Oxford University became increasingly meritocratic after World War II in its admissions, but since the 1970s the strong competition for admission has led to an increase in the preponderance of private school graduates (Soares, 1999).
704	1	12		When posed the question ‘would you say Oxford is a meritocracy in terms of its admissions?’
704	1	28		Furthermore, 18 of the 46 respondents (nearly 40%) also mentioned unequal schooling as a mechanism by which others—especially students from state schools—did not have the opportunity to meet the meritocratic standards that Oxford holds.

704	1	32		Some students both affirmed Oxford's meritocracy while also reporting unequal access via low-quality schooling.
704	1	38		This suggests that those who gained entrance despite their state-funded secondary education are more likely to see faults in the meritocratic system—in this case via schooling inequality—while those from private schools are more likely to overlook unequal access, suggesting that exposure to schooling inequalities personally may make state school graduates more cognizant of inequalities in the system.
705	1	27		This outlook resonates with those of many others who also identified inequality in schooling while also emphasizing belief in Oxford's meritocracy.
705	1	9		In other words, to some, unequal outcomes based on unequal schooling was lamentable but did not compromise Oxford's meritocracy.
705	1	34		So it is a meritocracy but that meritocracy might be to do with the upbringing of the child.
705	1	40		Students like the one above believed that admissions should be based on criteria that are achieved more successfully through private school education (high national test grades, interview performance), because those are what constitute meritocracy.
705	1	41	These findings suggest that the students understood merit not only as intelligence and thus intellectual capabilities but also as constituted by skills, which they accepted to be cultivated most successfully in private schools and in middle- and upper-class families.	
705	1	45		This explains why some state school students could use their own admission as evidence of meritocracy.

705	1	47			It proved to be a meritocracy for me because I went to a state school, and I'm an ethnic minority.
705	1	52		It does appreciate all people on their merit.	
706	1	1			Like several others, this student still tempered her view of Oxford's meritocracy by recognizing the dearth of students from secondary schools like the ones they attended:
706	1	6		Then again there is also a huge ratio of private school to state school so I am not sure whether that's based on merit, because I'm not sure all private school children would be more intelligent than state school children, so I think there is a slight kind of bias towards them. But, I think it's getting better, definitely.	
706	1	10			Such a qualification of an affirmative answer regarding whether Oxford is a meritocracy was common.
706	1	13			A minority who identified inequality in schooling argued that this inequality compromises Oxford's meritocracy.
706	1	13		These students believed that merit is evenly distributed in the population, and so the disproportionate numbers of private school students indicated a problem.	
706	1	15			The 20% of students who said that Oxford is not a meritocracy either cited inequality in schooling or else pointed to peers whose parents also went to Oxford.
706	1	34			He draws from popular culture—a movie—to understand how family connections to Oxford (and its colleges) might advantage the children of Oxford graduates. Students citing the lack of meritocracy defined merit as potential to shine at Oxford, based on intelligence alone.
706	1	37			For example, recall the student above who cited the overrepresentation of private school graduates as evidence of a lack of meritocracy, assuming that intelligence is evenly distributed in the population.

706	1	42	While a majority of students acknowledged that merit can be cultivated, all related their own status achievement to intelligence in one way or another.	
708	1	35		Given the overall beliefs in meritocracy as well as the explanations for black disadvantage, what do students feel the university should do, if anything?
709	1	2		Interestingly, although a majority of students either qualified their answers to whether Oxford is a meritocracy or disagreed altogether, few, when asked, had suggestions for how the university could better include black students.
711	1	13		A majority of students believed that Oxford is meritocratic in its admissions process.
711	1	15		Still, private school graduates were more likely than state school graduates to believe in Oxford's meritocracy.
711	1	17		This finding suggests that those who gained entrance despite their state-funded secondary education are more likely to see faults in the meritocratic system—in this case via schooling inequality—while those from private schools are more likely to overlook unequal access.
711	1	27		Thus, students defined meritocracy not only as intelligence but also as skills, which many acknowledged are best cultivated in private school settings.
711	1	34		Their sense of accomplishment and self-worth derived from their self-identified intelligence, which provided them with a solid and defensible rationale to overlook inequalities nurtured in the seemingly meritocratic system.
711	1	35		Furthermore, by affirming Oxford's meritocracy in admissions and recognizing the university's outreach to underrepresented groups, most students thereby maintained

					the legitimacy of the admissions contest and thus preserved the legitimacy of their burgeoning elite status as Oxford undergraduates.
712	1	1	1		This rationale allows students to maintain their sense of accomplishment and self-worth in a meritocratic system that cultivates inequality.
713	1		7		Other research has shown that national context does indeed influence the degree to which individuals in society believe that the society functions as a meritocracy (Duru-Bellat & Tenret, 2012).
713	1		10		Origins aside, the lack of expectation that the university change and adapt to accommodate nontraditional students assists in the maintenance of a static model of meritocracy at Oxford, and in this way reproduces social inequality.
713	1		14		Through this perspective, students did not have to compromise the legitimization of their own status achievement based on merit and thus their elite status itself.
714	nota 3	3			It is interesting to note that students' definitions of meritocracy do not align with the dominant view of moral philosophers, who suggest that if merit is inherent rather than earned it cannot be the basis for the social distribution of rewards (Rawls, 1971)—in this case, for admission to Oxford.
714	nota 6	12			Some students asked what meritocracy means.
714	nota 6				They were told, 'Meritocracy is a system in which achievement and success are based on merit rather than, for example, who your parents are, what school you went to, your class, who you know, etc.

Barbera, S., Bevia, C., & Ponsati, C. (2015).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
1	1	3		Egalitarianism and meritocracy are two competing principles to distribute the joint benefits from cooperation.
1	1	4	One could debate their relative merits and side for one or the other.	
2	1	4		r. If a coalition is formed, its members decide by majority vote whether to distribute their production according to meritocracy or to egalitarianism.
2	1	5		Hence, the median voter in each coalition ends up determining the distributional rule: it will be meritocratic if the median's productivity is above the coalition's mean, egalitarian otherwise.
2	1	22		We also notice that meritocracy and egalitarianism may coexist within stable societies, and that this can happen irrespectively of the segregated or non-segregated character of stable partitions.
3	1	5		In this new set up meritocracy is easier to sustain, and this works in favor of the stability of segregated organizations.
3	1	41		Productive coalitions internally decide, by majority voting, whether to distribute their product in an egalitarian or in a meritocratic manner.
3	1	43		There is no way to commit a priori to any of these two principles. A majority in coalition G will favor meritocracy if the productivity of the median, $\lambda m(G)$, is greater than $\lambda^- G$.
3	1	46		If the productivity of the median agent is equal to the mean productivity, we consider that the coalition is meritocratic.
4	1	37		Note that G1 is meritocratic and G2 is egalitarian.
4	1	39		But since the other high type not in G2 is already in a meritocratic coalition, he does not have incentives to form the potential blocking coalition.

4	1	40		The two high types cannot be together in a meritocratic coalition, and any other agent needs high types to improve.
4	1	52		If agents were forced to adopt a fixed distributional rule, either meritocracy or egalitarianism, the stable organizational structure would be segregated: the one where the v most productive agents get together, then the next v most productive form a second coalition, and so on, thus eventually leaving some agents out of any productive coalition.
5	1	2		For example, when $n = kv$ for some integer k , the unique stable structure would again be the one we just described, under a meritocratic reward scheme
5	1	17		In turn, if that maximal egalitarian coalition is part of an organizational structure, this will be dominated by the meritocratic coalition formed by one high, three medium and the one low type agents.
5	1	19		Therefore, organizational structures with a productive meritocratic coalition must leave at least one high type in the unproductive coalition.
5	1	34		In order to prove that no organizational structure is stable, it is enough to show that, in a stable structure, the high type productivity agent cannot belong to an unproductive coalition, cannot be part of an egalitarian coalition, and cannot be part of a meritocratic coalition.
5	1	38		The rest of the society has to be organized in a stable way, which implies an egalitarian coalition with productivities $(75, 25, 25)$ and a meritocratic coalition with productivities $(25, 25, 25)$.
5	1	40		The high type agent, together with the medium type agent in the second coalition and a low type agent in the third coalition, can form a meritocratic coalition that blocks that organization.
5	1	41		Finally, if the high type is in a meritocratic coalition, this coalition contains medium type agents, but independently of how the rest of agents are organized, the coalition of medium type agents blocks that organization.

6	1	3	Let $N = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$, $v = 3$, and $\lambda = (50, 40, 40, 35, 25, 10)$. Let (P, U) be an organizational structure where $P = \{1, 2, 3, 5\}$ and it is meritocratic and $U = \{4, 6\}$ and it is an unproductive coalition.
6	1	4	(P, U) cannot be blocked because P is the meritocratic coalition with the highest mean and the only agent that could improve without using anyone from P is agent 4 but $\{4, 5, 6\}$ is meritocratic
6	1	5	The egalitarian coalition with the greatest mean is $E = \{1, 2, 3\}$, $N \setminus E$ is meritocratic.
6	1	6	The organization $(E, N \setminus E)$ is blocked by $G = \{1, 4, 6\}$ which is a meritocratic coalition with a greatest mean than $N \setminus E$.
6	1	7	Any organization with two meritocratic coalitions or one meritocratic and one unproductive coalition is blocked by P , any organization with two egalitarian coalitions or one egalitarian and one unproductive coalition is blocked by E
6	1	10	Any organization where the most productive agent is part of an egalitarian coalition different from E and the other coalition is meritocratic is blocked by E .
6	1	22	The egalitarian coalition with the greatest mean is blocked by the meritocratic coalition containing the high, one medium and two low type agents.
6	1	23	Any meritocratic G with the high type is blocked by the four medium agents together.
6	1	24	But, if $v = 3$, $(G1, G2, U)$, with $G1 = \{1, 2, 6\}$ and $G2 = \{3, 4, 5\}$ both meritocratic and $U = \{7\}$ unproductive is a core stable organizational structure, because the high type is in a meritocratic coalition and he cannot increase the mean above 84 while keeping meritocracy.
6	1	33	The organization structure $(T, N \setminus T)$, where the top set T is meritocratic and $N \setminus T$ is egalitarian is core stable.
6	1	39	Whereas, if the first organization would have fired two of the medium productivity agents, rather than the two low ones, the core stable partition of the resulting smaller society would still be meritocratic.

6	1	44	What happens in the example is that the best coalition may end up shifting from meritocracy to egalitarianism at equilibrium.
6	1	51	In the same example, if the low type members would upgrade their qualifications close to the medium type, say from 1 to 6, meritocracy would also be lost in stable organizational structures.
6	1	56	For any distribution of productivities guaranteeing that segregated coalitions are meritocratic, any organization of society into segregated coalitions of minimal size is core stable.
7	1	37	Proposition 1. Let $M+(G)$ be the set of meritocratic coalitions of G with the greatest mean, and let $E+(G)$ be the set of egalitarian coalitions of G with the greatest mean
7	1	Rod n9	If we drop the lexicographic assumption on preferences among equal reward coalitions, the set of potential weak top coalitions will still include $E+(G)$ and now will be enlarged to any congruent meritocratic group, in addition to $E+(G)$.
8	1	6	Proof. Let $T = \{1, \dots, v\}$. If the top set T is meritocratic, it is trivially a weak top coalition of N and thus the core is not empty.
8	1	14	Note, however, that existence of core stable organizational structures is not guaranteed when $n/2 < v < 3n/2$ as we have shown in Example 2, where neither the meritocratic coalition with the greatest mean (the coalition of the medium productivity agents), nor any of the egalitarian coalitions with the greatest mean (the two high plus three medium productivity agents) are weak top coalitions of N .
8	1	52	The definition that follows has technical consequences, but we want to emphasize that it covers situations that will plausibly apply in many applications: it requires that the bulk of population be of a medium type, with a few highly productive agents and also some low productivity agents, and imposes some additional constraints on the ability to form meritocratic coalitions involving the three types.

8	1	56	In maximally mixed meritocratic societies we can always construct a meritocratic coalition of cardinality v that contains agents of all three types, all agents of the low type and the highest number of high types allowing for all the preceding characteristics to hold.
9	1	1	We call this a maximally mixed meritocratic coalition, and denote it by $M3$.
9	1	5	Note that $N \setminus M3$ is either an egalitarian coalition with high and medium type agents, or a meritocratic coalition with only medium type agents.
9	1	10	(b) If societies are maximally mixed meritocratic, then the structure $(M3, N \setminus M3)$, where $M3$ is non-segregated, is the only stable one.
9	1	12	(c) If societies are not maximally mixed meritocratic, then the segregated organizational structure $(T, N \setminus T)$ is stable, and there is at most one another stable structure.
9	1	20	One first lesson refers to segregation. For societies that are maximally mixed meritocratic, stability implies nonsegregation, as proven in Proposition 4.
9	1	25	In societies that are maximally mixed meritocratic, at least one of the coalitions in a stable structure must be meritocratic, while the second coalition may adopt meritocracy or egalitarianism.
9	1	44	We will prove that such structures must either contain the top set T or some meritocratic coalition G with high type agents
9	1	46	We'll say that core stable partitions must be structured around T or around some meritocratic G , meaning that one of these sets has to be part of the partition and that the rest of society must be able to accommodate the further requirements imposed by overall stability

9	1	50	They will either be all part of the best egalitarian coalition, when no stable partition can be structured around any meritocratic coalition containing high types, or else some of them will manage to structure a stable organization around a meritocratic coalition, where they get paid their full productivity, even if sometimes at the expense of other high type agents
9	1	55	. Otherwise, they could form a meritocratic coalition including all of them, and let the remaining members of society, which will now be of at most two types, to organize in a stable manner.
10	1	6	This is because a very small middle class, when coupled with a small high class, cannot de-stabilize a partition structured around T , while a large enough middle class will leave room for T to structure a stable partition again, this time thanks to the fact that the remaining middle type agents not in T will be able to achieve the highest mean meritocratic coalition, the one formed by medium type agents alone.
10	1	9	. Finally, (iii) unstructured societies are not able to satisfy medium type agents. Any partition structured around a meritocratic coalition G with high type agents can always be challenged by some of the medium type agents.
10	1	17	2. Either $(nH + nM) \cdot 1 \geq v$, or $(nH + nM) \cdot 2 < v$ and for all G meritocratic such that all $i \in G \cap T$ are better off in G than in T , $0 \leq n - 2v < \#L(G)$.
10	1	19	3. There exists a meritocratic coalition $G1$ with $G1 \cap H = \emptyset$ and $\#(N \setminus G1) \geq v$ such that: (a) $\lambda^- G1 \geq \lambda^- G$ for all meritocratic coalition $G \subset (G1 \cup H(G2) \cup G3)$ where $G2 = T \setminus (N \setminus G1)$ and $G3 = N \setminus (G1 \cup G2)$, and (b) Either $\#(H \cup M \setminus G1) = v$ or $\#(M \cup H(G2)) < v$, $M \subset G1$ and $\lambda^- T (M \cup (N \setminus G1)) < \lambda n$.
10	1	33	Similarly, though with some added complication, condition 3 provides conditions for the existence of a stable organizational structure around a non-segregated coalition, in the spirit of the maximally mixed meritocratic societies discussed in

				Section.
10	1	49		– if $nH < v$, and T is meritocratic, T is weak top and $N \setminus T$ contains at most two types of agents, medium and low.
10	1	51		– if $nH < v$, T is egalitarian but not weak top, then any weak top coalition W must be meritocratic with highest mean.
10	1	52		W must contain some high type agents, because all agents in a meritocratic coalition without high type agents will gain from adding one high type, whether this enlarged set is egalitarian or meritocratic.
10	1	55		In addition, W must contain all medium type agents, because if one of them was left out, adding that agent would increase the coalition mean while keeping meritocracy.
11	1	9		If $nH + nM < 2v$, then $nH + nM < 3v/2$ and $0 \leq n - 2v < \#L(G)$ for every meritocratic coalition G such that all $i \in G \cap T$ are better off in G than in T . Let $G1 = T$, $G2 = \{v + 1, \dots, 2v\}$ ($G2$ is an egalitarian coalition given that $nH + nM < 3v/2$), and $G3 = N \setminus (G1 \cup G2)$ a coalition of low types. Again ($G1$, $G2$, $G3$) is a core stable organizational structure.
11	1	12		This is because the potential blocking coalition of this structure is a meritocratic coalition G that contains low type agents.
11	1	14		But since low type agents in $G2$ are in an egalitarian coalition, they cannot be part of the blocking, and since $n - 2v < \#L(G)$, for any of those potential meritocratic coalitions blocking π , low type agents in $G3$ are not enough to form the potential blocking coalition G .
11	1	18		Second, because 3 holds, there exists a meritocratic coalition $G1$ with $G1 \cap H = \emptyset$ and $\#(N \setminus G1) \geq v$ satisfying (a) and (b). Let $\pi = (G1, G2, G3)$ where $G2 = T \setminus (N \setminus G1)$ and $G3 = N \setminus (G1 \cup G2)$.

11	1	20	If $\#(H \cup M)G1 = v$, $G2$ is either an egalitarian coalition with high and medium types or just a meritocratic coalition with medium type agents if all high type agents are in $G1$, and $G3$ is a coalition of low types. If $\#(H \cup M)G1 = v$, all the medium type agents are in $G1$, $G2$ is an egalitarian coalition with high and low types and $G3$ is a coalition of low type agents if any.
11	1	26	Assume that neither 1 nor 2 nor 3 hold and that a core stable organization structure π exists. Let $G \in \pi$ such that $G \cap H = \emptyset$. We show that G cannot be meritocratic, nor egalitarian, nor unproductive, which is a contradiction
11	1	27	(i) Assume G is meritocratic
11	1	29	Since condition 1 does not hold, there are no weak top coalitions in N . Then $nH < v/2$, because otherwise the top set T would be a meritocratic coalition and it would be a weak top coalition of N .
11	1	33	Since there is no weak top coalition, $\#N \setminus G \geq v$, because otherwise, if the remaining agents are in an unproductive coalition, π can be blocked. Apart from G , no other productive coalition $G' \in \pi$ with three types can be meritocratic
11	1	34	. Otherwise the medium type agents in the coalition with lower average productivity can switch to that other coalition. This generates a meritocratic new coalition with a greater average productivity that blocks π .
11	1	38	But if $\lambda^- G \leq \lambda m$ we contradict that π is core stable as well – since switching one of the medium types from G to G' increases the average in G and keeps meritocracy.
11	1	41	Note also that medium type agents cannot be in a coalition with just low type agents, because by joining G they increase the mean while keeping meritocracy, and this new coalition will block π .
11	1	42	Thus, π contains $G2 = T \setminus (N \setminus G)$, which is either egalitarian with high and medium types, or meritocratic with just medium type agents (if all high type agents are in G), or egalitarian with high and low types if G contains all the medium agents.

11	1	45	If (a) fails, a meritocratic coalition $G \subset (G \cup H(G2) \cup G3)$ where $G2 = T(N \setminus G)$ and $G3 = N \setminus (G \cup G2)$ exists with $\lambda^- G > \lambda^- G$.
11	1	46	Since only high type agents in $G2$ are potentially part of this meritocratic coalition, G blocks π .
11	1	50	Thus, all medium type agents are in G , and π organizes $N \setminus G$ with an egalitarian coalition with high and low types and a coalition of low type agents alone. If $\#(M \cup H(G2)) \geq v$, then the coalition of cardinality v with high types not in G and medium type agents is egalitarian (or meritocratic if only contains medium type agents) and blocks π .
11	1	53	Because of all the above points, high type agents cannot be in a meritocratic coalition.
11	1	55	Then, since there are no weak top coalitions and high type agents cannot be in a meritocratic coalition, it must be that $G = T$.
11	1	56	Since condition 2 does not hold, $nH + nM < 2v$ and either $nH + nM \geq 3v/2$ or there exists a meritocratic coalition G^* such that all $i \in G^* \cap T$ are better off in G^* than in T and $n - 2v \geq \#L(G^*)$.
11	1	59	In the first case, any organizational structure containing the top set T , where agents in $N \setminus T$ are organized in a stable way, is such that $T(N \setminus T)$ is a meritocratic coalition with medium and low types, and the remaining agents are just low type agents.
11	1	60	. Since T is not weak top, a meritocratic coalition G exist such that all $i \in G \cap T$ are better off in G than in T
11	1	61	This meritocratic coalition contains high type agents in T and medium and low types in $N \setminus T$.
11	1	62	Medium type agents in $N \setminus T$ are in a meritocratic coalition and low type agents are also in meritocratic coalitions or alone.
12	1	3	In the second case, $T(N \setminus T)$ is egalitarian, and the low agents in $T(N \setminus T)$ cannot be used to block π with a meritocratic coalition.

12	1	4	But, since condition 2 fails, then a meritocratic coalition can be constructed that blocks π . This is because the remaining low types not in T neither in $T \setminus (N \setminus T)$ are enough to construct G^* .
12	1	15	They are structured around a meritocratic coalition G that may or may not contain all high type agents.
12	1	18	These conditions are the analogue of the maximally mixed meritocratic property for general three type societies.
12	1	35	C2. For any $J \in \{H, M, L\}$, all segregated productive subcoalitions of J are meritocratic.
13	1	2	And then, the segregated partition of the kN v most productive agents into kN meritocratic coalitions of size v , along with an unproductive coalition formed by the rN less productive agents is trivially core stable.
13	1	21	If some of the mixed coalitions containing agents from $S \cup H$ are meritocratic, we distinguish two cases:
13	1	23	(i) Suppose that there is at least a productive subcoalition of $S \cup H$ which is meritocratic
13	1	24	Then, this subcoalition constitutes a blocking coalition of π^* , because it is meritocratic and has a greater mean than any of the other coalitions in π^* containing agents from $S \cup H$
13	1	26	(ii) Suppose all productive subcoalitions of $S \cup H$ are egalitarian. Consider the meritocratic coalition in π^* containing agents from $S \cup H$ with the greatest mean.
13	1	28	. The coalition G is meritocratic because agents in $S \cup H$ form a majority and, by C3, the average of the coalition is between the productivity of the less productive agent in $S \cup H$ and λ_{ij} .
13	1	32	. The new coalition is meritocratic with a greater mean than G , and will block π .
13	1	33	Suppose now that all agents outside $S \cup H$ are organized in meritocratic coalitions.
13	1	39	. Clearly this new meritocratic coalition will block π^* .

13	1	52	2. For all G meritocratic such that all $i \in G \cap T$ are better off in G than in T , either the society $(N \setminus T, \lambda_{N \setminus T}, v)$ has a core stable structure, π_1 , such that $\# \{i \in M \setminus T \mid (\text{payoff of } i \text{ in } \pi_1) < \lambda_i\} < \#M(G)$, or $\# \{i \in L \setminus T \mid (\text{payoff of } i \text{ in } \pi_1) \leq \lambda_i\} < \#L(G)$.
13	1	55	3. There exists a meritocratic coalition G_1 with $G_1 \cap H = \emptyset$ and $\#(N \setminus G_1) \geq v$ such that: (a) $\lambda^- G_1 \geq \lambda^- G$ for all meritocratic coalitions $G \subset (G_1 \cup H(G_2) \cup G_3)$ where $G_2 = T \setminus (N \setminus G_1)$ and $G_3 = L \setminus (G_1 \cup G_2)$. (b) Either the society $((H \cup M) \setminus G_1, \lambda_{H \cup M} \setminus G_1, v)$ has a core stable structure with segregated coalitions all of them productive, or $\#(M \cup H(G_2)) < v$, $M \subset G_1$ and $\lambda^- T (M \cup (N \setminus G_1)) < \lambda_m$.
14	1	28	But, given conditions C3 and C4, the high type agents in a mixed coalition are always worse off than in a meritocratic coalition with just high type agents (as they are in $\{S_k$ $H\}$ kH $k=1$).
14	1	44	But we believe that, in fact, reward systems will affect effort whenever effort is costly and agents are allowed to choose how much to contribute to the coalitions they join. In this section we present a simple model where individual effort decisions are strategic, and agents are still allowed to vote between meritocracy and egalitarianism.
14	1	45	Clearly, in such a model, the decision to join a meritocratic coalition will become favored by the fact that, under this reward scheme, the most productive workers will be willing to exert more effort.
14	1	49	Hence, we can interpret our basic model as one that gives the most advantage to the emergence of egalitarianism, but whose main results persist after the productive benefits of meritocracy are taken into account.
15	1	7	On the other hand, in a meritocratic coalition individuals exert effort equal to their productivity $eM_i = \lambda_i$.

15	1	8	Hence, the payoffs from membership in any meritocratic coalition are
15	1	10	Preferences regarding meritocracy and egalitarianism inside each productive coalition are a bit more complex than in the baseline model.
15	1	11	Agent $i \in G$ prefers meritocracy rather than egalitarianism if and only if π_M $i \geq \pi_E$ i , or equivalently,
15	1	15	Note that if the median member of coalition G prefers meritocracy to egalitarianism, then all agents with a greater productivity share this preference.
15	1	18	Meritocracy prevails more often than in the baseline model, since condition (6.1) may hold for a median with productivity $\lambda m(G) \leq \lambda G$
15	1	21	For three type societies where $n = 2v$ the conditions analogous to the “maximally mixed meritocratic societies” that deliver a non-segregated structure in the core are the following:
15	1	24	1. $nH < v/2$, $nL \leq v/2$, and $(\lambda M / \lambda H)^2 < (2nH) / ((v - 1)^2 + 2nH)$, i.e., T is egalitarian and $N \setminus T$ is meritocratic, and 2. λ_2 $M/2 \geq (\lambda_2$ $H + \lambda_2$ $M + nL\lambda_2$ $L) / ((nL + 2)^2 + 1)$, i.e. T is not weak top.

15	1	31	<p>T is egalitarian (because λ_2 $M/2 = 4 < 7.1 = ($ $\sum_{j \in T} \lambda_j$ $)/(g_2 + 1)$); N\T is meritocratic (because λ_2 $M/2 = 4 > 3.2 = ($ $\sum_{j \in T} \lambda_j$ $)/(g_2 + 1)$) with an average production equal to 4.5714. But $(T, N \setminus T)$ is not stable because the coalition of agents with productivities $(13,$ $\sqrt{8},$ $\sqrt{8},$ $\sqrt{8}, 0, 0, 0)$ (where the three medium type agents are from $N \setminus T$) is a meritocratic coalition with an average production of 27.571 that blocks $(T, N \setminus T)$.</p>
15	1	35	<p>The structure $\{(1, 4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 14), (2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11)\}$ where the first coalition is meritocratic and the second is egalitarian is (uniquely) stable.</p>
15	1	47	<p>Moreover, non-segregation may arise under meritocracy or under egalitarianism, and these two regimes can coexist.</p>
16	1	8	<p>. Our reward systems can be seen as resulting from a model of tax choice where a proportional tax t is levied and its proceeds are equally distributed: egalitarianism corresponds to the case $t = 1$ and meritocracy arises when $t = 0$, since voters will always favor one of these two extreme cases as their best choice.</p>
16	1	25	<p>If there is no agent $i \in W$ such that $\lambda^- W \leq \lambda_i < \lambda^- S$, we distinguish two cases: in the first one we suppose that W is egalitarian and in the second we suppose that W is meritocratic.</p>
16	1	29	<p>If W is meritocratic, since no agent $i \in W$ exists such that $\lambda^- W \leq \lambda_i <$ $\lambda^- S$, the median productivity of W is above $\lambda^- S$.</p>

16	1	37	Suppose now that the weak top coalition is meritocratic but does not belong to $M+(G)$.
16	1	56	(b1) To prove that $(M3, N/M3)$ is a stable organizational structure, first notice that medium type agents in $N \setminus M3$ can only improve upon if they can join an egalitarian coalition with highest mean. But such superior coalition must include high type agents from $M3$ that are not willing to join since $M3$ is meritocratic.
16	1	57	High type agents in $N \setminus M3$ if any, could be better off joining an egalitarian coalition with greater mean or a meritocratic coalition.
16	1	58	The first case is ruled out by the same argument as for medium type agents. The second is not possible either since, by construction, there is no other meritocratic coalition that can be formed without using other medium type agents from $N \setminus M3$.
17	1	5	In a maximally mixed meritocratic society, $nH < v/2$, $nL \leq v/2$, and consequently $nM > v$, which imply that the top set T is egalitarian, $T \in E+(N)$, and any other $G \in E+(N)$ is equivalent to T .
17	1	7	If $G \in M+(N)$, then G contains only medium type agents. This is because any meritocratic coalition with high type agents has the mean below the productivity of the medium type agents, and $nM > v$.
17	1	14	(i) If $G1$ and $G2$ are both meritocratic, both coalitions have three types of agents or one of them three types and the other two types, medium and low
17	1	16	In any case, adding the medium type agents to the coalition with greater mean forms a meritocratic coalition with increased mean that blocks $(G1, G2)$.
17	1	17	(ii) If $G1$ and $G2$ are both egalitarian then none of them is T , because $N \setminus T$ is meritocratic since we are in a maximally mixed meritocratic society by assumption. Thus, T blocks $(G1, G2)$.
17	1	19	(iii) If $G1$ is meritocratic and $G2$ is egalitarian, then $G2 = T$, because otherwise, $G1 = N \setminus T$ and then $M3$ blocks $(T, N \setminus T)$.

17	1	24	But then, given the construction of M3, we can replace medium type agents in G1 by high type agents while keeping meritocracy and increasing the mean, and this new coalition will block (G1, G2).
17	1	27	If society is not maximally mixed meritocratic, then either $nH \geq v/2$, or $nL > v/2$, or $nH < v/2$ and $nL \leq v/2$ but $(\lambda h + \lambda m + n\lambda l)/(nL + 2) > \lambda m$.
17	1	31	– If $nH < v/2$, but $nL > v/2$, T can be meritocratic (with three types) or egalitarian (with high and medium types).
17	1	33	In the second case, (T, B) is such that T is egalitarian and B is either egalitarian or meritocratic with just low type agents
17	1	36	T only contains high types and medium type agents and it is egalitarian, N\T contains only medium and low type agents and is meritocratic.
17	1	37	. Condition $(\lambda h + \lambda m + n\lambda l)/(nL + 2) > \lambda m$ implies that high type agents cannot be part of a meritocratic coalition, thus T is a weak top coalition of N and (T, N\T) is a core stable organizational structure.
17	1	46	To see that, note that no coalition can block (G, N\G) because such coalition would have to be meritocratic and thus formed by agents that are receiving less than their productivity in (G, N\G).
17	1	rod n16	16 This last situation can only happen if $vL > v/2$. To see this, note that, since T is meritocratic, high type agents have to be distributed between G and N\G.
18	1	4	(1) If G1 and G2 are meritocratic, it is blocked by T which is also meritocratic
18	1	5	(2) If G1 is meritocratic and G2 is egalitarian we distinguish two cases.
18	1	7	But then, adding a medium type agent from G2 to G1 creates a new meritocratic coalition of higher mean than G1 which blocks (G1, G2).

18	1	10	This new coalition will still be meritocratic, have a higher mean than $G1$, and block $(G1, G2)$.
18	1	16	In this case, T can be either egalitarian or meritocratic
18	1	17	Case 2a. Suppose first that T is meritocratic.
18	1	18	Since $nH < v/2$, T has three types of agents and consequently $N \setminus T$ is the meritocratic coalition with just low types, which implies that $nL > v$
18	1	28	In the case that $G1$ is meritocratic and $G2$ is egalitarian, $G2$ must contain at least two types of agents. If $G2$ contains high type agents, replacing a low type agent in $G1$ by a high type agent will create a new meritocratic coalition G (because T is meritocratic) of higher mean than $G1$ which blocks $(G1, G2)$.
18	1	33	Case 2b. Suppose that T is egalitarian. Since $nH < v/2$, T has two or three types of agents and consequently $N \setminus T$ is either egalitarian with medium and low types or meritocratic with only low type agents. There may exist a second core stable structure if (i) $G \in M+(N)$, $\#G > v$, and G is a weak top coalition, or (ii) if $G \in M+(N)$, $\#G = v$, $N \setminus G$ is egalitarian, $(N \setminus G) \cap M = \emptyset$, and the mean productivity of the coalition is below λ_m . If (i), since G is a weak top coalition, $(G, N \setminus G)$ is core stable and only G
18	1	38	There is no possibility of blocking because a potential blocking coalition should contain medium type agents. Since they are in a meritocratic coalition with the greatest mean, they will only participate in an egalitarian coalition with mean above their productivity
18	1	48	(2) If $G1$ and $G2$ are both meritocratic, and neither $G1$ nor $G2$ are in $M+(N)$, any meritocratic coalition $G \in M+(N)$ will block $(G1, G2)$. If one of them belongs to $M+(N)$ (let us say $G1 \in M+(N)$), since $nH < v/2$ and $nL > v/2$, both $G1$ and $G2$ contains medium type agents. Suppose that $\lambda^- G1 \geq \lambda^- G2$: then adding a medium type agent from $G2$ to $G1$ creates a new meritocratic coalition of higher mean than $G1$ which blocks $(G1, G2)$.

18	1	52	(3) If G1 is meritocratic and G2 is egalitarian, G1 may contain agents of two or three types. In the first case they must be medium and low types with a majority of medium types.
18	1	56	. If λ^- $G2 < \lambda m$, adding a medium type agent from G2 to G1 creates a new meritocratic coalition of higher mean than G1, which blocks (G1, G2). If λ^- $G2 > \lambda m$, replacing a low type in G2 with a medium type from G1 creates a new egalitarian coalition of higher mean than G2, which blocks (G1, G2).
18	1	rod n 17	Note that since T is meritocratic, this situation can only happen if G contains all the high type agents and $v - v$ H low type agents and it should be such that adding a medium type changes the regime.
19	1	5	Note that the meritocratic coalition with the greatest mean in this case is M, which is not a weak top coalition.
19	1	8	(1) Note that G1 and G2 cannot be both meritocratic, since there is no meritocratic coalition that contains high type agents.
19	1	11	(3) If G1 is meritocratic and G2 is egalitarian, G1 can only contain medium and low types or only medium type agents, but since this coalition is different from N\T, G2 must contain low type agents also. Note that since G2 is egalitarian and low types do not constitute a majority, λ^- $G2 > \lambda m$.
19	1	21	Note first that N\W only contains agents from at most two clusters. This is because either $W = T$ and then $N\T \subset M \cup L$, or W is a meritocratic coalition with agents from the three clusters.
19	1	21	In the latter case, since W is a meritocratic coalition with maximal average productivity it is necessary that $M \subset W$ and then $N\W \subset H \cup L$.
19	1	27	Then $\pi = \{T, \pi_l\}$ is a core stable organization of N because any coalition G potentially blocking π must be meritocratic and include agents from every cluster, and either some $i \in M \cap G$ is worse off in G than in π_l (if $\# \{i \in M \cap T \mid (\text{payoff of } i \text{ in } \pi_l) < \lambda_i\} < \#M(G)$), or else some $i \in L \cap G$ is worse off in G than in π_l (if $\# \{i \in L \cap T \mid (\text{payoff of } i \text{ in } \pi_l) < \lambda_i\} < \#L(G)$).

19	1	31	There exists a meritocratic coalition $G1$ with $G1 \cap H = \emptyset$ and $\#(N \setminus G1) \geq v$ satisfying a and b. Without loss of generality suppose that $i \in G1 \cap M$ are the agents with the lowest productivity in M (note that if this is not the case, we can always replace each of the medium type agents in $G1$ by one less productive medium type agent without changing the above characteristics of $G1$).
19	1	35	Also without loss of generality, suppose that all $i \in G1 \cap L$ are consecutive with the greater productivities in L compatible with $G1$ being meritocratic.
19	1	45	Assume that neither 1 nor 2 nor 3 hold and that a core stable organization structure π exists. Let $G \in \pi$ such that $G \cap H = \emptyset$. We show that G cannot be meritocratic, nor egalitarian, nor unproductive, which is a contradiction.
19	1	46	Assume G is meritocratic, let us see that the negation of conditions 1 and 3 lead to a contradiction.
19	1	48	Since condition 1 does not hold, there are no weak top coalitions in N . Then $nH < v/2$, because otherwise T would be a meritocratic coalition and it would be a weak top coalition of N .
19	1	48	Thus, if G is a meritocratic coalition it must include agents from the three clusters (by C3).
19	1	51	Apart from G , no other productive coalition $G \in \pi$ with agents from the three clusters can be meritocratic.
19	1	52	Otherwise, given C4, an $i \in M$ in the coalition with lower average productivity could switch to the other and increase the average productivity while keeping meritocracy, and this new coalition would block π .
19	1	57	But if $\bar{\lambda} - G \leq \lambda m$ for some $m \in M$, we contradict that π is core stable as well – since switching one of the agents in M from G to G increases the average in G and keeps meritocracy.

19	1	60	Thus, agents in $N \setminus G$ can only be organized in coalitions with agents from one or two clusters, and all $i \in H \setminus G$ are in an egalitarian coalition. Note also that an agent $i \in M \cap (N \setminus G)$ cannot be in a coalition that does not contain agents from H , because by joining G they increase the mean while keeping meritocracy, and this new coalition will block π . If $M \setminus G = \emptyset$, π contains $G2 = T(N \setminus G)$ which is egalitarian with agents from H and M , or meritocratic with just agents from M (if $H \subset G$).
20	1	1	. If there are still more agents in M , they are organized in segregated meritocratic coalitions with just medium type agents.
20	1	3	Note that they cannot be organized in egalitarian coalitions because the agents in those coalitions that receive a payoff below their productivity by joining G will increase the mean while keeping meritocracy.
20	1	7	– If (a) fails, a meritocratic coalition $G \subset (G \cup H(G2) \cup G3)$ where $G2 = T(N \setminus G)$ and $G3 = L \setminus (G1 \cup G2)$ exists with $\lambda^- G > \lambda^- G$. Note that G blocks π .
20	1	10	– If (b) fails, the society $((H \cup M) \setminus G1, \lambda HUM) \setminus G1$, v) cannot be organized in a segregated stable way with all coalitions productive for any meritocratic coalition $G1$.
20	1	13	Thus, $M \subset G$, and π organizes $N \setminus G$ with an egalitarian coalition $E \subset H \cup L$ such that $H \setminus G \subset E$, and the rest of low type agents are organized in a stable way. If $\#(M \cup H(G2)) \geq v$, then the coalition of cardinality v containing all $i \in H \setminus G$ and some medium type agents is egalitarian (or meritocratic if it only contains medium type agents) and blocks π . If $\#(M \cup H(G2)) < v$, the average productivity of $T(M \cup (N \setminus G))$ is greater than λ_m for some $m \in M$, which implies that $T(M \cup (N \setminus G))$ is an egalitarian coalition which blocks π .
20	1	17	All the above points imply that a meritocratic G containing high type agents cannot be part of a core stable organizational structure of N .
20	1	20	Since there are no weak top coalitions and high type agents cannot be in a meritocratic coalition, it must be that $G = T$.

20	1	23		Thus, the medium and low types necessary to form the meritocratic coalition that would challenge T are available.
20	1	24		To conclude, assume G is unproductive. But $h \in G$ is very welcome in any meritocratic coalition (even if that changes the regime), and if there are no meritocratic coalitions,
20	1	31		First remark that the grand coalition is meritocratic, stable and forms a non-segregated organizational structure.
20	1	33		. It is the one with two productive meritocratic groups, one containing two high, four medium and five low type agents and the other containing one high, three medium and three low type agents.
20	1	41		However, this structure is not stable because it is blocked by the meritocratic coalition formed by one high, the three medium type agents in the second coalition and the three low types in the unproductive group.

Newman, B. J., Johnston, C. D., & Lown, P. L. (2015).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
2	1	10		What effect does the day-to-day experience of economic inequality in one's local environment have on beliefs about meritocracy?
2	1	12		? In the U.S. and other marketbased systems, the idea of economic fairness is encapsulated in the concept of meritocracy, where material outcomes are awarded based upon individual initiative, hard work, and ability.
2	1	14		The notion of meritocracy is commonly deemed a centerpiece of American political ideology and a core tenet of the cultural belief system referred to as the "American dream" (Hochschild 1995), "American creed" (Huntington 1981), or "American ethos" (McClosky and Zaller 1984).
2	1	20		Indeed, the deep entrenchment of meritocracy in American culture has long been identified by scholars as a primary factor stymieing public support for redistribution in the face of economic inequality (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001; Hochschild 1981; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Foner 1984).
2	1	26		In this article, we analyze the sources of American citizens' belief in meritocracy in a manner that goes beyond prior work focusing on individual-level factors, such as income, education, and race (e.g., Kluegel and Smith 1986; Kreidl 2000), or more recent work focusing on personality (e.g., Jost et al. 2003).
2	1	31		Here, we focus on the contextual sources of support for meritocracy and offer a theory of activated class conflict.
2	1	36		We argue that residence in high-inequality contexts, compared to relatively equal contexts, increases the salience of economic comparisons and one's own relative economic position, and thus polarizes public belief in meritocratic ideology across income-based lines.

2	1	39	Among low-income Americans, we argue that exposure to high inequality will stimulate rejection of meritocracy by increasing the salience of their disadvantaged position within a conspicuous local economic hierarchy.
2	1	44	Among higher-income Americans, we argue that residing in a highly unequal environment will bolster support for meritocracy, thereby defending and rationalizing their position and the economic system enabling such privilege.
2	1	49	In local environments where income is more evenly distributed, we expect personal income to play a substantially smaller role in structuring meritocratic beliefs.
2	2	7	By demonstrating the conditions under which low-income citizens remain faithful to or reject meritocratic ideology, we reconcile these competing theories and provide an important launching point for future research.
2	2	16	In American society, political socialization and popular culture play a powerful role in inculcating public support for capitalism and belief in meritocratic ideals (Hochschild 1981, 1995; McClosky and Zaller 1984).
2	2	23	Nevertheless, survey data over the past 30 years consistently uncover variation and ambivalence in public attitudes toward meritocracy in America.
2	2	39	There is, however, an interesting tension in the literature characterized by countervailing predictions concerning the relationship between economic position and adherence to meritocratic ideology.
3	1	8	This relationship between income and meritocratic beliefs constitutes the crux of a realistic interest-based conception of class conflict expected by traditional Marxist theory (Schumaker, Kiel, and Heilke 1996) and contemporary realistic group conflict, relative deprivation, and social dominance theories

				(see Huddy 2003).
3	1	29		Collectively, these theories provide a foundation for the prediction that lower-income citizens, despite their less privileged status and putative self-interest in rejecting meritocracy and challenging economic inequities, will nevertheless endorse meritocratic ideals.
3	1	51		In contrast to rational actor and self-interest theories, these theories together suggest that personal income will play a negligible role in structuring meritocratic beliefs, as low-income citizens are expected to align with their high-income counterparts in upholding the economic system as meritocratic.
3	2	8		In short, in attempting to understand the sources of support for meritocracy, specifically as far as personal income is concerned, we are left with a definite puzzle within the literature characterized by countervailing perspectives and conflicting empirical evidence.
3	2	20		This theory attempts to reconcile countervailing economic and psychological theories concerning the role of personal income in shaping meritocratic belief by arguing that individuals' objective economic position does inform their attitudes, but that these position-based effects remain "latent opinion" (Key 1961; Zaller 2003), requiring a situational trigger to activate them.
3	2	30		According to our theory, the presence of income inequality in citizens' local economic context will activate these latent attitudes by increasing the salience of relative economic comparisons and one's own relative economic position, such that lower- and upper-income citizens will polarize in their belief in meritocratic ideology.

4	1	9		<p>The working poor should be inclined to view assertions of meritocracy as inconsistent with their own experience of economic hardship despite hard work, and should thus be disposed toward regarding the economic system as unfair.</p>
4	1	13		<p>Wealthy citizens, on the other hand, may find meritocratic ideology entirely consistent with their own lived experience and/or a normatively desirable narrative to embrace in accounting for their arrival in their current economic position.</p>
4	1	18		<p>The activation of these latent propensities into explicit acceptance or rejection of meritocracy, however, may depend upon relevant situational triggers.</p>
4	1	27		<p>There is strong theoretical reason to believe that the level of economic inequality in citizens' local context should serve as a situational trigger, bringing personal economic position to the fore in shaping belief in meritocracy.</p>
4	2	14		<p>Due to experienced hardships and held economic grievances, lower-income citizens may possess latent beliefs about economic fairness and success that ultimately ascribe outcomes to exogenous factors; however, such oppositional beliefs to the dominant ideology of meritocracy may remain inchoate and dormant in the absence of motivation for such beliefs to be deployed in conscious awareness.</p>
4	2	40		<p>Embracing these beliefs constitutes an attitudinal shift toward the rejection of meritocratic ideals and development of an "oppositional consciousness" (Mansbridge and Morris 2001) that directly challenge dominant ideology.</p>
4	2	48		<p>Among lower-income Americans, those residing in local contexts with high levels of income inequality should be more likely to reject meritocratic ideology than those residing in more economically equal contexts.</p>

5	1	25	Among higher-income Americans, those residing in local contexts with high levels of income inequality should be more likely to uphold meritocratic ideology than those residing in more economically equal contexts.
5	1	31	Combined, these two hypotheses suggest a process of activated class conflict, where increasing levels of local inequality lead to polarization between lowerand higher-income citizens over belief in meritocracy.
5	1	36	We believe our activated class-conflict framework resolves extant tension between self-interest and falseconsciousness theories by stipulating the conditions under which lower- and upper-income citizens will uphold or reject meritocratic ideology.
5	2	12	In short, higher levels of perceived distributive injustice motivated by racial identity and group experience among minority citizens imply not only between-group differences in the amount of variance in meritocratic belief to be explained, but also potential differences in the sensitivity of such attitudes to variation in personal economic situations or local economic conditions.
5	2	30	This possibility finds support in our data; while 22% of whites in our data reject meritocracy, meritocracy is rejected by 31.3% of black respondents.
6	1	1	These surveys were selected based upon their common inclusion of items tapping belief in meritocracy, county/level geo-codes for all respondents, and theoretically relevant demographic and political control variables.
6	1	17	The central construct we seek to explain is individual belief in meritocracy, which centers upon the idea that the economic system rewards individuals based upon their initiative, hard work, and ability, and that one can achieve economic success through such means.

6	1	21	Conversely, belief in meritocracy should also involve rejection of the opposing idea that the achievement of wealth and success is largely determined by forces outside of the hands of the individual, such as good luck, inherited privileges and resources, political connections, and other forms of structural advantage or preferential treatment.
6	1	28	Prior scholarship has typically measured individual opinion on meritocracy with items that tap perceptions of the factors determining economic wealth and success—specifically, the importance of hard work (Fong 2001; Hochschild 1995; Jost et al. 2003; Kluegel and Smith 1986).
6	1	32	In keeping with this research, we measure belief in meritocracy with a survey item contained in the 2005 and 2006 Pew surveys presenting the following pair of statements and asking respondents to choose which statement comes closest to their own view: “Most people who want to get ahead can make it if they’re willing to work hard” or “Hard work and determination are no guarantee of success for most people.”
6	1	40	From this item, we constructed a dichotomous variable, labeled Meritocracy, which was coded 1 for respondents reporting agreement with the latter statement and 0 for those agreeing with the former statement.
6	2	25	Collectively, utilizing our merged 2005–09 Pew data, we find that roughly 22% of white and 29% of nonwhite respondents reject the meritocratic notion that hard work affords success in favor of the disillusioned position that success is determined by forces outside of our control and that hard work and determination do not guarantee success for most people.

6	2	rod n 4	<p>The response frequencies for each individual survey (for whites and nonwhites combined) are as follows: (1) 2005 survey—32.6% reject meritocracy, (2) 2006 survey—32.3% reject meritocracy, (3) 2007 survey—17.8% reject meritocracy, and (4) 2009 survey—17.3% reject meritocracy.</p>
6	2	rod n 4	<p>We should also note that missing data for our Meritocracy variables were very minimal; in our merged data set, there was a total of $N = 113$ incidents of missing data for Meritocracy ($N = 21$, 2005 survey; $N = 62$, 2007 survey; $N = 10$, 2007 survey; and $N = 20$, 2009 survey).</p>
6	2	rod n 4	<p>In subjecting missing cases to regression analysis, we fail to find any evidence that Gini Index or Income exert any influence over refusal to respond to the Meritocracy items.</p>
9	1	17	<p>This model allows us to estimate the marginal effect of individual income across levels of local inequality while accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in both average levels of support for meritocracy and effects of income at the county level.</p>
9	1	21	<p>Among white respondents, we expect a positive and significant coefficient on the Gini constituent term, indicating increased rejection of meritocracy among low-income respondents as local inequality increases, and a negative and significant interaction term, indicating increased support for meritocracy among high-income respondents as inequality increases.</p>
9	2	8	<p>Beginning with whites (column 1), and focusing first on the effect of county Gini, the estimates reveal that, among those with the lowest incomes, an increase in county inequality is associated with a significant increase in the probability of rejecting meritocracy ($B = 1.71$, S.E. = .782, $p < .05$).</p>
9	2	12	<p>This result strongly supports our activated disillusionment hypothesis, as it reveals that among low-income citizens, those residing in highly unequal contexts are significantly more likely to reject meritocratic ideals than those in relatively equal contexts.</p>

9	2	19	<p>Turning to the interaction term between Gini and income, the negative and statistically significant coefficient ($B = -2.68$, $S.E. = 1.18$, $p < .05$) indicates that as we move from those with the lowest to highest incomes, the effect of increasing county inequality reverses and is associated with a decrease in the probability of rejecting meritocracy.</p>
10	1	1	<p>Last, the coefficient for personal income indicates that in low-inequality areas, lower- and upper-income citizens are equally likely to adhere to meritocratic ideology. In contrast, at high levels of local inequality, belief in meritocracy is strongly polarized by income.</p>
10	1	5	<p>These effects are depicted in Figure 2, which plots the predicted probability of rejecting meritocracy across levels of county inequality for citizens at the 5th and 95th percentiles of household income.</p>
10	1	13	<p>For example, for citizens with the lowest incomes, moving from low to high contextual inequality is associated with a .08 increase in the probability of rejecting meritocracy.</p>
10	1	16	<p>However, for those with the highest incomes, this range of movement in contextual inequality is associated with a .06 drop in the probability of rejecting meritocracy.</p>
10	1	20	<p>Again, what is important to note is that while there are no class-based differences in fidelity to the “American dream” in low-inequality settings, we observe nearly a 20% difference in the probability of rejecting meritocracy along class-based lines in high-inequality settings.</p>
10	1	26	<p>Turning to the contextual controls, the results reveal that variation in absolute wealth across counties emerged as a significant predictor, as those residing in wealthier areas—holding inequality constant—are significantly less likely to reject meritocracy.</p>

10	1	37	Moving on to individual-level controls, the results reveal that disillusionment with the promise of meritocracy is more prevalent among younger citizens and those who are members of a union or married to a unionized worker.
10	1	40	On the other hand, more educated and religious citizens are more likely to adhere to meritocracy, and, unsurprisingly, so too are conservatives and strong Republicans.
10	2	2	. In demonstrating differences in the responsiveness of meritocratic ideology to income and contextual inequality across basic white/nonwhite racial lines, these results support our decision to estimate separate models for whites and nonwhites.
10	2	18	Indeed, one finding among nonwhites that is interesting to note, and that departs from that found for whites, is that the probability of rejecting meritocracy among racial minorities increases ($B = .168$, $S.E. = .091$, $p = .06$) when moving from politically liberal to conservative local contexts.
10	2	52	Rather, and in contrast to whites, we find that while the meritocratic beliefs of nonwhites are rather insensitive to contextual inequality, they are responsive to variation in the dominant local political culture, as residing in a more conservative political context increases rejection of meritocratic ideology among racial minorities.
11	1	48	Our results hinge upon two untested assumptions concerning the mechanisms linking local income inequality to beliefs about meritocracy: first, that residing in a highinequality context raises the salience of inequality and relative economic comparisons, and second, that it raises the salience of one's own relative position in the economic hierarchy.

13	2	23		As the level of economic inequality confronting poorer citizens in their local environment grows, so too does their tendency to abandon the belief in meritocracy.
13	2	25		This process of disillusionment, given the link found in prior work between the rejection of meritocracy and support for redistribution, may thus serve as an important intermediate step in instigating demand among poorer citizens in unequal contexts for government redistribution.

Au, W. (2016).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
2	1	30		I further argue that, given their presumed objectivity, such standardized testing fundamentally masks the structural nature of racial inequality within an ideology of individual meritocracy, an ideology that advances a racialized neoliberal project that reconstitutes “anti-racism” as being against the very act of naming race itself.
2	1	38		This interplay of neoliberalism, the reconstitution of “anti-racism” in ways that deny the structural and material realities of racism, and high-stakes testing coalesce in what I name here as “Meritocracy 2.0.”
3	1	2		I then go on to consider standardized testing as a racial project in the United States historically, specifically addressing the ways that the ideology of meritocracy operates as the root justification for structural educational inequality.
3	1	7		Subsequently I take up an analysis of high-stakes, standardized testing as a racial project in modern day education policy, attending specifically to the ways that it empirically increases racism in education while ideologically denying structural inequalities, vis-à-vis neoliberal forms of meritocracy and anti-racism.
4	1	40		As a racial project, high-stakes, standardized testing constructs which children (and communities) are identified as “failures” by the tests, how such “failure” is used to justify neoliberal conceptions of individualist educational attainment and the denial of structural inequalities (Meritocracy 2.0), and, subsequently, what policies and practices are to be enacted on those children and communities identified by the tests as “failures.”

5	1	27		In what follows, I outline the history of standardized testing (the progenitor of high-stakes, standardized testing) as a racial project. I then address how this testing was used to justify an ideology of meritocracy, built on the presumed objective measurement of human intelligence.
8	1	27		This is the root of the idea that standardized testing, both historically and today, can be a means of challenging inequality, and it is the way that standardized testing helps uphold the ideology of meritocracy in the United States.
8	1	29		The ideology of meritocracy asserts that, regardless of social position, economic class, gender, race, or culture (or any other form of socially or institutionally defined difference), everyone has an equal chance at becoming “successful” based purely on individual merit and hard work.
8	1	33		Consequently, the ideology of meritocracy also asserts that failure is due to an individual person’s (or individual group’s) lack of effort and hard work (Lemann, 1999; Sacks, 1999).
8	1	40		This construction of standardized testing as an objective measure of merit was, as Karier (1972) explains, built by those in power who believed in the superiority of their own talents:
9	1	6		Most testers refused to admit the possibility that they were, perhaps, servants of privilege, power and status, and preferred instead to believe and “hope” that what they were measuring was, in fact, true “merit.”
9	1	11		This was a fundamental axiom in the liberal’s faith in meritocracy which emerged in twentieth century American education.

9	1	31	<p>As such, with the empirical evidence provided by presumptively “objective” standardized tests, Whites and wealthy elites could mask their own structural advantages, deny the existence of systemic racism, justify racial hierarchies, and structure specific racial groups as less intelligent and inferior (Au, 2009b, 2013), all under the guise of “naturally” occurring aptitude among individuals (Bisseret, 1979) competing within a meritocratic framework.</p>
10	1	15	<p>Now, over 100 years removed from the early years of standardized testing and in the midst of the ubiquity of high-stakes, standardized testing in schools, we see the same mix of the presumed objectivity of standardized test measurement, the ideology of meritocracy, and the notion that testing can be used to ameliorate racial inequalities.</p>
10	1	18	<p>However, one key difference is that this modern day mix is swathed by neoliberalism, and in the current context, it is critical to understand how the ideology of meritocracy fits the neoliberal project in such a complementary manner.</p>
10	1	29	<p>For the neoliberal individual, racism and other forms of systematic power outside of the market are considered obsolete and non-existent, and all that matters for success is individual drive, determination, sacrifice, and hard work. Fundamentally, this is the ideology of meritocracy of old, but reborn within the framework of global free-market capitalism as Meritocracy 2.0.</p>
10	1	41	<p>On the other hand, taking the form of official, neoliberal anti-racism, high-stakes, standardized tests establish the right of individuals of all races to gain access to education through the fair, objective, test-based measurement of them as (de-raced) individuals, since within the framework</p>

				Meritocracy 2.0 race or racism does not really exist within the parameters of test performance.
13	1	39		Thus, consistent with Meritocracy 2.0 and neoliberal anti-racism, and as evidence of what Bonilla-Silva (Bonilla-Silva, 2013) refers to as colorblind racism, we see a process where in the name of racial equality in education, race and culture in teaching and learning become anathema to the officially sanctioned, raceless, “correct” knowledge and pedagogy as defined by the tests. In this sense, and as part of the neoliberal multicultural project, to be “anti-racist” is defined as being against the act of naming race—as race has nothing to do with test-validated knowledge and learning, and being against the admission that systemic racism even exists—as the “objectivity” of the test excludes that possibility
15	1	34		In doing so, I have discussed how standardized IQ testing was stitched together with the presumed objectivity of the tests to mask structural racism in schools and society through the ideology of meritocracy.
15	1	36		I have also argued that these very same strands exist today, albeit transformed under neoliberalism in what I called Meritocracy 2.0.
18	1	11		These tests are far from objective measurements of teaching and learning (Au, 2013; DiMaggio, 2012; Farley, 2009, 2012), they are not improving the education of children of color, and research has consistently confirmed that test scores are determined more by structural conditions affecting students than any kind of individual meritocratic effort (Berliner, 2012)

Solt, F., Hu, Y., Hudson, K., Song, J., & Yu, D. E. (2016).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
1	1	1		Meritocracy—the idea that if one works hard, one can get ahead—is a core tenet of the American Dream (see, e.g., Hochschild, 1995: 21–23).
1	1	3		How belief in meritocracy, and in turn the country's dominant ideology, fares in the face of the stark economic inequality that has come to characterize life in the United States (US) is, therefore, crucial to understanding not only support for redistributive policies to address this inequality but also the continuing legitimacy of the US economic system as a whole.
1	1	18		In contrast to a range of earlier studies that found that greater inequality tends to be associated with attitudes that reinforce the status quo, Newman et al. (2015a, hereafter NJL) advances the argument that inequality in the US activates class conflict, leading poorer individuals in local contexts of higher inequality to reject meritocracy and become more class conscious.
1	1	24		Correcting this error reveals that there is little or no support in the paper's results for its conclusion that mere exposure to high levels of inequality stimulates a rejection of meritocracy.
1	1	16		To the contrary, but consistent with previous research, the results indicate that lower-income individuals are less likely to reject the meritocratic ideal where economic inequality is greater.
2	1	4		The crucial relationship between economic inequality and system-supporting beliefs like meritocracy is the subject of two diametrically opposed theories: the conflict theory and the relative power theory

2	1	28	<p>With regard to attitudes and beliefs like meritocracy, this theory suggests that the greater power imbalance that results from higher levels of economic inequality provides higher-income people with more resources to spread their views in the public sphere while depriving poorer people to a greater degree of the resources needed to resist these efforts.</p>
2	2	1	<p>Using the data files and commands provided (Newman et al., 2015b), we were able to reproduce a close approximation of the article's results on belief in meritocracy, as presented in the article's Table 1, Model 1 ("White Rs").</p>
2	2	10	<p>NJL (p.334) claim that its analysis reveals that among low-income citizens, those residing in highly unequal contexts are significantly more likely to reject meritocratic ideals than those in relatively equal contexts [and] indicates that as we move from those with the lowest to highest incomes, the effect of increasing county inequality reverses and is associated with a decrease in the probability of rejecting meritocracy.</p>
2	2	27	<p>In the multilevel logistic regression model employed in NJL, the logged odds of rejecting meritocracy for individual i in local context j are estimated as follows</p>
3	1	5	<p>Note: the dots represent coefficients of income inequality within respondents' county on their rejection of meritocracy for all values of respondent income, estimated from the data and model provided in Newman et al. (2015b); the whiskers represent the 95% confidence intervals of these estimates.</p>
3	2	6	<p>At the other end of the income scale, there is no hint of support for the NJL claim that these results support the conflict theory's prediction that higher-income individuals will be less likely to reject meritocracy in contexts of greater income inequality.</p>
3	2	9	<p>The article's own results provide little, if any, evidence for its conclusion that poorer people are more likely to reject and richer people more likely to embrace meritocracy where local income inequality is greater.</p>

3	2	20	Ostensibly to amass observations from a sufficient range of local contexts, NJL (pp.330–331) combines in a single analysis data from four surveys using three different measures of its dependent variable, rejection of meritocracy.
3	2	26	Those who chose the latter were coded as rejecting meritocracy
3	2	33	In Measure 2, used with data from the 2007 survey, those who mostly or completely agreed with both statements were coded as rejecting meritocracy.
3	2	38	Although the 2009 survey included these same two statements, and so made Measure 2 easily calculable, respondents to that survey were coded in yet a third manner: in Measure 3, those who mostly or completely agreed with statement (1) were coded as rejecting meritocracy regardless of how they responded to statement (2).
3	2	44	To assess whether these three very different measures are in fact comparable, we collected Pew surveys conducted between 1999 and 2012 that asked any of the items just described and plotted the estimated percentage of the population to reject meritocracy according to each of the three versions of the dependent variable in Figure 2.
3	2	47	The figure reveals that Measure 2 results in much lower levels of rejection of meritocracy than either of the others, and that Measure 3 often yields considerably higher levels than Measure 1.
4	1	5	Note: the analyses presented in Table 1 of Newman et al. (2015a: 333) were conducted on pooled observations with the dependent variable, rejection of meritocracy, measured in one of three different ways (see Newman et al., 2015a: 331).

4	1	10	Plotting the weighted percentage of respondents to reject meritocracy by each of these measures reveals that the second measure results in much lower levels of rejection of meritocracy than either of the others, and the third often yields considerably higher levels than the first. In light of the evident lack of comparability of these three measures, pooling them into a single analysis cannot be justified.
4	1	30	What then can be discerned regarding the relationship between economic inequality and belief in meritocracy?
4	2	35	Figure 3 displays a dot-and-whisker plot of the results: the dots represent the estimated change in the logged odds of rejecting meritocracy for a change of two standard deviations in each variable in the model, and the whiskers represent the 95% confidence intervals of these estimates (see Kastellec and Leoni, 2007; Solt and Hu, 2015a).
4	2	46	It shows that inequality's estimated marginal effects on rejecting meritocracy are negative and statistically significant for those with incomes of up to US\$50,000; that is, for those in the bottom half of the sample by income.
4	2	54	Figure 5 presents the predicted probability of rejecting meritocracy according to Model 1 across the observed range of local income inequality at various incomes when all other variables are assumed to take on their median values.
5	1	3	Note: the dots represent the estimated change in the logged odds of rejecting meritocracy for a change of two standard deviations in the independent variable; the whiskers represent the 95% confidence intervals of these estimates.
5	1	12	Given that assumption, those with the lowest incomes living where the context of income inequality is at the highest observed level are 19 percentage points (plus or minus 7 points) less likely to reject meritocracy than similarly low-income people living where inequality is at its lowest observed level.

5	1	17	<p>For people with incomes between US\$40,000 and US\$50,000 and otherwise median characteristics, the predicted probability of rejecting meritocracy declines from $37 \pm 2\%$ to $30 \pm 3\%$ over the observed range of inequality—a drop of $7.4 \pm$ percentage points.</p>
5	1	21	<p>For those with the highest incomes, given the confidence intervals, the predicted probabilities of rejecting meritocracy are consistent with no change across all levels of local income inequality</p>
5	2	5	<p>Note: results presented in Figure 3. The dots represent estimated coefficients of income inequality within respondents' commuting zones on their rejection of meritocracy for all values of respondent family income; the whiskers represent the 95% confidence intervals of these estimates.</p>
5	2	21	<p>Our analysis of data from a larger and more representative survey that employs a uniform measure of the dependent variable, in fact, yields the opposite result: lower-income people living where local levels of income inequality are higher are less likely to reject meritocracy than those living where the income distribution is more egalitarian, in line with the predictions of the relative power theory.</p>
6	1	10	<p>That lower-income individuals living in localities with higher levels of income inequality tend to be less likely to reject the meritocratic ideology that sustains the status quo means that change, if it is to occur, will only result from concerted effort, from the difficult and muchconstrained work of organization and mobilization.</p>
6	1	24	<p>The paper's revision history and the materials needed to reproduce its analyses can be found on GitHub at: https://github.com/fsolt/meritocracy.</p>

Gündemir, S., Homan, A. C., Usova, A., & Galinsky, A.D. (2017).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
1	2	14	A more recently introduced alternative to these ideologies, which we label value-in-merit, emphasizes equal opportunity and how individuals can expect uniform treatment and rewards based on competence regardless of their racial background (Apfelbaum et al., 2016).	
2	1	6	In the current research, we set out to explore whether an integration of the multiculturalism and value-in-merit ideologies—multicultural meritocracy—could produce a more effective ideology for both minorities and Whites.	
2	1	35		Apfelbaum et al. (2016) recently identified an alternative approach that organizations take, which emphasizes the principle of meritocracy, i.e., individuals are hired and promoted based purely on competence.
2	1	37	This value-in-merit ideology shows some parallels with the colorblind ideology, as both de-emphasize racial diversity.	
2	1	39	However, value-inmerit differs from conventional colorblindness by its explicit focus on equal opportunity rather than a tendency to overlook differences.	
2	1	41	Apfelbaum et al. (2016) found that this value-in-merit approach can, under some circumstances, overcome racial minorities' negative responses to traditional colorblind approaches.	
2	1	44		However, solely meritocratic approaches are likely to carry a critical flaw that can undermine their effectiveness
2	1	46		Joshi (2014) proposed that a purely meritocratic approach ignores institutionalized barriers that impede underrepresented groups' career progress and can decrease inclusion of racial minorities in organizations.

2	1	48			. A fair meritocracy requires a level playing field and minorities could see a focus on meritocracy as ignoring societal bias.
2	1	63	We propose that integrating multiculturalism with value-in-merit may be an effective way for organizations to approach diversity		
2	2	6			Multicultural meritocracy's explicit acknowledgement and celebration of diversity, can address minorities' needs for recognition of their identity, increasing their feelings of inclusion.
2	2	13			An explicit inclusion of a commitment to meritocracy into a multicultural approach could reduce Whites' experiences of exclusion and threat by broadening diversity statement's reach to include elements that more universally apply to a variety of employee groups.
2	2	20	An unintended consequence of multicultural approaches is that the sole focus on promoting diversity may be viewed as undermining merit considerations (Walton, Spencer, & Erman, 2013), raising fairness concerns in White perceivers		
2	2	24			. Multicultural meritocracy can help reduce these fairness concerns of White perceivers by making merit an explicit consideration of a diversity framework.
2	2	26			For minorities, multicultural meritocracy can be more effective than value-in-merit in addressing fairness needs, since a sole focus on merit may be perceived as ignoring bias and discrimination minority employees may face.
2	2	30			Thus, integrating multicultural elements into a meritocracy message could create more favorable outcomes arise through increased fairness perceptions.
2	2	36			We conducted five experiments to investigate how multicultural meritocracy affects well-established effects from previous research.

2	2	39		Our hypotheses focused on how the different ideologies address the inclusion and fairness concerns of Whites and of minorities. For Whites, we predicted that multicultural meritocracy would be more effective than multiculturalism because it addresses both their inclusion and fairness needs not met by multiculturalism.
2	2	42		For minorities, we predicted that multicultural meritocracy would be more effective than value-in-merit by addressing the inclusion and fairness needs not met by value-in-merit.
2	2	44		Thus, our main comparison for Whites was between multicultural meritocracy and multiculturalism, and our main comparison for minorities was between multicultural meritocracy and value-in-merit
2	2	47		The first two studies focused on whether multicultural meritocracy can reduce some of the negative effects of multiculturalism for Whites by measuring stereotype activation (Experiment 1) and the delegitimizing of racial discrimination claims (Experiment 2).
2	2	51		. Experiment 3 investigated whether multicultural meritocracy would the psychological engagement of minorities compared to the value-in-merit approach (Experiment 3).
2	2	54		Studies 4a and 4b explored whether multicultural meritocracy would increase engagement for both Whites and minorities by increasing perceived inclusion and fairness.
3	1	25	Additionally, because celebrating diversity could be seen as a cue for lowering merit considerations (Walton et al., 2013), we also included a measure of performance estimations.	
3	1	35	The experiment had three conditions: multiculturalism vs. value-in-merit vs. multicultural meritocracy.	

3	1	44	” In the value-in-merit condition it read: “At Livens [...] we seek the most qualified individuals to join our team and reach their potential, which, in turn, benefits our employees, clientele, and the industry at large.”		
3	1	47			” In the multicultural meritocracy condition it read: “At Livens [...] we foster an inclusive and open-minded workplace that values differences and seek the most qualified individuals to join our team, which, in turn, benefits our employees, clientele, and the industry at large.”
3	2	38	Negative stereotypes were more strongly activated in the multiculturalism condition than in the value-in-merit ($F[1, 364] = 6.51$, $p = 0.011$, $\eta^2_2 = 0.018$) and multicultural meritocracy ($F[1, 364] = 4.92$, $p = 0.027$, $\eta^2_2 = 0.013$) conditions.		
3	2	40	Value-in-merit and multicultural meritocracy did not differ ($F[1, 364] = 0.04$, $p = 0.837$, $\eta^2_2 = 0.000$).		
3	2	49	Participants estimated Lamar's performance to be lower in the multiculturalism than the value-in-merit condition ($F[1, 364] = 7.34$, $p = 0.007$, $\eta^2_2 = 0.020$).		
3	2	50			They estimated his performance as marginally lower in multicultural meritocracy than value-in-merit ($F[1, 364] = 3.23$, $p = 0.073$, $\eta^2_2 = 0.009$), while multiculturalism and multicultural meritocracy did not differ ($F[1, 364] = 0.51$, $p = 0.476$, $\eta^2_2 = 0.001$)
3	2	58	However, this indirect effect of ideology on estimated performance of a Black target did not for the value-in-merit and multicultural meritocracy comparison		
3	2	61			Stereotype activation was significantly lower in the multicultural meritocracy and value-in-merit conditions.

3	2	63	Experiment 2 tested whether multicultural meritocracy would also help individuals be more effective at identifying discrimination than multiculturalism.
4	1	3	In Experiment 2 we investigated whether multicultural meritocracy would reduce this concealment of discrimination from multiculturalism.
4	1	13	
4	1	43	The experiment had three conditions: multiculturalism vs. value-in-merit vs. multicultural meritocracy.
4	1	44	Participants perceived the lawsuit as less valid in the multiculturalism than in the multicultural meritocracy condition ($F[1, 342] = 6.55, p = 0.011, \eta^2 = 0.019$).
4	1	44	Multiculturalism and value-in-merit ($F[1, 342] = 0.92, p = 0.338, \eta^2 = 0.003$), and multicultural meritocracy and value-in-merit ($F[1, 342] = 2.54, p = 0.112, \eta^2 = 0.007$) did not differ.
4	1	52	Participants punished the plaintiffs more in the multiculturalism condition than in the multicultural meritocracy condition ($F[1, 342] = 4.97, p = 0.026, \eta^2 = 0.014$).
4	1	54	Multiculturalism and value-in-merit ($F[1, 342] = 0.60, p = 0.439, \eta^2 = 0.002$), and multicultural meritocracy and value-in-merit ($F[1, 342] = 2.10, p = 0.148, \eta^2 = 0.006$) did not differ from each other.
4	1	59	Participants in the multiculturalism condition delegitimized discrimination and countersued for a higher amount compared to those in the multicultural meritocracy condition.
4	1	60	These results suggest that multicultural meritocracy can reduce the concealment and delegitimizing impact of multiculturalism on racial discrimination claims.

4	1	65		Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that multicultural meritocracy can reduce some of the negative outcomes of multiculturalism for White perceivers
4	2	4	In contrast, value-in-merit approaches may suggest that organizations ignore institutional barriers faced by minority members.	
4	2	6		. Experiment 3 investigated whether multicultural meritocracy retained or gave an additional boost to the minorities' psychological engagement at work compared to value-in-merit.
4	2	17	The experiment had three conditions: multiculturalism vs. value-in-merit vs. multicultural meritocracy.	
4	2	40		Minority participants expressed increased psychological engagement in the multicultural meritocracy condition, compared to both the value-in-merit condition ($F[1, 200] = 5.30, p = 0.022$ $\eta^2 p = 0.026$), and compared to multiculturalism ($F[1, 200] = 3.81, p = 0.052$ $\eta^2 p = 0.019$).
4	2	46		Multicultural meritocracy increased the psychological engagement of minorities compared to both value-in-merit and multiculturalism.
4	2	54		First, we conducted identical studies for minorities (4a) and Whites (4b) to test whether multicultural meritocracy would increase psychological engagement for both groups.
4	2	58		Second, we included measures of perceived social inclusion and fairness in order to investigate whether our proposed underlying mechanisms explain the positive effects of multicultural meritocracy on participants' psychological engagement.
5	1	8	The experiment had three conditions: multiculturalism vs. value-in-merit vs. multicultural meritocracy.	

5	1	46		In line with our core prediction that minorities would respond more favorably to multicultural meritocracy than value-inmerit, we found that minority participants expressed greater psychological engagement in the multicultural meritocracy condition, compared to the value-in-merit condition, $F(1, 179) = 4.40$, $p = 0.037$, $\eta^2_2 = 0.024$.
5	1	50		Multicultural meritocracy did not differ from the multiculturalism, $F(1, 179) = 0.34$, $p = 0.559$, $\eta^2_2 = 0.002$
5	1	52	Interestingly, multiculturalism and value-in-merit also did not differ from each other, $F(1, 179) = 2.54$, $p = 0.113$, $\eta^2_2 = 0.014$.	
5	1	59		Supporting our prediction, minority participants expressed increased inclusion perceptions in the multicultural meritocracy condition, compared to the value-in-merit condition, $F(1, 179) = 7.23$, $p = 0.008$, $\eta^2_2 = 0.039$, and the multicultural meritocracy condition did not differ from the multiculturalism condition, $F(1, 179) = 0.77$, $p = 0.382$, $\eta^2_2 = 0.004$.
5	1	64	Moreover, participants reported higher perceived inclusion in the multiculturalism condition than the value-in-merit condition, $F(1, 179) = 13.51$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2_2 = 0.070$.	
5	2	9	We created two mediation models, separately comparing dummy-coded multiculturalism and value-in-merit (coded as 1) to multicultural meritocracy (coded as 0), including the mediators simultaneously.	
5	2	12	The indirect effect of value-in-merit versus multicultural meritocracy on psychological engagement through inclusion was significant, indirect effect = -0.20 , $SE = 0.09$, 95% CI $[-0.413, -0.057]$, while this indirect effect was non-significant for fairness, indirect effect = -0.06 , $SE = 0.05$, 95% CI $[-0.234, 0.004]$.	

5	2	17		The indirect effect of multiculturalism versus multicultural meritocracy on psychological engagement was non-significant through both inclusion, indirect effect = 0.06, SE = 0.07, 95% CI [-0.047, 0.217], and fairness, indirect effect = -0.01, SE = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.104, 0.059].
5	2	22		Enhanced perceptions of inclusion but not fairness explained why multicultural-meritocracy increases psychological engagement by minorities compared to a value-in-merit approach to diversity.
5	2	25		This experiment replicated the key finding from Experiment 3: an expression of multicultural meritocracy by an organization increased psychological engagement among minorities compared to a value-in-merit approach to diversity.
5	2	27		Unlike Experiment 3, multicultural meritocracy did not differ from multiculturalism; this is not particularly surprising since past research has found that multiculturalism increases the psychological engagement of minorities (Plaut et al., 2009).
5	2	33	Compared to value-in-merit, multicultural meritocracy increased a sense of inclusion among minorities.	
5	2	43	The experiment had three conditions: multiculturalism vs. value-in-merit vs. multicultural meritocracy	
6	1	5		In line with our core prediction that Whites would respond more favorably to multicultural meritocracy than multiculturalism, White participants expressed increased psychological engagement in the multicultural meritocracy condition, compared to the multiculturalism condition, $F(1, 219) = 16.13, p < 0.001, \eta^2 = 0.069$.
6	1	9		Their engagement was also higher in the multicultural meritocracy condition compared to the value-in-merit condition, $F(1, 219) = 13.67, p < 0.001, \eta^2 = 0.059$
6	1	11	Multiculturalism and value-in-merit did not differ from each other, $F(1, 219) = 0.05, p = 0.829, \eta^2 = 0.000$.	

6	1	18		As predicted, White participants expressed increased perceived inclusion in the multicultural meritocracy condition, compared to the multiculturalism condition, $F(1, 219) = 9.31, p = 0.003, \eta^2 = 0.041$.
6	1	20		They also reported higher inclusion in multicultural meritocracy condition compared to the value-in-merit condition, $F(1, 219) = 15.03, p < 0.001, \eta^2 = 0.064$.
6	1	22	Multiculturalism and value-in-merit conditions did not differ from each other, $F(1, 219) = 0.90, p = 0.345, \eta^2 = 0.004$.	
6	1	29		As predicted, White participants expressed increased perceived fairness in the multicultural meritocracy condition, compared to the multiculturalism condition, $F(1, 219) = 6.20, p = 0.014, \eta^2 = 0.028$.
6	1	31		They also reported higher perceived fairness in the multicultural meritocracy condition compared to the value-in-merit condition, $F(1, 219) = 15.90, p < 0.001, \eta^2 = 0.068$.
6	1	33	Multiculturalism and value-in-merit did not differ from each other, $F(1, 219) = 2.65, p = 0.105, \eta^2 = 0.012$.	
6	1	40	We created two mediation models, separately comparing dummy-coded multiculturalism and value-in-merit (coded as 1) to multicultural meritocracy (coded as 0), including the mediators simultaneously.	
6	1	43		There was an indirect effect of multicultural meritocracy versus value-in-merit on psychological engagement through inclusion, indirect effect = $-0.33, SE = 0.10, 95\% CI [-0.559, -0.175]$, but not through fairness, indirect effect = $-0.06, SE = 0.07, 95\% CI [-0.193, 0.077]$.

6	1	48	<p>The indirect effect of multicultural meritocracy versus multiculturalism on psychological engagement was significant through inclusion, indirect effect = -0.25, $SE = 0.10$, 95% CI $[-0.507, -0.107]$, but not through fairness, indirect effect = -0.04, $SE = 0.04$, 95% CI $[-0.135, 0.041]$.</p> <p>For Whites, multicultural meritocracy enhanced perceptions of inclusion, which then led these participants to feel more psychologically engaged in companies characterized by a multicultural-meritocracy approach rather than a value-in-merit or multiculturalism approach to diversity.</p> <p>Although multicultural-meritocracy increased fairness perceptions compared to the other two approaches, fairness did not explain its positive effects on psychological engagement.</p> <p>Because Experiments 4a and 4b were run simultaneously, we pooled the data from these experiments to test whether multicultural meritocracy differentially affected majority and minority group members.</p> <p>In particular, we were interested in whether this diversity approach would produce inclusion or fairness gaps between these groups ($N = 404$).</p> <p>Disentangling this interaction revealed that minorities and majorities did not differ in terms of inclusion in the multicultural meritocracy condition ($p = 0.158$, $\eta^2 = 0.005$), and in the value-in-merit condition ($p = 0.522$, $\eta^2 = 0.001$), but minorities' perceived inclusion was higher than majorities in the multiculturalism condition ($p = 0.015$, $\eta^2 = 0.015$).</p> <p>Importantly, these results provide support for the notion that multicultural meritocracy does not create inclusion or fairness gaps between minority and majority perceivers.</p> <p>Five experiments tested the effects of a hybrid diversity ideology—multicultural meritocracy—that combined elements from the multiculturalism and value-in-merit ideology</p>
6	1	53	
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6	2	26		Our multicultural meritocracy ideology simultaneously emphasized the importance of racial diversity and an equal opportunity meritocracy.
6	2	32		The results revealed the overall benefits of multicultural meritocracy compared to multiculturalism or value-in-merit.
6	2	34		For White perceivers, multicultural meritocracy eliminated the downsides of multiculturalism, reducing the activation of negative racial stereotypes (Experiment 1), reducing de-legitimization of racial discrimination (Experiment 2), and increasing their engagement at work (Experiment 4b).
6	2	38		For racial minorities, multicultural meritocracy increased psychological engagement in comparison with value-in-merit (Experiments 3 and 4a).
6	2	40		For both Whites and minorities, multicultural meritocracy increased psychological engagement through heightened feelings of inclusion.
6	2	43		Overall, our results suggest that multicultural meritocracy combines the benefits of multiculturalism and value-in-merit, while limiting their downsides.
6	2	48		Moreover, the psychological mechanisms that underlie the observed effectiveness of multicultural meritocracy—inclusion—open new venues for theory development around diversity ideologies.
6	2	51	We experimentally created an ideology that combined elements of multiculturalism and value-in-merit.	
6	2	52	As it turns out, recent research has found that merit-related themes can emerge as components of multiculturalist statements (Apfelbaum et al., 2016).	
6	2	54		This suggests that some organizations may already be utilizing multicultural meritocracy.

6	2	57	Our work offers clear practical implications: By emphasizing an explicit commitment to both racial diversity and merit in their policies and mission statements, rather than a singular focus on one of these, organizations can engage both its White and minority employees.	
6	2	60	Past work has suggested that multiculturalism and value-in-merit can each be effective for different underrepresented groups and under different conditions (Apfelbaum et al., 2016), that using these different ideologies depends on the levels of representation and threat	
6	2	64		However, multicultural meritocracy may offer a more efficient approach because it works for both minorities and Whites.
7	1	3		An intriguing finding in Experiment 1 was that participants estimated a minority hire's performance as marginally lower in multicultural meritocracy condition than in value-in-merit condition; it suggests that a pro-diversity message, even when it is integrated with a meritocratic ideal, can still be interpreted as reducing a focus on merit (Walton et al., 2013).
7	1	6		Thus, the effectiveness of multicultural meritocracy may not be universally positive. N
7	1	8		Nevertheless, the supplementary analyses showed that multicultural meritocracy had the same indirect effects on performance estimations through stereotype activation as value-in-merit, suggesting its promise within the performance domain.
7	1	13		Although our findings were in line with our core predictions with respect to the contrast between multicultural meritocracy and value-in-merit for minorities and between multicultural meritocracy and multiculturalism for Whites, the lack of differences between multiculturalism

					and value-in-merit was unexpected in multiple of our studies.
7	1	18	For instance, in Experiment 2's evaluation of discrimination claims we had expected Whites to respond differently to value-in-merit than to multiculturalism.		
7	1	24	Additionally, while previous research showed that Whites associate multiculturalism with feelings of exclusion compared to colorblindness, in Experiment 4b we found no differences between multiculturalism and value-in-merit conditions.		
7	1	25			Moreover, although Experiment 4a suggests that multicultural meritocracy may not be consistently better for minority engagement than multiculturalism (see Study 4b), the broader effectiveness of multicultural meritocracy (also for Whites) could make it a more efficient approach for organizations to apply.
7	1	30			Finally, even though Whites perceived multicultural meritocracy as fairer than multiculturalism alone, fairness did not predict their consequent engagement.
7	1	38			Additionally, future work could include performance measures, allowing- to explore the utility of multicultural meritocracy for performance outcomes in diverse organizations.
7	1	41			Another interesting new direction for future research would be to examine the link between multicultural meritocracy and polyculturalism (i.e., an approach focusing on interactions and mutual influence between groups; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010).

7	1	44		One possibility is that multicultural meritocracy puts individuals in polycultural mindsets, which may have implications for intergroup communication and contact.
7	1	50		The current research tested the effects of multicultural meritocracy, a hybrid approach to diversity that combined the celebration of diversity in multiculturalism with the equal opportunity elements of value-in-merit.
7	1	55		. We believe that a multicultural meritocracy approach to diversity has the potential to be an effective management of diversity in organizations for all its members.
7	2	8	Livens is actively committed to recruiting, retaining, and promoting the most qualified employees. Our employees also benefit from our dedication to this merit-focused policy: they have equal opportunities to succeed and are rewarded for their accomplishments.	
7	2	12	At Livens, our commitment to merit contributes to our success as a company.	
7	2	51	Our employees benefit from our dedication to this merit & diversity focused policy: Our employees have equal opportunities to succeed and are rewarded for their accomplishments, while their own diverse backgrounds are recognized and celebrated through our many diversity initiatives and programs.	
7	2	56	At Livens, our commitment to the combination of merit & diversity contributes to our success as a company.	

Ho, C. (2017).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
3	1	6		Congratulatory voices depict Asian–Australians as a model minority, whose work ethic promises to enhance the calibre of Australian schooling and propel the

					nation's meritocracy forward.
3	1	14			(1) a pro-meritocratic, neo-liberal discourse, in which Asian-Australians are a model minority embodying the competitive spirit and aspiration required in a globalised economy and A new meritocracy is being created in Australia that looks Asian. (Sheehan 2014) Other readers saw the achievements of Asian-Australians as the natural product of a healthy meritocracy at work: if you study and work hard, you'll get in. period. black, white, asian etc ... that goes for everything in life not just school. (bloke, October 17, 2011) Overall, these comments show that there is great support within Australian public opinion for successful Asian-Australian students (as well as pride among Asian-Australians themselves), driven by a commitment to the notion of meritocracy, and a firm belief that hard work deserves success. The model minority therefore demonstrates meritocracy at work, a system in which anyone can succeed. Within the discourse of meritocracy, the disadvantaged are blamed for being irresponsible, rather than seen as simply unfortunate (Archer and Francis 2007, 19).
3	1	33			
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12	1	43		Whether Asian–Australian students are lauded as the new meritocracy or pathologised as automatons, there is one discourse that runs through the public attitudes evident in this study: their success is explained by culture.
15	1	25		However, public opinion on their achievements is divided. While supporters applaud Asian–Australians’ success and view it as a testimony to Australia’s healthy meritocracy, critics resent their success, seeing it as a product of an excessive focus on schooling and oppressive parenting.

Chang, E. (2018).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
3	1	20		Accelerate-Edu constructed and reified policy knowledge that I term digital meritocracy: a belief in digital technologies as a means of more effectively evaluating individual success as a reflection of student effort and ability, regardless of historic, place-based, material inequities.
3	1	40		I conclude by elaborating on a definition of digital meritocracy and discussing what implications policy analysts and advocates might draw from this empirical case to strategically organize for more equitable and historically responsive school and educational opportunities.
8	1	24		These complementary discourses functioned as mutually reinforcing dimensions of digital meritocracy, which organized practices that targeted individual deficits and talents, regardless of structural inequities.
14	1	16		In this section, I theorize these complementary discourses by developing the notion of digital meritocracy.
14	1	17		I use this discussion of digital meritocracy to argue that IOs operate within discursive contexts not of their own making.
14	1	25		Myths of meritocracy long predate the emergence of new digital technologies and represent a deeply institutionalized feature of K-12 schooling.

14	1	26	Meritocracy understands individual success and failure as a product of individual effort, talent, and skill (Katz & Rose, 2013; Labaree, 1997, 2011; Metz, 1990).
14	1	29	Assumptions of meritocracy are evident in “reforms” such as tracking (Oakes & Rogers, 2006), high-stakes standardized assessments (Au, 2016), or programs and pedagogies that aspire to cultivate students’ “grit” (Golden, 2017).
14	1	36	Digital meritocracy innovates and intensifies longstanding myths of meritocracy.
14	1	37	I understand digital meritocracy as a belief in digital technologies as a means of evaluating individual success, regardless of historic, place-based material inequities.
14	1	39	Rendering meritocracy digital through discourses of personalization and everywhere preserves old myths about schooling and individual social mobility.
15	1	4	Digital meritocracy obscures attention to intensified racial and economic resegregation (Reardon & Owens, 2014), by recasting policy attention from material to digital planes and from societal to individual problems.
15	1	10	Although Accelerate-Edu purports to “disrupt” schooling, it merely constructs a digital gloss for talking about, justifying, and sustaining policy discourses of meritocracy.
15	1	20	Accelerate-Edu brokers policy knowledge of digital meritocracy in

					ways that extend Katz and Rose's analysis.
15	1	24			In sum, Accelerate-Edu does not merely "broker" resources and information about education technology but actively participates in the construction of digital meritocratic policy knowledge.
15	1	24			That a meritocratic conception of schooling emerges from a Silicon Valley culture steeped in individualist and entrepreneurial ways of knowing and being is perhaps not surprising.
15	1	40			In the case of Accelerate-Edu, policy knowledge of digital meritocracy actively excludes other vital needs, such as equitable school funding, nutritious foods, health care, or quality teachers.
16	1	23			Demands for community accountability over IOs like Accelerate-Edu might contribute greater transparency in their brokering work but will do little to challenge the diffuse ways in which Accelerate-Edu enlivens digital meritocratic policy discourses.
16	1	24			s. M. D. Young's (1958) satirical take on meritocracy exemplifies this point.
16	1	26		Young contends that competing factions might disagree on who deserves equitable opportunity but rarely question the value of "merit": the means of deciding on the appropriateness of societal divisions.	
16	1	33		This study reveals how countervailing political movements must demand IO accountability and cultivate a shared	

				critique of individualized, merit-based solutions that pit individual students and families against each other (Pedroni, 2007).	
16	1	40			Specifically, researchers might look toward IOs that challenge digital meritocracy and incrementally materialize an “alternative common sense” (Dumas & Anderson, 2014, p. 16).
19	notas	n 9			Efforts like those Emejulu and McGregor (2017) outline challenge prevailing policy knowledge of digital meritocracy.

Darnon, C., Smeding, A., & Redersdorff, S. (2018).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
523	1	31		The purpose of the present article is to test the belief in school meritocracy as one of these barriers
523	2	3	Recurrent evidence shows that several non-merit factors, including SES, affect school achievement (see Bradley & Corwyn, 2002; OECD, 2015; Sirin, 2005; White, 1982).	
524	1	6	In sum, the equilibrium of the whole system may result from the transformation of social inequalities into merit-based inequalities—in other words, from the transformation of a group-based hierarchy into an individual-based hierarchy (Bourdieu et al., 1990; Darnon, Dompnier, & Poortvliet, 2012; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).	
524	1	11	Consequently, the ideology of merit is likely to play a crucial role in the process.	
524	1	17		Meritocracy is an instantiation of the equity principle, prescribing that one's outcome should be allocated in proportion to one's individual ability and efforts (Son Hing, Bobocel, & Zanna, 2002).
524	1	22		Although not conducted in the sphere of school, some research has shown the role of meritocracy in maintaining, perpetuating, and legitimizing social inequalities.
524	1	24		. In particular, meritocracy is considered a hierarchy-enhancing ideology that provides moral and intellectual justification for the social practices that maintain group-based hierarchy and, thus, contributes to serve group domination (O'Brien & Major, 2009; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

524	1	30	<p>. In the same vein, meritocracy is one of the legitimizing beliefs through which people maintain a fair perception of the system (Jost et al., 2004; Jost & Hunyady, 2005).</p>
524	1	33	<p>This might explain why meritocracy is such a widespread ideology in most Western societies (Kaiser & Major, 2006; Kraus & Tan, 2015; Plaut, Markus, & Lachman, 2002) and why people are so concerned about defending and protecting meritocratic beliefs (Ledgerwood, Mandisodza, Jost, & Pohl, 2011; van der Toorn et al., 2015), including in the academic context (Wiederkehr, Bonnot, Krauth-Gruber, & Darnon, 2015).</p>
524	1	43	<p>A recent line of research (Son Hing et al., 2011) has underscored that an important distinction should be made between the belief that society is meritocratic (i.e., descriptive meritocracy) and the preference for the meritocratic principle (i.e., prescriptive meritocracy).</p>
524	1	47	<p>This research further documented that descriptive meritocracy—but not prescriptive meritocracy—was related to hierarchy-enhancing ideologies (e.g., conservatism, attitude toward police and politicians, right wing authoritarianism, racism toward ethnic minorities).</p>
524	1	51	<p>Prescriptive meritocracy was not related to the aforementioned constructs.</p>
524	1	53	<p>Thus, although prescriptive meritocracy could be considered as being more strongly ideological in nature than descriptive meritocracy, previous research has documented that the latter, more than the former, plays a role in system justification.</p>
524	1	57	<p>Indeed, belief in meritocracy (descriptive meritocracy) more than endorsement of meritocracy (prescriptive meritocracy) can serve to legitimate the hierarchy and contributes to maintaining the status quo.</p>

524	2	1		The role of descriptive (belief in) meritocracy in maintaining the status quo has received large empirical support.
524	2	4		. Notably, a correlation is often observed between belief in meritocracy and social dominance orientation, the personal preference for hierarchy within the social system (Haley & Sidanius, 2006; Pratto et al., 1994).
524	2	8		The more a society is hierarchical, the more the meritocratic principle (equity) is preferred over equality (Fischer & Smith, 2003).
524	2	12		Besides, when asked to explain economic inequalities, most participants attribute it to individual factors, especially if they endorse belief in meritocracy (Godfrey & Wolf, 2016).
524	2	13		Meritocracy also reduces perceived discrimination (Major et al., 2002; McCoy & Major, 2007; for a review see Kaiser & Major, 2006).
524	2	16		Particularly relevant to our purpose, belief in meritocracy has also been shown to reduce positive attitudes toward practices that serve more equality.
524	2	19		For example, individuals who strongly believe in meritocracy are likely to devalue programs designed to provide differential opportunities to discriminated people (Son Hing et al., 2002).
524	2	22		The defense of the meritocratic principle is often an argument against the use of affirmative action (Augoustinos, Tuffin, & Every, 2005; Chatard, Lorenzi-Cioldi, & Buschini, 2006; Crosby, Iyer, & Sincharoen, 2006; Faniko, Lorenzi-Cioldi, Buschini, & Chatard, 2012; Faniko et al., 2015; Fraser & Kick, 2000).

524	2	28	<p>. It is worth noting that the ideology of meritocracy is often operationalized via the Protestant work ethic construct—namely, the idea that people who work hard succeed (Pratto et al., 1994).</p>
524	2	39	<p>Thus, this research supports the somewhat paradoxical idea that believing we live in a meritocratic society (i.e., descriptive meritocracy) is associated with support for inequality, acceptance and legitimization of discrimination, and limited support for programs that promote equality.</p>
524	2	44	<p>No such effect is observed for endorsing meritocracy (i.e., prescriptive meritocracy).</p>
524	2	49	<p>The purpose of the present research is to test belief in school meritocracy (BSM) as a potential barrier to the implementation of equalizing pedagogical methods in the educational system.</p>
524	2	52	<p>. People are particularly attached to the idea of meritocracy, especially when it comes to explaining academic achievement (Duru-Bellat & Tenret, 2012; Khan & Jerolmack, 2013).</p>
524	2	55	<p>Indeed, meritocracy within the educational system is seen as an equalizing force, a way to fight social inequalities, a path for upward mobility (Duru-Bellat, 2006, 2009; Minow, Shweder, & Markus, 2008).</p>
524	2	60	<p>Paradoxically, however, for the reasons developed above, we believe meritocracy within school not only is an “unfulfilled” and “unfillable” promise (Mijs, 2016), it may itself contribute to social inequalities.</p>

525	1	3		. In particular, at school, belief in school meritocracy (i.e., descriptive meritocracy) should act as a glass barrier and be negatively associated with interest toward and behavioral engagement in the implementation of equalizing pedagogical methods.
525	1	16		Such a link is not expected for prescriptive school meritocracy (i.e., endorsement of school meritocracy [ESM]) and is expected to hold only for an equalizing method, but not for an enhancing method (Studies 2 and 3).
525	1	43		After a break during which they saw some humorous pictures about school, participants were asked to complete two questionnaires on meritocracy (descriptive and prescriptive).
525	1	52		Belief in/endorsement of school meritocracy (descriptive/prescriptive school meritocracy).
525	2	7		. They were then asked to indicate to what extent they thought each item corresponded to the reality of school today (left column, descriptive meritocracy) and to what extent they thought it corresponded to how the system should be (right column, prescriptive meritocracy) on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
525	2	13		The scale demonstrated good internal reliability for both descriptive ($\alpha = .79$; $M = 4$; $SD = .99$) and prescriptive school meritocracy ($\alpha = .74$; $M = 5.49$; $SD = .92$).
526	1	17		We were interested in whether interest and behavioral engagement in the equalizing method would be predicted by belief (BSM) and endorsement (ESM) of school meritocracy.
526	2	19		As expected, the more students believed in school meritocracy (BSM), the less likely they were to engage in the implementation of the method within their university.

526	2	23		As discussed earlier, and as argued by other researchers outside the educational context, believing in meritocracy (descriptive meritocracy) is different from endorsing meritocracy (prescriptive meritocracy; Son Hing et al., 2011).
526	2	26		The present results confirm that, as expected, descriptive meritocracy (in the present case BSM), more than prescriptive meritocracy (ESM), serves as a potential barrier for the promotion of equalizing practices within the university and, as such, as a tool for system justification and reproduction. However, the present data supports the view that BSM, more so than ESM, is the component of meritocracy that seems to be the most negatively related to engagement in equalizing practices.
526	2	40		Study 3 was conducted to address these limitations. Consequently, in Study 3, the salience of meritocracy was manipulated.
528	1	50		Thus, the goal of this study was to experimentally test the effect of merit prime on engagement toward the two methods while controlling for political orientation.
528	1	60		n. Priming meritocracy should result in a lower intention to engage in the equalizing method (but not the enhancing method) than priming a neutral content.
528	2	1		In the control condition, the authors defended the idea that the way a backyard space is organized can determine children's games and did not mention merit.
528	2	45		
529	1	12	The initial regression model included merit prime (coded 0.5 for the control condition, +0.5 for the merit prime condition), method (coded 0.5 for equalizing method, +0.5 for enhancing method), and their interaction. In addition, political orientation (mean-centered) was entered as a control variable.	

529	1	26	Contrary to expectations, no effect of merit prime was found on BSM, $B = .02, t < 1, p = .92$.	
529	1	33	Moreover, the interaction between method and merit prime, $B = .76, 95\% \text{ CI } [.05, 1.48], t(198) = 2.10, p = .04, \eta^2 = .02$, showed that the effect of the method only appeared in the control group, $B = .88, 95\% \text{ CI } [1.4, -.36], t(198) = 3.31, p = .002, \eta^2 = .05, M = 4; SD = .19$ for the equalizing method, $M = 3.12; SD = .19$ for the enhancing method), but was not significant in the merit prime condition, $B = .12, t < 1, M = 3.64; SD = .17$ for the equalizing method, $M = 3.52; SD = .18$ for the enhancing method.	
529	2	1	The results reported above suggest that merit prime did not produce the expected increase in BSM	
529	2	4	Because the level of BSM did not depend on merit prime, additional analyses were conducted to test whether the effects obtained in Studies 1 and 2 would be replicated in Study 3, with the inclusion of political orientation as a control variable.	
529	2	19	Because merit prime was related to some of the dependent variables, it was also included in the regression model.	
529	2	22	However, it was not related to any of the IV. Thus, the interactions between merit prime	
529	2	25	. To summarize, the final model contained: BSM, method, their interaction, merit prime, political orientation, and the interaction between political orientation and method.	
530	1	31		Study 3 aimed at testing whether priming meritocracy would affect the engagement toward an equalizing and not an enhancing method
530	1	34	Contrary to our expectations, the present merit induction failed to increase self-reported BSM.	

530	1	35	. In addition, the merit prime did not raise any effect on the outcomes.		
530	1	38	One of the reasons might be the resistance people have to renouncing the idea of merit (Kraus & Tan, 2015; van der Toorn et al., 2015; Wiederkehr et al., 2015).		
530	1	39	Importantly, although merit ideology has been previously studied, its relevance in the school context has been neglected.		
530	2	25			Believing we live in a meritocratic society is an ideology that serves to maintain and justify existing hierarchy among groups (Jost et al., 2004; O'Brien & Major, 2009; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Son Hing et al., 2002, 2011).
530	2	29			Surprisingly, the literature on meritocracy has rarely examined the context of the educational system even though this system is a cornerstone of the meritocratic ideal.
530	2	33			The purpose of the present research was to test the hypotheses that belief in school meritocracy (i.e., school descriptive meritocracy) should negatively predict interest and behavioral engagement in the implementation of equalizing interventions within the educational system.
530	2	39	To support the general hypotheses, the three studies demonstrated that the more individuals believed school rewarded efforts and merit, the less likely they were to engage in the implementation of an equalizing pedagogical method.		
531	1	19			Thus, in line with what was previously observed outside of the school context and with general (and not school-specific) beliefs in meritocracy, the present results support the existence of a negative association between descriptive meritocracy and the promotion of equality (Augoustinos et al., 2005; Chatard et al., 2006; Fraser & Kick, 2000; Son Hing et al., 2002).

531	1	50	In addition, as discussed above, in the present research the salience of merit was not manipulated successfully	
531	2	3	Thus, one cannot exclude the possibility that participants may have perceived the equalizing method as violating the merit principle	
531	2	5	Comparing engagement in methods that are explicitly presented as violating the merit principle or not could clarify the role of that process in explaining why high BSM participants resist the equalizing method.	
531	2	9		In his recent review, Mijs (2016) argued that one of the reasons why the meritocratic principle should be criticized within education is that too strong of a focus on meritocracy may tend to crowd out other justice principles—notably, the principles of equality and needs.
531	2	17		The present data confirm that the people who claim that the school system is meritocratic do not support measures designed to achieve more equality.
531	2	18		As such, although meritocracy is often presented as a way to fight social inequalities, we believe it instead plays a role in fighting equality.

Darnon, C., Wiederkehr, V., Dompnier, B., & Martinot, D. (2018).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
1	1	4		However, the purpose of the present paper is to highlight a possible dark side effect of promoting meritocracy in the context of school.
1	1	5		Indeed, in that context, the promotion of school meritocracy may contribute to the reproduction of social inequalities.
1	1	9		Believing in descriptive meritocracy means believing that ability and hard work are the main determinants of success (Son Hing et al., 2011).
1	1	13		School meritocracy is often presented as a way to fight social inequalities because, in meritocratic beliefs, success is perceived as the direct consequence of children's deservingness and not of irrelevant factors such as social class, gender, or ethnicity.
1	1	17		However, the pattern of stratification among groups in the school system shows that the goal of meritocracy is not being met (Mijs, 2016) because school success is influenced by factors unrelated to real merit.
2	1	14	In such a system, both low- and high-status individuals are led to believe that their success or failure is not due to their social background, but rather to differences in efforts and abilities (i.e., merit)	
2	1	15		However, the pattern of stratification among groups in the school system shows that the goal of meritocracy is not being met (Mijs, 2016) because school success is influenced by factors unrelated to real merit.

2	1	16	<p>. Indeed, the promotion of school merit among children is susceptible to affecting both the perception low and high SES students have of their ability to succeed within the system and their endorsement of system-justifying beliefs, two processes that—as detailed below—may contribute to increasing the SES achievement gap.</p>
2	1	21	<p>First, in meritocratic environments, performance is perceived as a relevant and accurate indicator of one’s own ability (Trautwein, Ludtke, Koller, & Baumert, 2006).</p>
2	1	31	<p>Taken together, these results suggest that, in meritocratic environments, low and high SES students are likely to endorse self-perceptions that match the place they occupy in the hierarchy (i.e., low and high self-efficacy beliefs), which could further explain the SES achievement gap.</p>
2	1	35	<p>Second, meritocratic contexts push individuals to endorse beliefs that are susceptible to explaining and legitimating social inequalities.</p>
2	1	38	<p>Indeed, outside of school, research has underscored the very role of meritocracy, especially in its descriptive form (i.e., believing the system is meritocratic), thereby making people accept the place they occupy within a system (O’Brien & Major, 2009; Son Hing et al., 2011).</p>

2	1	41		<p>According to system justification theory, meritocracy is one of the legitimizing myths through which a positive vision of the social system is maintained (Baron & Banaji, 2009; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003), regardless of one's own social position (Jost & Burgess, 2000; Ledgerwood, Mandisodza, Jost, & Pohl, 2011; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).</p> <p>In meritocratic environments, members of advantaged groups are perceived as having worked harder than members of disadvantaged groups.</p> <p>Meritocracy promotes outgroup favouritism for members of low-status groups and in-group favouritism for members of high-status groups (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; O'Brien & Major, 2009).</p>
2	1	45		
2	1	46		
2	1	49	<p>. Preference for merit also predicts a denial of racial privileges among white participants (Knowles & Lowery, 2012), pushes members of low-status groups to self-describe in a stereotyped way (McCoy & Major, 2007), reduces the perception of discrimination (see also Major et al., 2002), and leads people to attribute the disadvantages of dominated groups to internal causes (Fraser & Kick, 2000; Jost, 2001; see also Godfrey & Wolf, 2016).</p>	
3	1	6		<p>To sum up, priming school meritocracy should accentuate the SES achievement gap</p>

					via two possible mechanisms.
3	1	8	As a merit prime should favour the internalization process, it should strengthen the relationship between self-efficacy and performance.		
3	1	10	Second, priming merit should make both high and low SES children believe they deserve their position in the hierarchy and, thus, endorse system-justifying beliefs (i.e., belief in school meritocracy, BSM).		
3	1	15	Thus, school self-efficacy and BSM will be tested as two potential mediators of the impact of merit prime on the SES achievement gap.		
3	1	20			In the present research, low and high SES fifth-grade children were primed with a text that, depending on the condition, underscored either descriptive school meritocracy (merit prime condition) or an unrelated topic (control condition) before reporting their self-efficacy (in math and French) as well as their BSM.
3	1	23	We expected the SES achievement gap to be strengthened in a merit prime context (H1).		
3	1	26	Self-efficacy and BSM will be tested as two processes expressed as two mediated moderations (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005; Preacher, Rucher, & Hayes, 2007) that could explain the impact of the merit prime on the SES achievement gap (cf. Figure 1).		

3	1	29	To validate mediated moderation 1 (self-efficacy), SES should predict school self-efficacy (H2), and the relationship between self-efficacy and performance should be higher in the merit prime condition than in the control group (H3).	
3	1	30	To validate mediated moderation 2 (BSM), the merit prime should increase BSM (H4), and the negative link between BSM and performance should be stronger among low SES students than among high SES students (H5).	
4	1	16	In the 'merit prime' condition (N = 59; 33 low SES, 26 high SES), the introductory text indicated that 'At school, everyone has the same chances to begin with, but only some students manage to succeed: those who have the ability and motivation. Indeed, to succeed in school, children have to deserve it. (...)	
4	1	28	In particular, they were informed that school success did not only depend on merit and that some students might not succeed at a test for several reasons including being tired and being stressed, meaning that it was not 'their fault'.	
5	1	42	Merit prime is coded 1 for control condition, +1 for merit prime condition. Socioeconomic status is coded 1 for low SES, +1 for high SES.	

7	1	3	<p>A first regression analysis was conducted with SES (coded 1 for low SES, +1 for high SES students), merit prime (coded 1 for the control condition, +1 for the merit condition), and their interaction product as predictors and school performance as a dependent variable (Model 1). The effect of SES was significant, $b = 0.87$, $t(120) = 2.83$, $p = .005$, $g2$ $p = .06$.</p>	
7	1	7	<p>The effect of merit prime was not significant, $t(120) > 1$, but the interaction was $b = 0.66$, $t(120) = 2.15$, $p = .03$, $g2$ $p = .04$ (</p>	
7	1	11	<p>Supporting H1, whereas high SES students did not differ as a function of the condition, $t(120) < 1$, low SES students obtained a lower performance score in the merit prime condition than in the control condition, $b = 0.96$, $t(120) = 2.27$, $p = .03$.</p>	
7	1	16	<p>Regressing school self-efficacy on SES, merit prime, and their interaction product (Model 2) revealed a significant main effect of SES, $b = 0.06$, $t(120) = 2.12$, $p = .04$, $g2$ $p = .04$.</p>	
7	1	19	<p>Neither the effect of merit prime nor the interaction between SES and merit prime reached significance, $ts(120) < 1$.</p>	
7	1	25	<p>As expected by H4, BSM was higher in the merit prime ($M = 5.66$; $SD = 0.51$) than in the control condition</p>	

				(M = 5.34; SD = 0.92).		
7	1	29	<p>A last model was regressed on school performance with SES, merit prime, school self-efficacy, BSM (both mean-centred), and all interaction products as predictors (Model 4).</p> <p>No other effect reached significance, $1.32 < ts < 1.42$, $ps \geq .16$. This lack of additional results enabled several conclusions. First, the lack of significance of interaction between school self-efficacy and merit prime indicated that H3 was not supported, $b = 0.59$, $t(108) > 1$.</p> <p>Second, when controlled by the other terms included in the model, the interaction between SES and merit prime previously observed (H1; cf. Model 1) was strongly reduced and did not predict school performance anymore, $b = 0.35$, $t(108) = 1.07$, $p = .29$.</p> <p>In sum, these findings revealed that the increase in the SES performance gap produced by the merit prime was explained by mediated moderation 2 (BSM) but not by mediated moderation 1 (school self-efficacy): Both H4 and H5 were supported by the data, whereas only H2 (but not H3) was confirmed.</p>			
8	1	19	<p>The ideology of merit is a powerful instrument for system justification (Jost et al., 2004; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Son Hing et al., 2011).</p>			
8	1	21				
8	1	25				
9	1	2				

9	1	4	The present paper examined whether in the school context, priming merit contributes to accentuating the SES achievement gap.	
9	1	5	This question has important practical implications as merit is often promoted in the school context and low SES students have repeatedly been shown to have a poorer school achievement than their high SES counterparts. W	
9	1	7		We argued that meritocracy is likely to favour an internalization process, through which low and high social-class children attribute to themselves individual characteristics (i.e., low versus high self-efficacy) and endorse system-justifying beliefs (BSM)—two processes that may further explain their low or high performance
9	1	11	The present results support that priming merit has produced an increase in the achievement gap.	
9	1	14	. Indeed, the merit prime increased BSM endorsement (H4).	
9	1	21		Although school meritocracy is often presented as a way to fight social inequalities, the present results suggest that endorsing such beliefs may in fact accentuate social inequalities.
9	1	35	Although our merit prime did not mention SES, in future research, the implicit activation of the SES stereotype could be tested as another potential mediator of the SES by merit prime interaction on school performance.	

9	1	40	Finally, although mainly focused on effort, the present induction of merit underscored the role of both efforts and ability in explaining school success, which may explain the quite low effect size.	
9	1	43	Consequently, the internalization process is particularly likely to occur under the salience of effort-based merit.	
9	1	45	Merit is a widespread ideology in Western societies (Kraus & Tan, 2015) and is particularly present at school.	
9	1	46	The present findings showed that merit prime leads low and high SES children to endorse system-justifying beliefs (BSM) that in turn contribute to reproducing and accentuating the SES achievement gap.	

He, Y., & Markachev, N. (2018).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
1	1	10		Reinforcing this performance drive are claims that meritocracy is China's core political and society-wide governance principle.
2	1	2		This paper, then, examines the NOCs' response to these challenges and changes in terms of their engagement with meritocracy in the post-2008 era
2	1	4		Accordingly, the principal question guiding this paper centres on the nature and practice of meritocracy in post-2008 NOC graduate recruitment and selection.
2	1	6		The NOCs under consideration include China's three majors ⁴ which, since 2008, have placed stronger rhetorical emphasis on 'meritocratic' and 'fair' human resource management (HRM) practices.
2	1	8		Consequently, this paper proceeds to unpack the core theoretical and practical issues underpinning this growing NOC engagement with meritocracy.
2	1	8		For example, meritocracy possesses multi-dimensional meanings that can run into tension with one another.
2	1	10		Indeed, the aforesaid domestic and international developments encourage distinct meritocracy conceptions with diverse equality-efficiency tradeoffs.
2	1	12		Moreover, prospective rhetoric-behaviour gaps raise concern over NOC commitment to, and implementation of, meritocratic discourse.
2	1	13		Last, meritocracy can have wide-ranging implications on China's development through producing varied 'winners' and 'losers.'
2	1	15		Hence, it is clear that considerable ambiguity surrounds the NOC's post-2008 meritocratic 'transition.'

2	1	18	<p>This paper thus adopts an empirically driven, interdisciplinary approach (using original interviews, data sets and corporate records) to review the aforesaid issues and reach a more in-depth understanding of China's meritocratic ethos.</p> <p>As a consequence, it contributes to the ongoing academic debate over the nature and practice of meritocracy in contemporary China.</p>
2	1	19	<p>This can appear to, at minimum, advance a strong conception of meritocracy that tackles the unevenness in 'financial inheritances, educational opportunities and the cultural and social capital of different [stakeholders].</p>
2	1	33	<p>However, the state's simultaneous stress on a narrower, performance-driven meritocracy or SOE party patriotism points to the presence of other governance concepts with distinct social equality consequences.</p>
2	1	35	<p>Thus, reviewing the NOCs' engagement with meritocracy is important to achieving a more clear-cut understanding of the term's implementation in China and its broader stakeholder implications.</p>
2	1	40	<p>Tightening Party-SOE relations, moreover, make centre-level meritocratic dynamics ever more pertinent to NOC governance developments.</p>
3	1	15	<p>Therefore, this paper's in-depth, mixed-methods investigation can enrich our existing understanding of implemented meritocracy vis-à-vis claims from the centre.</p>
3	1	29	<p>Hence, this paper examines meritocracy implementation through a pertinent, though understudied, research combination.</p>
4	1	1	<p>Last, this paper's empirical emphases improve on existing China-related meritocracy scholarship that has, in most instances, remained grounded in inadequate or inconclusive data.</p>

4	1	3	<p>. For example, Bell's widely cited work²¹ on China's political meritocracy draws on thin evidence: 'no data on examinations conducted as a condition of appointment or promotion [is given]... [just] a few lightly spliced data points are introduced about performance-based promotions and the examinations that officials routinely sit before promotion.'</p> <p>As a result, common problems include (a) overusing meritocratic discourse analysis to extrapolate practice, thereby underestimating the impact of rhetoric-behaviour gaps (b) bringing a priori biases that remain unmitigated due to data paucity (c) engaging in excessive theorizing divorced from on-the-ground conditions.</p> <p>. It is thus somewhat unsurprising that scholarship on China's meritocracy presents polarizing conclusions and possesses no unanimous consensus.</p> <p>Accordingly, its principle contributions rest on showing (a) the actualities and implications of post-2008 NOC meritocratic practice (b) meritocracy-related rhetoric-implementation disconnects (c) a generally more nuanced picture of China's contemporary meritocracy dynamics.</p> <p>To attain a more rigorous understanding of Chinese meritocracy, as practiced in NOCs, it is important to investigate the term up-close, from a theoretical and applied standpoint</p> <p>Thus, this section goes on to review meritocracy's (a) core interpretations within political philosophy scholarship (b) comprehension and practice in the Chinese context (c) optimum implementation as formulated in HRM studies.</p> <p>To this end, it must be stressed that meritocracy can be conceived in terms of processes and outcomes, and contention is present across each one of these dimensions.</p>
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4	1	19	
4	1	13	
4	1	19	
4	1	21	
4	1	23	

4	1	25	First, concerning processes, weak meritocracy is preoccupied with anti-discrimination in recruitment and selection, thus opposing ‘selecting against candidates for jobs. . . on grounds that are unrelated to their capacity to perform well in the relevant job or position.’
4	1	28	On the other hand, strong meritocracy is more geared to easing socio-economic inequalities as these can ‘leave some of society’s native talent underused.
4	1	31	Second, concerning outcomes, there is disagreement over what wider purpose meritocracy serves.
4	1	33	Others, however, see meritocracy’s purpose as producing ‘intelligent, morally informed. . . judgements’ or more inclusive outcomes.
4	1	35	Meanwhile, in the Chinese case, there is equal contention over meritocracy’s meaning and practice.
4	1	37	For example, Bell suggests that China’s political system centres on selecting ‘able and committed’ cadres ²⁸ and, right now, operates closer to a weak meritocracy.
4	1	38	Liu goes further and positions weak meritocracy as China’s society-wide governance principle, noting that ‘to justify the social inequality and to restore confidence,’ the Party is ‘promoting meritocracy’ and cultivating ‘a widespread belief in [it].’
4	rodapé	n 25	However, this is a restive, function-based view (often adopted by weak meritocracy proponents) that doesn’t consider issues such as who ‘will produce the best music, making us listeners better off’; [Michael Sandel, Justice: What’s the Right Thing to do? (London: Penguin Books, 2009), p. 188].
4	rodapé	n 27	Stuart White’s Equality notes on page 74 that strong meritocracy adherents ‘will want many of the most important social goods. . . to be taken out of the market sphere and provided to all on the basis of equality,’ and will tolerate just ‘some [overall] inequality of income and wealth.’

5	1	2	Tang argues this had some success: ‘examinations and greater competition have helped move China towards a more meritocratic system.’
5	1	4	This seems to complement strong meritocracy, at minimum, and Li’s notion that China’s governance includes, among other well-being ends, ‘social development.’
5	1	7	On this point, Liu, Song and Tao paint the Chinese system in more non-public interest, non-meritocratic outcome terms, noting cadres are ‘more responsive to the Party and to higher-level government policies than they are to local needs.’
5	1	15	This view assumes a weak meritocracy conception, in the manner Liu described, and predicts graduate recruitment based on performance rather than inclusivity concerns
5	1	17	Other scholars, however, stress the SOEs’ (at minimum) strong meritocracy dimension, noting that in ‘employment, welfare, environmental protection, and even public welfare activities, the government has monitored SOEs in recent years. . . [to promote] a harmonious society. . . SOEs [have] less autonomy to lay off workers. . . [and are] required to create job[s].’
5	1	25	Hence, some scholars see it as promoting anti-meritocratic political interests, rather than efficiency or equality ends as such.
5	1	30	Last, it is worth reviewing the optimum implementation of meritocracy as put forward by HRM scholarship.
5	1	32	Here, it is important to stress that such scholarship has, for the most part, adopted a performance-maximizing, semi-weak meritocracy standpoint.
5	rodapé	n 39	. Many studies and commentators note that diversity is performance-enhancing and so does not undercut (weak or strong) meritocracy per se.

5	rodapé	n 39	<p>. Katie Jacobs, ‘Diversity and meritocracy “go hand-in-hand”’, says Prudential CEO,’ HR Magazine, 8 October 2014, available at: http://www.hrmagazine.co.uk/article-details/diversity-and-meritocracy-go-hand-in-hand-says-prudential-ceo;</p> <p>David Rock and Heidi Grant, ‘Why Diverse Teams Are Smarter,’ Harvard Business Review, 4 November 2016, available at: https://hbr.org/2016/11/why-diverse-teams-are-smarter?referral=00563. From this perspective, NOCs can, at minimum, defer to selecting diverse applicants when their performance is comparable to others.</p>
6	1	33	<p>This paper uses mixed methods to examine NOCs’ conception of meritocracy, its practice in graduate recruitment and selection, and stakeholder impact. It draws on semi-structured interviews, corporate documents, NOC tests and a recruitment data set to generate more credible conclusions via source triangulation.</p>
8	1	28	<p>Throughout this time period, numerous domestic and international developments, with distinct implications on NOC meritocracy, arose and grew.</p>
8	1	30	<p>This section, then, proceeds to review recent NOC HRM rhetoric and its meritocratic-orientation.</p>
8	1	31	<p>Accordingly, the most apparent new phenomenon concerns the increase of meritocratic synonyms that NOCs use to describe their employment processes and outcomes.</p>
8	1	37	<p>Thus, since incorporating ‘fair’ as a recruitment and selection principle in 2011, PetroChina Sustainability Reports have enriched their subsequent, relevant discourse through stressing ‘democratic, open, competitive and merit-based [hiring practices]’.</p>

9	1	4	<p>The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, in a 2014 Guideline on Recruiting Graduate Students in SOEs, underscored the need to ‘ensure there is a fair selection process.’ Equally, a CNPC manager remarked, ‘ideally we want to hire people with better knowledge and according to meritocracy. . . . [Our practices] have changed a lot [recently]. . . . fairness has improved.</p>
9	1	6	<p>On a more fundamental note, this new rhetorical thrust adopts an Aristotelian weak meritocracy orientation.</p>
9	1	15	<p>These points, then, gesture at a narrow performancecentric corporate purpose that an Aristotelian weak meritocracy supports.</p>
9	1	16	<p>Moreover, the NOCs’ rhetoric proposes to strengthen meritocracy not via a proactive talent pool enhancement or untapped disadvantaged talent development, but rather via (a) improved capacity to recognize and assess top talent through a ‘focus on [applicant] disciplines’ and their ‘qualification’ (b) more ‘impartial,’ ‘open’ and non-discriminatory selection process. It is therefore clear that NOCs express an Aristotelian weak meritocracy preference.</p>
9	1	20	<p>It is therefore clear that NOCs express an Aristotelian weak meritocracy preference.</p>
9	1	25	<p>The NOCs’ recruitment phase has experienced certain meritocracy-enhancing changes.</p>
9	rodapé	n 65	<p>Word frequency counts of pertinent synonyms relating to recruitment and selection’s meritocratic processes (e.g. ‘open’ and ‘impartial’) and outcomes (e.g. ‘outstanding,’ and ‘top’ talent) were performed</p>
9	rodapé	n 69	<p>References to meritocracy in this section and the next (selection changes) concern the Aristotelian weak variant, unless otherwise specified.</p>
10	1	31	<p>All this seems to suggest that the NOCs’ reforms are in line with their meritocratic rhetoric.</p>

10	1	35	This draws attention to pre-restructure continuities and the NOCs' misdirected or incomplete commitment to weak meritocracy.
11	1	22	Consequently, this development is problematic as it undermines meritocracy, which rests on deepening and diversifying pre-selection participation to ensure the 'best' outcomes.
11	1	33	As a result, NOCs are losing some of their most potentially innovative employees. Meanwhile, the NOCs' growing top-tier university preference also counteracts the practice of strong meritocracy through advantaging graduates with well-endowed Bourdieu capitals.
12	1	3	Meanwhile, the restructure continues to erode strong meritocracy through a sharp reduction of annual graduate intake numbers.
12	1	18	Thus, in absolute number terms, the recruitment cuts had the toughest impact on graduates with weaker university backgrounds and capitals, who now face fewer NOC employment opportunities and an overcrowded graduate job market. It is clear, then, that the post-2008 NOC recruitment restructure, despite creating an outwardly open system, has favoured an elite graduate group at the expense of performance and strong meritocracy-driven inclusiveness.
12	1	23	Certain procedural changes introduced new meritocratic principles that were dampened via incomplete implementations, other transformations or persisting continuities.
12	1	37	These changes, therefore, seem to run in tandem with the NOCs' weak meritocracy selection rhetoric.
13	1	9	The NOCs have also implemented procedures that reduce non-meritocratic exploitation of their selection processes.
13	1	24	The restructure's meritocratic orientation, however, is not comprehensive

15	1	1	1	As a result, these Maoist discourses undermine the post-2008 meritocratic gains through diluting the NOCs' purpose and overvaluing a non-pertinent performance predictor.
15	1		33	Hence, post-2008 selection changes have not brought true (weak or strong) meritocracy or clear-cut, substantive performance maximization.
16	1		4	It is apparent, then, that NOCs are undergoing an uneven restructure process that is not matching their Aristotelian weak meritocracy rhetoric.
16	1		5	. This paper thus proceeds to underscore the post-2008 reforms' advantaged and marginalized stakeholders, and what this suggests of NOC meritocracy from, above all, a social equality standpoint.
16	1		9	This undercuts the practice of strong and, to a certain extent, weak meritocracy as these graduates can possess undeveloped or even actualized talent that is not being rewarded in NOC recruitment and selection.
17	1		5	This represents a flawed implementation of meritocracy or performance enhancement as (a) most untalented managers or senior employees remain unaffected and (b) NOCs are not making strong savings from retiring low paid workers, whose salary is, in some cases, as little as 1500 RMB per month.
17	1		18	Accordingly, it is clear that the NOCs' practice of meritocracy has not matched the rhetoric and neither delivered performance maximization nor inclusive development.
18	1		3	Consequently, it seems that post-2008 NOC meritocracy has primarily achieved elitism at the expense of maximizing other ends.
18	1		13	Indeed, NOCs interpreted fairness in terms of an Aristotelian weak meritocracy that discriminates according to Bourdieu's capitals, socio-structural barriers and natural endowments.
18	1		15	. Even so, despite improvements in various formal procedures, the NOCs have not achieved a performance-maximizing, weak meritocracy in their post-2008

				recruitment and selection.
18	1	22		This conclusion, then, introduces a more nuanced and surprising picture to pertinent scholarship's suggestion that China's meritocracy effectively serves particular interests, whether pro-public, political or performance.

Kuppens, T., Spears, R., Manstead, A. S.R., Spruyt, B., Easterbrook, M. J. (2018).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
1	1	9		Michael Young, in The rise of the meritocracy (1958), p. 106 Education, education, education British Prime Minister Tony Blair, on his three priorities ahead of the 1997 General Election
3	1	12		In a world where inequality and discrimination based on gender, race, and class are now less acceptable, emphasizing the meritocracy of education may still be an acceptable way to justify one's high status position.
3	1	34		Given the strong relation of education to income and unemployment in contemporary societies (a relation that has become stronger, see Featherman & Hauser, 1976; Grusky & DiPrete, 1990), the nature of educational differences might contribute to a meritocratic view of inequality.
3	1	46	Specifically, we predict that educational differences will be seen as more deserved than income or class differences, and thus high and low educated groups will be seen as more responsible for their respective outcomes than is merited (the “ultimate” attribution error), and this will also have consequences for the emotions felt towards those groups.	
10	1	13	Moreover, the increased importance of education for life outcomes may have led to an increased perception that existing socio-economic differences are based on merit.	
10	1	27		We expected the less educated to at least partly endorse this meritocratic view of academic achievement.

13	1	26	At a societal level, the increased importance of education (Grusky & DiPrete, 1990) and the suggestion that education is a universal social problem solver (Depaepe & Smeyers, 2008) may increase the risk that groups with low levels of socio-economic status will be especially negatively evaluated while strengthening the ideology of meritocracy.
13	1	27	We investigate this idea more directly in Study 7, where we include measures of meritocratic ideology.
13	1	45	We added measures of meritocratic ideology in order to investigate the extent to which the results of Study 6 reflect ideological beliefs about inequality.
13	1	47	. Measuring meritocratic ideology enables us to relate ideological beliefs to processes of attribution and emotions regarding the less educated.
13	1	49	Because those who believe in meritocracy assume that people get what they deserve, we expected that meritocracy beliefs would be related positively to judgments of responsibility and blameworthiness, and negatively to perceptions of unfairness and deservingness of help.
13	2	8	Similarly, believing that your own educational achievement was mainly due to hard work is likely to be related to meritocratic ideology and to judgments of responsibility for educational outcomes
13	2	36	. Finally, participants completed the meritocracy scales and responded to questions about their own educational career.
14	1	6	Because the three measures correlated highly (all $r_s > 0.67$), we constructed a single meritocracy scale ($\alpha = 0.88$).
15	1	51	As expected, meritocracy beliefs were strongly related to attributions of responsibility ($r = 0.47$, $p < .001$) and blameworthiness ($r = 0.48$, $p < .001$) in relation to the less educated, and this was the case regardless of participants' own educational group.

15	1	54	Meritocracy beliefs were related to a similar degree to attributions of responsibility and blameworthiness for the other four disadvantaged groups (see Table S10 in the Supplemental material).
15	1	58	This is consistent with the fact that meritocratic beliefs include beliefs that people deserve their own outcomes.
15	1	60	Meritocracy beliefs were also moderately negatively related to judgments of unfair treatment ($r = -0.34$, $p < .001$), suffering ($r = -0.21$, $p < .001$), and deservingness of help ($r = -0.35$, $p < .001$) in relation to the less educated, and this was similar when working class people and obese people were the target group.
15	1	67	However, these relations were stronger in relation to Black people (all r s > 0.53 , see Tables S11–S12 in the Supplemental material). With respect to emotions, meritocracy beliefs were related to less sympathy ($r = -0.23$, $p < .001$) and less pity ($r = -0.19$, $p = .001$) towards the less educated.
15	1	72	Thus, apart from the responsibility and blameworthiness ratings, meritocracy beliefs were especially related to attributions, emotions, and liking with regard to Black people compared to the three other disadvantaged groups we investigated.
15	2	9	Meritocracy beliefs were also related to internal attributions for participants' own achievement, $r = 0.31$, $p < .001$, but not to difficulty of own achievement, $r = 0.10$, $p = .11$.
15	2	28	None of the above relations regarding meritocracy beliefs, participants' own educational achievement, and self-reported education bias were moderated by participant education.
16	1	10	Meritocracy beliefs were strongly related to making internal attributions for the situation of disadvantaged groups, including less educated people.
16	1	14	Given that the less educated are seen as particularly blameworthy for their own situation, this suggests a link between the ideology of meritocracy and people's opinions about educational

					inequality
17	1	10			Michael Young (1958) (sarcastically) coined the term 'meritocracy' to refer to a dystopian future society in which power and status was believed to fairly reflect differences in intelligence and education.
17	1	15			Our evidence suggests that his warning was correct. Ironically, his term 'meritocracy' is now generally used in an uncritically positive way (Young, 2001).
17	1	29		This means that negative attitudes towards the less educated cannot be justified in terms of the greater merit of those with higher education.	

Lim, L., & Tan, M. (2018).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
2	1	3	Ideas about merit and the associated notion of a meritocracy have for long been drawn upon to frame and understand a range of issues central to education policy.	
2	1	17		However, even as these studies have yielded a number of macro policy insights, they have largely assumed that meritocracy as a discourse comprises an essentially coherent set of ideas and principles that may be practiced, pursued or refused.
3	1	1		Thus, for example, at various points the literature refers to meritocracy as a 'positive ideal', one 'against which we measure the justice of our institutions' (Allen, 2011, p. 367); at other points the trappings of meritocracy are laid bare and scholars warn of the 'racial project' that it is and the dystopia it really represents (Au, 2016, p. 39; see also Young, 1958).
3	1	6		To be sure, what has been ignored is how, as an idea that is intuitively appealing but 'essentially underdefined' (Sen, 2000, p. 5), the concept of meritocracy is itself unstable and contains inherent contradictions.
3	1	8		Consequently, these studies have paid little attention to how in practice and through the workings of policy, meritocracy functions as an ideology that is negotiated, even struggled over as various social actors attempt to forge an unavoidably contradictory consensus on what it means, how it is beneficial, and for whom.

3	1	14	<p>Adopting an analytic focus on classroom pedagogic practices, the article explores the ways in which, in an ostensibly meritocratic education system, ideas about culture and its relevance for teaching are interpreted, negotiated, and ultimately drawn upon to engage students in the system's low-progress academic tracks.</p> <p>A self-professed meritocracy, the state's education policies have for long remained silent on the role of culture in students' learning and its relation to the systemic underachievement of various social groups.</p> <p>. Indeed, official discourses have consistently appealed to meritocracy's emphasis on non-discrimination (especially in terms of ethnic differences) as being fundamental to the establishment of a level-playing field in the education system.</p> <p>The findings suggest that in actively if sometimes unconsciously foregrounding a cultural dimension in their teaching, the teachers are resisting, even challenging meritocracy's principle of non-discrimination.</p> <p>Indeed, to the extent that the state's 'charade of meritocracy' (Barr, 2006) evacuates a concerted focus at a politics of difference, the article argues that these teachers are engaged in what the political theorist Nancy Fraser (1997, 2003) calls struggles over recognition and redistribution.</p> <p>In this paper we explore the ways in which Fraser's ideas become critical in understanding the tensions and contradictions of meritocracy, and how these are worked out by teachers in the spaces of their classrooms.</p>
3	1	18	
3	1	21	
3	1	30	
3	1	31	
3	1	37	

3	1	39		<p>The article begins by first elaborating on how meritocracy features as both policy and ideology in Singapore – the exigencies it responds to, the contradictions it embodies, and how it shapes broader considerations of ability and pedagogy.</p> <p>There is a wealth of scholarship that critically examines the ways in which meritocracy extends our understandings of equality of educational opportunity and how such ideals may be or have been pursued in practice</p> <p>Central to these discussions is the idea that meritocracy involves the rewarding of individual merit with social rank, job positions, higher incomes, general recognition and prestige, and, in the education system, greater educational resources.</p>
3	1	45		
4	1	2		
4	1	4	<p>As Swift (2003, p. 24) notes, ‘people with the same level of merit – IQ plus effort – should have the same chance of success’. By thus focusing on ‘careers open to talents’ (Rawls, 1971, p. 65), meritocracy signals merit as the rule or principle that governs how limited resources and rewards in a society are to be distributed.</p>	
4	1	8		<p>This ensemble of ideas central to discussions of meritocracy, however, remains open to a number of interpretations – most notably between those that focus on fairness and those that focus on outcomes – and tensions (Cavanagh, 2002).</p>
4	1	11	<p>For example, egalitarian approaches (that focus on fairness) usually couple a merit-based selection with a principle of non-discrimination: individuals should be selected based only on their talents and qualifications for the position and not their race, class or gender (Satz, 2007).</p>	

4	1	23		Here, what matters is for meritocracy to serve as a mechanism for resource allocation, identifying individuals who have the right qualities that positions (of leadership) require.
4	1	25		Such understandings of meritocracy often involve motivating individuals to do the best they can because, as the view goes, it is only through a fierce competition for educational resources and later material rewards that human talents may be developed to their fullest potential (Tan, 2008).
4	1	31		Given, however, the ways in which the economic and cultural capital of one generation find their way into the educational capital of the next (Bourdieu, 1984; Lareau, 2003), this focus on outcomes, efficiency and competition can easily displace the egalitarian aspects of meritocracy discussed earlier.
4	1	32		These tensions inherent in the concept of meritocracy are aptly witnessed in Singapore.
4	1	35		A tiny city-state with a population of 6 million composed of 74% ethnic Chinese, 13% ethnic Malays and 9% ethnic Indians (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2016), meritocracy has been a key principle of governance and educational distribution.
4	1	39	This is most visibly embodied in its highly competitive education system culminating in 'bonded' government scholarships and where top positions in the civil service administration and political leadership are staffed by individuals with demonstrated track records of merit (Barr & Skrbis, 2008).	
4	1	40		In Singapore, the state's discourse and practice of meritocracy has invariably emphasized the principle of non-discrimination (Mauzy & Milne, 2002).

4	1	46		However, as commentators have recently pointed out, over time, a categorical good faith in non-discrimination risks giving meritocracy the veneer of equality while at the same time masking the real advantages and disadvantages across social groups.
5	1	3		In Rahim's (1998) words, '[t]he rhetoric that Singapore is a meritocratic society where equal opportunities are available to all has also served to add legitimacy to the [view] that [minority] Malays have not been able to make it in a meritocratic society because they have not worked hard enough and thus have only themselves to blame'
5	1	8		Indeed, in a context characterized by high levels of competition and, as we explain later, a highly stratified education system, appeals to meritocracy can be made to legitimize an unequal distribution of resources both within and beyond the education system
5	1	15		Thus, as Tan (2008, p. 9) observes in the case of Singapore, in practice meritocracy often translates into 'an ideology of inequality', a widely accepted belief about the 'value' of inequality, held to be in the public interest, but mainly serving the interests of dominant social groups, a fact that the belief actively obfuscates.
6	1	6		However, as the next section argues, they remain framed by dominant discourses of meritocracy, in particular, their assumptions of what counts as merit and ability.
6	1	13	Indeed, even as academic achievement by students in Singapore continues to be indexed by an individual's ethnic and class backgrounds, much of the above measures remain underpinned by an essentialist view of merit	

6	1	13	Here merit, or more specifically the ability it is often indexed by, is seen as innate, objective and fixed – independent of a host of factors such as family upbringing, social connections and cultural capital and experiences that McNamee and Miller (2004) and others identify as key enablers of social success.	
6	1	31		In all this it would seem that the state's meritocratic ideology and in particular the emphasis on non-discrimination constrains policy efforts at developing a discourse of difference, and elaborating on how that difference – racial/ethnic, religious customs, linguistic, class, etc. – both provides motivation for students and also accounts for the unique challenges they face in school.
7	1	13		To the extent then, that in Singapore the state's discourses of meritocracy have evacuated a concerted focus at a politics of difference, official pronouncements of what constitutes students' needs continue to locate the problem within students themselves.
7	1	15	Not unlike notions of ability and merit, these accounts of needs remain highly individuated and psychologized, invariably taking the form of a trait or series of traits belonging to the student (such as motivation, effort or self-esteem) while ignoring how these may in turn be structurally related to the family environment and culturally mediated by diverse backgrounds and experiences (Clycq, Nouwen, & Vandenbroucke, 2014; McLaren, 1989)	
7	1	25		Given the above silence over how such differences need to be accounted for and considered in teaching, we turn to explore how ideas about culture and its relevance for pedagogy are interpreted, negotiated and drawn upon by a group of Singapore teachers in ways that both attempt to grapple with the state's discourses of meritocracy and

				at the same time challenge them.
8	1	24		Nevertheless, these differences were undergirded by similar views of what constituted students' abilities, views that both informed their pedagogical approaches but also challenged key assumptions within the state's discourse of meritocracy.
8	1	25	Rather than a fixed, stable trait or quality that could be identified through established measures of merit, the teachers spoke instead of their students' abilities as malleable, requiring drawing out, and as arising only out of appropriate and relevant forms of engagement.	
9	1	18		While most teachers everywhere would agree that it is important to provide additional and differentiated support for these students, worth pointing out is that in Singapore the state's manifest discourses of meritocracy and non-discrimination have neglected a critical conversation around how such support needs to be related to wider social and cultural differences.
13	1	5		While some of the above practices may simply represent examples of 'good teaching' (Ladson-Billings, 1995), taken together they provide a sense of how in Singapore ideas around meritocracy reflect deep contradictions and continue to be negotiated and contested by teachers.
13	1	6		As pointed out earlier, official discourses around meritocracy have sidelined critical conversations around the ways in which curriculum and pedagogy need to be related to wider social and cultural differences.

13	1	10	Working both with and against official discourses, the teachers in this study frequently drew upon dominant notions of ability and merit, even as they often offered alternative, critical accounts of these.	
13	1	35		It may thus be that under conditions of meritocracy, these curriculum fields in low-progress tracks function critically as sites of possibility.
13	1	37		In concluding, then, this article encourages future critical studies of meritocracy to go beyond macro policy debates of educational governance, administration and resource allocation.
13	1	40		As the foregoing discussion shows, a much-needed focus centres on how policies and ideologies around meritocracy become taken up and instantiated in the quotidian aspects of schools – pedagogic relations in the classroom, students’ experiences with the curriculum, the differentiation and stratification of knowledge, roles and opportunities – and the tensions and contradictions these create (Lim 2016b).
13	1	44		Indeed, in the case of Singapore, meritocracy is not just a set of abstract ideals or a theory of distribution of resources.
13	1	45		As a pervasive social, political and moralizing discourse, meritocracy specifies more than who learns what.
13	1	46	Dominant ideas about what counts as merit and ability feed into constructions of who the ‘who’ is, and these function in powerful ways to shape how schools and teachers teach in the ways they do, and what (which) students ‘deserve’.	
14	1	3		In thus establishing differences in social expectations and access, meritocratic ideologies often legitimize and revivify the unequal roles and relations in society, effectively introducing and deepening in schools and classrooms the social cleavages meritocracy ostensibly works to

				level (Lim & Apple 2015)
14	1	10		To be sure, such directions may not completely assuage concerns of meritocracy as an ‘ideology of inequality’.
14	rodapé	n 1		Here, we focus on elaborating upon how ideas about meritocracy relate to and are framed by these broader considerations of equality.
14	rodapé	n 2	See Guinier (2015) for the need to redefine merit in ways that go beyond standardized tests and that instead foreground the collaborative and deliberative nature of leadership in democracies.	
14	rodapé	n 4		Most recently, in what appears to be an indirect admission of the inadequacies of meritocracy, the government has begun to provide early support for young children from low-income families through various community, home-based and pre-school channels

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
1	1	2		Universities present themselves as meritocratic
1	1	2		. In Scully's (1997: 413) terms a meritocratic system is a social system in which merit or talent is the basis for sorting people into positions and distributing rewards.
1	1	4	s. Implicit in this is the idea that merit is unambiguous and that rewards accrue to individuals based on it (Nielsen, 2016).	
1	1	5	The objective assessment of merit is seen as particularly important in public universities in the context of issues related to public accountability and transparency.	
1	1	7		Van den Brink and Benschop (2012: 508) point out that meritocracy in universities is reflected in the concept of excellence, which encourages the highest level of academic achievement and has become the 'holy grail' of the university.
2	1	1		However, studies focused on gender, race or class inequalities increasingly question that supposed meritocracy (Nielsen, 2016; O'Connor and O'Hagan, 2016; van Den Brink and Benschop, 2012).
2	1	2		Indeed, Nielsen (2016) argues that meritocracy is little more than a 'rationalized myth'.
2	1	19		There is a tension between the depiction of universities as unambiguously objective and meritocratic (i.e. the bureaucratic model) or as characterized by competing groups (i.e. the political model).
4	1	39		The Irish and Spanish case study universities are characterized by two contrasting management systems but principles related to transparency, equality and merit are assumed to underpin appointments/promotions in both contexts.

7	1	31	We all need opportunities. Anyone who says they have achieved something for themselves, I think they are deceiving themselves. Of course you need your effort, and the merits are yours, but everybody needs opportunities. (ES, woman, 03)	
10	1	26		Because universities are associated with meritocracy, we assume that selection processes are not influenced by the personal characteristics of the candidates.
12	1	46	I know women who could be full professors on the basis of their merits and I think they are not [professors] simply because when they had to choose, they chose the man. (ES, women, 03)	
13	1	1	Similarly, Irish women referred to men with less merit being promoted over women, and said that women had to work harder and longer to achieve success: women will say that.	
13	1	13	Men in the Spanish context referred more openly than their Irish counterparts to such practices, arguably reflecting the strength of discourses other than merit in that context	
13	1	18	When we think of a university, we think of an institution that seeks to recruit the most qualified staff through purely objective processes: one where objectively assessed academic merit takes precedence, as in the bureaucratic model.	
13	1	21		However, the interviewees in the Irish and Spanish universities perceived that micropolitical practices based on non-meritocratic criteria are used to benefit some candidates over others – a reflection of the political model.
13	1	42	This could be a reflection of the fact that factors other than merit (and particularly ‘in-breeding’) are more acceptable in the Spanish context.	

14	1	6	In this article we have highlighted (perceived) practices unrelated to the objective assessment of merit in two very different university systems: the Irish managerial and the Spanish collegial one.	
14	1	10	The informal structure of the university is thus perceived as having an impact on its formal structure, violating the principles of equality, transparency and merit ostensibly pursued by universities.	
14	1	20		Practices that violate meritocracy cannot be accepted in organizations that aspire to excellence.

Pettit, H. (2018).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
1049	1	16		I argue that Cairo's global city affects structurally excluded men with a powerful feeling of meritocratic hope that belonging is achievable.
1051	1	34		Across the urban global South, there are attempts by policymakers, development practitioners and the private sector to promote entrepreneurialism, and
1057	1	21		construct modern, meritocratic labour markets (Pow, 2002). This rested on the city discursively opening itself up as reachable, through extending a meritocratic fantasy.
1057	1	29		The government, development organizations, and recruitment and training companies are attempting to construct a 'modern', meritocratic labour market and remove the infamous problem of 'wasta' (nepotism), and prejudicial notions of where people belong.
1058	1	17		These conversations reveal the existence and reproduction of a meritocratic discursive terrain within Cairo's global city—in this case its entrepreneurship scene—that posits that reaching its employment and lifestyles is dependent upon the autonomous individual, upon attitude rather than inherited privilege.
1058	1	29		Entrepreneurial and meritocratic discourses have been much critiqued for legitimizing the reproduction of privilege, placing blame on an 'undeserving poor' and masking inequalities (Khan, 2012; Littler, 2013).
1058	1	34		However, meritocracy also has important 'affects' on those pursuing privilege, because of its hopeful quality.
1060	1	8		A consequence of the meritocratic discursive terrain was the emergence of moral hierarchies between those exercising behaviours of success, and those who

					refused.
1061	1	47			Ibrahim had penetrated the meritocratic myth.
1061	1	6			Ibrahim was actively returning to the meritocratic promise he had come to know as false just a few weeks previously.
1061	1	23			She argues, in the context of the American poor, people form an optimistic attachment to a 'cluster of promises'—intimacy, dieting, voting, a belief in meritocracy—that define the pillars of liberal-democratic ideas of the good life.
1061	1	34			It is the product of an urban-capitalist formation that promises a fulfilling future to all through extending a meritocratic myth, yet delivers precarity and stagnation to many as a result of structural inequalities.
1061	1	36			In the absence of alternatives, people experiencing class immobility rely on a form of meritocratic hope which makes accessing a dignified life more and more difficult, even if it shows itself to be harmful.

Fiske, S. (2019).

Página	Coluna	Linha	Mérito/merit	Meritocracia/meritocracy
1	2	19		These dimensions also differentiate socialclass stereotypes, in support of meritocracy beliefs.
2	1	18		This section applies them to political cognition starting with candidate images, their dimensional tradeoffs, and the role of ideology in this; then the analysis applies to groups in society, viewed through the lens of meritocracy; finally, it focuses on mutual stereotypes of social class.
3	2	16		Societies use class stereotypes to justify inequality as meritocratic (that is, groups' SES ranks follow from their competence; Fiske & Durante, 2016).
3	2	20		. Lower-SES are stereotypically incompetent, so low status is deserved (meritocracy again).
3	2	43		Buying into this tradeoff avoids conflict, allowing each side a favorable dimension, but not upsetting the status = competence link that fits meritocratic beliefs.
6	2	14		People do not support the system if they believe that ordinary people do not get a fair break: for example, if there is no mobility (no meritocracy, or not a just world).
6	2	16		A low social-mobility frame reliably reduced people's endorsement of (typically strong) meritocratic and just-world beliefs, which in turn explained lower system defense (Day & Fiske, 2017).